Resisting Reconciliation: State Power and Everyday Life in Post-Genocide Rwanda

by

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Dedication

For Alison Des Forges, an extraordinary presence whose courageous voice dared to speak truth to power. May we all be as forthright and fair in our own analyses.
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Abstract

This dissertation is a political ethnography of state-society relations in post-genocide Rwanda. It challenges much of the conventional post-genocide literature which focuses on the behaviour and practices of urban élites, provides a top-down perspective on the socio-political climate in contemporary Rwanda and treats the regime of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as a unitary actor in its efforts to promote “one Rwanda for all Rwandans” in the name of national unity and reconciliation. The dissertation employs the concept of everyday resistance to identify and analyse the power relations between ordinary people and the Rwandan state, to show how individuals are positioned in relation to state power, and how this positioning affects their life chances in the post-genocide order.

The dissertation argues that the programme of national unity and reconciliation constitutes a mechanism of state power that presents a self-serving version of history and manipulates the language of ethnicity to justify and maintain policies of exclusion in much the same way as previous regimes in Rwanda have done. In the name of national unity and reconciliation, the RPF maintains tight control over the socio-political landscape with myriad negative consequences for ordinary peasant Rwandans at the lowest rungs of society. Specifically, the dissertation finds that the programme of national unity and reconciliation is at odds with their interests as peasants since its aims do not accord with the exigencies of everyday rural life. Indeed, many ordinary Rwandans trace the illegitimacy of the programme of national unity and reconciliation to the mediating role that local officials play in its implementation, a finding which challenges the RPF’s assertions to western donors and journalists that its post-genocide policies enjoy broad-based grassroots support.

The dissertation argues that Rwanda’s rigid socio-political hierarchy limits the ability of ordinary Rwandans to reconcile with one another. It also argues that the programme of national unity further limits their willingness to reconcile with neighbours and friends. It opens up avenues of future research both in Rwanda and other African societies, where layered domination is commonplace and is legitimated through practices of coercive compliance.
## List of Abbreviations Used

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<td>APROSOMA</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACORD</td>
<td>Association de Coopération et de Recherche pour le Développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADL</td>
<td>Association Rwandaise pour la Défense des Droits de la Personne et des Libertés Publiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo/Zaïre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France Presse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>Avocats sans frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAURWA</td>
<td>Communauté des Autochtones Rwandais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Coalition pour la défense de la république</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGC</td>
<td>Centre de Gestion des Conflits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNS</td>
<td>Commission Nationale de Synthèse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPORWA</td>
<td>Communauté des Potiers Rwandais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPJ</td>
<td>Committee to Protect Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Forces Armées Rwandaises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARG</td>
<td>Fonds d’Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIDH</td>
<td>International Federation for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRC</td>
<td>Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTR</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDRP</td>
<td>Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace</td>
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</table>
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IRIN  Integrated Regional Information Network
LCC  Legal and Constitutional Commission
LDF  Local Defense Force
LGDL  *Ligue des droits de la personne dans la région des grands lacs*
LIPRODHOR  *Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la défense des droits de l'homme*
MDR  *Mouvement Démocratique Rwandais*
MIGEPROF  Ministry of Gender and Women in Development
MIJESPOC  Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports
MINAFET  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MINALOC  Ministry of Local Government, Good Governance, Community Development and Social Affairs
MINECOFIN  Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MINIJUST  Ministry of Justice
MINIRENA  Ministry of Lands, Environment, Forestry, Water and Natural Resources
MRND  *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement*
MRND(D)  *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement et la Démocratie*
MSF  *Médecins sans frontières*
MSM  *Mouvement Social Muhutu*
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NRA  National Resistance Army
NRM  National Resistance Movement
NSGJ  National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions
NURC  National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ORTPN  *Office Rwandaise du tourisme et des parcs nationaux*
PADE  *Parti Démocratique*
PARMEHUTU  *Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu*
PCD  *Parti Chrétien démocrate*
PDI  *Parti Démocratique Islamique*
PL  *Parti Liberal*
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>PPJR</td>
<td>Parti Progressiste de la Jeunesse Rwandaise</td>
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<td>PRI</td>
<td>Prison Reform International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Parti Social Démocrate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSR</td>
<td>Parti Socialiste Rwandaise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADER</td>
<td>Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>RSF</td>
<td>Reporters sans frontières</td>
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<td>RTD</td>
<td>Rassemblement Travailliste pour la Démocratie</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTLM</td>
<td>Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHRC</td>
<td>Rwanda Human Rights Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIEPA</td>
<td>Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIG</td>
<td>Travaux d’intérêt général</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDPR</td>
<td>Union Démocratique du Peuple Rwandais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCS</td>
<td>United Nations Centre for Human Settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHRFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Human Rights Mission for Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAR</td>
<td>Union Nationale Rwandaise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNU</td>
<td>United Nations University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCRI</td>
<td>United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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# Glossary

## French Words

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<td>Association for the Social Promotion of the Masses</td>
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<tr>
<td>Association de Coopération et de Recherche pour le Développement</td>
<td>Association of Cooperation and Research for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association Rwandaise pour la Défense des Droits de la Personne et des Libertés Publiques</td>
<td>Rwandan Association for the Defense of Human Rights and Public Liberties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo/Zaïre</td>
<td>Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaïre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agence France Presse</td>
<td>French Press Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avocats sans frontières</td>
<td>Lawyers without Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cachot</td>
<td>Local detention centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communauté des Autochtones Rwandais</td>
<td>Community of Indigenous People of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conseil Supérieur</td>
<td>High Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition pour la défense de la république</td>
<td>Coalition for the Defence of the Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre de Gestion des Conflits</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Universitaire de Santé Mentale</td>
<td>University Centre for Mental Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission Nationale de Synthèse</td>
<td>National Synthesis Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communauté des Potiers Rwandais</td>
<td>Community of Rwandan Potters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces Armées Rwandaises</td>
<td>Rwandan Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fonds d’Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide</td>
<td>Genocide Survivors’ Assistance Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fonctionnaire</td>
<td>Public servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendarmes</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Génocidaires</td>
<td>Individuals accused of acts of genocide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ligue des droits de la personne dans la région des grands lacs</td>
<td>League for the Promotion of Human Rights in the Great Lakes Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la défense des droits de l’homme</td>
<td>Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights</td>
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<td>Mouvement Démocratique Rwandais</td>
<td>Rwandan Democratic Movement</td>
</tr>
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<td>French Name</td>
<td>English Translation</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement</td>
<td>National Revolutionary Movement for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement et la Démocratie</td>
<td>National Revolutionary Movement for Development and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Médecins sans frontières</td>
<td>Doctors without Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouvement Social Muhutu</td>
<td>Muhutu Social Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Rwandaise du tourisme et des parcs nationaux</td>
<td>Office of Rwandan Tourism and National Parks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Démocratique</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu</td>
<td>Party of the Movement for Hutu Emancipation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Chrétien démocrate</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Démocratique Islamique</td>
<td>Democratic Islam Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Liberal</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Progressiste de la Jeunesse Rwandaise</td>
<td>Progressive Party of Rwandan Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Social Démocrate</td>
<td>Social Democrat Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Socialiste Rwandais</td>
<td>Rwandan Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pères Blancs</td>
<td>White Fathers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporters sans frontières</td>
<td>Reporters without Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rassemblement Travailliste pour la Démocratie</td>
<td>Workers’ Assembly for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais</td>
<td>Democratic Assembly of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines</td>
<td>Thousand Hills Free Radio-Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Réseau de Citoyens</td>
<td>Citizens’ Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>travaux d’intérêt général</td>
<td>Works in the public interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tigistes</td>
<td>Individuals who perform work in the public interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Démocratique du Peuple Rwandais</td>
<td>Democratic Union of the Rwandan People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Nationale Rwandaise</td>
<td>Rwandan National Union</td>
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### Kinyarwanda Words

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<th><strong>Translation and Notes</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>abacengezi</td>
<td>derogatory term for RPF infiltrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abahinza</td>
<td>persons with ritual importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abiru</td>
<td>official interpreters of history and culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abunzi</td>
<td>dispute mediators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abakagurambaga</td>
<td>peace volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>akazu</td>
<td>literally, little hut. Used to refer to the inner circle of political power under Habyarimana before the genocide and President Kagame’s inner circle since 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ashwi</td>
<td>emphatic no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bakiga</td>
<td>people from the Kiga region in pre-colonial northern Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banyamulenge</td>
<td>people from the Mulenge hills in southern Kivu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banyarwanda</td>
<td>people of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ceceka</td>
<td>shut up or be quiet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cyane</td>
<td>emphatic yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demokrasi</td>
<td>democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gacaca</td>
<td>traditionally, the spot where local-level dispute resolution takes place (lit. lawn or grass); the post-genocide meaning is neotraditional community-based courts that are outside the formal judicial system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ibiteekerezo</td>
<td>official oral histories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ibyitso</td>
<td>accomplices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ibirongozi</td>
<td>pre-colonial local administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>icyihebe (ibyihebe, pl.)</td>
<td>fearless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>igipinga (ibipinga, pl.)</td>
<td>people with deep-rooted principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imana</td>
<td>God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imidugudu (umudugudu, pl.)</td>
<td>Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ingando</td>
<td>re-education camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interahamwe</td>
<td>those who work together (youth wing of the MRND)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inyangamugayo</td>
<td>title given to gacaca judges (lit. those who detest disgrace)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>inyenzi</strong></td>
<td>cockroach (to identify Tutsi infiltrators in 1960 and again in 1990s)</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>inzu</strong></td>
<td>house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>impuzamugambi</strong></td>
<td>those with a single goal (youth wing of the CDR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>isambu</strong></td>
<td>land owned by hill chiefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>mabati</strong></td>
<td>iron roof sheeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>mayibobo</strong></td>
<td>homeless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>mwami</strong></td>
<td>king</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>oya</strong></td>
<td>no</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>panga</strong></td>
<td>machete</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>shebuja</strong></td>
<td>patron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ubuhake</strong></td>
<td>traditional system of vassalage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ubukonde</strong></td>
<td>practice of acquiring land through sweat equity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ubureetwa</strong></td>
<td>manual labour in the service of Tutsi chiefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ubutabera</strong></td>
<td>justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ubwoko</strong></td>
<td>ethnicity (or clan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ubwiyunge</strong></td>
<td>reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>umuganda</strong></td>
<td>community work</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>umugaraguc</strong></td>
<td>client</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>umuhakwa</strong></td>
<td>servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>umuheto</strong></td>
<td>clientship practice based in reciprocal alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>umukuru w’umuryango</strong></td>
<td>head of a lineage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>umuryango</strong></td>
<td>lineage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>umusazi (abasazi, pl.)</strong></td>
<td>foolish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ukuri</strong></td>
<td>truth</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>yee</strong></td>
<td>yes</td>
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Acknowledgments

This dissertation almost didn’t get written – for a variety of reasons. First, when I imagined my career back at the end of my Master’s degree in 1992, I was distracted by Africa. I wasn’t ready to return to my hometown in Nova Scotia and certainly wasn’t keen on the desk jobs my friends were choosing. I wanted to go abroad, and experience a part of the world that was rarely discussed in the lecture hall, but featured frequently on the evening news. The first Iraq war was raging at the time, and I was glued to CNN most evenings. Africa, with its wars, ethnic conflicts and famines, captured my imagination. I eventually opted for a career with the United Nations in East Africa. The civil war in Somalia was underway, and my first posting was supposed to be as a “Nation-Building Officer” with the United Nations Mission to Somalia starting in June 1993. The UN didn’t have the slightest clue about what was actually going on at the local level so the mission ended shortly after 23 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed in July 1993. I took one lesson away from my three-week stint in the field: local knowledge matters.

My first actual posting with the UN was with the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) in Kenya where I worked with its women’s programme. I was seconded to cyclone-ravaged Madagascar in September 1993. I was supposed to monitor the gender dynamics of food distribution for 10 months, but only lasted about 3 months. The monitoring of the food distribution took place in rural communities, sometimes as far as 25 kilometres off the main road. Madagascar has a rudimentary road network, and there is only one paved link between Antananarivo (the capital) and Tamatave (an eastern port city). Repeated cyclones in late 1993 washed the road way in
many spots, and travelling the 300 kilometres between the two cities could take up to 12 hours in a 4x4 that ferried me back and forth between “the office” (the UN office in Tamatave) and “the field”. Every morning, I would be dropped off, with my translator, to trek from the main road back to the communities where I would spend my days monitoring food distributions organised by the UNHCR and international NGOs. My mission was cut short when I witnessed a murder. It was a surreal event, and one that I struggled to make sense of for a long time.

One afternoon, we finished up early, and had walked back to the pick-up spot on the main road about two hours early. My translator lived in a nearby community and left me there to wait for my lift back to the office. I sat up on an outcrop of volcanic rock that characterised much of the landscape, and watched the comings-and-goings of foot traffic, moto bikes, private vehicles and the UN pick-ups and 4x4s that all vied for space on the narrow, muddy main route which was basically a strip of cavernous potholes. There was a three-part funeral procession walking along the side of the road. The younger men and relatives of the deceased walked up front, where the shrouded body was carried in a burlap stretcher on the shoulders of six or eight men. Most of the population of the community walked behind, with children, dogs and goats bringing up the rear. Suddenly there was a thud, and then loud wailing and incessant screeching. The driver of the Renault 4 had hit a boy at the back of the procession and it looked like he was badly injured. The pallbearers dropped the body, and ran back to confront the driver. He stepped away from the car, and crossed his wrists as he stretched out his arms towards the approaching group. No one seemed to be attending to the boy who had been hit by his car. Soon, I was off my perch and looking for safety. I was scared because the
pallbearers began to disjoint the driver. He yelped, and the crowd seemed to cheer. I saw his arm fall to the ground. His death ended with decapitation.

It was well past sunset before my driver appeared, three hours late, as I sat in the dark waiting for him to arrive. I had been in Africa for less than a year, and interpreted the killing through my own cultural lens. Obviously, what I had just seen was murder. But was it? It was so controlled, so methodical. All the parties to the event seemed to have a defined role. Why would the driver get out of his vehicle and offer himself with outstretched arms? Why did the rest of the community cheer? What about the boy? I remained at the office for the next few days, in a state of shock and unable to articulate my feelings. It took me three days to tell my boss what I’d seen. He was blasé about it. “Oh, OK. Um, you know that is how they solve problems between themselves. The driver probably gave himself up.” I was dumbfounded. When I expressed my disbelief, he continued, “Yes, what you witnessed is nothing unusual. The tribes around here operate in an-eye-for-an-eye way. The boy got killed, so the driver gave himself up to avoid turmoil between his tribe and the other one.” This made some sense to me, vulnerable and shaken as I was from my experience. Eventually, I broke down, unable to function in this remote area in a high stress position. I was medically evacuated to Sweden where I underwent a period of “decompression” to help me process the experience.

Following almost four months of rest and recuperation, I had to undertake a “trial” mission, just a short two or three week mission back to “Africa” to determine my fitness to continue working with the UN in Nairobi. I was given two choices: Malawi or Rwanda. I chose Rwanda, as only a 25-year-old could, because of its proximity to my
residence in Kenya – it was one less flight to Nairobi than Lilongwe and I was anxious to
get “home” after an extended visit in Sweden. I arrived in Rwanda on 26 March 1994, to
follow a team from UNDP on their assessment of a women’s cooperative in Gitarama.
The mission was to end 13 April 1994. When I landed in Kigali, there was an obvious
military presence. But I had not been briefed on the political situation, and didn’t think
much of the armed vehicles and the 50-men troop patrols that walked the city. I hopped
into another white UN 4x4 and was taken to the office, where I met my team leader and
was briefed on what we would be doing in and around Gitarama, approximately 45
kilometres southwest of Kigali. What struck me most during our meetings with the local
coco-ops the UN was funding were the inequalities between the local representatives and
the broader membership. The leaders were clearly economic and social élites, given their
covered shoes, stylish outfits, well-coiffed hairstyles, and perfect French. Ordinary
women were usually barefoot, spoke only Kinyarwanda, had threadbare clothes, and had
a brood of children in tow. We never spoke to them, although they were always present.
I asked a few times during our interviews if we could speak to our “beneficiaries”, but
our hosts always replied with a polite “no, they have nothing to say they are poor, you
see. Our job is to take care of them for the development of the country”. I knew nothing
at the time about the development initiatives of President Habyarimana, which I later
learned were grounded in an ideology where only Hutu were the “real” peasants and that
this ideology in part fuelled the genocide that would engulf Rwanda just a few days later.
Everything I experienced during my first week in country was filtered, through the lens
of my UN colleagues, and the local élites we worked with. I could see ordinary peasant
people everywhere I went but had no way to interact or engage them as individuals.
They were, in the words of my UN boss, “the masses” and their needs were best left to Rwandan authorities.

At 10:30pm on 6 April 1994, the genocide started. I was safely ensconced at the UN headquarters in the centre of Kigali. We had arrived back from Gitarama late, and were still at the office when I heard the crash that launched the genocide. Habyarimana’s plane had been shot down as it approached Kigali International Airport, returning from peace talks with the leadership of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Arusha, Tanzania.¹ All passengers on board were killed, including the President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira. Roadblocks were going up around the city, and we received word from the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to stay put. I spent the next five or six days in the UN compound, waiting to be evacuated. I had no initial sense of what was going on outside our gates, but had a pretty good inkling when armed militia entered forcibly and killed some Tutsi staff members, including the UN driver I had spent the last week with. Their remains lay in the courtyard, and we had to step around and over their decomposing bodies to get to the cars that would take us by road to Uganda. The re-entry mission to determine my “fitness” to continue working for the UN would change my life.

How could UN personnel not have known what was going on in Rwanda? How could I have been sent to a country on “the brink of civil war” (to quote the UN staffer who briefed us upon safe arrival in Uganda)? The answers weren’t that hard to find: Rwanda was the development darling of the international community, the Arusha peace talks were

¹ The RPF is mainly made up of Tutsi refugees who had fled Rwanda during earlier waves of politically motivated violence aimed at Tutsi between 1959 and 1973. The military wing of the RPF invaded Rwanda in 1990 with the purpose of toppling Habyarimana’s authoritarian regime and to gain the right of return for Tutsi refugees.
progressing well. No one imagined a rupture as dramatic as genocide. I returned to
Nairobi in May 1994 and my post with UNCHS.

But what I experienced in Kigali became a constant preoccupation, which was fed
by erroneous reports that atavistic ethnic hatred had erupted in Rwanda. Was it indeed
genocide, like some sources were saying? How could genocide happen among
neighbours? The US certainly refused to say it was, and UN inaction was a common
theme of the reporting. Gruesome images of people dying by machete chop at
roadblocks were interspersed with images of mass graves as bloated, decomposing bodies
were piled high over 100 days of genocide. The more I read, the less I knew. Since the
RPF eventually stopped the genocide with a military victory, I like many others perceived
them as the “good guys”. I wanted to help rebuild the new Rwanda. I first went to Ngara
refugee camp in Western Tanzania in mid-1995, where I worked with a team of
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegates investigating sexual violence
in the camps. I had a naïve notion that justice was a necessary part of understanding and
explaining the genocide. Poking around in the lives of women who had lost everything
seemed a good idea at the time. But the choice was ultimately about me – I needed to feel
like I was doing something to help. I wouldn’t understand until years later that the help I
offered was hardly the help people wanted or needed.

I eventually moved to the new Rwanda in July 1997, working for the Human
Rights Mission for Rwanda (UNHRFOR). This was a ragtag bunch of young and often
ambitious Westerners, with an occasional West African national thrown into the mix.
Many of my colleagues just wanted to be “where the action is” and saw the posting in
Rwanda as a strategic career move. We spent our days interviewing peasants, with the
help of a translator, about their experiences of genocide, with the broad purpose of monitoring the human rights situation in country. It didn’t seem to matter very much that many of my colleagues didn’t have the slightest clue what constituted a human rights abuse. Instead, we traipsed across the country, with armed soldiers as our escorts, to speak with ordinary Rwandans. We often met in hospitals, seeking to speak to people who had just been victims of violence. The hospitals stank: a pungent mix of dried blood, festering machete wounds, human waste and charcoal smoke. Many of my UN colleagues would wait outside while those of us who were willing would go “interview” weakened, vulnerable and frightened Rwandans. It didn’t take long to see that many of my colleagues were building careers, not caring for local people. The power dynamics inherent in these interactions were an equally unexamined aspect of our work.

I resigned from the Mission less than two weeks later. My last assignment was to monitor the public executions of 22 Rwandans at various sites across Rwanda. I witnessed the executions in Kigali of six people, including one woman, at Nyamirambo soccer stadium. As their bodies slumped over in the hail of bullets from six police AK-47s, I knew I would have to resign. The situation in Rwanda was simply too complicated for me. Many in the crowd cheered, others danced, some wept, others remained stone-faced. How would public executions facilitate reconciliation? What I was seeing and hearing in the hills when we interviewed ordinary people made no sense in the broader context of post-genocide Rwanda. I understood the executions as a political act, but came to realise that I only superficially understood Rwandan politics and this was perhaps dangerous, both for me, and the people I was interviewing. A few weeks later, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan visited; he held a townhall meeting with UN staff.
We were invited to ask questions. I raised my hand and asked “What do we tell local people when they tell us human rights don’t matter?” Annan didn’t directly answer my question, and I was later called in to the office of my team leader, who told me that my question was inappropriate given the prevailing political climate. I assumed he meant the political dynamic within Rwanda at large, but later learned that he meant between the UN mission and the RPF-led government. The UN Mission would be shut down about a month after Annan’s visit.

My resignation was well timed. I was asked to work on the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) project at the National University of Rwanda. The project was training Anglophone lawyers to take up genocide trials. I jumped at the opportunity; I would be working directly with Rwandans! I was “allowed” to stay in Rwanda, after a meeting with the then Minister of Justice Gerald Gahima where he made a few phone calls and ensured that I had a working visa. All UNHRFOR staff were asked to leave, and only a few of us were able to negotiate staying behind to take up other justice-related tasks. As Gahima said, “Our needs are many, and we want friends of Rwanda to work here; not those who criticise what they don’t understand”. I spent three-and-a-half years in Butare, working with students who had returned after the genocide with their families. Many had never been to Rwanda before, and few spoke Kinyarwanda, the national language. Most of them spoke in glowing terms about the RPF and I must admit I was swayed by their influence: I continued to believe that the RPF were the good guys. What I was seeing and hearing was filtered through my students, but their earnestness in the vision of the RPF swayed me greatly, and when I left Rwanda for Canada in January 2001, I was a strong supporter. I wasn’t totally blind to
the shortcomings of RPF rule, but felt strongly that their authoritarian practices were necessary to rebuild a peaceful and secure Rwanda. A benign dictatorship made sense, particularly since so many of the Rwandans around me supported the government. I didn’t reflect much on the fact that I was helping to train the new élite, and that the welfare of ordinary Rwandans was not a priority for the RPF. It also didn’t occur to me that everything I had heard about or witnessed in the new Rwanda was again filtered through local élites.

All of these experiences eventually culminated in an intellectual journey that marked the beginning of my research project, albeit long before I even thought of doctoral work. When I first arrived home to Canada in early 2001, I was tired and fed-up. I vowed never to go back to Rwanda and decided instead to focus my energies on human rights work in Nova Scotia. This lost its appeal quickly as did my efforts to find a therapist who could help me make sense of everything that I witnessed in Rwanda. Nothing actually ever happened to me, yet I saw and heard a lot. This disconnect would bother me for several more years, until I finally figured out that I was actually working through the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). My denunciation of all things “Africa” was the first step in that process. I still couldn’t find a therapist who could help me understand what I had experienced in Rwanda, Madagascar and elsewhere. In lieu of therapy, I took a second Master’s degree, one that focused on the democratic transition in post-genocide Rwanda. My analysis was shaped by my belief that the RPF was doing the best it could and I produced a glowing tribute to their vision for the new Rwanda.
The second reason this dissertation almost didn’t get written concerns my trauma. I was disconnected from myself and everyone around me. I was cynical and bitter about my experiences. My Master’s degree hadn’t settled my strong emotions about Rwanda like I needed it to. My family and friends were slightly fed up with my obsessing about Rwanda. In 2004, I finally found a therapist who specialised in re-integrating Canadian peacekeepers stationed in Bosnia. She helped me see that my feelings were definitely PTSD related and that my hatred for things African was actually anger directed at the UN, who had left me vulnerable and alone on more than one occasion. She also showed me that I actually had good coping mechanisms, and that my rejection of “Africa” was likely a self-preservation device. She encouraged me to embrace all that I had experienced there, and to share it with her. I did this over an eight-month period of self-reflection and study. At her request, I don’t name her here, but her influence on my work continues to this day and I will always be grateful to her. She, along with David Black at Dalhousie, encouraged me to take up further study, which I did in the spring of 2002.

My journey to doctoral studies matters because it profoundly shapes my current work. It took me several years to process my experiences and to reflect back on what I had seen in Rwanda and elsewhere. More importantly, it led me to think about all that I had not seen. A reflective focus on those silences led me to study the first hand experiences of ordinary Rwandans in the post-genocide period. One thing that was clearly lacking was their individual voices. I had lived in Rwanda for almost five years yet knew next to nothing of the everyday lives of ordinary Rwandans, and of how the non-élite peasantry were coping in the aftermath of the genocide. Yet, their personal ability to adapt to the “new Rwanda” was a central feature of government discourse –
Rwanda was a nation on the road to recovery because of government policy combined with the resilient spirit of Rwandans. I needed several years’ distance from my time in Rwanda to even begin to make sense of my experiences there. My wish was to design a project that would write the voices of ordinary Rwandans into academic knowledge, to analyse the post-genocide political order from their perspective, and to understand the workings and effects of state power within Rwandan society. Others were analysing how the genocide could have happened; and while I devoured these works as they were published, I really wanted to understand the everyday politics of ordinary Rwandans as they struggled to make sense of their lives in the aftermath of the genocide.

The third reason why I almost didn’t write this dissertation is institutional. I ran into some opposition at my home department at Dalhousie University. Bigger problems ensued with the Human Subjects Research Ethics Board. While my committee was supportive, members of the political science department who were peripheral to my research project were the primary problem – individuals with whom I had taken courses or interacted with during my comprehensive examinations were less generous in their feedback and commentary – how was my project political science? I eventually convinced the naysayers that my project was indeed squarely situated within the “discipline” as it was a study of power in a post-conflict society. Much bigger challenges arose with the Ethics Board, which required five written submissions over a period of nine months before I was granted ethics clearance, a mere two weeks before my fieldwork began. Working with the Board to explain and justify my choice of ethnographic methods in a post-conflict society like Rwanda was compounded by their lack of actual knowledge about Rwanda. One member even thought Rwanda was still “at
war” and that conducting research would be impossible! The process was time-consuming and frustrating but ultimately produced a stronger research proposal as I explained and reiterated my methodology, particularly my strategies for gaining access to ordinary Rwandans. In fact, I am indebted to the members of the Ethics Board that made me think and re-think through my research methods. I was forced to consider – patiently, cautiously, systematically – what my reality, as a foreign researcher in a volatile context like post-genocide Rwanda, could be like. This understanding would later prove invaluable when the Government of Rwanda stopped my research and asked me to undergo “re-education” about the “real Rwanda” since ordinary people had “filled my head with negative ideas”.

When I arrived in Rwanda in April 2006 to begin the approved research, I was easily able to articulate its purpose, methodology and the safeguards in place to protect my Rwandan participants to a government that arguably hosts more researchers working on social and political topics related to the 1994 genocide than it needs to. I received my research permits in less than a month, which was almost unheard of in a country that takes several months to authorise the work of foreign researchers. My research required detailed knowledge of Rwanda, particularly the decade before the genocide. My close familiarity with the workings of the Rwandan government, and of Rwandan society provided the necessary foundation to voice the individual lived experiences of ordinary Rwandans. Ordinary people sought me out to share some of their experiences of the genocide, how life was different since the genocide, how deep poverty makes reconciliation with neighbours “so hard”, how the government treats some survivors better than others, and how Hutu brothers are in prison through “no fault of their own”. It
was a privilege to have spoken to Rwandans in such depth, at bars, on buses, in gardens, and on long walks through the hills. I chose to undertake research on ordinary people in post-genocide Rwanda because I care about the evolution of Rwandan society towards one that is more fair and equitable than the one that allowed for the 1994 genocide.

The cessation of my research by the government in late August 2006 is the fourth reason why this dissertation almost didn’t get written. When officials at the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) summoned me to Kigali to meet with them as well as officials from the Ministry of the Internal Security, I was very nervous for me and for the 37 ordinary Rwandans who volunteered to participate in my research. My physical safety was never at risk, although my stress levels shot through the roof for the first time during my research when a MINALOC official took my passport, saying I’d get it back once the government was satisfied that I had been “adequately re-educated”. What that meant or how long “re-education” might last were not disclosed. After much discussion, it was revealed that my methodology was too “kind” to prisoners accused of acts of genocide; I was not to treat “them” as I was treating Tutsi survivors (the only legitimate “survivors” in post-genocide Rwanda). Did I not know that prisoners had killed and had to be “re-educated” themselves?

I eventually learned that the Director of Prisons in Butare did not record the names of the individuals I interviewed. As the government did not know their names, and I was unwilling to reveal them, I was ordered to stop interviewing. Initially reluctant, feeling that if I had worn out my welcome, it might be best to wrap up my research as quickly as possible and return to Canada, I realised on reflection the importance of the re-education offer, and jumped at the opportunity. I wanted to remain in Butare to monitor
whether or not there was any government harassment of my other research participants, and continue with participant observation. I also wished to understand the sudden shift in attitude within the government regarding my research.

Re-education is a Rwandan euphemism for political indoctrination. As a result, I spent almost six weeks participating in various government re-education activities, meeting with high-ranking government, private sector and civil society representatives (all members of the ruling RPF-party), and collecting documentation from these normally hard-to-access sources. I participated in seven gacaca (neo-traditional justice) sessions around Butare, as well as five ingando (citizen re-education) sessions in a locale just outside Kigali. The zeal with which the government approached my re-education yielded much valuable information that provides added context and validity to the statements made by ordinary Rwandans. It also provided numerous documents and reports that I may not have otherwise had access to. I returned to Canada in October 2006, five months earlier than planned.

The experience of having my research cut short impacted the research in a number of positive ways. First, in offering to “re-educate” me, the government actually availed a frontline look at the tactics and techniques it uses to control Rwanda’s political and social landscape. Initial feelings of fear, both for my physical safety and that of my respondents, soon changed to a sense of privilege at being able to spend so much time in the company of Rwandan élites. Since my research was grounded in the voices of ordinary Rwandans, I quickly recognised the sweeping generalisations and over simplifications of Rwandan history that the government relied upon to legitimise its rule, which allowed me to further contextualise and situate the narratives of my participants.
The government’s attempt to influence my thinking on its reconstruction and reconciliation successes since the 1994 genocide was equally revealing as I was able to see first-hand how the government organises the flow of information, and determines what counts as the “truth” in post-genocide Rwanda. Talking to Rwandan élites was not part of my research design, but listening to them speak positively influenced my research in the end. Government interference and surveillance is likely in intensely political research sites such as post-genocide Rwanda and it is important to listen to as many viewpoints as possible from a broad cross-section of actors. Indeed, awareness of multiple view points is helpful in understanding and interpreting the individual “truths” that people share, as is the ability to compare and contrast these alternate versions with the dominant version of the truth.

In the end, despite the various hurdles and challenges of working and researching in Africa in general and Rwanda in particular, I wouldn’t have wanted my work to unfold any other way. Despite the sometimes gruesome path that my professional life has taken, I have also been fortunate to share in the lives of the 37 Rwandans who formally participated in my research project and the hundreds of other Rwandans who shared part of themselves with me. One of the highlights of my fieldwork was a weekend trip to visit the 96-year-old grandmother of one of my Twa participants. She used to work for the Tutsi royal household in the 1930s and ‘40s. Her son was born an ethnic Tutsi within the royal court, but took on Twa identity in 1959 when his parents were killed in the first wave of genocide. He and his younger brother were adopted by the Twa servant who he now calls his mother. We spent a week in Western Rwanda at her homestead talking
about her memories as a young girl, as a servant to the royal court, and the loss her family members to genocide in 1959, 1962 and 1994.

During the course of my research, I also benefited immensely from the generosity and kindness of innumerable people and organisations in Canada, Rwanda and elsewhere. The research benefited from the funding support from the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, the Canadian Consortium on Human Security, the Dalhousie University Faculty of Graduate Studies, the International Development Research Centre and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I do not name my Rwandan research partners or my research participants for fear of government backlash against them. Their commitment to my work is deeply appreciated, and I hope the text that I have produced meets with their approval. I am likely unable to travel back to Rwanda any time soon to share my research with them, but I hope to do so one day. My research assistants and translators were invaluable and their friendship, particularly after the government stopped my research, is something I will never forget. Friends in Kenya also receive special mention as it was there that I rested and relaxed. Other “outsiders” supported me during my fieldwork, and always offered to lend an ear or shoulder after long days interviewing: Isabella Flüeler, Beth Kaplin, Stella Jordan and Frank McMillan deserve special mention here.

Others have been generous in sharing their time and intellect. I thank in particular the members of my doctoral committee, David Black, Stephen Brown (of the University of Ottawa), Jane Parpart and Tim Shaw. Their unwavering support and belief in my research was not only a much-needed source of inspiration when the path seemed darkest, but also just plain fun. I benefited in particular from the insightful, and often witty,
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Chapter 1: Introduction

One Sunday afternoon in late September 2006, a genocide survivor named Jeanne\(^1\) came to my residence in Huye, just northeast of Butare town in southern Rwanda. Among Rwandans, élites and ordinary folk alike, Sunday is a day reserved for prayer and visiting family and friends. Jeanne had never visited me before. I knew her well since she participated in my research project, which sought to understand the effects of the post-genocide government’s programme of national unity and reconciliation on ordinary peasant Rwandans living in the southwest of the country. I often received visitors on Sunday, and continued to do so even after the government halted my project in late August 2006, stating that it “was against national unity and reconciliation” and “was not the kind of research they needed” (fieldnotes, 2006).\(^2\)

Given government scrutiny of my project and the precarious social position of most of my participants in the post-genocide order, I was rather surprised when people continued to drop by to show their support for me and the research. My astonishment was a reflection of my own state of mind – the post-genocide government was exercising its muscle and I was its target. My visitors understood my feelings of powerlessness; some revelled in our mutual condition. I had “become one of them” and this newly acquired status was rooted in my detailed knowledge of the individual life stories of the 37 ordinary Rwandans that participated in my research. It was the sharing of secrets that structured my interaction with ordinary Rwandans, and many visitors subtly reminded me

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\(^1\) Not her real name. All names have been changed to ensure the anonymity of participants.

\(^2\) I discuss why the government stopped my research in the Acknowledgements, pp. xxvii -xxix.
not to reveal anything that they had shared with me to the authorities.\footnote{In Rwanda, individual integrity is marked through one’s ability to keep secrets. It is also a form of power, linked in particular to the secret rituals and codes of kingship. For further analysis see, de Lame (2004b; 2005a: 14-16, 88-91, 93-94, 382-383); Pottier (1989: 472-474); and Turner (2005: 43-47).} Most acknowledged my “troubles” with the government and assured me that its interference was actually a good thing. As one participant stated prosaically just a week before I left the country: “My government knows what it will like and not like. You now know what it is like to fear because of them. It’s good for you because now you know even better what we feel when the [local government official] comes to visit, or when [President] Kagame makes a speech that affects our life.”\footnote{The participant is referring to President Kagame’s July 2006 directive that all kiosks, the makeshift shops where ordinary Rwandans buy their staple goods and enjoy a Primus (local modern beer), were to be shut down until further notice. The impetus was to get store owners to move their business to the local market centre so that taxes could be levied on their profits, and daily rental fees for their market stalls could be charged. The directive was devastating not only to the economic lives of the owners of these kiosks, but also for ordinary people who have to travel further to market centres for their sugar, oil and other basics, with higher prices and without the opportunity to socialise over a beer or tea.}

Jeanne was different from my other participants. She was initially reluctant to participate in the research, but as time passed, she recognised that I was serious about listening to her life story. As our relationship progressed, she became adamant that her story be shared so people “outside Rwanda” could learn about her everyday struggles, and perhaps “storms like the war against Hutu and genocide against Tutsi” could be stopped and her surviving children would not suffer like she has.\footnote{Her surviving twin girls were 20 months old in April 1994 when the genocide started. Jeanne feels some solace that they do not remember what happened “to their country and their relatives”.

(interviews, 2006). Before the genocide, ordinary people did so under the
cover of madness and these individuals are known as abasazi (plural, meaning foolish). They used their “madness” to give the impression that they were mentally unstable to justify their willingness to say “what ordinary people can’t attempt” (interviews, 2006). Since 1994, ordinary Rwandans, like Jeanne, who no longer fear speaking out are known as ibyihebe (plural, meaning fearless). On our previous meeting in June 2006, Jeanne hugged me for a long time, perhaps five minutes, and when she broke our embrace she said,

I am glad you have come into my life. You gave me a safe space to share my inner thoughts. It is not always safe in the new Rwanda to share what you really think. I had that with some people before the war. But Rwandese, we need secrets, we don’t share easily. But with you, I shared and my heart feels lighter. You understand because you want peace for all of us, even poor people like me. I am stronger because I met you, because we shared.

But our time is now over. I can’t see you anymore because people know that our official time together is now over. I want you to know you will always be my friend in here [taps her chest], but you must go and not greet me if we meet, and do not visit. I sometimes told you more than I should have but I wanted to and you can tell my story in your book. But it is best for me and my family if you never come back here again (fieldnotes, 2006).

I understood why she asked me to keep distance, since our relationship was grounded in my knowledge of power relations in post-genocide Rwanda. As an “unimportant person” (meaning powerless subordinate) in Rwandan society, Jeanne likely wanted to distance herself from a (white-skinned and foreign) “important person” like me, lest our continued relationship result in jealous neighbours or the renewed attention of the local official who would sometimes pop in during our interviews to enquire about “how things were going”. So when she appeared at my gate a few months later, I assumed she had come to withdraw her consent to share her story in my “book”.

3
To the contrary, and like many of my participants who heard the news of my “problems” with the government, she had come to remind me that my “troubles” were far less severe than people like her experienced every day.

I also interpreted Jeanne’s visit as an act of resistance, given the attendant risks of possibly encountering the handler the government had assigned to keep tabs on me, or perhaps worse, the member of the Local Defence Forces (LDF) who lived across the street and who was likely keeping an eye on me as well. Before the government stopped my research we greeted one another politely, sometimes even engaging in small-talk about the security situation in our neighbourhood. I still saw him almost every day but he no longer said hello – perhaps an insult in a society that prides itself on the formality of greeting one another, or perhaps he felt it best to no longer fraternise with me, as he was likely reporting back on whom I was with and what I was doing. His continued presence around my residence was not lost on many of my participants who came for a visit, as some joked about it with me. One individual summed up our shared condition with a proverb – the cracked pot laughs at the broken bottle (ikimuga giseka urujyo) – and further joked that all that was missing from my Rwanda experience was to be thrown in jail!

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6 The LDF is a government-backed citizens' militia introduced by the government in 1997 with the stated aim of protecting civilians at the community level from insurgent incursions along Rwanda’s western border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By the end of 1998, LDF commands had been established across Rwanda charged with assuring peace and security at the lowest administrative levels. In practice, they often harass, intimidate, rob, rape, detain or torture citizens. In southern Rwanda, the LDF is under the supervision of local government authorities. In some of the communities where I worked, the LDF is called to account for its abuses and are disciplined, while in others they had free rein, notably in communities where government authorities are afraid of them or have benefited from their actions (interviews, 2006; see also HRW, 2000). Rwanda’s dense administrative structure is discussed in Chapter Five.

7 See de Lame (2005a: 38-39) on formalism in Rwandan society.
Jeanne’s visit, which lasted over two hours, constituted an appropriate ending to a period of fieldwork that was fraught with challenge, most notably government interference in the research process (Thomson, 2009a). During our visit, she spoke of how she valued our relationship and how she was “glad” to have been part of my project since she learned it had been stopped by the government. As a 47-year-old Tutsi widow of the genocide, she did not expect that anything would change in Rwanda in her lifetime, but perhaps the “disturbance” I caused the government would “make them wake up” to the “hardships” of many ordinary Rwandans.\(^8\) She continued,

The problems we have aren’t just because we are poor. We know we are but the government reminds us often that we are poor and need their help. We see new [local authorities] often. Kigali [the seat of government] changes them just as we are getting used to them, to their rules and ideas. They come in to our community and we respect them. We do this because that is our culture. As peasants, we have no say in governance. Those who speak out can really get into problems. That is what happened to you. You made it easy for us to speak about our problems and the [government] officials got really nervous and decided to stop your work.

This is the problem we suffer when the officials tell us about national unity and reconciliation. We can’t speak out about our hardships. No [shakes head]. We must go to gacaca (neo-traditional justice courts) and we must do what we are told, say what we are educated to say. We go to umuganda (community work) and we listen to their speeches. But they didn’t grow up in our communities. They come from Kigali and don’t understand what is necessary for us to live in peace. Some of them speak only a little Kinyarwanda. The one who helped stop your work has only been our [official] these last six months. He never asks us what we need. You understand that we peasants have few choices until the government says we do. That makes you a problem that must go away….

I am glad to be part of your research and I came to tell you in person that you are doing a good thing. If the government has noticed you among all the white researchers we see in [Butare] town, then I need to come and tell you to keep working and do your best when you get back to Canada (fieldnotes, 2006).

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\(^8\) Jeanne considers herself to be an old woman. Average life expectancy at birth for Rwanda is 45.2 years (UNDP, 2008b).
Jeanne’s salvo was a great relief to me. She remained committed to the research, and affirmed her continued consent. Her words also made me realise that the ordinary Rwandans who had participated in my research and later visited me at my residence not only understood its purpose and goals, but also knew that I would protect their life stories, despite the less-than-ideal conditions of my hasty departure. Jeanne understood the risks inherent in coming to visit me but she came anyway, and shared that I “made it easy” for the ordinary Rwandans I consulted to talk about their hopes, fears and frustrations with the post-genocide social order.

Jeanne’s narrative also speaks to a key finding of the research – ethnicity is not the most salient aspect of individual identity; levels of poverty as well as one’s social location since the genocide shape everyday life. When she speaks of “us”, she does not mean other Tutsi, but instead means others in her socio-economic class. As a widow, Jeanne’s position in the post-genocide order is exceedingly weak – she is poor and landless, without sufficient income to feed or clothe her children, let alone provide for their health care or schooling. Jeanne is a self-described umutindi (singular), which is one the six categories of socio-economic status that stratify Rwandan society. Abatindi (plural) are near the bottom of the hierarchy, second only to those who have to beg to survive, the abatindi nyakujya (fieldnotes, 2006; MINECOFIN, 2001). Her ethnic identity matters most when she is required to participate in state-led initiatives of national unity and reconciliation. National unity and reconciliation is the backbone of the government’s reconstruction strategy; it is the defining feature of state power in post-

9 The socio-economic hierarchy is discussed further in Chapter Six.

10 Throughout the dissertation, I use the terms “ethnic Tutsi”, “ethnic Hutu” and “ethnic Twa” to indicate that these identities are imposed upon ordinary Rwandans by the state, they are not necessarily identities that they themselves hold. The politicisation of ethnic identities by successive regimes in Rwanda is discussed in Chapter Three.
genocide Rwanda as it structures the interactions of individual Rwandans with the state, as well as with each other. On paper, it is a set of mechanisms that “aims to promote unity between Tutsi and Hutu in creating one Rwanda for all Rwandans” (NURC, 2000b: 4). In practice, it disguises the government’s efforts to control its population by using the language of ethnic unity and social inclusion while working to consolidate the political power of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). 11

Broadly, the dissertation reveals the power relations that structure the lives of ordinary peasant Rwandans. 12 Post-genocide Rwanda represents a context where political power is firmly held by the state. When exercised at the local level, it takes the form of directives from “on high” (the regime in Kigali) and strict monitoring of the ability and willingness to “implement government orders effectively and efficiently” (interview with MINALOC official, 2006). Local leaders in turn keep an eye on the activities and speech of individuals within their bailiwick. Compliance with the requirements of the programme of national unity is paramount. Individuals are constantly and consistently reminded by local officials of the need to “unify and reconcile” in order to consolidate present and future security. Ordinary Rwandans like Jeanne are subject to the exercise of power granted to local leaders and must perform the prescribed rituals of national unity and reconciliation, regardless of their private realities.

11 The RPF is comprised mainly of ethnic Tutsi and their children who fled Rwanda in the decades prior to the 1994 genocide during episodes of politically motivated violence against Tutsi. The first wave of violence was during the Rwandan Revolution (1959-1961) and the second began in 1973 when the Habyarimana targeted Tutsi students and salaried staff in pogroms. The third began in October 1990 when the military branch of the RPF, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), entered Rwanda via its northern border with Uganda with the stated aim of toppling the authoritarian regime of Juvénal Habyarimana, and to win a right of return for Tutsi refugees.

12 By “ordinary Rwandans”, I do not mean those individuals who hold formal political power as a member of the political élite, nor those individuals engaged as agents of the state (police officers, civil servants, military personnel, local authorities, etc.). Instead, I conceptualise “ordinary Rwandans” as the non-élite and largely peasant citizenry.
More narrowly, the dissertation is a study of the individual lived experiences with state power of ordinary peasant Rwandans living in the southwest of the country. The analysis distinguishes between the terms “state” and “regime”. By “state”, I mean the common set of public institutions capable of distributing goods and services and controlling violence within a defined, internationally recognised territory. By “regime”, I mean the political order of a particular administration, in this case “the regime of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)” as opposed to “the state of the RPF”. This distinction allows for a critique of the mechanisms and practices of the Rwandan state in pursuit of the twin goals of national unity and reconciliation as implemented by the RPF and its agents. The state-system in Rwanda is “a palpable nexus of practice and institutional structure centred in government and more or less extensive, unified and dominant in any given society” (Abrams, 1988: 82). Ferguson (1990) talks about the “anti-politics machine” in reference to the depoliticising effects of development practices in Lesotho. In Rwanda, the most remarkable aspect of the state is not the depoliticisation of the relationship between individuals and the state but rather its ability to simplify and impose a sense of national unity and reconciliation. In this sense, the state is a unity-generating

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13 Rwanda, unlike most other African states, exercises its territorial control exceedingly well (des Forges, 1995; Longman, 1998). It, like other African states, also often exercises power via means other than those sanctioned by law, and it shares power with myriad other kinds of formal and informal institutions. See, for example, Boone (1998: 129-141); Herbst (2000: 11-32); and, Villalón (1998: 3-25).

14 Rwandans are urged to unify and reconcile in all government communication with the population via radio addresses, speeches to the population on the need to reconcile, as well as in the messages of local officials during national unity and reconciliation activities such as umuganda (community work) and ingando (citizenship re-education). Radio soap operas transmit the message of unity and reconciliation, as do signboards on the side of main roads, posters at businesses, and signs attached to most government offices and public schools, as well as at all memorial sites. Signboards “advertise” the gacaca courts with an image of a group of survivors, citizen spectators and witnesses sitting in front of the panel of judges with the text, Truth. Justice. Reconciliation. (Ukurì. Ubutabera. Ubwiyunge.) A sign at a bar, one of hundreds across the country with similar messages, states: “That criminals are many doesn’t make them innocent. Justice must do its job.” (Ubwinshi Bw’abanyabyaha Ntibukuraho Uburemere Bw’icyaha Ubutabera

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machine. National unity and reconciliation are the sole prescription for a society that has suffered the “ill-effects of bad governance and ethnic divisionism” and it is one that has been imposed by the state (Office of the President, 1999a: 7).

I dissect the power of the post-genocide state through an examination of the various acts of everyday resistance of the 37 ordinary Rwandans that I consulted as they engage, avoid or subvert the requirements of the programme of national unity and reconciliation. Specifically, I employ the concept of everyday resistance is used to identify and analyse the power relations between ordinary people and the Rwandan state, to show how individuals are positioned in relation to state power, and how this positioning affects their life chances in the post-genocide order. Individual acts of resistance are not conceptualised as half of the unambiguous binary of domination versus resistance, which sees domination as a relatively static and institutionalised form of state power and resistance as organised opposition to it. Instead the dissertation identifies and analyses the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans – from silence and secrets to lying and foot-dragging – to show the many ways in which the programme of national unity and reconciliation represents an oppressive form of power in their lives. What emerges is a powerful narrative of the subtle ways in which ordinary Rwandans exercise their agency in reframing, rethinking and reshaping virtually everything that comes their way through the programme of national unity and reconciliation.

\[\text{Nibukore Akazi Kabwo.}\) Four shop owners reported that they were required by law to hang government-issued posters and messages on the theme of national unity (fieldnotes, 2006).
Political Ethnography: Identifying Everyday Acts of Resistance

The analyses that follow are based on the first in-depth study carried out in rural Rwanda of the programme of national unity and reconciliation. The research is a political ethnography, and it joins a growing movement within political science of research that draws on ethnographic methods to illuminate different ways of analysing state power. Political scientists have fruitfully employed ethnographic approaches to “get close” to people’s everyday experiences. For interpretativists, ethnography is “the art and science of describing a group or culture” (Geertz, 1973: 5). For positivists, it is a tool used to explain the causal story (e.g., Allina-Pisano, 2007). Despite this epistemological distinction, both camps agree on a minimal definition of ethnography as “the process of learning through exposure to or involvement in the day-to-day or routine activities of participants in the research setting” (Schensul et al., 1999: 91).

In order to bring in the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans, I drew upon ethnographic methods: living in southern Rwanda for six months in 2006; learning Kinyarwanda, the national language; participating in daily life through everyday

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15 Susanne Buckley-Zistal’s work also speaks to the programme of national unity and reconciliation. She problematises who is and who is not a “citizen” in post-genocide Rwanda and the implications of this for future peace and security (Buckley-Zistal, 2006a and b).

16 Admittedly, there are only a few political scientists who draw on ethnographic methods in their work. There are a growing number of scholars, however, who agree that a study of politics without ethnographic approaches is an impoverished affair. See, for example, Allina-Pisano (2007); Schaffer (1998); Schatz (2004); and, Weeden (1999). The seminal statement on the need to include ethnographic methods in political science research is Bayard de Volo and Schatz (2004). Fujii (2006) and Straus (2006) have studied the motivations of genocide perpetrators using ethnographic methods. International Political Anthropology published its first journal issue in May 2008 (www.ipa3.com). The University of Chicago Press will soon publish an edited volume on the importance of ethnographic immersion for the science of politics (Schatz, 2009). There are listservs devoted to debating the importance of ethnographic methods for political science, including the Yale Working Group on Interpretative Methods (http://listserv.cccd.edu/pipermail/interpretationandmethods/2006-August/000510.html).

17 Although ethnography as a method has come under much criticism within anthropology, this minimum definition has not been challenged by political scientists. See Gupta and Ferguson (1997) for an excellent overview of the discipline and practice of anthropology as it relates to fieldwork. Cf. Aunger (1995) on its “validity” as a method.
interactions and conversation; observing events like meetings, festivals, *gacaca* trials, *ingando* sessions, and so on; examining gossip, rumours, proverbs and jokes for their underlying meaning; recording fieldnotes to produce everyday accounts of socio-political life; and letting trust and emotional engagement be of benefit to the research. On the surface, this list of ethnographic activities might suggest that my use of ethnography as a method of political analysis is the same as that used by cultural anthropologists. The key difference however is that political ethnography aims to understand how everyday life is linked and changes in relation to political processes that transcend the boundaries of a given community or region. Cultural anthropologists on the other hand tend to immerse themselves in remote, isolated areas with the purpose of describing a given community, rather than linking activities in that location to broader socio-political trends and processes (Burawoy, 2000; McGlynn and Tuden, 1991; Neiburg and Goldman, 1998; Vincent, 2002).

As a tool for political analysis, ethnography is best understood as both an activity and a sensibility, an approach which squarely situates my research within the interpretative tradition of political science. It is closely tied to fieldwork, where the researcher physically and emotionally enters the space she seeks to understand. Ethnography seeks to allow “the original researcher and subsequent readers to make

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18 The “interpretative turn” in the social sciences is provocatively analysed in Flyvbjerg’s *Making Social Science Matter* (2001). Flyvbjerg argues for a phronetic social science, which is a science driven by problems, not methods. Both “positivist” and “interpretativist” political scientists draw on Flyvbjerg in their debates for a predictive science (positivist) or one along more humanistic forms of inquiry (interpretativist). Enlivening the debate are the interventions of political scientists who fall in neither camp – the mixed-methods researchers (e.g, Munro, 2005; Smith, 2002; Topper, 2005). Dryzek, for example, calls for a “critical pluralism” where positivist approaches inform interpretativist ones and vice versa (Dryzek, 2005: 509). Flyvbjerg’s phronetic method has also sparked debate among those who critique his failure to recognise the political nature of research. These debates are well-represented in three recent edited collections: Schram and Caterino (2006); Scott and Keates (2001); and Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, (2006).
sense of local knowledge, expert knowledge and the researcher’s and reader’s own knowledge (among others) in a manner that has potential to accord more equal weighting among different bases” (Pader, 2006: 163). The ethnographic stance is a commitment to what Geertz calls “thickness” to produce meaning through nuance, texture and detail (Geertz, 1973: 5-6, 9-10). This is not to be read as “exhaustiveness” as there is an inherent hubris in seeking to analyse every nook and cranny of a given subject. Instead, my ethnographic stance is first an epistemological statement that aims to portray ordinary people as “knowers” and as “recorders” of their own life stories, rather than to build on existing portrayals of these individuals as “powerless” victims of the 1994 genocide, and willing “to do whatever we [the RPF] tell them to do” (interview with RPF official, 2006). Such an approach renders visible the power relations that structure the way in which ordinary Rwandans I consulted understand the situations they face and the options available to them in the face of the official goals of national unity and reconciliation.

My approach to political ethnography is also grounded in an understanding of “knowledge”, be it the local knowledge of ordinary Rwandans, that of Rwandan élites, or the “specialist” knowledge of outsiders as historically situated and enmeshed in relationships of power. Knowledge is socially constructed, meaning that the categories and classifications that refer to particular phenomena – for example, who is a “survivor” of the genocide and who is a “perpetrator” – are manufactured for political gain rather than naturally occurring as a result of the 1994 genocide. My approach also eschews the rationalist individual as a unit of analysis. Instead, it recognises that there is never a single, unitary individual and that occupants of different subject positions will have different, even opposed perspectives on a given situation (Bruner, 1986: 46-51; Freeman,
2004: 66; Hoppe, 1993: 624; Ortner, 2001: 79). The world is understood as “a messy and contradictory space” where individuals make decisions based on their own understanding of their own circumscribed position (Davies, 1991: 51). Individual subjectivity is understood as “precarious, contradictory and in process, constantly being reconstituted through action” (Weedon, 1997: 32). An ethnographic approach provides a means to access and understand the options available to ordinary Rwandans as they position themselves within the structurally and discursively constituted “choices” that the programme of national unity and reconciliation presents to them.

Ethnographic methods highlight the ways in which individual subjectivities are the result of how actors “make their appearance” through social norms and standards (Arendt, 1958: 179). Subjectivities are not always something over which agents themselves have control (Ireland, 2004: 17-19; Scott, 1991: 775). Since individuals do not act in isolation, but interact with others, who one becomes through practice is not entirely up to the individual. Instead, it is the outcome of many intersecting and unpredictable interactions, such that “nobody is the author or producer of his [sic] own life story” (Arendt, 1958: 184). An emphasis on the everyday strategies of resistance of ordinary Rwandans resident in the south allows for analysis of the post-genocide political order from their perspective. Such analysis is not possible without an ethnographic approach. This agent-centred approach privileges the locally situated knowledge ordinary Rwandans possess by employing methodological tools that uncover, rather than presuppose, individuals’ motivations and behaviours.

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19 See Comaroff and Comaroff (2001: 271) for deconstruction of the notion of identity through the concept of “personhood” among the Tswana where they argue for an analysis of the “scaffolding” that shapes individual self-construction in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods.
An ethnographic approach also puts flesh on the notion of individual agency as “performative practice” (Butler, 1997: 270-278; Goffman, 1959: 55-60). “Performance” is practiced as a series of actions that are repeated over time; they are learned, reproduced and subjected to the risk of sanction for non-compliance through social interaction. Practice includes individual choice and responsibility, the meaning and sense individuals apply to their actions and speech, as well as self-monitoring adherence to social conventions, norms and rules (Bourdieu, 1991: 220-228; de Certeau, 1988: 43-90. Fraser, 1989: 144-160). Performative practices may be self-consciously executed but this is not always the case; they tend to be intelligible to others in context-dependent ways. An ethnographic approach allows for a focus on the ways in which national unity and reconciliation relies on individual performances of the norms and standards associated with it from a variety of subject positions. In this way, we can begin to understand and analyse the “performances” that individuals render in the name of national unity and reconciliation as forms of resistance rather than as survival strategies or as forms of obedient compliance.

Rendering the required performances demands that the ordinary individual both understands the nature and extent of the programme of national unity and reconciliation as well as the casted role. The dominant person in the relationship will seek to force the subordinate to perform according to his or her assigned role. For example, a “survivor” woman who was raped during the genocide, now has AIDS and has lost her social and

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20 Performances are ultimately “dual”, comprised of both what the outside observer can see and of the agents’ understanding of what they are doing. Geertz (2000) highlights the double hermeneutic of social science research in noting that it involves interpreting the interpretations social actors make out of their experiences.

21 The question of what constitutes an act of resistance and what is survival strategy runs through the literature. See the edited collection of Scott and Kerkvliet (1986) for an excellent overview of the debates.
economic networks through the death of family and friends has a different set of options and limitations on her actions than does a woman who returned after the genocide ("returnee") to take up a position as a local official. The survivor may choose to avoid gacaca trials as a mode of self-protection while the returnee official will seek, by force if necessary, to encourage her to attend gacaca as the full participation of the population is required by law.\textsuperscript{22}

An ethnographic approach also positions resistance as an analytical category. Everyday resistance is a useful concept as it highlights the scope and nature of power in most forms of relationship (Abu Lughod, 1990, 42-43; Ortner, 1995: 175). I conceptualise acts of resistance as acts which individuals undertake knowing that there is the risk of sanction from the state.\textsuperscript{23} This does not mean that there needs to be a law against the act in question, but more simply that individuals take a calculated risk to maintain or enlarge their position vis-à-vis the state. In the relationship of power, the dominant will do what is necessary to maintain their positions of power, which in turn gives the subordinate many grounds to resist the relationship (Scott, 1990: 9). Indeed, the ways in which the RPF, as the dominant political class, justifies the routine repression of its subordinates – ordinary Rwandans as well as its political opponents – emerges more clearly when everyday acts of resistance are identified. It also exposes the exaggerations of the RPF, who strategically situate ordinary people as “passive”, “powerless” and “like infants” to justify continued authoritarian control of its population (fieldnotes, 2006).

\textsuperscript{22} Article 29 of \textit{Organic law n.o. 16/2004 of June 19, 2004 establishing the organization, competence and functioning of Gacaca Courts} (hereinafter the 2004 Gacaca Law) states that: “Every Rwandan citizen has the duty to participate in the gacaca courts’ activities” (MINJUST, 2004: 8).

\textsuperscript{23} The qualities that exemplify acts of everyday resistance are further discussed in Chapter Six.
Routine surveillance is a tactic of the RPF regime, and it includes exaggerating the “urgent need to re-educate [ordinary Rwandans] on the purpose and goal of national unity and reconciliation” (fieldnotes, 2006). Government surveillance in the name of national unity and reconciliation seeks to justify the economic and political domination of the RPF. It also allows the RPF – as Rwanda’s current élite – to maintain the barriers between social classes and ethnic groups that its vision of national unity and reconciliation claims to eliminate. An ethnographic approach reveals that ordinary people are far from apolitical, “passive” and “ignorant” individuals who need to be “taught what it means to be Rwandan” (interviews, 2006). This challenges élite exaggerations that ordinary people lack the necessary consciousness to actively and productively engage in politics (Gupta, 2001: 91-92; Hobsbawn, 1973: 12-16; Scott, 1990: x-xi). The non-consciousness of ordinary people is assumed to lead to their inability to participate in the political arena, which in turn leads to the conclusion that “obedience is part of Rwandan political culture” (NURC, 2004a: 16). The 37 ordinary Rwandans I consulted hardly lack political consciousness; to the contrary, they are very much aware of their subjugated position within society and understand their presumed powerlessness to mean that they must take orders from “important people” and that they rarely have a right to give orders (fieldnotes, 2006). An ethnographic sensibility reveals the everyday lived realities of ordinary Rwandans to show that the forms of obedience they practice are tactical, as they seek to limit their interaction with the imposed requirements of the programme of national unity and reconciliation in their daily lives.

24 Indeed, it is a tactic of élites in other authoritarian regimes as well (Stenner, 2005: 2-7).
25 Analysts who have fallen back on Rwandan’s authoritarian political culture to explain the obedience of “the masses” include Lemarchand (2002: 513); Mamdani (2001: 41); and Prunier (1995: 141).
Instead, it opens up an opportunity to both acknowledge and explain numerous instances of resistance to state power since colonial times. It also highlights the importance of social class and gender in determining one’s ability to participate in the post-genocide political order.

My focus on the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans in post-genocide Rwanda is not without its shortcomings. The analysis is limited to the politics of resistance between the state and the 37 ordinary Rwandans I consulted in the course of the research. Indeed, individuals do much more in their everyday politics than resist the programme of national unity and reconciliation. The politics between men and women, parents and children, young and old; inheritance conflicts within families; struggles for land and other forms of property and so on are conspicuous in their absence in the analysis that follows, and this is a weakness of the dissertation. Ordinary Rwandans have their own politics, which I was unable to adequately bring in and analyse because of the shortened research period. For this reason, along with the reluctance of many of my research participants to speak about the inter-personal alliances and conflicts that structure their everyday lives, my dissertation does not analyse the internal politics of ordinary Rwandans.

26 For example, African Rights (2003g) shows how peasants ignored the orders of élites to burn Tutsi bodies during the genocide. Burnet (2007) states that peasants in southern Rwanda refused to cut down their banana plantations to plant crops that the government considered more productive. Des Forges, (1972; 1986) describes instances of resistance against the German colonial authority as well as the Tutsi king in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Longman (1995) describes how peasants burned woods to resist élite directives before the genocide. C. Newbury (1992) shows how peasant farmers destroyed coffee bushes in the late 1980s and early 1990s to grow food for their families instead.
Situating Lived Experiences of State Power in Post-Genocide Rwanda

Because the dissertation differs from much of the post-genocide Rwanda literature, it does not take the genocide as its starting point of analysis. Instead, it focuses on the everyday activities of ordinary people living in southern Rwanda in their efforts to perform the requirements of the programme of national unity and reconciliation. To do so, the dissertation draws primarily on theories of power, notably Foucauldian and feminist critiques of state power, alternate theories of power which focus on the “weak”, as well as theories of resistance to dominant forms of power. These literatures combine to provide powerful conceptual tools to access the externally invisible “infrapolitics of the powerless” (Scott, 1990: xiii). The key to analysing the “weak” is to recognise that they are not truly weak and to appreciate that power is relational in seeking to surveil and discipline those subject to it (Carroll, 1972; Foucault, 1977; 1980; Janeway, 1980; Scott, 1976).

The work is first and foremost a contribution to the Rwanda literature, which I read prior to and re-read after fieldwork. This approach allows me to prioritise the voices of ordinary people in my analysis in situating the dissertation within the burgeoning literature on post-genocide Rwanda. When post-genocide Rwanda is no longer seen solely through the lens of ethnicity, an examination of the different subject positions of the ordinary Rwandans that participated in the research becomes possible.

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28 Others have used this approach as well; for example, Cohen et al. (2001: 12-13); Comaroff and Comaroff (1992: 34); and, de Lame (2005a: 6-12).
Contextualising their narratives through the literature helps us delve more deeply into the range of choices and options that ordinary individuals have at their disposal in the post-genocide period. With this goal in mind, there are many published works on the 1994 genocide that provide useful empirical signposts for understanding individual lived experiences of the genocide. Before assessing their value, it must first be said that a copious amount of scholarship has been produced that focuses on the causes of the genocide and/or its aftermath, many of which are substandard in their approach and analysis; they will not be cited.\(^{29}\)

Much of what has been written about Rwanda since the genocide either lacks critical depth or fails to take into account the rich pre-genocide literature on Rwandan society.\(^{30}\) Many academics and journalists “new” to Rwanda relied on Maquet’s heavily criticised and long since invalidated (by scholars writing in both English and French) study *Le système des relations sociales dans le Ruanda ancien* (1954, translated as *The Premise of Inequality: A Study of Political Relations in a Central African Kingdom* in 1961). Maquet’s statist interpretation of Rwandan society as a feudal kingdom that was highly centralised and stratified by caste-like ethnic groups became the field guide for scholars new to the region, and they consequently based their analyses on his static interpretation of Rwandan society. These works offer truncated analyses, as

\(^{29}\) A number of recent publications that uncritically praise the RPF for its post-genocide successes, notably restoring peace and security. These works are grounded in a “Tutsi” version of history that plays into the desire of the RPF to craft a specific historical narrative about the root causes of the genocide, which in turn justifies their oppressive post-genocide policies. For analysis of a cross-section of these substandard works see, de Lame (2004b: 280); Pottier (2002: 1-8, 53-108); Vansina (1998: 37-45); and Waldorf (2006: 30-34, 37, 44-48, 52).

consideration of individual lived experiences of genocide are sublimated in favour of themes that are directly linked to the genocide itself – state power, élite politics, the socio-psychological features of the killers, and the failures of the international community (see Ingelaere, 2006; Uvin, 2001 for a review of the literature). This has the effect of continuing the longstanding academic tradition of ignoring key elements of Rwanda’s history, notably “the interaction of local agency with élite policy” (D. Newbury and C. Newbury, 2000: 833).

This dissertation partially addresses this gap in seeking to understand the life worlds of ordinary Rwandans since the 1994 genocide. Specifically, it analyses the interactions with state power of 37 ordinary Rwandans at the lowest rungs of society – notably the vulnerable (abatindi) and the poor (abakene). Taken together, the abatindi and the abakene represent approximately 66% of Rwanda’s peasantry (Howe and McKay, 2007: 200).31 Such an approach does more than bring the lived experiences of ordinary Rwandans into the frame of analysis; it also provides a basis from which to analyse the post-genocide political order from the bottom up. The analysis that follows also underscores the historical continuities in both the nature of social hierarchy and governance in Rwanda to show that the programme of national unity and reconciliation

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31 Eighty-seven percent of Rwanda’s entire population live in rural areas and are considered by the government to be peasants. The Rwandan peasantry is made of four categories of differing degrees of poverty. Lowest in the socio-economic hierarchy are those living in abject poverty (abatindi nyakujya, sing., umutindi nyakujya); next highest are the vulnerable (abatindi, sing. umutindi); above them are those identified as poor (abakene, sing., umukene). Taken together, these three categories represent “the poorest of the poor” in Rwanda and make up, in socio-economic terms, the majority of those living in rural areas. The fourth and highest category of the peasantry is the poor with means (abakene wifashije, sing. umukene wifashije) which is the socio-economic class of many elected local officials. Abakene wifashije represent about 14% of the peasantry (Howe and McKay, 2007: 200). The socio-economic context in which these individuals live their lives is discussed in detail in Chapter Six at pp. 195-208.
does not represent “a new way forward to assure peace and security for all Rwandans since the genocide” (President Paul Kagame quoted in Jha and Yadav, 2004: 69). 32

Usefully employing the genocide literature as a tool to understand the range and diversity of individual experiences during the genocide requires a critical read of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial histories as well as local power relations across these time periods. de Lame links these two themes in reviewing the ethnographic literature, to reveal the “distortions in Rwandan historiography and […] the contribution of the colonial powers to a myth of racial superiority that was to further legitimate the local power in place (de Lame, 2005a: 3). She cautions against anything but a prudent reading of Rwandan history, noting its historical lacunae – rural life in general and peasant experiences in particular – as well as its dominant themes: royal and state power, the presumption of political unity, and élite manipulation of European views of Rwandan history, notably its socio-political lineages and ethnic distinctions (de Lame, 2005a: 3-12).

de Lame’s concern with a cautious reading of history remains relevant in post-genocide Rwanda, where the programme of national unity and reconciliation has imposed a hegemonic view of Rwandan history to the exclusion of meaningful alternative interpretations. As in the past, other viewpoints are dismissed as “politically motivated” or the work of “opposition politicians intent on destabilising Rwanda’s peace and

32 A careful reading of the pre-colonial, colonial and pre-genocide literature highlights the deep historical roots of the programme of national unity and reconciliation. The complex machinery of tactics, hierarchies and direct and indirect instruments of control all ensure the integrity of the state system. The programme of national unity and reconciliation has its roots in the pre-colonial governance structures, and it highlights the ethnic unity of Rwandans under Tutsi monarchs with no regard for the intrigues of the court (Des Forges, 1972; Vansina, 2004). The programme also adopts an official history that starts with an already established Tutsi monarchy which both glosses over Rwanda’s distant origins and romanticises the ethnic harmony of the pre-colonial period. It also effectively erases the presence of ethnic Twa in Rwandan history and undermines their legal standing as an indigenous population (fieldnotes, 2006).
security” and can result in public denunciation, imprisonment, intimidation, disappearance and even death (Amnesty International, 6 July 2004; BBC, 2004; Frontline, 2005; P. Kagame, 2004; Médecins sans frontières, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c; Reporters sans frontières, 2001; Reyntjens, 1999a, 2004a, 2004b; Senate of the Republic of Rwanda, 2007; USIP, 2001, 2003). Still, there are a number of critical works that provide meaningful insight into the lived realities of ordinary Rwandans resident in the southern so long as the reader is able to situate individual experiences in broader historical context. Readers must also be aware of the political uses of competing historical interpretations of the past without relying on racist representations of Rwandan society created largely by outsiders, and manipulated by local élites for their own gain (de Lame, 1995, 2004a; Eltringham, 2003a, 2003b; Jefremovas, 1995; D. Newbury and C. Newbury, 2000, particularly 854-866; Vansina, 1998).


rulers of Rwanda” (Office of the President, 1999b: 17). They also provide much needed historical signposts when reading the rest of the pre-1994 genocide Rwanda literature. Jefremovas sums up their contribution beautifully: “the writings of David Newbury and Catharine Newbury…have the distinction of making extremists of both groups [Hutu and Tutsi] unhappy through their forthright and complex analyses” (Jefremovas, 2000: 300).

Historical analyses such as those produced by the Newbury’s are also important tools to reveal and assess the experiences of ordinary Rwandans with state-led processes of national unity and reconciliation. Individual experiences of the 1994 genocide are tied to both personal histories and the grand narrative of national unity and reconciliation. Understanding these individual experiences is important as there are multiple and sometimes contradictory layers of victimhood and perpetrator-hood that go back for decades among individual Rwandans, which do not mesh with government-imposed initiatives of national unity and reconciliation. Most notable of these is the RPF’s focus on creating a unified Rwandan identity or “Rwandan-ness”. Rwandan-ness is the official rejection of ethnic identity – of being Hutu, Tutsi or Twa – in favour of creating “one Rwanda for all Rwandans”. In attempting to wipe away ethnicity, the programme produces two broad simplifications where all Tutsi (whether they were in Rwanda during the genocide or not) are innocent victims or “survivors” and all Hutu (whether they participated in the genocide or not) are guilty perpetrators and “violent killers who need to be re-educated (on what it means to be “Rwandan”)” (NURC, 2007d; 2007e; 2007f).

A focus on the lived experiences of ordinary Rwandans reveals the danger of government efforts to impose a single version of national unity and reconciliation as it

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34 Straus critiques Kagame’s claim that the RPF are Rwanda’s rightful rulers at a 2005 panel on the theme of “Taking Stock in Post-Genocide Rwanda” (USIP, 2005).
opens up the possibility to identify and contrast the seemingly irreconcilable standpoints of survivors, perpetrators, survivors of RPF-led killings, bystanders and witnesses, those who hid during the genocide, those who returned after the genocide, Rwandans in the diaspora, and so on, regardless of their ethnicity. One’s experience of the genocide (or lack thereof) speaks directly to one’s historical location. For example, an English-speaking man who grew up as a refugee in southern Uganda and returned after the genocide will recall an entirely different life history than a Kinyarwanda-speaking woman who grew up in Rwanda and lived through the genocide.

Recent studies have produced insightful theoretical work on individual motives to commit acts of genocide against neighbours, friends and family, to show that the genocide is not rooted in “long-standing ethnic hatred between Hutu and Tutsi” as the RPF contends (NURC, 2004a: 19). Instead, recent micro-level studies show that individual decisions to commit acts of genocide are grounded in intra-ethnic social pressure or personal grudges, and feelings of fear, insecurity and anger as well as poverty (André and Platteau, 1998; Fujii, 2006; Longman, 1995; Mironko, 2004; Shotsmans, 2000; Straus, 2006; Verwimp, 2005). As a whole, these analyses constitute a significant contribution to the micro-dynamics of mass violence grounded in both local knowledge and analysis of the prevailing social and political climate in a context of Rwanda’s civil war (1990-1994). In particular, Fujii’s research shows that the collective categories of killers, survivors, bystanders and rescuers are often incomplete, with individuals often inhabiting a variety of these categories. This has practical implications for how practices of justice and reconciliation play out at the level of the individual (Fujii, 2008). Straus’s work challenges the wisdom of the government’s post-genocide strategy of “maximal
prosecution” of ordinary Hutu men for crimes that many committed either under duress or as a survival strategy (2006: 244; Straus, 2004).

More importantly, together these works also speak to the climate of intimidation and fear on one hand and the coercive social pressures on the other that left ordinary Hutu with little option but to commit acts of genocide against their Tutsi brethren when instructed to do so by their political and military leaders. Read in conjunction with existing knowledge on the prevailing political climate and the RPF stratagems to gain state power, this micro-level research also challenges dominant government narratives about the genocide, and its role in both precipitating and stopping it (Dallaire, 2004; Mamdani, 2001: 159-184; Melvern, 2006: 13-132; Prunier, 1997: 356-389; Ruzibiza, 2005). Kuperman shows, in one-on-one interviews with senior members of the RPF’s inner circle, that genocide as a possible response of the Habyarimana regime to its demands for power-sharing were known and accepted, with the broader goal of state power trumping other considerations (Kuperman, 2004: 63). Ruzibiza’s contribution in recounting his role in downing the plane that killed then President Habyarimana, sparking the genocide which ended with the RPF taking state power, is particularly damning to the government version about its role in the genocide. The official government position is

35 This research becomes even more important as the post-genocide government amends its version of events, presumably for an uninitiated audience, about its role in the genocide (see Pottier, 2002 for analysis of the media savoir faire of the RPF). It is well documented that the genocide occurred in the context of civil war (1990-1994) and that the RPF entered Rwanda from Uganda on 1 October 1990 with the stated purpose of overthrowing the Habyarimana government, and to gain the right of return for Tutsi refugees. Recent government publications, notably tourist information, claim that the RPF entered Rwanda in April 1994 “to stop the genocide”. See, for example, ORTPN, 2004: 3; The Eye Rwanda, 2006: 16; and Republic of Rwanda, 2005: 7-8. Good examples of the government’s discourse on its role in stopping the genocide and rebuilding Rwanda “in its vision” are the “Culture”, “Politics” and “Security” links at the Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency (REIPA) website: http://rwandainvest.com/spip.php?rubrique23.

36 Ruzibiza’s admission that he fired the rocket-propelled grenade that downed the Presidential plane is well documented. His broader account is considered to be an accurate and fair assessment of RPF activities before and during the genocide. His work has been well-received by Rwandanists. French magistrate Jean-
that Hutu extremists shot down the plane because they feared Habyarimana’s apparent willingness to share state power with the RPF (CGC, 2003: 7; Gourevitch, 1996: 184-186; NURC, 2004a: 45; Reed, 1996: 480).

Research prepared by international organisations can also be productively read through an ethnographic lens in seeking out points of reference about why current state practices of national unity and reconciliation are so damaging for a large number of ordinary Rwandans. African Rights (1994) produced a significant volume that is grounded in local testimonies and eyewitness accounts, as did numerous non-governmental organisations (NGOs) based in Rwanda (e.g., Cahiers Lumière et Société, 1995, 1996; Dialogue, 2004). Combined these accounts provide useful empirical evidence on individual experiences of the genocide across time and space. African Rights continues to document individual experiences of genocide in its reports on the history of genocide in various sectors (African Rights, 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003e, 2003f, 2003g, 2003h, 2003i, 2006). The reports also reveal some of the silences that the recent administrative restructuring has created in showing how the gacaca jurisdictions do not necessarily overlap with pre-genocide administrative units. This is a significant development as the post-genocide government claims that it reconfigured Rwanda’s

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The African Rights report was widely criticised for being too soft on the human rights abuses of the new government. Reports produced by domestic organisations immediately following the genocide painted the genocide as the result of deep-seated ethnic hatred between Hutu and Tutsi that was driven by media propaganda, an argument in direct agreement with the position of the post-genocide government (see Office of the President, 1999a; NURC, 2004a).
administrative boundaries to “decentralise the power structures that led to genocide” and to “foster ethnic unity as people will have to live together” (fieldnotes, 2006). In practice, it appears more likely that the government has redrawn administrative boundaries to further consolidate its own power, and to enable it to deploy administrative and security personnel in all corners of the country (Reyntjens, 2004a: 187-194).

Human Rights Watch (HRW), in a meticulously prepared report under the supervision of Alison Des Forges (1999), produced the most complete and thorough analysis of the genocide and its historical antecedents, including analysis of the strategy of genocide from the inner circles of state power through the military and militia groups, down to the lowest level of administrative fonctionnaire. It continues to provide excellent locally-situated analysis of the causes of genocide as new evidence comes to light (e.g., HRW 2006a, 2006b), just as it has sought to understand the post-genocide social and political order and its impact on ordinary people, notably the rural poor (e.g., HRW 2000, 2001b). HRW maintains its “watchdog” practices in reporting on key developments, including the 2003 presidential elections and the political and social climate in its run-up (HRW, 2003a). Along with Amnesty International (AI), HRW has released a multitude of reports, press releases and briefing papers that are replete with

38 In 1994, Rwanda was organised into the following administrative hierarchy: 10 préfectures, 106 communes, 154 secteurs, and 9201 cellules, with each cellule being further sub-divided into groupings of ten households called nyumbakumi. In 2001, Rwanda's administration was reorganised into: 11 provinces, plus the city of Kigali, 106 districts, 154 sectors, and 9201 cells. In January 2006, the government again engaged in a sweeping administrative carve-up that reduced the number of provinces (from 11 to 4), districts (from 106 to 30), and sectors (from 154 to 416). Government officials claim that gacaca jurisdictions do not have to conform to the new administrative boundaries (interviews with MIJESPOC, MINALOC, and MINIJUST officials, 2006). The African Rights (2006g) report suggests that this is not the case, as the re-drawing of commune boundaries has resulted in the omission of some of the events surrounding the genocide that ordinary Rwandans consider part of their experience.

locally grounded and historically contextualised collective and individual testimonies that speak to the everyday challenges of ordinary people as they seek to navigate the post-genocide social and political order.\textsuperscript{40} Read together, the reporting of AI and HRW not only paint a credible picture of the social and political milieu in post-genocide Rwanda, their publications also provide an inside track to the lived experiences of 37 ordinary Rwandans resident in the south as they seek to rebuild their lives in the aftermath of genocide.\textsuperscript{41}

Accounts from journalists add nuance to understanding of how individuals survived the genocide, notably from the position of Tutsi survivors of the genocide. These accounts are not representative of individual experiences of the genocide, but instead are better interpreted for how they present the stories of individual Rwandans (e.g., Gourevitch, 1998; Keane, 1995; Koff, 2004). These accounts provide insight on the nature of the moral discourse surrounding the genocide that lumps all Hutu men into the category of evil perpetrators, and all Tutsi survivors as hapless victims. An ethnographic reading highlights both the folly of collectively victimising perpetrators and survivors, and reveals the many silences that such an approach entails.\textsuperscript{42} In addition, these journalistic accounts further complicate efforts to understand the multiple motivations that individuals had for killing and tend to conflate acts of genocide against Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu by militias, the military and some ordinary Rwandans with the killing of civilians in the course of the war between the \textit{Forces Armées Rwandaises}

\textsuperscript{40} Some international organisations monitor specific elements of Rwandan politics. On press freedom see, RSF (2001; 2002).
\textsuperscript{42} See also Burnet (2005) on “amplified silences” in post-genocide Rwanda.
(FAR) and the RPF (1990-1994) and the killing of civilians (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa) by the RPF in the immediate post-genocide period (1994-1996).\footnote{The RPF shut down the research of Davenport and Stam (2005) because of their typology of Tutsi deaths as genocide, the killings of Hutu opponents as politicide, and the remaining deaths of Hutu and Twa civilians as massacres. The RPF denounced their work as “revisionist” in 2004. See their reply to the government at: \url{http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/davenport/gedodynamics/clarification.htm}.}

Equally subjective is the witness literature, meaning the corpus of personal stories written by individuals who survived the genocide (e.g., Aegis Trust, 2006; Hatzfeld, 2005a, 2007; Ilibagiza, 2006; Kayitesi, 2004; Mujawayo and Belhaddad, 2004, 2006; Mukagasana, 1997, 1999, 2001; Mukasonga, 2006; Rucyahana, 2007).\footnote{Kinzer dedicates a chapter of his book to Rucyahana’s work as an example of “where church and the country’s political leadership [come] together to make a difference” (Kinzer, 2008: 304). I have criticised Kinzer’s contribution to our knowledge on post-genocide Rwanda as a book that “many people seeking to understand Rwanda will read without realizing that it is little more than government propaganda” (Thomson, 2009b).} Verging on a cottage industry for some, these works provide direct testimony of the experience of genocide and provide some insight and allow for a greater sense of context when interpreting individual experiences of genocide. Of particular value are testimonies that focus on the reconciliation process from the perspective of survivors, including critiques of the gacaca court trials to show that what the government perceives as sincere reconciliation is actually forced co-existence between survivors and perpetrators.\footnote{See also the survivor stories published by the international NGOs Advocats sans frontières (ASF) and Médecins sans frontières (MSF). See for example, ASF, n.d (a); ASF, n.d (b), MSF, 2003, 2004a; 2004b; 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; 2006d.}

Nonetheless, these accounts are to be read with caution, as most of the present individual stories of survival are not only designed to shock and horrify the reader, but also draw on simplified versions of history that make it sometimes difficult for the uninformed reader to situate these narratives in broader context. As a whole, these books are written by members of Rwanda’s educated élite (save Hatzfeld, an outsider), who write
authoritatively of individual experiences without adequately situating their interlocutors within Rwanda’s social hierarchy, and without due regard to other salient forms of identity (e.g., gender, occupation, class) that could have shaped one’s chances to survive, and consequently enhance or constrain one’s ability to reconcile with other Rwandans.

Testimonial accounts from Hutu voices add much-needed nuance about how many ordinary people lived through the genocide and about the diversity of their experiences of survival in its aftermath, when millions of Hutu quit Rwanda, sometimes forcibly, to refugee camps in neighbouring countries, notably in eastern Zaïre (now Democratic Republic of Congo). They were later returned to Rwanda, often against their will by the RPF and/or the United Nations (Hatzfeld, 2005b, 2009; Lyon and Straus, 2006; Umutesi, 2004). Umutesi’s (2004) work is particularly powerful as her story is representative of the lived experiences of hundreds of thousands of individuals who fled the genocide in Rwanda only to find themselves trapped in crowded, unsafe refugee camps.46 As such, it is an important antidote to the simplified historical narratives of Tutsi as the only legitimate “survivors”. It provides a more complex version of reality, showing the multiple and fluctuating constraints that shaped individual options of survival. Umutesi’s story is also representative of the everyday experiences that all Rwandans – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa alike – lived through before, during and after the genocide. Tutsi are rightfully and correctly survivors of genocide as they were targeted by virtue of their ethnicity, but all Rwandans are survivors of conflict, jostled and shaped by events over which they had no control. Umutesi’s account also shows the folly of analysts new to the region who rely on stereotypical generalisations about ethnic conflict

46 Umutesi’s work is the subject of a special issue of the African Studies Review, 2005, 48(3). See in particular the comments of de Lame (2005b); Habimana (2005); C. Newbury (2005); Songolo (2005).
and simplified accounts that seek to explain the genocide in the language of atavistic ethnic enmity.

Paul Rusesabagina’s *No Ordinary Man* (2006) is an example of a “Hutu” version of events that the government actively tries to suppress in denouncing him as “a liar” and “a genocide revisionist” for his account of saving over 1200 Tutsi lives during the 1994 genocide (fieldnotes, 2006). His book, which was made into a movie, *Hotel Rwanda*, shows the importance of personal networks and the strategic use of resources as salient determinants of survival in narrating how he negotiated and bargained with senior members of the Habyarimana regime to save the lives of Tutsi who sought refuge at the Hôtel des Milles Collines in central Kigali. Much to the chagrin of the RPF, his account has been internationally acclaimed and Rusesabagina deemed a “hero” in North America and Europe for his actions during the genocide.47 He also uses international fora to speak out about the current political climate of authoritarianism in Rwanda and calls for a truth and reconciliation commission to bring RPF crimes committed during the genocide to book. The RPF responds by saying that those soldiers who broke rank and perpetrated revenge crimes against individuals are being dealt with “accordingly” (UNU, 2007). The RPF further contends that Rusesabagina is lying because “there are no Milles Collines

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47 For example, Rusesabagina was awarded the (United States) Presidential Medal of Honor in 2005. There are rumours that Rusesbagina uses these international platforms to further his own political agenda, viz., to return to Rwanda to contest the Presidency in the next election (currently scheduled for September 2010). It is unclear if Rusesbagina has political aspirations. Careful analysis of Rusesbagina’s speeches to international audiences is beyond the scope of this dissertation. It would be useful to analyse his speeches to determine his use of history and to see if he manipulates it in the way that other Rwandan political leaders have done in the past, or to determine if he truly interested in “flipping evil’s assets against itself”, by which he means never again cultivating genocide as an option amongst Rwandans (Rusabagina, 2006: 204). The movie *Hotel Rwanda*, and his book *No Ordinary Man* offer a simplistic account of the genocide and its historical antecedents. For analysis, see, Adhikari (2008).
survivors” and that his status as a hero is something that “only the people of Rwanda can decide” (fieldnotes, 2006).

Rusesabagina’s international notoriety and the government’s reaction to it matter because it is emblematic of how the RPF seeks to control the political landscape in post-genocide Rwanda. The RPF works hard to ensure that its version of “how things really are in [post-genocide] Rwanda” is the only one that circulates and it employs a variety of tactics to ensure that its version of everyday life in post-genocide Rwanda is the one presented to foreign audiences (interview with RPF official, 2006; see also Pottier, 2002, 151-178). Rusesabagina is considered “an enemy of the state” since his book and movie directly challenge “the moral authority of the RPF” to rebuild Rwanda in its vision of national unity and reconciliation (fieldnotes, 2006). The RPF continues to discredit Rusesabagina to international and domestic audiences alike, including sponsoring the publication of a book, *Hotel Rwanda or the Tutsi Genocide as seen by Hollywood* (Ndahiro and Rutazibwa, 2008). The book, which was written by President Kagame’s press secretary and a senior member of Rwanda’s Information Agency, alleges that Rusesabagina is “trading for personal riches” and that his account “distorts the true history of what happened during the genocide” (Kezio-Musoke, 2008: 1).

Ndahiro and Rutazibwa’s book is also part of the growing list of “approved by the RPF” publications that are produced by domestic think-tanks, non-governmental

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48 He has been denounced by prominent members of the Rwandan government, most notably President Paul Kagame and Senator Odette Nyiramilimo. Both Kagame and Nyiramilimo gave their blessing to the movie as an important vehicle for educating the world about what “really happened” in 1994 when it premiered in the USA in October 2004 (fieldnotes, 2006). Nyiramilimo also recounts how Rusesabagina sent a car to carry her and her family to safety at the Milles Collines in Goureivitch (1998: 129-131), *We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow we will be Killed with our Families*, which would seem to make her a “Milles Collines survivor”. Denunciation of Rusesabagina was ongoing during fieldwork.

organisations, and government offices (fieldnotes, 2006). The RPF sees itself as the guardian of “Rwanda’s culture and destiny” and has subsequently made “its own contribution to the crafting of an intellectual image about [Rwanda] and its heritage” (Pottier, 2002: 109). To this end, once-exiled intellectuals, many of whom have returned to Rwanda since 1994, and who now hold positions of authority in government, universities and churches, have produced numerous publications. These publications have the RPF “seal of approval” and are useful as they reveal at length the RPF’s interpretation of Rwandan history and the causes of the 1994 genocide.

The substantive content of this body of work is remarkable only in the similarity of its message wherein ethnicity is de-emphasised and historical unity between Rwanda’s ethnic groups prior to the arrival of colonialists is invoked to justify current policies, notably the programme of national unity and reconciliation. The leading example of this is Kimonyo’s *Revue Critique des Interprétations du Conflit Rwandais* (2000), a Centre for Conflict Management (CCM) publication, and a document that numerous élites told me during my “re-education” that “I must read” as it is the “truth about how people came to kill one another”. Other noteworthy examples include the *Cahiers Lumière et Société* series, as well as the reports and surveys produced by the CCM, the Institute for Conflict Management (CCM) publication, and a document that numerous élites told me during my “re-education” that “I must read” as it is the “truth about how people came to kill one another”. Other noteworthy examples include the *Cahiers Lumière et Société* series, as well as the reports and surveys produced by the CCM, the Institute for Conflict Management (CCM) publication, and a document that numerous élites told me during my “re-education” that “I must read” as it is the “truth about how people came to kill one another”.

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50 During my “re-education”, I was handed numerous publications that were considered “must reads” by the various members of the RPF that I met. My host would tell me that the publication in question is a “must read” because “it has been approved by the leadership”. A staff member at the Ikirezi bookshop in central Kigali told me that their collection of books on the 1994 genocide is approved by the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MIJESPOC) before being shelved for sale. Ikirezi is the repository for government publications, and sales are reported to MIJESPOC on a quarterly basis (fieldnotes, 2006).

51 Kimonyo is the chair of the Commission of Inquiry that the RPF created to investigate the role France might have played in the 1994 Genocide. His CCM publication is based on his doctoral thesis (Kimonyo 2002).


53 See CCM (2002); CGC (2002a, 2002b, 2003). See also Gasana et al. (1999).
of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IDRP), the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (NSGJ), the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the Office of the President. Read together, these works reveal not only the official narrative of national unity and reconciliation but also point to reasons behind the paucity of published works from Rwandan academics on the causes and consequences of the 1994 genocide. This is perhaps not surprising, given that “the issues are too fresh, the society too divided, the community of scholars too small, and the political situation too tense” (Uvin, 2001: 76).

Learning from Ordinary Rwandans

My modus operandi in writing this dissertation is to bring in the individual lived experiences of ordinary people to show a different side of post-genocide Rwanda and to provide a human dimension to our understanding of the everyday lives of ordinary Rwandans since the 1994 genocide. This raises the issue of why we should care about ordinary Rwandans as they struggle to re-establish livelihoods, re-constitute social and

54 See IDRP (2003; 2005).
58 See Office of the President (1999a, 1999b).
59 Indeed, the gatekeeping capacities of the RPF to ensure their version of history is the only relevant one extends beyond the academy to documentary films. During my “re-education”, I was alerted to the “misguided” efforts of foreign film-makers to understand the government’s vision of national unity. I was told to avoid most of them, and rely on “the one written by a Rwandan” (Keepers of Memory, 2005).
60 This is not to suggest that there are no critical and objective Rwandan scholars, but only to highlight their rarity in the literature. I have been subject to the public wrath of Rwandan (and American) academics at conferences in the United States, who called my work “revisionist”, “pro-Hutu” and “baseless”, which perhaps explains in part why Rwandan scholars choose not to write on the politics of their homeland.
economic networks, and reconcile with neighbours, friends, and family 14 years after the genocide.

Different scholarly works have been decisive influences on my thinking, providing important conceptual tools. Bayart’s *The State in Africa* (1993), Ferguson’s *The Anti-Politics Machine* (1990), Malkki’s *Purity and Exile* (1994), Ross’s *Bearing Witness* (2003), Scott’s *Weapons of the Weak* (1985) and White’s *Speaking with Vampires* (2000) all deal with subjects and places removed from post-genocide Rwanda. Nonetheless the instruments of analysis and the usefulness of the methods they employ transcend the contexts of their origin to interact with my research in productive ways. This question of what we can learn from the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans has driven my research as I struggled to put into practice the concepts and tools that ground the analyses that follow in order to engage readers who are not particularly concerned with post-genocide Rwanda.

Portrayals of ordinary people, the “weak”, “powerless”, “passive” and “ignorant” in Africa that circulate in the North rarely come from ordinary people themselves, especially the poorest ones. Ordinary people are virtually absent as recorders of history and as actors in their own life story. The muffling of their voices has expunged the lives of millions of individuals, in turn crippling the breadth, depth and accuracy of depictions of societies in Africa and elsewhere. At best, ordinary people are “the masses” or “the population” and are freely spoken for by local élites or international actors. They are “powerless” and thus their opinion does not matter; their fears, struggles, triumphs and desires are written out of history instead of into it. Simply changing the ways of seeing ordinary people cannot transform the forces and structures that threaten or thwart their
survival. Yet, bringing in the individual experiences of ordinary people, like the 37 Rwandans from southern Rwanda whose voices form the backbone of this research is an important first step in altering the ways in which they are viewed and understood in the world. Thus, the dissertation is about crafting an image of ordinary people as agents.

Studying the different forms of everyday resistance of 37 ordinary Rwandans living in southern Rwanda allows for an understanding of how individuals mitigate the seemingly insurmountable effects of their social position – of, for example, their ethnicity, class or gender. It opens up not only a new way of seeing the personal strength and ingenuity of individuals who have had their lives torn asunder by conflict and genocide, but also makes a good case for bringing the lived experiences of ordinary people into the frame of analysis.

This dissertation will also be of interest to resistance studies scholars, as well as those interested in feminist interpretations of power. The research enriches the concept of everyday resistance in revealing its ambiguities from the side of the weaker party to the relationship. Such an approach appreciates the ways in which resistance is more than opposition to a dominant power; it can also be creative and transformative as it reveals the ways in which ordinary people negotiate the circumstances of their own lives to access more political, social-economic and personal control. A focus on the everyday acts of resistance also opens up novel ways of thinking about social and political inequities and the exploitative relationships that they breed in the social structure, to show how social hierarchies are maintained and to what effect for the so-called “weaker”
Everyday forms of resistance, understood as the “intersection of power and resistance and the complex processes in which the two are enmeshed” allows for a fuller picture of the politics of ordinary people to emerge (Haynes and Prakash, 1992: 19). This is important since the way in which politics affects and engages the real lives of people is almost completely absent or is represented through the eyes of local élites. From this perspective, those interested in Rwandan politics as well as those interested in the methodological aspects of bringing the everyday politics of ordinary people into their own analyses can productively read my research.

Plan of the Dissertation

The 37 ordinary Rwandans from southern Rwanda who participated in my research from April to October 2006 have four things in common: (1) they think of themselves as “survivors” of the 1994 genocide, regardless of their ethnicity; (2) they are poor and live in rural areas across southern Rwanda; most are landless and are unable to meet the minimum basic needs of their families; (3) they have been required, in some cases forced, by the government to perform acts of national unity and reconciliation and have tried to resist in indirect and non-confrontational ways; and (4) they have acted or spoken against the post-genocide government. Through a detailed exploration of these four elements, the dissertation identifies the various forms of resistance employed by

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61 This sets my work apart from anthropologists who study individual acts of resistance to reveal the devastation being caused by global capitalism. See, for example, Berry (1985); Gough (1981); and, Watts (1983).

62 The RPF has held power since it stopped the genocide in July 1994, first as the head of a transitional government of national unity and reconciliation (essentially a dictatorship), then as a constitutional dictatorship following national elections in 2003.
ordinary Rwandans as they seek to rebuild their lives in the face of a strong and centralised state power that has its home in the programme of national unity and reconciliation. The dissertation first situates the research in broader historical context to set the stage to communicate – in their own voices – the individual lived experiences of 37 ordinary Rwandans with the programme of national unity and reconciliation. It then focuses on the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans to the programme of national unity and reconciliation as a way to reveal and critique the mechanisms of state power in post-genocide Rwanda.

Chapter Two provides an overview of the methods used to research the everyday lives of ordinary, peasant Rwandans as they seek to rebuild their lives following the 1994 genocide. In particular, the chapter discusses site selection, access to respondents, interview procedures and safeguards, and well as how the raw narratives of ordinary Rwandans from across southern Rwanda are interpreted. The focus is on the life history interview aspect of the methodology.

Chapter Three contextualises the role of the state in the lives of 37 ordinary Rwandans to show how ethnic identities are a product of the power of the state, and of the various state-building projects that successive regimes have undertaken. It also shows how the programme of national unity and reconciliation is a mechanism of control that the RPF-led government employs to justify its oppressive post-genocide policies and practices. The chapter also illustrates the ways in which successive regimes in Rwanda have manipulated ethnic identity to seize or consolidate their power in situating the programme of national unity and reconciliation as another example of the pattern of political élites to maintain state power through the manipulation of history.
Chapter Four deconstructs the official version of the genocide found in the programme of national unity and reconciliation to show how it seeks to both simplify and shroud the individual acts that in aggregate make up the 1994 genocide in ways that allow the RPF-led government to silence dissent and control political opponents. The chapter also examines the extent to which the programme of national unity and reconciliation suppresses open and frank discussion by Rwandans of the violence perpetrated against them throughout the 1990s. Chapter Four illustrates the extent to which the programme of national unity and reconciliation fails to acknowledge how Rwandans of different backgrounds recall and make sense of the various forms of violence they experienced between 1990 and 2000.

Chapter Five identifies and analyses the various mechanisms of the programme of national unity and reconciliation to illustrate the extent to which it is a source of oppression in the daily lives of ordinary Rwandans. Drawing on feminist critiques of Foucault’s approach to relational power, the chapter makes clear the extent to which the RPF controls the political and social landscape in post-genocide Rwanda through its programme of national unity and reconciliation. It also shows the diffuseness of power relations in post-genocide Rwanda in examining how élites and ordinary folk alike are subject to the power of the state, albeit in very different ways. The chapter sets the stage for the analysis of the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans that are the subject matter of both Chapters Six and Seven as it sets out the discursive and structural elements of the programme of national unity and reconciliation that they seek to resist.

Chapter Six introduces the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans living in southern Rwanda. Specifically, the chapter explores the dynamics between local
government officials and ordinary Rwandans as both sides of the relationship endeavour to perform acts of national unity and reconciliation. It situates the discussion within the Africanist resistance literature to show how an analytical focus on the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans illustrates how they are not only enmeshed in but also positioned differently in relation to the mechanisms of national unity and reconciliation. I discuss the generalities of resistance – from talking back to a local police officer (irreverent compliance), to defying orders to remember and mourn lives lost during the 1994 genocide in accordance with state directives. In this chapter, we see how resistance includes maintaining silence (withdrawn muteness), as well as identifying when ordinary people push to open up space to better their lives, or the lives of their loved ones. The chapter also illustrates how acts of everyday resistance include staying on the sidelines in tactical and clever ways to avoid having to perform the rituals of national unity and reconciliation. The chapter demonstrates that where the programme of national unity and reconciliation forces ordinary Rwandans to live within its lies, they confront it in ways that seek to restore their personal dignity while subtly attempting to live their own truth of what they experienced before, during and after the genocide.

Chapter Seven explores one specific mechanism of national unity and reconciliation – the gacaca (ga-cha-cha) courts. Specifically, it illustrates the extent to which the post-genocide government and its agents control the gacaca process. The chapter focuses on the power of the state and its efforts, through its local officials, to control the gacaca process to identify the myriad constraints that the programme of national unity and reconciliation imposes on individuals, and how this limits individual opportunity for resistance. It focuses mainly on the everyday acts of resistance of Tutsi
survivors, as critical actors in the *gacaca* process, to demonstrate the subtle and creative ways in which ordinary Rwandans resident in the south express their discontent towards government policy before the *gacaca* courts. The chapter finds that the *gacaca* courts are more than an instrument of state power that is creating an atmosphere of fear and insecurity in the everyday lives of many ordinary Rwandans; the courts also help the RPF consolidate its political power in ways that are contrary to the stated goals of the programme of national unity and reconciliation.

The conclusion summarises the dissertation, with a focus on the implications of the research for theories of power as well as the methodological importance of bringing in the individual lived experiences of ordinary people. It also examines what the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary peasant Rwandans teaches us about the broader stability of the programme of national unity and reconciliation as the basis of Rwanda’s “present and future peace and security” (interview with NURC official, 2006). Lastly, the conclusion highlights some areas for further comparative research.

**A Note on Fieldnotes and Interviews**

Astute readers will have already noticed that I distinguish “interviews” from “fieldnotes” in the text. I do this to help readers understand and interpret who has said what.⁶³ The material gathered in formal interviews, which I define narrowly to include only the stories and observations of my 37 research participants, often in the presence of a translator and sometimes in full view of family, neighbours and even local government officials, are cited as “interviews”, while the experiences and observations in my

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⁶³ I used Emerson *et al.* (1995), *Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes* as a guide to make sense of the anthropological distinction between “interviews” and “fieldnotes.”
everyday interactions with Rwandans from all walks of life – peasants and élites alike – that I inscribed every evening in the format of “fieldnotes” are cited that way.⁶⁴ These distinctions are used so the reader can make sense of how I turned personal narratives into “findings”, taking descriptive accounts of everyday life in post-genocide Rwanda from a variety of actors, as well as my own observations, to reveal broad patterns of state activity from the perspective of some ordinary Rwandans. I also ascribe the observations and experiences of state agents, be they local officials or government élites in Kigali to the “fieldnote” category as most of my interactions with them were unplanned and informal exchanges since they took place as part of my re-education process.⁶⁵ Material gathered from state élites in formal interviews before my research was stopped are cited as interviews with a representative of a particular government ministry or body (e.g., “interview with NURC official, 2006” or “interview with senior RPF official, 2006”).

Pseudonyms are used throughout the text. As an additional safeguard against any potential government backlash or reprisal against the ordinary Rwandans that participated in the research, I do not cite the specific date or location of interviews.

Some participants, such as Jeanne, shared more of themselves with me, allowing me to understand and interpret their everyday experiences both formally through “interviews”, and informally through “fieldnotes”. In some instances, the voices of

⁶⁴ I maintain different standards of consent with state élites as I was almost always the weaker party in the exchange. Interacting with them was a perfunctory part of the research process as there were always layers of administrative approval required to access the remote areas where ordinary Rwandans live. In the early stages of the research, I had to cultivate rapport and trust with local officials in order to be allowed “to enter” rural regions within the bailiwick of the official in question.

⁶⁵ I had conversations with representatives of the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Gender, Internal Security, Justice, Local Government, and Youth, Sports and Culture; the Attorney-General, the head of the Gacaca Courts, judges on the Supreme Court; the heads of the Constitutional Reform, Human Rights, National Unity and Reconciliation, and National AIDS Control Commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman; leaders of the RPF as well as Catholic, Pentecostal, Presbyterian and Muslim leaders.
ordinary Rwandans are composites that grew out of the personal experiences of a cross-section of individuals. The composites are not fictional, but are instead a truthful representation of elements of personal experiences to represent fairly and adequately the challenges and hardships of daily life for ordinary people in post-genocide Rwanda. This may appear inappropriate to some, but I made this decision to protect individuals where their story was specific enough for representatives of the Rwandan government who monitored my research to identify them. In particular, I employ this strategy for research participants who are more likely to be identifiable through their marginal social location, notably detainees who are still imprisoned, ethnic Twa since they make up less than 1% of Rwanda’s population, as well as physically disabled participants.66

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66 Other researchers have taken this approach in other intimate settings. See for example, Alexander et al. (2000); Shostak (2000), Steedman (1986); and White (2000). Composites are also common in feminist-inspired research, see Anderson and Jack (1991); Einagel (2002); Minister (1991); Panos (2003); Stack (1996), and Wolf (1996).
Chapter 2: Bringing In Ordinary Rwandans

In studying ordinary Rwandans as active subjects, the research methodology allows for inquiry into their past, present and future. The task is not prediction but rather to illustrate the knowledge that ordinary Rwandans possess as a result of their lived experiences and to situate those individual realities within a broader historical, cultural and institutional context. At issue is how state practices and techniques of national unity and reconciliation affect people’s worldview, including their relation with self, other people and the state. The research does not seek to establish a knowable ‘truth’ but instead to show what counts as truth (state-based claims to national unity and reconciliation at the level of the ordinary individual), who or what evokes it, how it circulates, and who gains and loses by particular nominations of what is true, real and significant. The research brings in 37 ordinary Rwandans as “knowers” of their own life stories, rather than building on existing portrayals of these individuals as powerless victims.

The “tools” required to undertake this nuanced analysis have multiple footings. The first is deconstruction of the structural and discursive elements of the Rwandan state and the tools at its disposal to implement its programme of national unity and reconciliation. To this end, I employ a broad range of linguistic and non-linguistic materials – reports, speeches, websites, newspaper articles, policy documents and laws as well as symbolic practices such as art, poems, songs, and proverbs. The second tool is genealogy, which I used to understand the historical bases of national unity, and the politicisation of ethnicity in Rwanda. Genealogy is an important tool in showing how historical structures play out in the present lives of ordinary Rwandans and in dissecting
the meaning they attach to the programme of national unity and reconciliation as well as
to their own history (or lived experiences). The third is ethnographic immersion as a
means to uncover the routine, daily lives of people from their own perspective. These
“tools” contextualise how the programme of national unity and reconciliation structures
the lived reality of ordinary Rwandans resident in the south and serve to triangulate the
knowledge gap between the constructed reality of national unity, and the lived
experiences of unity and reconciliation of ordinary Rwandans. Life history interviews
were the backbone of the research, and this chapter focuses on the techniques and
procedures of conducting life history interviews with 37 ordinary Rwandans in the course
of their everyday lives, as well as the challenge of translating their experiences into
knowledge. This approach is developed over four sections. I first conceptualise life
history interviews as a method to analyse personal stories; I then discuss the choice of
southern Rwanda as the research site, as well as the process of identifying individuals
who were willing to share their life stories with me. In the third section, I examine the
procedures and protocols for conducting life history interviews with 37 ordinary
Rwandans, including discussion of some of the challenges I faced while in the field. The
last section details my interpretative approach and the methods I used to analyse the
stories told to me in the course of the research.

**Conceptualising Life History Interviewing**

I use the life history interview method as a way to bring in the life stories of
ordinary Rwandans to counter and contextualise the official narrative of national unity
and reconciliation. Life history interviews are a powerful tool to bring in the knowledge
of ordinary Rwandans as active subjects, rather than as passive, powerless ones. Through
life history interviewing, meaning the telling and retelling of the stories of ordinary people about their lives before, during and after the 1994 genocide, we learn more than how they see themselves in relation to others – we also see how they represent their own lived experiences of violence. As Plummer writes, “stories are the pathways to understanding the bases of identity” (Plummer, 1995: 19). The narrative approach that is inherent to life history interviewing has much to offer critical political scientists as they provide a way to make sense of language, including that which is not spoken (Riessman, 1990). In addition to encouraging a plurality of viewpoints and opinions to become known, life history interviews also provide ways to understand the interactions that occur among individuals, groups and societies – important insights when seeking to understand and explain any post-conflict environment (Jackson, 1998; Plummer, 1995, 2001).

With its capacity to contextualise and situate individual stories within broader societal discourses, both symbolic and material, life history interviews provide much needed nuance to the dominant narrative of national unity and reconciliation as crafted by the RPF (Fransozi, 1998, Milner, 2002; Young, 1997). Life history interviews are able to provide this contextualised nuance through the stories that ordinary people tell (Gubrium and Holstein, 1995; McCabe and Bliss, 2003). As a method of knowledge production, life history interviews are productive as they do not “ignore the politics of narratives and the extent to which they support or contest social structures and practices” (Jackson, 1998: 62; see also Robertson, 1983). Indeed, the knowledge produced from life

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1 In anthropology, history, social psychology and sociology, life histories have long been recognised as a valid means of knowledge production as post-positivist research has become increasingly legitimised (Cotterill and Letherby, 1993; Reinharz, 1992; Riessman, 1990, 1993; Skeggs, 2002). Life histories have been used by political scientists, but as a mode to write political biographies. Lasswell writes, “political science without biography is taxidermy” (Lasswell, 1986: 1). Needless to say, this was long before the post-modern turn made room for storytelling as a valid means of knowledge production (Aunger, 1995; Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2003).
history interviews with ordinary people does more than just reflect their lived reality; it also challenges taken-for-granted beliefs, assertions and assumptions of life before, during and after the 1994 genocide like those found in the RPF’s programme of national unity and reconciliation (Jackson, 1998; Worthington, 1996). In situating the lived experiences of ordinary Rwandan men and women, my dissertation privileges individual agency in producing a text that is grounded in the narratives that they use to “explain to outsiders what practices, places or symbols mean to them” (Young, 1997: 72). This is accomplished by retaining an awareness of the socio-economic conditions and the broader political context, as one considers how culture and social structures shape the stories that life history interviewees tell (Lawler, 2002).

**Site Selection and “Sample”**

In seeking to uncover the everyday experiences of Rwandans from all ethnic groups – Tutsi, Hutu and Twa – before, during and after the 1994 genocide, it is important that research participants live in and be surrounded by more or less the same people. This is the primary motivation for basing the research in southern Rwanda, home to the largest pre-genocide Tutsi population (Des Forges, 1999: 432, 489, 593; Guichaoua, 2005: 19-21). Many Rwandan communities have undergone profound changes as a result of the civil war of 1990-1994, the genocide, massive population displacement during and after the genocide, government pressure to relocate to an umudugudu (village) since the genocide, and the administrative reorganisation of the country.² Tutsi survivors of the genocide represent a small minority in many

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² Villages are not a feature of the Rwandan landscape, with most people living in dispersed homesteads; government efforts to relocate individuals to villages have been met with much resistance, with Tutsi in the South most vocal about their unwillingness to move (De Lame, 2005a: 12-16; fieldnotes, 2006).
communities, and indeed many have relocated since the genocide.³ Southern Rwanda however, notably in and around Butare town, is demographically similar before and after the genocide (MINALOC, 2002).

Butare province (now part of Southern province) also had a tradition of resistance to the genocidal politics of the previous regime, and is where instances of Hutu and Tutsi working together to resist the genocide in its early days are documented (Des Forges, 1999: 494-499; Guichaoua, 2005: 250-258). Also documented are instances where Hutu who resisted the plan to kill Tutsi were threatened with death themselves by the 
*interahamwe* militias that oversaw much of the killing (Des Forges, 1999: 555-591; Fujii, 2008; Straus, 2006: 122-152). Also living in and around Butare town are Rwandans who lived through the “humanitarian assistance” offered by the French, and those who fled to the relative safety of Burundi or were pushed into the camps along the border in then Zaïre, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Pottier, 2002, 1-8; Umutesi, 2005).⁴ There are also many survivors of the double massacre at the Kibeho internally displaced person camp in then-Gikongoro province; first the massacre of Tutsi and Hutu opposed to the genocide in April 1994 by the *interahamwe*, and again in April 1995, when the military wing of the RPF, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), opened fire on a largely, but not exclusively Hutu population (Burnet, 2005: 175-204; Getrey, 1998: 17-21).

*Umudugudu* were introduced by the RPF government to facilitate the resettlement of survivors of the genocide and old caseload (1959 – 1962) refugees.

³ IBUKA, the main survivor organisation, estimates that 70% of survivors have relocated (interview with IBUKA representative, 2006). Waldorf, citing a representative of AVEGA, another prominent survivors’ organisation, estimates 65% of survivors have relocated (Waldorf, 2006: 76, n. 457).

⁴ By the end of the genocide in July 1994, an estimated one million Rwandans were internally displaced, and about 1.7 million took to the roads and fled to neighbouring countries. The French, under Opération Turquoise, blocked at worst and delayed at best the flows of refugees crossing from Southwest Rwanda into Goma (in Northeast Zaïre) and Bukavu (in Southeast Zaïre).
The choice of southern Rwanda is also grounded in my own experiences in the region during an extended period of residence from July 1997 to January 2001 when I worked first as a human rights investigator with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Mission for Rwanda (UNHRFOR) in Gitarama and Kibuye préfectures (both now Southern province); and then as the Resident Co-ordinator of the USAID/National University of Rwanda Anglophone Law Project, based in Butare town (now Huye). Knowledge of place names from the period before the post-genocide government restructured Rwanda’s administration was critical during the research as the government changed the names of all provinces, and collapsed smaller units into bigger units with new names (see figure 1). Place names, notably towns and districts, were

**Figure 1: New and Old Provinces, 2006**

![New and Old Provinces Map]

Source: BBC, 6 January 2006
either renamed or dropped altogether. The government justified the renaming as necessary for the healing of Tutsi survivors as the invocation of place name is “just too upsetting for them” (fieldnotes, 2006). Throughout the research however, ordinary Rwandans from all walks of life continued to use the old place names, while government officials, many of whom returned to Rwanda after the genocide, used the new names.

Given the diversity of individual experiences before, during and after the genocide, and the demographic and administrative realities in southern Rwanda, I opted to follow individuals through their social and political networks, rather than limit the research to the goings-on in a specific community. Much like the footpaths that link homesteads, I chose to follow the paths between individuals and this approach took me across the country as the linkages between individuals were revealed. For example, the first participant in the research was born in Southern province, and her genocide experiences were in and around the place where she grew up just to the south of Butare town. As she shared her story with me, I made, with her permission, notes about the individuals she referred to. She spoke of family, friends, neighbours as well as her interactions with government officials before and after the genocide. Some of the experiences with the people were positive, others negative. Regardless of the quality or nature of the relationship, I tried to follow up with each of the named individuals. In this way, I was able to trace the private and public relations of the individuals who agreed to participate in the research. This method provided 167 names. I contacted 95 individuals of which 37 agreed to participate. In addition to these individuals, I spoke to or observed approximately 400 Rwandans in the course of their everyday life in spontaneous, casual conversations that resulted from everyday interactions from my base in Butare to
Cyangugu in the west, north to Gitarama and northwest to Kibuye and Gisenyi as well as points in between (see figure 2). I kept field-notes of observations and informal conversations, which I prepared every evening. Formal interviews with state authorities resulted in 79 hours of recorded material.

**Figure 2: Political Map of Rwanda**


I have a basic knowledge of Kinyarwanda, and was aware of the cultural norms and codes that would frame my presence in the lives of ordinary Rwandans. I kept a book of Rwandan proverbs (Crépeau and Bizimana, 1979) which served as a useful way to understand euphemistic comments about cows, drums, cooking pots and warriors. I also kept Kinyarwanda language books with me at all times (Overdulve, 1975; Shimamungu, 1998) both as a learning tool and to show that I was trying my best to speak to ordinary Rwandans in their mother tongue. I was able to speak about everyday
things, such as shopping in the market, asking about one’s family or work, and ordering a drink at a local kiosk. It also provided unparalleled day-to-day access to ordinary Rwandans as I was able to repeatedly interview individuals in locations of their choosing – for example, homesteads, banana groves, grazing pastures, at kiosks or pubs, on the bus or at the taxi-stand, or simply during long walks through the hills – without a translator.

Knowledge of the quiet resistance of ordinary Rwandans also helped me dig deeper when consensus versions of events inevitably arose, to go beneath the accepted standards of what could be safely discussed with an outsider. For example, a senior representative of my local partner association recommended many participants for me to interview, which I did but only because they were presented to me as “interview-able”. I later learned that the state member told these recommended participants what they could and could not say to me.\(^5\) If the participant spoke on themes other than those “authorised” by the staff member, cessation of the privileges of membership was likely, including loss of access to health care and funds for school fees. These narratives are not excerpted in the dissertation but instead speak to broader processes of surveillance of foreign research projects and to local power dynamics within survivor organisations in particular and at the community level more generally.

My formal sample consisted of 37 individuals, consisting of three ethnic Twa, 20 ethnic Hutu, and 14 ethnic Tutsi, all of whom are survivors of the genocide.\(^6\) I averaged seven meetings with each individual, resulting in an average of 9.4 hours of recorded interview data per participant, for a total of 348 hours of recorded material. Of the Hutu

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\(^5\) The cousin of the older sister (by a different father) of one of my participants was one of the individuals brought to my home by my local organisational contact. She said that members of the organisation in a community where some of my participants live were told by my contact what they could and could not say during the interview.

\(^6\) The 37 individuals are identified in *Dramatis Personae* (Appendix I).
individuals I interviewed, six have been through the *gacaca* process while another six
individuals – three who had confessed their crimes and three who had not – are in prison
on charges of genocide. None of the 37 participants identified as mixed Hutu-Tutsi; all
declared a “single” identity of being Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, which may be a reflection of
kinship ties as Rwandans take the ethnicity (or *ubwoko*) identity of their father. It may
also be a function of socio-economic class as all but two of my participants self-identified
as poor or very poor; ethnic identity did not shape their daily existence until the genocide
singled out Tutsi for death.⁷

Sixteen women participated in the research. Two participants were under the age
of sixteen. The average age was 43 years for women and 39 years for men; one
participant was over 70 and one was over 90. None of my participants finished primary
school; the average length of schooling was three years. Two have salaried jobs; the rest
are subsistence farmers, day labourers or unemployed. Twelve individuals consider
themselves *mayibobo* (homeless) as they lived in *imidugudu* (government-sponsored
villages), not in their communities of origin. All consider themselves Christian and
attend church regularly. All of my participants participated in the *gacaca* courts on
several occasions, and all 12 individuals had been through *ingando* re-education.

All but two of the individuals who agreed to participate reside in rural
communities, and their social and political outlook is oriented to hillside life. The social
and economic diversity within the sample resulted in my decision to sub-divide it into
three broad categories: 1) members of peasant families without sufficient land to be

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⁷ Indeed, nine participants to the research who identified as Hutu told me, in the words of one man that “we
all ran together when the killing mobs came. It wasn’t until later that we realised only some of us [Tutsi]
were being killed” (interviews, 2006).
economically self-sufficient (the vulnerable *abatindi* (*umutindi*, sing.)); 2) members of peasant families with sufficient land to be economically self-sufficient (the poor *abakene* (*umukene*, sing.)); and 3) members of peasant families possessing sufficient land and cash income to satisfy basic needs (the salaried poor *abakene wifashije* (*umukene wifashije*, sing.)). Such an approach allows for variations in the themes of the life stories of ordinary Rwandans to be further contextualised as their perspectives on life before, during and after the genocide are organised according to their location in the social structure. It also allows for nuanced distinctions among individual life experiences to emerge as the range of social roles played by ordinary people is shaped by their agency as structured within a range of limited choices.

I did not sample on ethnicity despite the temptation to do so, as individuals lived or died during the genocide on the basis of their ethnic identity. One reason why discussion of ethnicity was avoided is that the programme of national unity and reconciliation makes it illegal. I also did not want to frame individual experiences of the genocide in ethnic terms; instead I sought to gain the widest possible representation of participants regardless of ethnicity, and across diverse forms of identity, including kin, friendship networks, class, and gender.

**Interview Procedure and Protocol**

At the heart of the research is oral testimony, which speaks to my epistemological commitment to voicing ordinary Rwandans as sources of knowledge, as individuals who have lived part of their lives in conflict, and as a result possess knowledge that is the

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8 The various socio-economic classes that stratify Rwandan society are discussed further in Chapter Six.
9 This approach is inspired by de Lame (2005a: 168-243).
direct result of their lived experiences. By “ordinary Rwandans”, I do not mean those individuals who hold formal political power as a member of the political élite, nor those individuals engaged as agents of the state (police officers, civil servants, military personnel, local authorities, etc.). Instead, I conceptualise “ordinary Rwandans” as the non-élite and largely peasant citizenry. The life history method provides “an analysis of the social, historical, political and economic contexts of a life story” (Hatch and Wisniewski, 1995: 125). In many ways, the life history interview allows for a history of the present; it also centres the individual in his or her own narrative as the researcher becomes an instrument to voice the told story (Alesvesson and Skoleberg, 2000; Hoppe, 1993). The goal is not to elicit specific information, but rather to allow individuals to speak to the topics and issues that were important to them at their own pace and in accordance to their comfort level (Bondi, 2002; Einagel, 2002; Keller and Grontkowski, 1983).

The task of the researcher is to turn the life story into a life history by situating the individual narrative in broader context (Borland, 1991) and in ways that may cast doubt on official accounts and established theories (M.E. Brown, 1990; Olson and Shopes, 1991, Reinharz, 1992; Stanley and Wise, 1991). In turn, the “findings” produced can lead to the development of new theories that resonate more with people’s lives (Hyden, 1993; Stanley and Wise, 1991; Worthington, 1996). In addition, by entering into conversation with others, the stories that result from life history interviews have the

11 There is a growing literature on “just what constitutes the ordinary” (Gubrium and Holstein, 1995: 558). The starting point of this literature is the study of individual behaviour and agency from the bottom up, which is grounded in the work of Erving Goffman (1959; 1961; 1967). Gubrium and Holstein define the “ordinary” as that which goes on “while individuals are born, play, grow up, suffer, have crises of confidence, enjoy cheerful and rewarding moments, reason, experience change, encounter the strange, relish the routine, complain of the boredom of daily living, and die” (Gubrium and Holstein, 1995: 557).
potential to validate the knowledge of ordinary people as subjects that tend to be omitted from academic research and policy formulations alike (Benmayor, 1991; Reinharz, 1992; Smith, 2004). The life history interview is a critical tool for developing new ways of knowing, and of developing new frameworks and theories based on the lived realities of ordinary people. For this reason, I do not use the language of “informants” or “respondents”, but instead use “participant” to acknowledge the important individual role of ordinary people in sharing the knowledge that makes the production of this text possible.

Initial contact with potential participants was made by me alone, usually in Kinyarwanda, or sometimes in Kiswahili or French, where the participant and I discussed the possibility of working together. I told everyone the end product would be my doctoral dissertation, and perhaps in future a book. The goal was to produce a written document that would allow readers to understand the life worlds of ordinary Rwandans better. Several participants saw this as important to avoid future violence in Rwanda; others felt a sense of pride in that a foreign researcher would spend so much time with them, letting them talk. Many voiced a feeling of anonymous security in sharing experiences with someone with no formal links to Rwanda. The words of one elderly participant are emblematic:

Madam, I am so happy that you have come into my life. Never before have I been able to speak with such openness, and to a young stranger like you. There is no hope for me, I am an old man and the future is for youth. But maybe the work you are doing will help other young ones avoid storms like the genocide again. I am proud that you ask my stories and even more proud that you will write them down for others to see (interview with Aimable, a 76-year-old umukene Tutsi man, 2006).12

12 Many of my participants spoke of being “proud” about a variety of topics. I eventually came to interpret the various uses of “proud” to equate with the English word “glad”.

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Once the participant and I established a formal working relationship, the next task was to determine which translator would accompany me to the first interview. Some individuals sought an alternate translator to the one I proposed. For example, in one case I presumed that a Tutsi woman who was raped during the genocide would want to be interviewed by a woman translator who had also been raped. Instead, she opted for the male returnee because she felt she would feel less ashamed to “tell a boy” who would not know much about her life before or after the genocide and who had no knowledge of her personal ties or alliances.

Obtaining the informed consent of participants was often a challenge. Most of the “formal” life history participants, and the ordinary people I would meet and talk with in the street or in the hills, were illiterate and unable to understand the concepts associated with informed consent. I had two ways of dealing with this. First, I always explained my presence as a Canadian researcher and my interest in voicing the lived experiences of ordinary people before, during and after the genocide. I also explained that I was particularly interested in how national unity and reconciliation processes were progressing for specific individuals. This approach invariably resulted in anecdotal evidence about a friend, relative or associate of the person I was speaking to – the genocide touched everyone in Rwanda, even those who returned after 1994 and particularly those who had been in country during the genocide but who were not considered “survivors” by the government. Even the most nonchalant beginnings to conversation, “It is really hot today”, or “Did you see the Arsenal [soccer] game last night?” often resulted in a story of someone who had to deal with the local authorities in pursuit of unity and reconciliation, as individuals wanted to know what I was doing in
Rwanda and why. Second, with the life history participants, I tried to make it clear that their voices (in the form of text) would be quoted at length and verbatim and that it was my job as the researcher/writer to contextualise their stories within broader social, political and historical trends in Rwanda. Consent, or perhaps more appropriately, conditions of use, are always under review.

I worked with four research assistants to transcribe what was captured by voice recorder before translating the material into English. I carefully considered whom I would hire as research assistants after interviewing twenty individuals. No member of the research assistance team is mentioned by name and the discussions with each of them about whether or not to acknowledge their individual contribution to my research resulted in an added level of respect between team members and me. We were all aware of the politically sensitive nature of the research, and the assurance of confidentiality only led to increased trust and rapport between us. The assistants chose not to meet one another, preferring to transfer files through me. In the end, the team consisted of a male returnee whose family had been exiled in Congo in the 1960s and who was born abroad and did not experience the genocide directly, one man who lived through the genocide as a young teenager, and one woman who was raped during the genocide and lost her entire family. The fourth member of the team was another woman who survived the 1995 attack at Kibeho and lost several family members after the genocide officially ended in July 1994. Two of the assistants were of mixed ethnic heritage, with one Tutsi and one Hutu parent. Two were senior students enrolled in Translation Studies at the University of Rwanda. Both women were mothers, and this was also a factor with many female participants as we were able to share experiences of motherhood and continue our discussions about
their lives long after the voice recorder had been turned off. None of this post-interview material is quoted in the research, but did result in a deeper and more nuanced interview process as we spoke about topics that may have been off-limits without this personal rapport. Of particular interest and a real ice-breaker were my own children, the youngest of whom was born in Kigali in 1999; that I had chosen to deliver in Rwanda made me more approachable as some women felt “I was one of them”.

I never used the names of participants during the interviews, nor did I type or write their names in the transcripts or fieldnotes. Where a name might appear in an audio recording, I blanked out the name before transcription by a member of the research assistance team. I also blanked out any information that could be used to identify a participant, such as the names of relatives or friends, associational memberships or place names. I enacted these safeguards to protect the identity of participants and to ensure their confidence as part of the trust-based relationship I shared with both my participants and my research assistance team. Anonymity during the research process, particularly with individuals sharing their life history with me (and my translator), was virtually impossible. I followed these safeguards meticulously to ensure that any potential backlash during the research process, or resulting from any publications that ensued from the research, would ensure that Rwandan government officials would be unable to locate the ordinary Rwandans that participated in my research.

No two interviews with the same individual unfolded in the same way. Some interviews lasted for hours, and included sharing a drink or a meal with the participant and his/her family while others lasted only a few minutes. Only one individual did not complete the life history interview, saying that it was “too hard to relive it all” after the
third meeting. The first interview opened with the question, “How did you grow up?” Subsequent interviews opened with a theme from our previous discussion, unless the participant had something specific to share. Every participant responded with a long narrative about either the genocide itself or its aftermath; where they were, who they were with, what they saw, what they heard, and how “everything” changed after “that” (meaning the genocide). Others spoke about their trauma; still others about the experience of living with HIV/AIDS. Some spoke at length about how they killed. Most complained about increasing poverty and of living in constant fear of the future. All spoke about a loss of personal safety and increased insecurity in their home communities since the genocide.

I never asked questions about individual experiences during the genocide both as a matter of respect and to ensure that the individual remained in control of the conversation as much as was possible in the power-laden relationship between a foreign researcher and an ordinary Rwandan. Some participants would re-visit narratives about specific acts of violence during the genocide at the beginning of subsequent meetings, which further facilitated analysis as each meeting revealed slightly more or different information. Sometimes subsequent meetings would be griping sessions, where the participant would complain to me about a friend or relative, or the abuses of an “important person”, meaning someone higher up on the social ladder. Stories of the excesses of local officials, or the lack of morality of religious leaders would often fill our conversations.

The interpreter who translated the interview for me then prepared a verbatim transcript. I asked, in French or English, depending on the preference of the translator,
who then repeated in Kinyarwanda, how things were going with the participants, and if there was anything they wanted to share with me. I used a digital voice recorder after explaining its purpose; a few participants declined its use. I never took notes, opting instead for an active listening approach that allowed me to focus on what was being said, or not said, observing body language and nervous habits, and listening for possible denials or revisions from our previous interviews. The interpreter prepared the Kinyarwanda transcription before the next meeting with the participant, and we went with the digital recorder and the printed page in hand to show the participant the result of our previous interview. Only a handful of participants could read, so most listened to what he or she had said before the interpreter transcribed it into English, and I encrypted the file to a password-protected Adobe Acrobat file that was uploaded to a secure storage site every evening. I kept no files were kept on my computer any longer than necessary. At this point, I destroyed the paper copy and erased the voice recording. All participants listened to themselves early in the research, many enjoying hearing themselves for the first time, and most made corrections, or refined comments they had made at our previous meeting. While most participants stopped listening to the material from previous meetings as we moved away from topics dealing with the genocide and the post-genocide government, I continued this process throughout the research, relying on six voice recorders and a secure process of translating and transcribing the interview material.

Multiple meetings with the same participants made it possible not only to revisit events, but also for both parties to the research relationship – researcher and researched – to develop relaxed interactions. I sometimes used photographs, usually from local newspapers, as a prompt. The research was entirely open-
ended, with few closed questions posed, except to clarify. I worked with two of my translators before arriving in Rwanda to translate key concepts, and to strengthen my understanding of the nuanced meaning of such concepts in Kinyarwanda. Interestingly, some ordinary people, because of their low social status, were surprised the first time I asked them if “they felt that they had a choice.” For example, I initially translated the word “choice” as a command, rather than as an option, and my research team and I had long conversations about the meaning of such words in Kinyarwanda, which we refined and redeployed over the course of the research. In much the same way, I spent several hundred hours with each team member poring over the interview material, carefully working through meaning and context to ensure that the translations were as accurate as possible.

There was an element of caution early in the interview relationship, with participants maintaining distance until our rapport was established and we began to establish a relationship. The usual cultural wariness of an outsider was somewhat mitigated by my having lived in Rwanda. But, ultimately, my ability to conduct research depended on the various permission letters that constituted my official authorisation, which implied a tie with the government. That I had official permission was of no surprise to anyone. It was assumed and expected. I was unsure how ordinary Rwandans would interpret my obvious ties to the government, and the frequent visits to the offices of my local partners in their home communities. My willingness to come to the homes of individuals, sit with them and listen to their stories was an obvious benefit once the initial breaking-of-the-ice had been completed. Indeed, I was required to record my presence in
a community with the required visit to the local authority office, and to pay a courtesy
visit to the local office of my local research partners. Once this had been done, and the
local official recorded that I had come to speak to “peasants” or “unimportant people”,
they all but ignored my presence in a given community – it seemed that I was left alone
with ordinary people on the assumption that they had nothing to say that was of any
interest. Over time, my interactions with local authorities would inevitably become a
topic of conversation and a point of shared experience, as individuals would recount their
own experiences in navigating their relationship with local officials before and after the
genocide.

Another element of the research design was critical to building rapport and
maintaining trust. I tried to live, as much as a white foreigner possibly could, as ordinary
Rwandans lived, albeit in Butare town. I had no hot water, no telephone or any of the
“conveniences” of town life as a matter of choice. I walked everywhere, and only took
public transportation when I had to go any extended distance (I traversed distances of less
than 10 kilometres on foot; my translator for the day would often meet me at the agreed
site rather than walk). This gave me a certain cachet as it became evident to many people
that I was ready and willing to travel considerable distances on foot over steep hills, on
hot humid days, as well as during the rainy season. Some of the most revealing
conversations were in the hills surrounding the valley where I lived, and walked every
evening after dinner. During these walks I always met a broad cross-section of ordinary
Rwandans, some of whom were participating in the life history aspect of the research.
When I ran into participants outside the formal interview setting, I did not greet them
unless they greeted me first. This was out of respect for them as questions about how and
why we knew each other would inevitably arise. Sometimes, I was met with shouted greetings, such as “So nice to see you out here [in the hills]”, “I forgot to tell you this when we met last time”, or “Now you can come and meet my sister that I told you about…”

I did not pay any of my participants for the time spent interviewing, although I did provide sodas and tea and sometimes we would share a meal if appropriate. There was an inkind payment for every participant as I provided 2500Frw (approx. CN$7) phone cards for use at public call boxes in the event that a traumatic event manifested after any interview. Some individuals required more than one phone card, and some did not use them at all. One person returned the card to me after our last formal interview. Participants often asked me for money for school fees, or for dowry, or to buy livestock, but I always respectfully declined, stating that I had to save my resources to raise my own two children. Eventually, people began to see that I was “the one with the notebook” and, although a white foreigner, all I had to offer was my time and some kindness. The only time I offered any form of payment was when the child of one of my participants had fallen in a pit latrine during our interview and required medical care. I gave 1500Frw (approx. CN$4) towards his emergency care so that he could be ferried to the nearest medical facility, 19 kilometres away.

Participants and I built mutual trust and confidence over time, and it came more readily with some than with others, but I was mindful to treat everyone the same: with humility and respect. I knew from prior experience that Rwandans would speak their minds when they felt secure and comfortable. I was sensitive that learning about the lived experiences of a cross-section of Rwandans would require that I leave some topics
untouched, and that I listen empathetically to what individuals deemed important, and to
demonstrate my trustworthiness in not prying where my presence was not wanted. I never
pressed anyone to speak about anything they did not want to discuss. The close
relationships that developed were a reaction to my interest in peoples understanding of
and feelings about events and changes, in their lives particularly since the genocide. I
was only interested in what individuals were willing to share.

The research also had therapeutic effects for many individuals. In fact, many
people thought that if I was a researcher, and so interested in their lives as few before had
been, then I must by definition be a therapist. Most individuals were aware of the role of
therapists since the genocide as the post-genocide government had organised post-
traumatic stress counseling units for survivors of the genocide and for individuals who
need emotional support following participation in the gacaca courts (Bagilishya, 2000;
Ndayambajwe, 2001; Pham et al., 2004). “Therapist” was a role I could not escape, and
many individuals asked me during the long walks to and from interview sites if their
behaviour was “normal”, or confided to me their troubles and heartaches. This was an
added layer of stress for me as I spent most of my days listening to the narratives of
individuals who survived the genocide, had been raped, or tortured, or had witnessed
killings, or who had killed. While personally difficult as I often took on the pain and
suffering that individuals shared with me, the therapist image also meant that the
combination of my empathy and respect made me privy to significant and intimate details
of peoples’ lives that would have perhaps been unobtainable otherwise.

In anticipation of the trauma that I expected people to exhibit during the research,
I set up two safeguards. Prior to fieldwork, in October-November 2005, I spent six
weeks in Rwanda on a trauma counselor training session, organised by one of my local partner organisations. I lived with genocide widows in a homestead that the local civil society organisation Rwanda WomenNet built to provide a safe home for widows of the genocide that were too traumatised, too poor or too old to return to their home communities. During my interviews in 2006, trained trauma counselors from one of my partner organisations were available to each of my participants, either in person or by telephone.

**Interpretation**

All this material about the feelings and perceptions of ordinary Rwandans about their lives before, during and after the genocide leaves the problem of translating the “raw” material into a workable and academic document that is clearly intended for audiences far removed from the everyday lives of participants. Moreover, individual lived experiences are embedded in social and cultural forces that can constrain some and enable others (Scott, 1991). What standard of “truth” and validity can possibly be attributed to information generated by the life history interview method, and triangulated with participant observation, genealogy and narrative analysis? Ultimately, the veracity will be determined the reader, not the text, which is why I made the decision to quote the narratives of ordinary Rwandans at length. As Kellehear writes, interpretative research “is a ‘reading’ of the world, and the task is always on persuasion rather than proving” (Kellehear, 1993: 25). It is the work of the author to ensure the logical coherence of the argument being advanced, as well as the cogency of supporting evidence and historical contextualisation of the narratives presented. My commitment is to voicing ordinary Rwandans as active subjects, so it should come as no surprise that I embrace the
contradictions, exaggerations, and perhaps outright fabrications that the life history
method entails. Seeing Rwandans as agents means situating them within the complex
and ambiguous arena that makes up political and cultural relations in post-genocide
Rwanda. My task is to piece together and to make coherent sense of the multiple and
often contradictory presentations of self that constitute the life worlds of 37 ordinary
Rwandans.

I have not verified the narratives that were generated through the life history
method, except to ascertain the commitment of the individual speaker to his or her own
life story. Instead, I acknowledge that the individual narratives are historically situated
and enmeshed in relationships of power. In addition, I understand that each narrative is
shaped by each person’s selective and often self-interested memory. Some elements of
what was narrated to me may actually constitute something that happened to a friend or
relative of the speaker; I do not try to distinguish what is actual lived experience and what
is lived-through-someone-else experience. For example, among survivor women, it was
common to learn early in our relationship that the sister or neighbour had been raped
during the genocide. Sometimes, later on, the individual reported that she had been raped
during the war and it was important to her that I know it was her, and not for example her
sister. Instead, I seek to ascertain and understand the interconnections between who sees
what as important, when and how. My role as the author is critical, and a core
assumption driving my use of the life history method is that the material gathered is
mutually constituted. Together, the researcher and researched bring the life history
stories to life; the text is co-produced.
Central to this co-production is the idea that memory is important and the idea that the individuals living in the present sometimes develop a historical amnesia, particularly in a country like Rwanda where a plurality of histories exists, each corresponding to a political agenda of its own. History in this sense is hidden from memory, although it can be recaptured through the life history method, with its ability to frame, construct and define what is seen or obscured by individuals in the course of their everyday lives. In this way, life history is an entryway, through which both researcher/author and reader may begin to understand a political system other than their own. The purpose is to contextualise and situate the lived experiences and memories of individuals within the literature, to add a nuanced layer of knowledge rather than to correct or revise the existing material; instead literature is a tool for fieldwork. The life history narrative exists somewhere between history and memory, as it is spoken interaction that creates memory from the perspective of the present; the life history is, after all, that which is made real through being spoken about. As Feldman notes: “The event is not what happens. The event is that which can be narrated” (1991: 14; quoted in Ross, 2003: 77).

Memories are recalled for reasons that are important to the individual, which perhaps explains in part why each of my participants started our research relationship with their own experience of the genocide. It is still an event from which individuals are emerging, and which continues to shape the range of options available to them and ways in which they choose, or choose not, to engage those options (Roth and Salas, 2001). In many cases, particularly around processes of national unity and reconciliation and often with one another, ordinary Rwandans are circumspect in their engagement with state
power. Yet, through the material gathered through the life history method, individuals reveal sites of political and social struggle about what is “real” to them and its meanings. The life history method also reveals that personal interpretations of the past are founded on their experiences of the present, and the two are often in “deep and ambiguous conflict with the official interpretative devices of a culture” (Steedman, 1987: 6). The goal of the life history method then is not to determine the truth of an individual narrative but instead to situate it within broader societal narratives and to present alternate visions of the present while challenging dominant narratives about how things are with multiple versions of how things may be. My task is to sift through and analyse these narratives while keeping in mind the broader political and social context in which they were shared. Chapter Five marks the beginning of this analysis, in deconstructing the various mechanisms of power of the Rwandan state. Before moving on however, historical background is necessary. Chapter Three analyses the evolution of state power in Rwanda from pre-colonial times to 1990, while Chapter Four analyses the role of the Rwandan state in fomenting violence from 1990 to 2000.
Chapter 3: Everyday Life and State Power in Historical Perspective

I don’t understand why the government is always telling us to forgive those who killed and to reconcile with those who are not like us. We can decide who to forgive and who to reconcile with. Things happened here during the genocide. But things [violence] happened before and things have happened more and more since the gacaca courts started sending people to prison. Before 1994, we heard about this problem or that problem in Kigali when the burgomaster (mayor) would come and tell us there were problems. Sometimes we would have to perform some extra work (umuganda, communal work) but none of the benefits came to us. When politics eventually comes to our door like it did during the genocide, we have problems because the government always likes to pretend that we [poor] will do what they tell us to do.

I know that the government gives orders to show us they are in charge. Before the genocide, I was a Hutu who lived in the same community as Tutsi and we shared sometimes. But mostly within families, not with people we didn’t know. Or if someone got wronged, we ignored that family too. But now it is different. Everyone is different since the genocide. Some of us lived, some of us died. Some are still living but they say they are dead inside. We hardly share at all now because we don’t know who to trust to keep our safety.

Now, I am a former Hutu because the new government says that we have to get unified. I never thought about being a Hutu before but now I wonder why they want to wipe that idea out of our heads. We were unified before; we were poor then and we are poor now, even more poor. But now our problems include forgiving and reconciling with people we don’t even know or talking about things we never saw. [As a former Hutu], they [the government] expect me to go and “tell my truth”. As a Hutu [man] who was just in prison, I just want to keep quiet. I would say something [to the local official] but I have kids and I want them to grow up without interference so it is best that I just keep quiet about my frustrations. I have seen what happens to others who speak out. I just want to live in peace without interference…. (interview with Tharcisse, a 39-year-old umutindi Hutu man, 2006).

Tharcisse is a very poor (umutindi) “former Hutu” with limited options to exercise his agency, yet his narrative shows political acumen. He was accused of acts of genocide in his home community in 2001. He spent almost two years in prison, and was released
for lack of evidence in 2003. His struggle to re-establish the semblance of a normal life has been compounded by constant reminders from local officials to reconcile with his neighbours. His is a “small statement of dissent” (Scott, 1990: 192) as he and others in his marginal social position are hardly able to openly challenge the post-genocide order of national unity and reconciliation. Instead, he shows us the ways that the power of the Rwandan state enters into the everyday lives of ordinary Rwandans as he questions the need to “forgive”, “reconcile” and “get unified”. The excerpt also highlights the intersection of ethnicity and social location, as these two factors structure Rwandans’ experiences of violence as the state decides who is targeted and why.

Before and during the genocide (1990-1994), the Rwandan state targeted ethnic Tutsi and politically moderate ethnic Hutu. Since the genocide, whether or not the state decides to target individuals depends on where they were during the genocide and what the state perceives that they did. For example, Hutu men like Tharcisse are targeted for their presumed participation in the 1994 genocide. Tutsi who returned after the genocide, many of whom occupy local government positions, view Tutsi survivors of the genocide as suspicious, the rationale being that they must have colluded with Hutu in order to survive. The structural violence that individuals experience since the genocide is less obvious because the current regime has eliminated references to ethnicity from public life. Individuals are no longer Hutu, Tutsi or Twa but instead are simply “Rwandans”.

1 By “structural violence”, I mean the continued social and political inequality that manifests itself in the lives of ordinary Rwandans on a daily basis through state-led practices of discrimination and exclusion in ways that limit the social, economic, physical and psychological well-being of individuals. Others use similar definitions. For example, Schepers-Hughes, writing about everyday life in Brazil refers to structural violence as “unrecognized, gratuitous and useless social suffering” (Schepers-Hughes, 1993: 889). Uvin identifies structural violence as one of the root causes of the 1994 genocide, defining it as “a deep and widening inequality of life chances; corruption, arbitrariness, and impunity; the permanence of social and economic exclusion; lack of access to information, education, health, and minimal basic needs; and an authoritarian and condescending state and aid system” (Uvin, 1998: 107).
How individuals perceive their own identity matters less – both historically and today – than does the power of the state to shape individual realities through the careful and strategic use of competing historical interpretations of ethnicity and statehood. The broader point is that violence of some kind forms a definitive backdrop to the everyday lives of ordinary Rwandans. What changes is the type and intensity of violence depending on one’s social location and ethnic identity as categorised by the state.

This chapter places in historical perspective the impact of such fictions on the lives of ordinary Rwandans resident in the south. In particular, it examines the processes through which contrasting interpretations of ethnicity and statehood have been manipulated by successive regimes in Rwanda to justify and maintain policies of exclusion, the most recent of which is the programme of national unity and reconciliation. Such an approach matters because élite characterisations of ethnicity and the contours of the state “can be traced to intense struggles over power carried out by leaders – struggles involving the politicization of ethnicity and a perverse dynamic of violence and fear” (C. Newbury, 1998: 7).

The Strategic Roots of National Unity and Reconciliation

The government’s programme of national unity and reconciliation is grounded in a specific interpretation of more than a century of history. According to “historical” documents produced by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC),

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2 D. Newbury’s article “Irredentist Rwanda” also shows that Rwandan élites have used erroneous historical arguments to “legitimately claim” parts of Zaïre (now Democratic Republic of Congo) (Newbury, 1997: 212). For the “source” of this claim, see Cahiers Lumière et Société’s Ibisigo: Comme source de l’histoire (2003).

3 The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) was established by an act of Parliament in 1999 (law no. 03/99 of 12 March 1999). The 1993 Arusha Accords provided for the Commission as well as for a national summit on Unity and Reconciliation. Its founding Executive Secretary was Aloysia
Rwandan society was essentially unified before the arrival of colonial powers and the Catholic Church. Pre-colonial social categories did not matter because the three groups were unified by language, religion, loyalty to the Tutsi king, clan lineages and socio-economic interdependence. Conflict between groups was rare, and when it did arise it was rooted in regional or clan identities, not ethnic ones. Also implicit in this interpretation of social unity are pre-colonial class distinctions, with Tutsi being the richest, and therefore most important: “Ethnic groups are … characterised by wealth or poverty; they were not based on blood. One could shift from being a Twa or a Hutu and become a Tutsi if he got rich, if he became poor while he was a Tutsi, he was called a Hutu or Twa” (NURC, 2000: 19).

The official historical interpretation is that it was colonial rule, first by the Germans, then the Belgians, that divided Rwandan society and transformed the categories of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa into ethnic identities. The programme of national unity and reconciliation posits that the ethnic divisions imposed on Rwanda by colonial rule are the primary cause of the 1994 genocide: Until the arrival of the white man, who “threw down the seeds of ethnic division that caused the [1994] genocide”, the categories of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa had limited social importance, being occupational differences rather than status-based ones (NURC, 2004a: 11). Pogroms in 1959 led to the mass flight of Tutsi into exile and marked the first instance of genocide in Rwandan history. The 1959 genocide was not a “revolution” of Hutu against the oppressive rule of Tutsi but instead was the end result of the manipulations of Catholic missionaries and colonial

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Inyumba, considered by many to be the most senior female politician in the RPF. Burnet notes that her appointment was likely an attempt by the RPF to “control the commission and ensure that it promoted the RPF’s vision of national unity” (Burnet, 2005: 220). The current Executive Secretary is Fatuma Ndangiza, a woman who is also a member of the RPF.
administrators, who wanted to safeguard their influence on the Rwandan leadership following independence in 1962 (Office of the President, 1999a: 41-46). According to the programme of national unity, the post-colonial Hutu-led governments of Kayibanda (1962-1973) and Habyarimana (1973-1994) used ethnicity strategically to divide Rwandans. These regimes taught that “all Tutsi were foreign invaders who always subjugated and exploited the labour of the Hutu majority” (NURC, 2004: 22). It was these false teachings that created the hatred of “all Hutu for all Tutsi” (President Kagame, quoted in Jha and Yadav, 2004: 67, my emphasis). This false history also “dehumanized Tutsi” which resulted in a “widely-held belief that minority Tutsi were less deserving of basic rights than the majority Hutu” (Kimonyo, 2000: 107). The official narrative of national unity and reconciliation also sees the 1994 genocide as rooted in bad governance and weak leadership, which manipulated ethnic identities to hold on to state power (NURC, 2004a: 5-6). The post-colonial regimes encouraged an obedient and tractable population, which allowed an ideology of genocide “to take hold in the minds of Hutu” (Office of the President, 1999a: 54).

To counteract the teachings of the post-colonial regimes, the current government teaches an ideology of national unity and reconciliation through a variety of social mechanisms. Significant state resources are dedicated to ensuring the population “understands the importance of unity” (fieldnotes, 2006). The post-genocide government has established mandatory solidarity camps known as ingando to “re-educate” the population. Politicians, church leaders, ex-combatants, released prisoners, gacaca judges, and incoming university students attend ingando for periods ranging from several days to several months. Ingando lecturers, all of whom are RPF-loyalists, teach
participants the official interpretation of history presented in the programme of national unity and reconciliation (NURC, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2007e, 2007i; fieldnotes, 2006). The government also encourages a collective memory of the genocide through memorial sites and mass graves that double as genocide museums to show the end-result of ethnic divisionism. In many sites across the country, the bodies of victims are on display, exposed on shelves, in semi-open tombs, or in the rooms where the killing took place. Every year, annual commemorations are held during national mourning week (7 to 14 April) to remind Rwandans of the “pernicious effects of ethnic divisionism” (interview with NURC official, 2006). The RPF-led government has introduced new national holidays – Heroes Day (1 February), Day of Hope (April 7), Independence Day (1 July), Liberation Day (4 July), and Patriotism Day (1 October) – to accord with the vision of ethnic unity and act as platforms for leaders to remind Rwandans of the need to fight the ideology of genocide. The RPF also adopted new national symbols in 2001 – flag, anthem, and emblem – as the existing ones “symbolised the genocide and encouraged an ideology of genocide and divisionism” (Burnet, 2009; interview with NURC official, 2006). The 2003 revised Constitution made illegal public references to ethnic identity (article 33) and criminalised ‘ethnic divisionism’ and ‘trivializing the genocide’ (article 13). The RPF also changed place names at all administrative levels, from villages to provinces, in 2006 as part of Rwanda’s administrative re-structuring to “protect genocide

4 Several ordinary Rwandans told me that the new national anthem is actually an RPF war song that warns Tutsi to protect themselves against Hutu. I cannot confirm this as no RPF leader would discuss the lyrics of the anthem with me. The fact these individuals believe that these are the lyrics is significant.

5 These constitutional provisions reinforce a 2001 criminal law on divisionism and sectarianism that punishes public incitement to ethnic discrimination or divisionism by up to five years in prison, heavy fines or both (Burnet, 2007: 2; fieldnotes, 2006).
survivors from remembering where their relatives died” (interview with Ministry of Culture official, 2006).  

The programme of national unity and reconciliation is grounded in a strategic vision of history that differs from that taught by previous regimes. The pre-1994 regimes taught that Tutsi, Hutu and Twa were distinct racial groups that migrated into Rwanda at different times. That the Tutsi are foreign invaders who conquered Rwanda centuries ago and who have since oppressed and exploited the majority Hutu in myriad ways was a key aspect of the ideology used to incite the 1994 genocide and is obviously one that the current government seeks to undo (Waldorf, 2007).  

That the official interpretation of history had changed since the genocide was of no surprise to many of the ordinary Rwandans I spoke with. As one elderly man from Western Rwanda noted caustically, “whoever has power are the ones that shape our national history” (interview with Aimable, a 76-year-old umukene Tutsi man, 2006). Many ordinary Rwandans understand that those who hold state power shape the official interpretation of history; in this case, it is the RPF’s version of history that forms the official one. The version of history found in the programme of national unity and reconciliation is the “politically correct” one, and is the one that most ordinary Rwandans parrot in public even if they disagree in private.

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6 The re-structuring is officially a part of Rwanda’s decentralisation policy. The rationale is to dismantle the highly centralised administrative system that made the genocide possible (BBC, 3 January 2006; fieldnotes, 2006). In practice the policy of decentralisation appears to cover up the deployment of RPF loyalists throughout the lowest levels of the administration.


8 Others researchers have found the same. See, Longman and Rutagengwa (2004: 170).
In promoting a singular version of Rwandan history, the programme of national unity and reconciliation fails to acknowledge the multiplicity of historical interpretations (and individual lived experiences) that constitute Rwandan history. The post-genocide government has effectively disseminated a message of national unity and reconciliation that seeks to reshape the collective memory of Rwandans about the causes of the genocide. Many ordinary Rwandans understand the version of history put forth in the programme of national unity and reconciliation to be a product of the RPF élite, designed to safeguard their own positions of power rather than the result of a sincere effort to unify and reconcile the country. As Emmanuel, a 27-year-old Tutsi man who survived the genocide, whispered as we shared a tea at the local kiosk,

I can hardly support this notion of national unity when I know it is meant to keep us [Hutu and Tutsi] apart. If they [the government] left us alone, we could find our own ways to reconcile. Now, we have to do it publicly, and when we are told to do so. The RPF doesn’t care about if we truly reconcile, they only care about their own positions. Reconciliation is for the élite; it is not for unimportant people like me. I am Tutsi, and I can say that because I am a survivor. My [Hutu] brothers cannot speak for fear of being accused of supporting genocide. Who in their right mind supports genocide? Not [umukene] peasants like me. It is those who love power who love genocide…

I don’t know if Hutu and Tutsi like me [meaning peasant] were unified before the white man came. That is what they [the government] say. But how does it matter? I want to eat every day and I want to send my children to school. If they tell me that you [whites] brought division, then of course I agree.

Peace is for those with power; not [poor] people like me. All I can say right now is that I don’t know any Hutu who hold hatred for their Tutsi brothers like the government says they do. If they did, how would I even know? Rwandans keep secrets easily. And my [Hutu] brothers are hardly going to tell me about their inner secrets. All I know is that history is for our leaders; we just try to live our life without attracting extra problems. Even the genocide, how they say it happened at gacaca is not like it really happened…(interview with Emmanuel, a 27-year-old umukene Tutsi survivor, 2006).
This excerpt shows that for some ordinary Rwandans, the programme of national unity and reconciliation has adopted a historical narrative that is but one version of a sequence of inventions and reinventions about ethnicity and state power. The programme also ignores the power of the state to entice or coerce ordinary Rwandans to participate. Chapter Five details this aspect of the programme of national unity and reconciliation.

The remainder of this chapter situates the programme of national unity and reconciliation in broader perspective to show that the official version of history it presents to ordinary Rwandans is not only inaccurate, but also revisionist and designed to allow the ruling RPF to maintain control of Rwanda’s political and social landscape in much the same way as previous regimes in Rwanda have done. Specifically, the chapter focuses on the origins of the labels “Hutu” and “Tutsi” and the way élites manipulated these terms for political gain.

**Official versus Lived Histories**

In Rwanda, as elsewhere, élites have creatively revised history to justify their policies and actions, and the RPF’s programme of national unity and reconciliation is no exception. Two distinct histories have emerged. The first focuses on the distinct origins of Rwanda’s “racial” groups – the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. The second focuses on historical patterns of unity among Rwandans, noting that any differences were occupational rather than ethnic. The latter version is the one that the programme of national unity and reconciliation in order to socially engineer the future is a common strategy of élites. See Hobsbawn (1983: 1-14). For specific reference to the invention of tradition in colonial Africa, see Ranger (1983).
reconciliation draws upon to justify its policies and actions since the genocide. Both interpretations rely on the selective amnesia of élites about what ethnicity may have meant once upon a time and what ethnic labels came to mean over time. Neither version is reflective of the objective history of this complex state, whose political élites have written and rewritten official history for political gain (Chrétien, 1985, 1992, 2006, particularly 201-290; Vansina, 2004, 67-98; 126-139). Central to both fictitious versions is discussion about the nature of pre-colonial state structures and the role of history in creating and propagating ethnic antagonisms.10 The Twa, Rwanda’s third social group, are not discussed in much depth given their marginality: they make up about one percent of the population, and were “universally disregarded as well as disdained in state politics”, thereby minimising their political impact and unfortunately, relevance (D. Newbury and C. Newbury, 2000: 840).

*Imagining Pre-Colonial Rwanda*

Before German (1894-1916) and Belgian (1916-1962) colonisation, the Rwandan state was a highly centralised monarchy. The mwami (king) ruled through divine authority. He was the embodiment of political power, which was bestowed by imana (God). The good fortunes of the royal court were linked to the king’s well-being and supreme intellect in determining what was best for his subjects, ordinary Rwandans (Des Forges, 1972: 28; Reyntjens, 1985: 24-25). The first of Rwanda’s official histories were chronicled by historians attached to the royal court and were a reflection of power interests, not empirical fact. Official oral histories (*ibiteekerezo*) were mechanisms used

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to glorify the Tutsi dynasty known as the Nyiginya kingdom that held monarchical power for hundreds of years prior to the arrival of the Europeans (Vansina, 2000: 375-377). As Vansina points out, “Rwanda’s past was the history of a nearly uninterrupted progression of chosen people, the Tutsi, whose royal dynasty descended from the sky” (Vansina, 2004: 46).

Official histories, narrated by the *abiru* (the official interpreters of custom and history), situated the three groups – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa – into specialised roles that were based in each group’s innate characteristics. The official court story stated that prior to the arrival of the Tutsi in present day Rwanda, the Nyiginya kingdom (the pre-Rwandan state) was home to dispersed groups of cultivators (the Hutu) and forest dwellers (the Twa). In the tenth century, a group of pastoralists, the Tutsi, arrived from the north and easily conquered the region and its inhabitants through their cunning military prowess. The Tutsi, advanced as they were, introduced a centralised form of government along with pastoralism and ironworking. It was the Tutsi – specifically the members of the Nyiginya clan – that brought the Hutu and Twa together to create Rwanda (Vansina, 2004: 45-46). The Hutu were assimilated through a system of vassalage known as *ubuhake*. To submit to an *ubuhake* contract was an acknowledgment of submission to the king. The king ruled through a complex hierarchy of subordinates responsible for controlling the population, settling disputes and collecting revenue, and the *ubuhake* contract was a key instrument in the consolidation of his power (Codere, 1962: 50). The patron (*shebuja*) gave more cattle to the client (*umugaragu*), but maintained ultimate ownership. In return the client became the servant (*umuhakwa*) and

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11 It is called the Nyiginya kingdom after the clan name of its rulers.

According to this official narrative, Tutsi rule is natural since it is grounded in a benevolent relationship that respects the “skills and attributes of each group” (Des Forges, 1972: 51). Various proverbs and myths tell tales of Tutsi supremacy in all things intellectual and administrative. The predominant myth, which several RPF leaders used to legitimate the preponderance of Tutsi in the current regime, states that Kigwa, the first-born son of the heavenly king Nkuba, entrusted each of his three sons – Gatutsi, Gahutu and Gatwa – with the safekeeping of a calabash of milk overnight. In the morning, Kigwa found that Gatwa had drunk his milk. Gahutu spilled his. Only Gatutsi kept his milk safe; Kigwa therefore entrusted to him a command of the gluttonous Gatwa and the clumsy Gahutu (Linden and Linden, 1977: 17; Lemarchand, 1970: 33; Vansina, 2004: 12-13).

The official history and accompanying myths are but half-truths used to justify Tutsi supremacy and maintain differentiation among Rwanda’s social groups. Many court rituals and institutions were “fundamentally Hutu in nature”, and ignored “the role played by leading Hutu” in shaping the growth of the state (Des Forges, 1995: 45). Vansina’s research (2000, 2004) exposes the claim that governance was introduced by the “more enlightened” Tutsi, noting that Hutu lineages did have pre-existing forms of

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12 Control over cattle was a key element of acquiring power for the royal court. Extension of control over land, another important aspect of power and political relationships emerged later, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century (C. Newbury, 1980: 99).

13 The captain of Rwanda’s national football team uses the nickname Kigwa Kidogo (Kigwa Junior) to show “his power in leading the team to victory” (fieldnotes, 2006). Football fans told me that the nickname belongs to the national team captain. When I asked why, each informant linked the name back to Kigwa’s historical dominance. Kigwa Kidogo is not to be confused with Junior Kigwa, a Rwandan reggae musician.
social and political organisation long before the Nyiginya clan arrived. The true history of Rwanda is better understood as one of lineages (umuryango\textsuperscript{14}) which were both Hutu and Tutsi lines, both of which enjoyed significant autonomy and unity under the ultimate authority of its leader or head (C. Newbury, 1988: 95-98).\textsuperscript{15}

\textit{The Hamitic Myth}

The arrival of European explorers and missionaries in the late nineteenth century made way for the first written histories to emerge. Catholic missionaries, known as \textit{les Pères Blancs} (White Fathers), were encouraged by the Church to study local customs and learn Kinyarwanda; early written accounts were thus a result of their work (D. Newbury and C. Newbury, 2000: 844). Their historiography was grounded in the racialised worldview of Europeans, informed as it was by the “Hamitic hypothesis”. A pseudo-scientific and fundamentally racist theory, the Hamitic thesis ranked all races according to each group’s innate intelligence and skills.\textsuperscript{16} In Rwanda, the hypothesis maintained that members of a superior Caucasoid race from northeastern Africa was responsible for any signs of civilisation that the Europeans found upon arrival in East and Central Africa (Chrétien, 1985: 131). Through the Hamitic lens, European colonisers saw obvious

\textsuperscript{14}Literally, “the gate to the compound” (Vansina, 2004: 31). Lineages are made up of inzu (the house), made up of three generations: grandparents, their married sons and their grandchildren. They live in the same compound, or nearby. Inzu is the basic social unit in Rwandan society and is considered as the smallest political unit. Only older married men were the leaders of inzu. Younger married men and all women were their dependents. The social position of women was “complex and variable” (Burnet, 2005: 46). Their status derived from their father, husband or sons. Age and personality were of considerable importance as a generous bridewealth could greatly enhance a woman’s position, bringing with it considerable freedom of action within the family.

\textsuperscript{15}The other major kinship group in pre-colonial Rwanda was clans (ubwoko), which are more of a social category than corporate entity. Members of a clan cannot usually trace their ancestral links to each other, and clans have no political function “apart from social identity” (D. Newbury, 1980: 391). Each clan includes members from all three ethnic groups, which challenges the idea that Rwanda’s ethnic groups are rigid to the point of resembling castes (Codere, 1993: 94. Maquet, 1954, 1961).

\textsuperscript{16}The various (and contradictory) forms of the hypothesis are considered in detail in Evans (1980); Sanders (1969); Taylor (1999); Chrétien (1985).
evidence of Tutsi superiority in their natural ability to lead, their tall and slender builds, aquiline noses and fine hair; they were black Europeans. In reality, these characteristics can hardly be applied to all Tutsi. It must also be stressed that the Europeans interacted almost exclusively with the Tutsi aristocrats and their view was shaped by their relationship with the Tutsi political élite. Tutsi members of the political classes “accounted for less than 10 percent” of all Tutsi in Rwanda at the time of the arrival of the Europeans (D. Newbury and C. Newbury, 2000: 839). (Tutsi make up about 15% of the Rwandan population, both at the time of colonisation and today. For an explanation of these percentages, see Codere 1973).

Similarly, the Hamitic lens assumed that Hutu (about 85% of the population, then and now) were sturdy, short and dark. These physical features invariably meant that the Hutu were best kept as a subordinate class of labourers as they were seen as “naïve” and “easily duped” (Rwabukumba and Mudandagizi, 1974: 13). In fact, the Hutu were never a homogeneous group and numerous lineages, particularly in what is now the north, were headed by Hutu political élite (Des Forges, 1972: 3-4; Vansina, 2004: 145, 162). A third social category was also defined by the Hamitic myth – the Twa (comprising less than one percent of Rwanda’s population, then and now). Popular imagery portrayed them as shorter of stature “than even the Hutu” and “powerfully built” (Willis, 2005: 128). Like the Tutsi and Hutu, the Twa were hardly a homogenous social group; some were attached to the royal court as entertainers and story-tellers, but most were on the margins of society, relegated to the status of “exotic appendages to Rwandan society” (Kagabo and
Mudandagizi, 1974: 76).\(^\text{17}\)

Creating Ethnic Distinctions

It is important to appreciate that Rwanda’s social groups did not “arrive” as rigid ethnic categories, nor were they “found” as static entities. Instead, the categories of Tutsi, Hutu and Twa “emerged as part of the larger processes of social flux, individual action and political power” across the territorial region that would become Rwanda (D. Newbury and C. Newbury, 2000: 840). Indeed, there was significantly more individual mobility and interchange than any version of a collective Rwandan past can account for.

The state was hardly created by a single lineage, royal or otherwise. Power and ethnicity did not coincide originally; they took shape and salience in cadence, not confrontation with each other (C. Newbury and D. Newbury, 1995: 16). Before the arrival of the Germans, region was more important than lineage (royal or not) in defining identity, and the lived environment more influential than ethnicity in shaping the lives of ordinary people (D. Newbury, 1991, 43-64; D. Newbury and C. Newbury, 2000: 864-866). Pre-colonial historiography emphasised royal history – essentially a history of Tutsi élites – which was narrated by historians appointed by the king, notably Alexis Kagame. The official history of the pre-colonial period relied on the Hamitic hypothesis that favoured the Tutsi as natural rulers.\(^\text{18}\)

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\(^{17}\) Such imagery is used today to “attract attention to the plight of Twa. We can no longer organise as Twa because of the politics of national unity. We need to keep our people in the imagination of Westerners and that [as exotics] is how you whites know us” (interview with Prosper, a 46-year-old umukene Twa man, 2006). See also ASBL “Feu Blanc”, 2006 which outlines the importance of traditional forms of pottery for Twa living in Gatagara in Southern Rwanda. This publication relies on exotic images of the Twa, noting their “natural skill for the repetitive work of hand-building pots” (ASBL, 2006: 4).

\(^{18}\) Vansina was the first to debunk the Hamitic history of Rwanda in his 1962 L’Evolution du Rwanda des origines à 1900 (cited in Pottier, 2002: 50).
In reality, the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” did not refer to clearly demarcated, static groups; instead their meaning varied by context, particularly in regional usage. The nature of the ties to the royal court of a given lineage shaped the everyday meaning of “Hutu” and “Tutsi”. In regions where there were loose or non-existent ties to the royal court, the terms rarely had any meaning in everyday life. In northern Rwanda, where lineage heads, and their subordinates, carefully guarded their autonomy from the royal court, individuals referred to themselves as bakiga, not Hutu (Lemarchand, 1970: 99). In southwestern Rwanda, along the shores of lake Kivu, individuals identified themselves in terms of clan affiliation, which was shaped by kin and clientship ties, not by ethnicity (C. Newbury, 1978: 18). Residents in this region used the term “Tutsi” but in ways that did not accord with its usage in other regions (C. Newbury, 1988: 11).

In parts of Rwanda where the everyday use of both “Hutu” and “Tutsi” was common, their meaning leaned more towards identifying wealth, or region of origin, and not ethnicity. In southeast Rwanda, “the origin of the terms Tutsi and Hutu is obscure, but, in fact ‘Tutsi’ refers to a ‘noble’, as ‘Hutu’ refers to a ‘commoner’ and not to different tribes” (Gravel, 1968: 165). Wealthy, and hence powerful, Hutu lineages that commanded the respect of their neighbours acquired local influence to the extent that they often were “absorbed into the upper class” (Gravel, 1967: 329; 1968: 170). Economically successful Hutu clients could adapt their identity to become Tutsi, which was used as a marker of socio-economic status. The meanings of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” were fluid in that individuals could become influential (Tutsi) or remain common
“Tutsi” was used to indicate a certain level of power and wealth (particularly in the form of cows) and was generally associated with those lineages linked to the royal court. Even Alexis Kagame recognised that “whoever possesses many heads of cattle is called Tuutsi [sic], even if he is not of the Hamitic race” (quoted in C. Newbury, 1988: 253, n.34; see also d’Hertefelt, 1971: 49-62).

Thus, the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” were terms whose meanings varied according to context, notably region and clan identification. Most important were lineage affiliations as these structured the elements of identity that were relevant in daily interactions as well as economic and political obligations to the state (through local chiefs). Tutsi were members of the ruling élite, particularly those closest to the royal court. Many chiefs were Hutu and they held important positions as confidants to the royal court (Franche, 1997: 18). The programme of national unity and reconciliation relies on these meanings of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” in hopes of harkening back to the imagined unity of the pre-colonial period. What the programme fails to appreciate is that state-building marked an increasing intrusion into the everyday lives of rural Rwandans. The meaning of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” began to take on a more fixed and uniform meaning under a period of state expansion led by mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri (ca. 1865-1895). Rwabugiri was determined to expand the territorial reach and political influence of his kingdom by expanding the network of lineage chiefs to bring more ordinary Rwandans into contracts of servitude and submission.

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19 The programme of national unity and reconciliation relies on a portrayal of Tutsi as a socio-economic category, rather on the image of Tutsi as immigrants from Ethiopia (as per the Hamitic myth). The genocidal ideology of the previous regime was grounded in part on the premise that Tutsi were foreign invaders who only needed to be returned to Ethiopia (Des Forges, 1999: 84).
**State Power and the Politicisation of Identity**

It was the middle of the nineteenth century when the royal court began to centralise political power under the expansionist approach of king Rwabugiri. The diversity of political lineages and the high degree of autonomy they enjoyed from the royal court were soon a thing of the past. Rwabugiri sought close administrative control through central chiefs, many of whom he hand-picked (Vidal, 1969: 391). Peripheral regions that had previously enjoyed significant autonomy from the royal court soon found themselves governed by a complex network of chiefs that Rwabugiri appointed from Tutsi-headed lineages. Rwabugiri freely disposed of incumbents and appointed chiefs directly dependent on him (C. Newbury, 1988: 108). Direct central administrative control was the hallmark of Rwabugiri’s reign. Under his rule, domination of Hutu by Tutsi through clientship mechanisms began to take on political meaning, particularly as the royal control spread administratively across the kingdom, and downward to the lower levels of society (C. Newbury, 1978: 19). Three related processes in particular shaped the everyday life of ordinary Rwandans: the growing ascendance of chiefs appointed by Rwabugiri at the expense of the authority of lineage heads, shifts in land rights, and a move towards greater social stratification. In particular, Rwabugiri sought to exercise influence through chiefs loyal to him with a clientship practice called *umuheto*.

Before Rwabugiri extended his reign to the regions, *umuheto* was a practice in which lineage heads in the peripheral regions maintained ties to central chiefs loyal to the court. *Umuheto* ties were grounded in reciprocal alliances, sometimes even characterised by strong affective ties (C. Newbury, 1978: 18). It was a bond between élites that was

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limited to cattle-owning lineages and its defining characteristic was the social and political cohesion it created among élites (Vidal, 1969: 390). With the extension of the power of the royal court and the appointment of provincial chiefs loyal to the court, *umuheto* became a tool of ethnic differentiation. Under Rwabugiri, differences between the heads of Hutu and Tutsi lineages were sharpened as his provincial chiefs in turn appointed their subordinate hill chiefs. Most importantly, most provincial chiefs were Tutsi, and the category began to take on “hierarchical overtones” (C. Newbury, 1978: 21). Tutsi became a term associated primarily with central administrative power, particularly the exactions of chiefs that were arduous for many ordinary Rwandans – both Hutu and Tutsi. Dispossessed chiefs – Hutu and Tutsi – were relegated to the sidelines of political activity as they were increasingly unable to protect their subordinates from the continued demands of court-appointed provincial chiefs (Des Forges, 1972: 147).

Rwabugiri’s policies led to significant changes in land rights related to both tenure and distribution. *Ubukonde*\(^{21}\) was transformed from a collective endeavour where property rights were vested in a lineage as a whole into *isambu*, land owned by hill chiefs who guaranteed land tenure to subordinates in exchange for payments and corvée labour (Vansina, 2004: 42). Dispossessed lineage heads and their membership found that under *isambu* their ability to work the land – either through pasturage or cultivation – was compromised as the demands of the hill chief determined when and by whom the land could be used (C. Newbury, 1978: 20). This also marked a dramatic shift away from the need of young lineage members to address its head to request their own land; instead it

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\(^{21}\) *Ubukonde* is the practice of acquiring land through sweat equity. As Vansina writes, “whomever cleared a plot of land became its owner because the arable land was the fruit of his labour” (Vansina, 2004: 40).
became a form of coercive political control as hill chiefs sought to extend their political authority over existing lineage members (Meschi, 1974: 44-49; Vansina: 2004: 97).

By the end of the nineteenth century, “Tutsi” came to identify those individuals associated with central power, notably through the exactions of Tutsi hill chiefs who served the interests of the court, not those of everyday lineage members. “Hutu” came to be associated with, and defined by, inferior status. The political salience of membership in one category or the other came to depend on who held power through clientship mechanisms, and who did not (C. Newbury, 1980: 100). It is doubtful that Rwabugiri’s policies were specifically designed to transform the meaning of the labels Tutsi and Hutu. They were developed with the goal of enlarging the power of the royal court, and not to favour Tutsi as a group. Most important was the changing nature of power and the increasing authority with which subordinates of the court in turn treated their subordinates in the hills.

**The Internal Politics of the Royal Court**

Also of importance for understanding the politicisation of the terms Tutsi and Hutu are the internal politics of Rwabugiri’s court. His reign, particularly in the last 10 years before his death in 1895, gave rise to a period of increasing violence among prominent lineages, all of whom vied for royal power in violent ways. The effects of the violence among and within lineages impacted court relations with the German colonisers as the policies of Rwabugiri’s successor Musiinga shaped relations; indeed it was the Rwandans “who largely determined the ways in which colonialism influenced the

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22 Rwabugiri did not discriminate and killed Hutu and Tutsi rivals, including his own mother (Des Forges, 1972: 13; Linden and Linden, 1977: 20).
transformation of clientship ties” (C. Newbury, 1988: 59). The politics of the court and its rivals were intense, characterised by waves of executions and persecutions among various factions.\textsuperscript{23} The intrigues of the court culminated in a coup d’état that overthrew Rwabugiri’s legitimate successor king Mibambwe Rutarindwa and put Musinga on the throne in December 1896.\textsuperscript{24} It resulted in a “nearly permanent recourse to violence” that created a climate of insecurity and fear among ordinary Rwandans and élites alike (Vansina, 2004: 181). It also succeeded in dissolving the cohesion of the most basic social groups, from the inzu up to the court itself. The coup also marked intense violence between élite lineages within prominent clans as the Abahindiro (of the lineage of Abanyiginya royal clan) were soundly defeated by the Abakagara (of the Abeega clan). The shift in power from élites of one royal clan to another generated significant changes in local patron-client ties, “since those with links to a central patron who was on the losing side … found it necessary to switch allegiances” (C. Newbury, 1988: 59).

Military activity intensified, as did the politics of denunciation and accusation (Weinstein, 1977). Both practices were common among élites as tools for eliminating adversaries, either for the purpose of obtaining their wealth (in the form of cattle and people) or out of simple hatred (Codere, 1962: 71; Vansina, 2004: 184). Acts of denunciation among lineage heads could culminate in the death of one or both men, adding further to the sense of insecurity among the population as the protection of patrons for the members of their lineage could not be assured. Patterns of disgracing or shaming


\textsuperscript{24} The Rucunshu coup took place in December 1896. Members of Musinga’s lineage (the Abakagara) staged a bloody coup d’état in which king Mibimbwe Rutarindwa was overthrown. The Rucunshu coup granted an increase in power and prestige to the Abeega clan (of the Abakagara lineage), as well as the status of individuals linked to Abeega patrons.
hill chiefs by competing élites was devastating to ordinary people, as Musinga replaced these chiefs with regard to his own power base, not the contractual rights of its occupants (Des Forges, 1972: 148-150). The new chiefs routinely abused their power and extorted as much as they could from local people (Meschi, 1974: 49). This inevitably led to often violent conflict in the hills as the newcomers sought to exercise their authority over the existing chiefs. Ordinary people did not know where to look for protection, further heightening their insecurity. The internal politics of the royal court served to further institutionalise a “humiliating differentiation made between Tutsi and Hutu” in the exploitation of the population, including imposed corvée labour on farmers but not herders and the increasing interference of the court in local administration (Vansina: 2004: 192). Ubuhake contracts were particularly affected as once powerful patrons fell in disgrace some ordinary people were unable to establish relations with a new patron; others, particularly in northern Rwanda, no longer looked for a patron, preferring to “go it alone” (Meschi, 1974: 44).

The dissolution of ubuhake relationships was but one aspect of the ever-increasing exploitation of the population. Ubureetwa – manual labour at the service of Tutsi authorities – applied only to Hutu and it quickly became “the most hated and humiliating [of practices as it] symbolised the servitude of the Hutu vis-à-vis the dominant minority” (Rwabukumba and Mudandagizi, 1974: 21). Ubuhake affected only a small percentage of ordinary Rwandans while ubureetwa put thousands of people

\[25\] Vansina suggests that ubureetwa was introduced as an act of vengeance by Rwabugiri after a Hutu-led military unit routed his army in late 1894 or early 1895. He writes, “a resentful Rwabugiri supposedly decreed that the Hutu could cultivate for themselves by night, since by day they would have to work for the courageous Tutsi!” (Vansina, 2004: 192). Newbury suggests that the imposition of ubureetwa on Hutu varied from one region to another, further highlighting the need for aggressive and violent attacks by the court to impose its control on the regions (C. Newbury, 1980: 101).
in “direct contact with political authority through an extractive relationship” (C. Newbury, 1980: 108). The centralisation of control over land, the loss of autonomy for ordinary people dependent on patrons and the multiplication of local authorities linked to the royal court, combined with the violent politics of the court were all on going on the eve of European arrival.

**Colonial Transmutations**

Rwabugiri died in 1895. Shortly after, Germany established a military presence in northwest Rwanda and their colonial rule began in 1898 with a minimal presence of five administrators for the entire country (Louis, 1963: 204; Reyntjens, 1995: 17). The political and social impact of their presence was substantial. A German officer, von Ramsey, proposed an alliance with Musinga that his mother Kanjogera readily accepted. Musinga ascended to the throne at the age of 13 or 14 in 1897 and his enthronement was heavily contested by chiefs, warriors and lineage heads seeking either to maintain a position of influence with the royal court, or seize its power (Louis, 1963: 204; Vansina, 2004: 179). The Germans did not interfere in domestic affairs for the next twenty years, which allowed the political intrigues and violence of Rwabugiri’s era to continue (Des Forges, 1972: 174-180).

It was German policy to rely on the “traditional” rulers, which meant that they used Tutsi chiefs as intermediaries to the population (Reyntjens, 1985: 97). This greatly enhanced the power of these chiefs,

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26 Kanjogera was a member of the Abakagara lineage, and was influential in court politics, notably in orchestrating her son Musinga’s accession to the throne following the Rucunshu coup. As queen mother, she held a vaunted position, and used her power to shape court ritual obligations as well as important political prerogatives. Her efforts to concentrate royal power in her own hands continued well into Musinga’s reign, the result of which was continued violence among competing élites to gain power. See Des Forges, 1972: 33-62; C. Newbury, 1988: 58-59; Vansina, 2004: 176-177, 190-191, 202.

27 The sheer number of adversaries facing one another allowed “every ambitious aristocrat […] to try to concentrate as much power and wealth as possible in his own hands” (Vansina, 2004: 181).
furthering adding to the violence and intrigues surrounding the court, which in turn heightened the fear and insecurity of ordinary people. Chiefs appointed an additional layer of administrators, the *ibirongozi*, to perform “particularly unpopular functions for the hill chiefs, such as extracting prestations, services and taxes from the population” (C. Newbury, 1988: 115). These new officials usurped the functions previously carried out by lineage heads. Hutu, who had once enjoyed autonomy and authority as lineage heads and local leaders, saw their status diminished as power concentrated in the hands of Tutsi chiefs (Linden and Linden, 1977: 124).

At about the same time, Catholic missionaries arrived in Rwanda. The White Fathers also tried to establish good working relations with Musinga but were met with a mixture of resistance and quiescence. Under pressure from the Germans, whose firepower Musinga relied upon to consolidate his power, he granted the Fathers land for their missions (Des Forges, 1972: 37-38). The parcels of land Musinga granted the White Fathers were strategically offered in a location far away from the court to provide a modicum of distance while superficially appearing to facilitate their mission. Musinga was uneasy about the presence of the White Fathers, and advised Tutsi chiefs not to send their children or subjects to missionary school – religious teaching was to be only for Hutu and Twa (Des Forges, 1972: 39). The result was the unintentional creation of a largely Hutu church since the first converts were nearly all poor Hutu (Linden and Linden, 1977: 52). Indeed, many Hutu and ordinary Tutsi sought the protection of the White Fathers from increasingly extractive Tutsi chiefs and their new deputies, the *ibirongozi* (Des Forges, 1972: 41-42).
Rwanda came under Belgian control in 1916 following the advance of Belgian troops across Rwanda. German forces retreated, leaving Rwanda to the Belgians, which also altered local power relations. During the first year of Belgian rule, its military administration regarded Musinga with suspicion. Prominent regional chiefs took the opportunity to defy royal authority and deal directly with the Belgians. Musinga was unable to punish these renegade chiefs, which further undermined his personal prestige and political power (C. Newbury, 1988: 129). Belgian policy initially favoured the Hutu, notably in the northwest of Rwanda. Like the Germans, they relied on Tutsi chiefs as agents of their rule but tried to influence their conduct to “conform to standards of administrative, rational behaviour” (C. Newbury, 1980: 102). Chiefs astutely recognised that loyalty to the Belgians was critical for their own survival as Musinga was no longer “the top of the clientship chain” (Linden and Linden, 1977: 157). The Belgian authorities backed the power of Tutsi chiefs, in turn allowing for a greater proliferation of chiefly dominance through administrative practices such as obligatory cultivation, corvée labour and the imposition of additional taxes which were levied on individuals, rather than on lineages as they had been in the past (C. Newbury, 1978: 23). With these new powers concentrated in the hands of Tutsi chiefs, two parallel systems of exploitation emerged under Belgian rule – clientship linkages and administrative powers. The role of “patron” and “chief” were conflated in ways that “much reduced the capacity of clients to bargain and manoeuvre” (C. Newbury, 1978: 22). Moreover, the Belgian authorities appointed chiefs from above, and usually an individual who was not resident in the community he was to control. The primary responsibility of the chief became ensuring that the local

28 These changes in the power equation were further underscored by the hardship experienced by ordinary Rwandans by severe famine (known as Rumanura) in the northwest (Des Forges, 1972: 210-211).
population met its corvée and tax obligations while his loyalty was to his political superior (C. Newbury, 1988: 110-114). When the Belgians consolidated small administrative units into larger ones, the distance between chiefs and the population was increased (C. Newbury, 1978: 22).

Belgian policy required that chiefs ensure that every adult man pay taxes and performed corvée when requested. In practice, the Belgians often arbitrarily administered their policies to serve the interests of the chief as the local chief had great discretion in determining who paid or participated, and in what capacity. The type of work that chiefs assigned to individuals for corvée often depended on that ordinary individual’s standing with the chief. Those of low or no status were called upon more often, and for the more exploitative and oppressive tasks (Codere, 1962: 51; C. Newbury, 1988: 127-128; 136-137; Vidal, 1974: 55). An oft-cited reason for a chief to dispossess an individual of his land was non-performance or non-payment. Even where the work was completed, or the payment made, it was the chief who reported to his Belgian superiors who had “paid” or “refused” corvée (Pottier, 2002: 183-184). The arbitrary use of power by the chiefs, who were the most effective intermediaries to local populations, was usually overlooked so long as “the chiefs met the requirements placed on them” (C. Newbury, 1978: 24). This put ordinary people in a bind as they consistently found themselves in increasingly oppressive client-patron relationships where they were the weaker party but which also required that they seek to gain the favour of the chief in their community. Ordinary Rwandans who had strategically abandoned client relationships after Rwabugiri’s reign were forcefully brought back into patron-client relationships, the
most important of which was the land clientship practice of *ubureetwa* (C. Newbury, 1988: 134).

The Belgian authorities were particularly fond of *ubureetwa* as it ensured the submission of the population to their chiefs. In practice, *ubureetwa* was a specifically Hutu obligation, particularly as those of Tutsi status could more easily defend themselves against the whims of chiefs. The services performed “were usually of the most menial kind” (C. Newbury, 1988: 141). More significantly, *ubureetwa* directly shaped the relationship of the ordinary person to their land since non-performance could provoke the chief to seize one’s land. The Belgian authorities did not abolish the practice as they saw it as an expression of the obedience of the population to their chiefs, who owed their privileged position of power to the Belgians. Newbury argues that pressure from the chiefs themselves to uphold the practice likely contributed to *ubureetwa*’s longevity as “the unpaid labour available could […] contribute substantial enrichment of the chiefs” (C. Newbury, 1988: 142), fuelled continued insecurity among Hutu and “further bitterness” toward the capricious rule of Tutsi chiefs, backed as it was by the Belgian authorities (C. Newbury, 1978: 25).

Colonial rule thus resulted in a more pronounced centralisation of power at the top while creating group awareness among élite Hutu as they were the primary victims of the political, social and economic changes that allowed élite Tutsi to use the state apparatus to forward their own interests. These changes meant that élite Tutsi identity was formed before the colonists arrived, backed as it was by the rich oral tradition of the royal court and its historians. Hutu group awareness emerged in relation to the colonial state as it formalised the leadership of Tutsi. Hutu were not given a national political role
in a restrictive colonial context which favoured élite Tutsi; it is the use and abuse of power by Tutsi chiefs that created Hutu consciousness. As Newbury argues, “It was in fact oppression in its many different forms that brought about the cohesion among Hutu…” (C. Newbury, 1988: 209). Those Hutu who became political leaders in the 1950s pursued higher education through seminary school offered by the White Fathers, where they were exposed to the ideals of equality and social justice (Linden and Linden, 1977: 209, 198). Hutu leaders were able to tap into this consciousness to call attention to the inequalities in Rwanda, and gave a voice to their grievances as the country moved towards independence at the end of the 1950s. Ordinary Rwandans – Hutu and Tutsi – suffered under the expansionist policies of both the royal court and colonial authorities. The growth of the colonial state meant a greater intrusion and increased extractions, which in turn threatened their security. Ethnicity was less salient in their daily lives than was their relationship to their patron, and the ways in which they were able to navigate the labour requirements of that relationship, which was in turn shaped by the relationship of their patron to the Belgian authorities. Most devastating to many ordinary Rwandans was the loss of kinship ties; if anything, the dual colonial practices of the Belgians and Tutsi authorities heightened awareness among ordinary Rwandans of their lack of control over key resources, namely their own land, cattle and labour.

*Decolonisation and the 1959 Revolution*

The bitter resentments and political consciousness of rural Rwandans – ordinary Hutu and Tutsi alike – were transformed into a movement for Hutu liberation by educated Hutu. Ordinary Tutsi participated in hopes of releasing themselves from the oppressive nature of clientship relations and labor control mechanisms. The movement called for the
transformation of the oppressive political and economic structures before independence (Lemarchand, 1970: 112). Belgium was under pressure from the United Nations to decolonise. In July 1952, it issued a decree setting out the procedures for the formation of elective councils from the level of the sub-chief up to the highest positions in the state (Lemarchand, 1970: 79-81; Linden and Linden, 1977: 230-231). Elections were held in 1952 and 1956; both times Hutu candidates were virtually shut out as Tutsi authorities rigged the vote to ensure that their incumbents held on to their positions (Linden and Linden, 1977: 231; Lemarchand, 1970: 83).

Defeat had a significant impact on the corps of Hutu local leaders, particularly as neither the Belgians nor the Tutsi authorities introduced reforms that would pave the way for élite Hutu participation in the structures of power (C. Newbury, 1988: 190). In response, Hutu leaders issued the “Manifesto of the Bahutu” which “vociferously asserted the centrality of the ‘Hutu-Tuutsi [sic] problem’”, which lay directly in the “political, socioeconomic, and cultural monopoly” of the Tutsi élite and its continued oppression of ordinary people (C. Newbury, 1988: 191). The Manifesto identified the source of rural grievances, noting the disaffection of rural Hutu (and impoverished Tutsi) youth and their inability to continue to accept the coercive practices of the Tutsi authorities. The only plausible solution was the implementation of radical changes to

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29 For example, the High Council (Conseil Supérieur) included only three Hutu members, which constituted less than 6 percent of its members. The HC was the highest advisory body of the state and “was expected to assume legislative functions when Rwanda was granted self-government by Belgium” (C. Newbury, 1988: 191).

30 Kinyarwanda uses prefixes to indicate whether a word is singular or plural: “Ba” is used to indicate plurality, while “mu” is the singular prefix.
Rwanda’s political and social system.\(^{31}\) Calls for change fell on deaf ears with both the Belgians and the Tutsi authorities (Lemarchand, 1970: 114).\(^{32}\)

Hutu leaders responded by creating organisations that could defend Hutu interests in anticipation of the first national elections. Grégoire Kayibanda formed the *Mouvement Social Muhutu* (MSM), which later became a political party, *Le Parti du Mouvement de l’Émancipation Hutu* (PARMEHUTU) with the purpose of promoting the objectives articulated in the Hutu Manifesto (C. Newbury, 1988: 192). Another prominent Hutu leader, Joseph Gitera, formed *l’Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse* (APROSOMA), whose stated objectives were not framed in ethnic terms. Instead, it sought “to represent the interests of all poor groups, Tutsi as well as Hutu” (C. Newbury, 1992: 196).\(^{33}\)

Tensions between élite Hutu and Tutsi continued, fuelled as they were by PARMEHUTU’s appeals to ethnicity. Violence erupted in central Rwanda in November 1959, later spreading to the North and South of the country (Lemarchand, 1970: 159; Reyntjens, 1985: 196). The *Union Nationale Rwandaise* (UNAR), a Tutsi monarchist party, sparked local violence when a group of its militants attacked one of the few Hutu sub-chiefs in Rwanda. Rumour quickly spread among the population that he had been killed (which was not true). In protest, a group of Hutu went to the residence of a Tutsi sub-chief and killed him, along with two other Tutsi notables (Reyntjens, 1985: 260). In

31 For more on the political origins of the Manifesto and its recommendations for structural change, see C. Newbury, 1988: 190-193.
33 Parties led by Tutsi élites also emerged, notably the UNAR (*Union Nationale Rwandaise*), which wanted to crush Hutu resistance to maintain the monarchy. The RADER (*Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais*) was led by younger, educated moderate Tutsi who favoured reform and a constitutional monarchy (Lemarchand, 1970: 160; C. Newbury, 1988: 194).
the aftermath, the resentment of the population reached the point where many Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs were forced to resign. The Belgians further fuelled this climate of insecurity in November 1959 when they switched their allegiance from the Tutsi authorities to the Hutu counter-élite in declaring their commitment to majority rule (Reyntjens, 1985: 278). They then filled these newly vacant posts with “interim” Hutu appointees, many of whom showed little administrative aptitude (Lemarchand, 1970: 173-174). A climate of fear and insecurity once again reigned in the everyday lives of ordinary Rwandans.

The transfer of power from Belgium to the Hutu élite normalised routine violence in the everyday lives of Rwandans. Communal elections were held in June-July 1960 to select burgomasters and councilors to replace the existing sub-chiefdoms, which were restructured into larger units, and chiefdoms into provinces (C. Newbury, 1988: 198). The elections were violent; UNAR thugs tried to use intimidation tactics to prevent victory for Hutu parties, which won 83.8 percent of the vote anyway (C. Newbury, 1988: 198; Lemarchand, 1970: 179-180). PARMEHUTU won 71 percent of the vote (Reyntjens, 1985: 283). These elections were instrumental in placing Hutu leaders in key administrative positions. Despite this apparent “ethnic” victory, the identities of ordinary Hutu remained tied to tradition, extending only as far as one’s family and clan; group consciousness and references to Hutu ethnicity were an élite affair (Lemarchand, 1970: 182). Newly installed burgomasters, unconditionally supported by the Belgian authorities, used their newfound power to intimidate former Tutsi authorities, notably through arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. In some areas, burgomasters fabricated

34 Of the 2896 councilors elected, 2623 were candidates of Hutu parties (C. Newbury, 1988: 198), meaning that 91% of the seats went to candidates of Hutu parties.
rumours of night raids and other disturbances to initiate “retaliations” against the old Tutsi authorities. Many fled with their families to other regions of Rwanda or to neighbouring countries (Linden and Linden, 1977: 160; Reyntjens, 1985: 289).

The Belgians ensured a quick transfer of power to the PARMEHUTU leaders despite the disquiet surrounding the communal elections. On 23 January 1961, Joseph Gitera assembled the recently elected burgomasters and councilors to “declare the abolition of the monarchy and the birth of the newly independent Republic of Rwanda” (Lemarchand, 1970: 192). The Belgians named PARMEHUTU’s Grégoire Kayibanda as the country’s first president, which was later confirmed when Rwanda gained its independence from Belgium on 1 July 1962.

**Post-Independence Politics 1962-1990**

Far from the pristine image of national unity that the Belgians thought they had created in transferring their loyalty to the majority Hutu, dissension among Hutu élites was rife in the immediate post-independence period (1962-1973). A regional rivalry emerged almost immediately, with northern Hutu showing “unmitigated disdain” for their counterparts from the southern and central regions of Rwanda (Lemarchand, 1970: 266). In an effort to unite the various Hutu factions, Kayibanda’s government identified a common threat – the *inyenzi* (or cockroach) raids that began in late 1961. The so-called *inyenzi* was an armed faction of the UNAR (Reyntjens, 1992: 172). Small bands made frequent forays with the aim of “creating a sense of insecurity within Rwanda, and the prime targets were Hutu officials and European administrators” (Weinstein, 1977: 61).35

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35 Weinstein outlines the nature of a series of attacks between 1959 and 1963, showing how Tutsi guerrillas targeted Hutu leaders in a defined campaign to regain state power (Weinstein, 1977: 57-59, 64).
The worst attack was in December 1963 when more than 1000 *inyenzi* rebels crossed into Rwanda from Burundi, and came within 20 kilometres of Kigali (Lemarchand, 1970: 220; Weinstein, 1977: 64). The reaction of the Kayibanda government was swift. Authorities rounded up 20 Tutsi leaders affiliated with UNAR and RADER (a moderate and ethnically inclusive party) and publicly executed them (Lemarchand, 1970: 225). Local militias were created in each province to guard against future Tutsi attacks. In some areas, Hutu authorities attacked Tutsi homesteads, burning, looting and pillaging (Weinstein, 1977: 65). By the time the attacks had been contained, more than 10,000 Tutsi had lost their lives (Lemarchand, 1970: 225). The national police rounded up a few hundred influential Tutsi and some Hutu; some were executed, others charged with treason or held without charge (Reyntjens, 1985: 463). By the end of 1963, between 130,000 and 300,000 Rwandans (mostly Tutsi, along with Hutu and Twa who followed their patrons), had fled to neighbouring countries (Lemarchand, 1970: 172; Reyntjens, 1985: 455).

In identifying the *inyenzi* rebels as the common enemy, Kayibanda was able to unite the Hutu leadership. His tactics, however, eventually backfired as the population – both ordinary people and the educated class – recognised that government-led efforts to unify against the *inyenzi* threat were designed to consolidate Kayibanda’s position, rather than actually addressing the sources of fear, insecurity and dissatisfaction that motivated Hutu to participate in the 1959 revolution in the first place. Ordinary people continued to suffer the same abuses of power that their local officials (now of Hutu ethnicity) exacted upon them. Educated Hutu – students, teachers and junior civil servants – felt shut out of

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36 This meant a foot trek of about 230 kilometres.
the rewards of the revolution, from which much was promised. Despite their initial commitment to Kayibanda’s cause of Hutu unity, many educated Hutu quickly saw corruption among state élites, recognised that the promises of increased pay would not be honoured, and judged that opportunities for career advancement were virtually non-existent (Lemarchand, 1970: 238-241). The response of the Kayibanda regime to these grievances was to blame all Tutsi.

Kayibanda expanded PARMEHUTU’s reach into local communities in efforts to “mould the loyalties of citizens” (Lemarchand, 1970: 247). Kayibanda retained the identity cards that the Belgians introduced in 1931 to label Rwandans as “Hutu”, “Tutsi” or “Twa”, and he instituted a quota system to ensure proportionality in education and employment. The Kayibanda regime also limited Tutsi to nine percent of the total number of seats in schools, the civil service and even the private sector (Reyntjens, 1985: 501). Despite the quota system, Tutsi continued to populate the ranks of the educated élite. This was because colonial policy had limited access to formal education to Tutsi, which meant that few Hutu had the necessary skills to compete for these jobs (C. Newbury, 1992: 197). It also meant that close to fifty percent of the teachers and students at secondary school and in universities were Tutsi (Reyntjens, 1985: 501). At the National University, the primary training ground for the civil service, Tutsi accounted for ninety percent of the student body (Lemarchand, 1970: 260). The residual effect of these colonial practices prompted members of the Hutu élite from the northern region of Rwanda to call for radical reforms to remedy this ethnic imbalance.

Individuals from central Rwanda, where Kayibanda grew up, dominated his government (C. Newbury, 1992: 197). Corruption was the order of the day; Kayibanda’s
long-term associates and family held key administrative positions, which caused a rift among Hutu élites. Northern factions “began to openly criticize the regime” (Jefremovas, 2000: 303). In efforts to protect his power, Kayibanda reframed regional dissent into ethnic violence. Rumours of Tutsi attacks against Hutu like those of the *inyenzi* in 1959-1963 spread quickly. The population was quick to believe them, based on the stories of refugees from Burundi who fled that country’s 1972 Hutu genocide, in which an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 individuals died (Lemarchand, 1998: 6). As Burundian Hutu streamed into Rwanda, Kayibanda instituted public safety committees, which were essentially vigilante groups to monitor the civil service, universities, schools and businesses to ensure that the ethnic quota regulations were being followed (Des Forges, 1999: 40). In late 1972 and early 1973, almost all Tutsi students were run out of schools and the national university (Reyntjens, 1985: 503). Anti-Tutsi sentiment affected élites and ordinary people alike. The public safety committees ensured that educated, salaried workers were fired and blacklists were posted in offices to intimidate. Ordinary folk were asked to leave, and their homes were looted and burned by members of public safety committees (Reyntjens, 1985: 503). In the hills, the violence was not directed solely at Tutsi as it was in economic centres like Kigali, Butare and Gitarama. Instead, the wealthy, rural élite Hutu and Tutsi alike – not ordinary Tutsi – were the victims. Those from the north targeted southerners while those with outstanding grievances against the local authorities used the opportunity to exact payback (Reyntjens, 1985: 504).

The violence came to an end in July 1973 when Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana, the most senior officer in the northerner-controlled army, took power from Kayibanda in a “bloodless” coup (Des Forges, 1999: 41; C. Newbury, 1992: 197-198;
Reyntjens, 1985: 506). Under Habyarimana, the ethnic question took a backseat and his coup was “welcomed” because it reduced both ethnic violence and rampant government corruption (Jefremovas, 2000: 303). Habyarimana was popular with Tutsi, and some Hutu groups accused him of favouring Tutsi. Relations between élite Hutu and Tutsi were amicable early in Habyarimana’s rule, although top positions in government were reserved for northern Hutu. There was also considerable intermarriage, “not only between southern Tutsi and Hutu but also between northern Hutu families and economically powerful Tutsi families” (Jefremovas, 2000: 303).

Peace and the semblance of stability nonetheless came at a cost. Habyarimana created a highly centralised state apparatus to monitor and control the activities of the population. Habyarimana banned political parties. In 1975, he created the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND) of which all Rwandans were members (Des Forges, 1999: 41). The party structure was then extended down to the most local levels of government as the central party apparatus appointed officials. Each local official was granted a leadership position in the MRND so that the state and the party became one entity in people’s daily lives (Prunier, 1997: 76). The central government required that residents of each commune register with the local authorities, which in turn reported all births, deaths and movement in and out of their bailiwick on a monthly basis (Des Forges, 1999: 42). In addition, the education system underwent major reforms in the 1980s, which included the introduction of national history and civics curriculum for students who understood Rwandan history in terms of the (pro-Tutsi) Hamitic myth. Identity cards continued to categorise Rwandans according to their

37 It was not entirely bloodless. Approximately 50 members of Kayibanda’s regime were killed or later died in prison. Kayibanda himself starved to death in prison in December 1976.
ethnicity. This measure was necessary to implement Habyrimana’s policy of “ethnic and regional equilibrium”, which reserved seats in educational institutions and in the state apparatus in order to rectify the favouritism of the Belgians for Tutsi. On paper, the policy aimed to ensure ethnic equality; in practice, it excluded Tutsi and non-northern Hutu from lucrative government posts.\textsuperscript{38}

The “hierarchical ethos” and top-down decision-making structures that shaped Habyarimana’s regime affected ordinary people (C. Newbury, 1992: 199). Mobilising the population for public work projects like road repairs, ditch digging and brush clearing was common practice in most rural communities, harkening back to the colonial practice of \textit{akazi} (or labour). The stated difference in the practice under Habyarimana was that it was voluntary (not mandatory as it had been under Belgian rule) and limited to only two days a month (not weekly as it had been). In practice, the government required ordinary people to work on \textit{umuganda} projects on average four days per month, and local officials enforced everyone’s full participation. Individuals who did not report for work duty were fined (Des Forges, 1999: 42). Some men in their late 40s and early 50s who participated in my research reported that the poorest of the poor “had to report for \textit{umuganda} at least one or two days a week or suffer imprisonment or worse” (interviews, 2006). They also told me that as the poorest of the poor (either \textit{abatindi} or \textit{abakene}) they had to report more frequently in those days as the authorities told them, “since you don’t work for money, you will come work for the state and we will feed your families”. Local officials often used this tactic to entice men to participate in \textit{umuganda} projects, as the full participation of the population showed “those at the top” (senior government officials)

\textsuperscript{38} Only nine percent of positions were reserved for Tutsi, despite the fact than an estimated 15 percent of Rwandans held a Tutsi identity.
that the local official was able to control the activities of ordinary people in his jurisdiction (interviews, 2006). When local officials actually delivered food to families as promised, it was “usually rotten or infested” (interviews, 2006).

The ordinary people I knew also made it clear that, despite the years of social revolution (1959-1962) and Habyarimana’s policy of ethnic equilibrium, ethnicity was a tool that élites used to gain and keep power. Burnet notes that among the women she worked with during her field research, many of them “learned who they were when they went to school, obtained their national identity cards (around the age of 16), or applied for jobs. The majority of women I interviewed … became aware of their ethnic identity while at school” (Burnet, 2005: 68). In 1972 and 1973, before the Habyarimana regime introduced reforms to the education system, teachers forced Tutsi students to stand up in their classrooms and identify their ethnicity, as only Hutu would be allowed to sit for national exams (Burnet, 2005: 69).

The highest level of formal education attained among my participants was the equivalent of grade 3. Most participants had only a year or two of formal schooling, meaning that none of them sat for national exams none graduated from primary to secondary school. They also all lived in southern Rwanda, where relations between Hutu and Tutsi were more amicable and co-operative than in other regions of the country, particularly the north. For these individuals, ethnic identity was even more remote in their daily lives. The ordinary Rwandans who participated in my research understood that their lives were shaped by their social and class positions, and by their daily

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39 An approach to governance that Bayart (1993) has identified in other post-colonial states, the tendency to try to control and direct as many aspects of political and social activity as possible.

40 In other regions, particularly the North, hatred of Tutsi was taught in primary schools although this was not part of the formal curriculum.
interactions with local authorities which in turn were formed by the prevailing regional and class politics at the time. All of the individuals who participated understood themselves to be peasants. As Martin, a Tutsi man who survived the genocide told me,

I’m a former Tutsi. I had an identity card that said so. But it meant nothing until the genocide. Why do you think they [the government] kept the cards? Even they can’t tell who is Tutsi or who is Hutu. They needed cards to tell the killers, just like they needed cards before [under Habyarimana] to determine who would benefit from politics.

But me, and my family, and the others around us, Hutu or Tutsi or what, we are peasants. And the authorities don’t care about us. Any of the benefits of being Hutu didn’t matter; we [peasants] didn’t get anything out of being this ethnicity or that one. We were told what crops to grow and always support the party (MRND). Coffee was important in those days. But we didn’t have land like that. We can hardly feed our families. Some grew coffee instead of food because they were forced. Others grew coffee and stole food from other plots. There were a lot of problems among us [peasants] but they [the authorities] didn’t care. We are peasants, and we don’t matter for much.

Being Hutu or Tutsi that was the business of the government and other important people [élites]. We just hoped, like we do now with this government, that we could get some peace (interview with Martin, a 47-year-old umutindi Tutsi man, 2006).

The Habyarimana regime created a strong, centralised and effective state that served as an instrument of domination and control. In the process, his government sought to contain the regional and ethnic tensions from which his power was born. The system of ethnic equilibrium was unable to contain rivals for state power. Two senior officers in Habyarimana’s army made an unsuccessful coup attempt in April 1980 (Gasana, 2002: 30). The coup sharpened the divisions within the northern Hutu élite, meaning that those from Habyarimana’s home province of Gisenyi were favoured over individuals from

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41 For analysis of the coffee economy in the late 1970s and 1980s, see Verwimp (2003).
bordering Ruhengeri province. Habyarimana’s most favoured individuals were those from the *abahinza* lineage, of which his wife was a member. Habyarimana himself was from an unimportant Hutu lineage; he consequently relied on “his wife’s clan … to be his ears and eyes” (Prunier, 1997: 86). Rather than try to enlarge his regional and ethnic power base, Habyarimana limited the fruits of power to those individuals linked or loyal to Mrs. Habyarimana’s clan. This inner circle, or *akazu* (little hut), became the locus of power from the mid-1980s as Rwanda entered a period of economic decline, which limited its ability to shape the political and social landscape.

In October 1990, the RPF, then a rebel group, attacked Rwanda from Uganda. This marked the beginning of a low-intensity civil war led to negotiations for power sharing between the MRND, the RPF and other political parties. Habyarimana’s regime also suffered under the double pressure of structural adjustment and international pressure to democratise. In his willingness to negotiate with the RPF, Habyarimana became a potential enemy of the *akazu*, particularly of its extremist faction, the Zero Network (*Réseau Zéro*). The economic decline, continued élite manipulation of ethnicity and the civil war all contributed to the disintegration of Rwandan society starting in 1990, which in turn allowed the “self-interested fraction of an élite, not of an ethnic group” to plan and carry out the 1994 genocide (Jefremovas, 2000: 304). The next chapter analyses the causes of the genocide as part of a continuum of violence between 1990 and 2000.

42 Gisenyi province borders eastern Congo (then Zaire) while Ruhengeri province borders southwestern Uganda. Gisenyi town centre is 5 kilometres from Goma town centre.

43 Agathe Habyarimana was nicknamed Kanjogera, which was the name of King Musinga’s prominent and powerful mother (Barahinyura, 1988: 143).
Conclusions

The historical record shows that ethnic identities are very much a product of the state, and of the various state-building projects that successive regimes have undertaken. The policies and actions of the Belgian colonisers and missionaries had a negative impact the lives of ordinary Rwandans. The failure of the Belgians to understand the complexity of Rwanda’s political and social organisation allowed the king, and his chiefs and sub-chiefs, to shape power relations between ordinary Rwandans and the state. The intersection of Belgian policy with the practices of local Rwandan authorities transformed power relations, notably through land tenure and distribution patterns. Some individuals, mostly Tutsi but some Hutu, benefited under these changes; others, mostly Hutu but some Tutsi, did not. As state power became more centralised and hierarchical, ordinary people lost their ability to shape their everyday realities. Instead, the relationship of ordinary people to their local authority came to determine their life chances, not their ethnicity. Ethnicity mattered most during periods of acute violence. The tactics and practices of control that both Tutsi and Hutu leaders used to justify policies of exclusion to control the state apparatus actually show little variation over the years. The supposed historical unity that the programme of national unity and reconciliation of the current government relies upon to justify its policies is not grounded in empirical fact. Instead, it is another example of a strategic version of history designed to protect the RPF’s grip on state power.

The historical record also shows that ethnic violence is not an innate aspect of Rwandan society. Quite the opposite; history shows how the manipulation of ethnicity is a tactic of the élite – whether Hutu or Tutsi – to justify resorting to violence. Violence is
indeed an everyday part of Rwandans’ past and present lives. It is not however rooted in ethnic hatred or, as the current government would have us believe, pent-up feelings of genocide ideology amongst a poor rural population. Violence in Rwanda has been consistently dressed up as ethnic when in fact the motivations of its organisers and sponsors have invoked age-old ethnic animosity to seize, gain or consolidate power. In this way, the programme of national unity and reconciliation is hardly a new interpretation of history, nor representative of an enlightened political élite that claims to “undo the infrastructure and ideology of the past to ensure that genocide never again happens in Rwanda” (Office of the President, 1999a: 22). Instead, it is a tool that the current government uses to de-emphasise the actual causes and consequences of the 1994 genocide while masking its own efforts to mould Rwandan society in its image, a theme that I examine in detail in the next chapter.
Chapter 4: The 1994 Genocide in a Continuum of Violence, 1990 to 2000

I wanted to go to ingando [re-education camp] but was told I couldn’t because I was a Twa in 1994. [The official] said, ‘you don’t need re-education because you are not part of the genocide. Your people did not kill or get killed”. I was so angry with him. I lost my [Twa] mother and sister and I even hid some Tutsi in my home. I asked my wife to go out during the killing and get food for us. I couldn’t go myself; I was too scared. But I knew they wouldn’t even look at an old Twa woman. Those Tutsi we saved don’t even speak to me when they see me now. And I saved their lives! As soon as he [the official] said that [I don’t need re-education], I slammed my fist on the table like this [gestures]. He looked at me and I knew I had done a wrong thing. He called some people and I spent the next week in prison. Now I just keep to myself and try not to cause any trouble… (interview with Théogène, a 49-year-old umutindi Twa man, 2006).

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Before 1994, I felt proud to be Rwandan. Then there was genocide and now the new government shames us by saying that we [Hutu] did that. Some of us did. I killed too. I killed my Tutsi neighbour because we ran when the events started, and we soon understood that only his kind of people [Tutsi] were getting killed. He said to me over there [points to the location], “if the interahamwe comes, kill me so I can die with respect. I don’t want to be thrown away. You can kill me and bury me on my land so my ancestors will know me”.

He said this! Imagine how I felt! But I also understood because it was a very difficult time for us. Our [hill] was unsettled. Homes were being burned, cows were slaughtered and many of our women got violence [raped], although those women don’t talk about it, I saw it myself. So when the time came to kill my friend, I did. That is the only Tutsi I killed. For the rest, I just went along. I joined some of the killers so they would think that I supported them. So eventually my government lost, and the Tutsi one came in. I fear a lot now because I know how they [the government] hate Hutu (interview with Félicien, a 33-year-old imprisoned Hutu man, 2006).

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During the genocide, you cannot imagine how it was. My father was an intellectual and taught at the university. He was amongst the first to be killed when the interahamwe and the other killers got to Butare. My mother died with him, as did my three sisters and my young brother. They killed them all at the home I grew up in. My father told us when
things started in Kigali that the genocide would not reach here [Butare] because of the good relations between Hutu and Tutsi. But he underestimated his colleagues; his Hutu colleagues killed my family. My other brother got killed at a roadblock not far from here. I was alone after that; I am the only survivor in my [immediate] family. The one that killed my brother was a famous Hutu – very powerful since he owned land and had many people working for him. But before things happened [the genocide] he was known to be a moderate.¹ My father was his friend, and he and his wife used to visit us at least once a month. All this and he still killed my brother!

Since my family had been killed, I thought it would be smart to go home and hide there until the killing stopped. When I got there, the Hutu that killed my brother was there. So I panicked. I panicked so badly that I just stood there when I saw him in our kitchen. He saw me and ran out of the house. I knew I was going to die at that moment so I didn’t run. I was so tired of hiding and running…..

When he came, I hid my face and hoped he would kill me quickly. But instead, he held on to me so tight, and he cried. He wept and wept and asked for my understanding. He said, “It is war. And we are killing all Tutsi. I am doing my duty. I killed many of my friends. You can’t stay here; it’s not safe because the [death] squads are on their way to loot and then burn this home”. I couldn’t believe my ears. This Hutu who killed was trying to protect me. I told him I was so tired and didn’t know what to do to save myself. He said he was tired too. We sat on the ground and rested together for a minute. Then he said, “This is what you will do. You will go to my house. There are other Tutsi there. You cannot stay in the house because we [the killers] are looking for you. The higher-ups have told us to kill you because of your father. You are the only one left in your family, and your name is on our list of people who must be killed. If you go to my home, you will put other Tutsi there in danger. I want you to go to my chicken coop. Hide in there until we can figure out how to care for you. There are too many roadblocks, and the militias are on their way”.

I went to his coop, and stayed there for three weeks until the war ended. He brought me food and water. He really saved me. He fled into the [internally displaced] camps after the French [protection force] came here and I never saw him again. He has never been charged with genocide that I know of. All I know is he saved me; maybe he saved some others because there were about 20 Tutsi at his house when I got there. But he

¹ In this instance, the phrase “a moderate” means that the Hutu killer under discussion shared his resources with Tutsi before the genocide. This usage is a modified form from the phrase “Hutu moderate”, which came into popular usage since the 1994 genocide. It means “Hutu who do not have hatred for Tutsi in their hearts” (interview with NURC official, 2006).
also killed. I don’t know what was wrong with his mind but maybe some people do evil things for reasons I don’t understand. I know that he saved me but I also know that he killed my brother (interview with Didier, a 47-year-old [salaried poor] umukene wifashije Tutsi man, 2006).

Each of these excerpts reveal more than simply different subject positions on the 1994 genocide; they also show the nature of local ties in determining who lived, who died, and how. Didier, the Tutsi man who hid in the chicken coop of his Hutu friend, survived because of a known killer. Félicien, the Hutu man who killed his Tutsi friend, did so as a favour, and then joined the killing squads as a survival strategy to appear to support the execution of Tutsi in his community. Théogène’s narrative shows how Twa individuals also experienced the genocide in sharing that he rescued some Tutsi while losing his family members in the genocide. Implicit in these three excerpts is an appreciation of local power relations. Those with power, like the killer who spared Didier’s life, had different options available to them. Those not in positions of power had more limited options available to them; but this does not mean that they lacked individual agency. Instead it was an agency shaped by the complex and shifting nature of the situation. Didier struggles to understand how an individual respected in the community could kill some Tutsi while saving the lives of others. Félicien killed as an act of friendship; both he and his Tutsi friend understood that options for survival were limited. Théogène understands that his existence, both during the genocide and now, is shaped by broader historical patterns of marginalising ethnic Twa.

In order to interpret the ways in which a cross-section of ordinary Rwandans from different backgrounds understand their own lived experiences of the 1994 genocide, an

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2 Fujii’s dissertation (2006) shows how ties to family and friends shaped one’s lived experiences of the genocide. See also Fujii (2008).
understanding of the broader social and political context in which violence occurred is necessary. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse waves of violence in Rwanda from 1990, when the RPF first invaded Rwanda from Uganda, until 2000, when the RPF first began to “talk seriously about national reconciliation” following the defeat of Hutu Power forces in the northwest of the country and the subsequent consolidation of its political power (Waldorf, 2006: 38). This exercise is critical since the RPF’s near-hegemonic interpretation of the causes and consequences of the 1994 genocide shapes individual opportunities to rebuild one’s life since the genocide. This chapter continues with the historical analysis of Chapter Three to further situate the broader context of routine violence that ordinary Rwandans experienced before, during and after the genocide. Before it does so, I analyse the official version of the genocide, and how it is represented as part of the programme of national unity and reconciliation.

The second section of the chapter then analyses patterns of violence in Rwanda from 1990 to April 1994 and from July 1994 to 1999 with emphasis on the role of the state in fomenting violence to show how the official representation of the genocide is outside the lived experiences of everyday violence of most Rwandans. This is an important step as it situates the ways in which Rwandans of different backgrounds experienced violence in the recent past; in particular the analysis shows that violence was a regular and normal part of everyday life throughout the 1990s. It also shows that the 1994 genocide is not an instance of atavistic ethnic hatred or a spontaneous outburst of tribal violence, as the RPF version of events asserts. Specifically, the way in which the RPF represents the genocide as something that only happened to Tutsi victims whom it eventually saved by taking military control of Rwanda in July 1994 has two main effects:
first, it negates the everyday lived experiences of violence that Rwandans of all ethnicities experienced before and after the genocide; second, it privileges the genocide as the only source of violence in the lives of ordinary Rwandans. The remainder of this chapter shows that in addition to the violence of the 1994 genocide, there is a continuum of everyday violence that Rwandans of all ethnicities experienced, albeit to varying degrees of intensity, before, during and after the genocide. Instead, the RPF is promoting a programme of national unity and reconciliation that feeds into, rather than alleviates, the deep-rooted feelings of fear, anger and despair that many ordinary Rwandans feel as they struggle to rebuild their lives and reconcile with friends, neighbours and in some cases, family.

**Representations of the 1994 Genocide**

The programme of national unity and reconciliation relies on two interpretative filters to shape the post-1994 Rwandan political and social order. The first is “history” and the second is “genocide”. Both of these terms work to inhibit multiple representations of the Rwandan conflict. I analysed in the last chapter how the presumption of a singular official history has been manipulated by successive regimes in Rwanda for political gain; the RPF’s use of history is no different in this regard. In this section, I analyse the official representation of “genocide” to show how the programme of national unity and reconciliation collapses the different forms of killing (and the attendant motivations) into a singular representation of genocide as something that happened only to Tutsi. Eltringham and Van Hoyweghen explain the importance of unpacking the official representation of “genocide”: “Official discourse on the 1994 genocide maintains in practice the ethnic division which the RPF-led government
denounces in theory: only Tutsi are victims of genocide; moderate Hutu are victims of
politicide who died in massacres” (Eltringham and Van Hoyweghen, 2000: 106). 3 Before
analysing the political motives behind the reductionism of the official representation of
the 1994 genocide, I first situate the genocide to show the extent to which the official
representation does not correspond to individual lived realities.

Situating the Genocide

Between April and July 1994, genocide engulfed Rwanda. Across the hills and in
the valleys, in churches and homes, on narrow footpaths and in banana groves, in
stadiums and schools, killers slaughtered more than 500,000 people, mainly ethnic Tutsi
(Des Forges, 1999: 15). The genocide was carefully planned by a small élite group of
powerful ethnic Hutu extremists who refused to share power under the conditions of the
Arusha Accord. Through an orchestrated strategy to liquidate Tutsi and any politically
moderate Hutu perceived as opposed to the Habyarimana regime, the extremists had one
goal in mind: to maintain their monopoly on state power.

The killing started in the capital during the night of 6-7 April 1994, soon after the
plane carrying the Rwandan president was shot down by unknown assailants as it
approached Kigali airport. Militias – the Interahamwe4 and the Impuzamugambi5 – led
the killing with the help of the Presidential Guard, the army, and local government

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3 Pottier (2002: 126) calls the distinction between Tutsi-survivor and Hutu-perpetrator a “moral hierarchy”.
Burnet (2009) identifies “experiential categories” that are synonymous with Tutsi: old (1959) returnees,
widows of the genocide, survivors and victims; and Hutu: new returnees (since 1996), infiltrators, prisoners
and perpetrators.

4 Associated with the ruling party, Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND)
of then President Habyarimana.

5 Associated with the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR) party, an extremist and hardline
satellite of the MRND.
officials (African Rights, 1994; Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1995). Outside Kigali, ordinary Hutu men committed acts of genocide, often under the direction of militia or government soldiers, under the threat of loss of their own life or that of their loved ones if unwilling to participate (Straus, 2006: 122-152). Genocidal violence occurred at different times in different regions of the country (André and Platteau, 1998; Des Forges, 1999: 303-591; Guichaoua, 2005, 258-290; Straus, 2006: 53-60). In some instances, local political and business élites colluded to enlist ordinary Rwandans to genocide (Longman, 1995; Wagner, 1998). Social ties and local power dynamics often compelled ordinary Hutu to kill; others resisted participation. Some stood by while a few rescued, instead of killing intended victims (Fujii, 2008; Straus, 2006: 65-94). Not all Hutu participated, and not all participated to the same degree. Some killed enthusiastically; others killed a few (Prunier, 1995: 242-250). Some Tutsi men joined in the killing as a means to save themselves and their families (fieldnotes, 2006).

The RPF also committed widespread reprisal killings – between 10,000 and 50,000 Hutu died – while countless others of all ethnicities died as the RPF gave greater priority to military victory than to protecting Tutsi civilians (Des Forges, 1999: 16). An estimated 10,000 ethnic Twa were killed during the genocide (IRIN, 6 June 2001). At least 250,000 women – mostly Tutsi but some Hutu – were raped (HRW, 2004: 7). Some men also admit to being raped (fieldnotes, 2006). Countless others, men and women, young and old, healthy and infirm, were tortured or maimed.

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6 Fujii demonstrates how local leaders used family ties to target male relatives for recruitment into the killing groups responsible for carrying out the genocide. She also finds that ties of friendship drove individual choices to kill as did immediate social context (Fujii, 2008: 568-597).

7 This figure does not include the widespread killings of ordinary Rwandans by representatives of the ex-Forces armées Rwandaises (FAR) and the RPF alike during the 1990-1994 civil war (Des Forges, 1995; Lemarchand, 1998; LGDL, 2004).
The 1994 genocide is much more than a series of facts and figures about who killed, who died and who survived. Irrespective of ethnic category, ordinary Rwandans were caught up in the maelstrom. There are countless stories of survival, of friends and family who took extraordinary risks to protect Tutsi (African Rights, 2003f, 2003h; Rusesabagina, 2006; Umutesi, 2004). There are stories of Tutsi who put their own lives on the line to protect Hutu family and friends from the coercion and intimidation tactics that the killing squads used to goad ordinary Hutu into killing (African Rights, 2003b, 2003c; fieldnotes, 2006). Notorious killers protected Tutsi they knew personally, ushering them safely through roadblocks, warning them of the whereabouts of marauding groups, and even hiding them at their homes. Some individuals killed during the day, only to shelter Tutsi friends and relatives at night (fieldnotes, 2006). Many Tutsi survived because of the aid and succour of a Hutu family member, friend, colleague, neighbour, or stranger (Jefremovas, 1995). There are stories about Twa and Hutu who were killed in the genocide because of their “typical Tutsi features” (fieldnotes, 2006).

Instrumentalising the Genocide

Despite the complexity of the genocide, the RPF-led government presents it as a clear-cut affair: Hutu killed Tutsi because of ethnic divisions that were introduced during the colonial period (1890-1962) and hardened to the point of individual action during the postcolonial period (1962-1994). Ethnicity is a fiction created by colonial divide-and-rule policies. Ultimate blame for the 1994 genocide therefore lies with Rwanda’s colonial powers, who instituted policies that made the Hutu population hate Tutsi. Divisive politics grounded in decades of bad governance resulted in deep-rooted ethnic hatred of all Tutsi by all Hutu, causing the 1994 genocide (NURC, 2004a; Office of the
President, 1999a; my emphasis). This simplistic interpretation of events forms the backbone of the programme of national unity and reconciliation, which is grounded in the need “to eradicate the devastating consequences of the policies of [ethnic] discrimination and exclusion” so that “the scourge of genocide never again happens in Rwanda” (NURC, 2004a:19-20).

Straus (2006) identifies different motivations for different forms of killing in interviews with génocidaires. He writes, “motivation and participation were clearly heterogeneous” with different forms of killing with different motivations occurring simultaneously (Straus, 2006: 95).8 The forms of killing were: 1) killing, torture, rape, and mutilation perpetrated against civilians – mainly Tutsi but also politically moderate Hutu – by militias, Forces armées rwandaises (FAR) soldiers and willing ordinary people; 2) killing, torture, rape, and mutilation perpetrated against Tutsi by ordinary Hutu, typically under duress from local leaders; 3) intended killing of soldiers and collateral killing of civilians (Tutsi, Hutu and Twa) in the course of the conflict between the RPF and the FAR; 4) killings carried out by the RPF against civilians (Tutsi, Hutu and Twa); and 5) murder motivated by theft and looting as well as the settling of scores between ordinary people (Straus, 2006: 113-118; 135-140; 163-169). Ordinary Rwandans understand that all of these different types of killings took place during the genocide and they use the phrases “les événements de 1994” (the events of 1994) and “en 1994” (in 1994) to describe “everything that happened in 1994, not just the genocide” (fieldnotes, 2006).

8 Des Forges and Longman make a similar point, noting that “the emphasis of some authors on popular participation fails to take account of the varieties of participation, as well as the extent of official pressure needed to obtain such a high level of mobilization” (Des Forges and Longman, 2004: 50).
Straus’s findings on individual motivations to kill are particularly instructive as they reveal the intentional simplification of the government in grounding its approach to post-genocide justice in the presumed ethnic hatred of all Hutu for all Tutsi. His research shows that “preexisting ethnic animosity, widespread prejudice, deeply held ideological beliefs, blind obedience, deprivation, or even greed” did not motivate individual Hutu to kill individual Tutsi (Straus, 2006: 96). Instead, Straus finds that “Rwandans’ motivations [for killing] were considerably more ordinary and routine than the extraordinary crimes they helped commit” (Straus, 2006: 96. See also, Fujii, 2008; Hatzfeld, 2005b; Longman 1995; Wagner 1998). Among ordinary Hutu, participation was driven by intra-ethnic pressure from others, usually more socially powerful Hutu, security fears in the context of civil war and genocide as well as opportunity for looting and score settling. Straus concludes that these factors “were salient in a context of national state orders to attack Tutsis [sic], war, dense local institutions, and close-knit settlements” (Straus, 2006: 97). The available evidence simply does not support Rwandan government claims that ethnic enmity drove the participation of ordinary Rwandans in the 1994 genocide. Officially, this ethnic enmity is called “genocide ideology”; much of the work of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission is concerned with identifying and eliminating the genocidal thoughts of ordinary Hutu to prepare them to engage in state-led reconciliation activities. In practice, as will be further analysed in the next chapter, accusing an individual of harbouring “genocide ideology” is a tool used against any individual or group that steps outside the accepted

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⁹ As a RPF member and private business person said during my re-education, “we [senior RPF members] would rather be conscious of our enemy [read Hutu] than naively pretend, like you whites, to think we have no enemy out there planning to exterminate us but instead to hopelessly fantasise about a utopian Rwanda” (fieldnotes, 2006). This statement contradicts the tenets of the programme of national unity and reconciliation.
boundaries of government policy. Approaching post-genocide justice on the presumption of a criminal (adult male Hutu) population is a useful mechanism that the RPF strategically deploys to control political opponents, deflect criticism of its actions during the genocide and justify its continued military presence in Eastern Congo (Jordaan, 2007; Usborne and Penketh, 2008).

The programme of national unity and reconciliation legitimates the moral right of the RPF to rule post-genocide Rwanda. The programme is supported by a historical narrative about Rwanda’s past in an effort to shape the collective memory of the genocide, a narrative which eliminates the real social and economic inequality faced by most ordinary Rwandans under colonial and post-colonial rule. In particular, it reformulates the violence against Tutsi in 1959, 1962 and 1973 and during the 1994 genocide as strictly ethnic in origin, thereby ignoring important class and regional dimensions of those conflicts. Instead, the programme of national unity and reconciliation reframes certain aspects of the genocide, while completely misrepresenting other elements, notably in its premise that the violence was the result of “seething ethnic hatred” of Tutsi rather than fear or opportunity (interview with senior RPF official, 2006). For example, the narrative of national unity and reconciliation ignores the fact that the labels Hutu, Tutsi and Twa represented status differences in pre-colonial Rwanda and overlooks the ways in which these labels became politically significant during the

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10 In Rwanda, the government accuses domestic and international actors alike. For example, in the run up to the 10th anniversary of the genocide event in April 2004, the government accused the BBC, Care International, and Voice of America of promoting genocide ideology (Frontline, 2005: 20-24). I was accused of harbouring genocide ideology by the Rwandan Ambassador to the United States. After a 2007 conference presentation in Sacramento where I argued that gacaca was undermining government efforts to unify and reconcile ordinary Rwandans, the Ambassador stood up and denounced my presentation, stating that my research “was wrong” and asserted that I could only have reached such conclusions if I had “genocide ideology in my heart”.

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colonial period. In addition, it overlooks the ways in which Tutsi élites participated in and benefited from colonial rule. The narrative of national unity and reconciliation also depicts the events of 1959 as a “practice genocide” when in fact it was a social revolution of Hutu against the Tutsi élites (Kinzer, 2008: 11).

The programme of national unity and reconciliation uses this re-interpretation of history as a tool to shape the collective memory of how the genocide happened and the role of the RPF in stopping it while limiting the boundaries of acceptable public speech on the causes and consequences of the 1994 genocide. Notably, it is taboo to discuss the atrocities committed by the RPF during the genocide or speak of the partial responsibility of the RPF in creating the necessary conditions of fear and insecurity that in part caused the 1994 genocide. Instead, the RPF portrays its invasion as a necessary but principled battle on behalf of all Rwandans against the excesses of the Habyarimana regime. Rather than engage in frank discussion on what happened during the genocide, the RPF opts instead for a discourse which purports to restore Rwanda to the “peaceful harmony of pre-colonial days” (NURC, 2004a: 21), through re-education camps (ingando) about “what it means to be a Rwandan and how we used to live before the seeds of division were thrown down by the Belgians” (Office of the President, 1999a: 76). This interpretation allows the RPF to paint Tutsi as innocent victims who passively waited for the ethnic enmity of Hutu to be enacted, which in turn allows it to capitalise on its ability to liberate Rwanda from an oppressive and genocidal political leadership. This interpretation of the genocide legitimates the repressive approach of the post-genocide government in three ways: First, it invokes the heroic status of the RPF in liberating
Rwandans from “oppressive rulers” (NURC, 2004a: 9). Second, it provides the RPF with a virtual *carte blanche* with which it can reconstruct Rwanda and “reconcile” Rwandans according to its own “vision of how things should be done” (MINECOFIN, 2000: 12); and third, it allows the RPF to continue to elide the specificity of their role in the genocide, while evoking the genocide guilt card with international audiences.

Finally, the programme of national unity and reconciliation does not acknowledge the lived experiences of most Rwandans: Tutsi and Twa perpetrators, Hutu and Twa rescuers; Tutsi, Hutu and Twa resisters; as well as Hutu and Twa survivors. The words of a Hutu woman widowed during the genocide sum up the situation well:

> For me, the genocide is what happened after the killing stopped. I lost my husband and four of my children during the events. Now I suffer without hopes and dreams. My brother is in prison, and I have no one to take care of or to take care of me. I feel alone even when I am with other people. And then the government forces us to tell the truth about what we saw. I saw a lot of bodies but never did I see someone getting killed. I heard people dying but I did not see anything. How can I tell my truth when the government has told me what I have to say? I fear being sent to prison and I think now that my neighbours no longer like that I live in [the same community as before the genocide]. Where can I go, what can I do? The government says Rwanda has been rebuilt but my life and home are still not repaired…. (interview with Scholastique, a 54-year-old *umutindi* Hutu woman, 2006).

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11 The hero status of the RPF is reinforced through its use of the “genocide credit” with Western audiences, to remind them of their collective failure to help stop the genocide. This tactic has been in use since 1994 (Reyntjens, 2004: 199) and continues today; see Amanpour’s November 2008 interview with President Kagame: [http://edition.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/world/2008/11/20/sbm.kagame.intv.cnn.html](http://edition.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/world/2008/11/20/sbm.kagame.intv.cnn.html).

12 The RPF has been “credibly accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity” (S. Brown, forthcoming 2009). The RPF does acknowledge that some crimes were committed by undisciplined and rogue soldiers bent on revenge, and that they have been tried and convicted in the military courts. As of November 2008 only 14 trials of low-ranking RPF soldiers were known to have taken place, all of whom received light sentences of less than six years (HRW, 2008). S. Brown (forthcoming 2009) contrasts such leniency with that of Hutu woman who received a sentence of 25 years in prison for giving food to the *interahamwe* militia during the genocide.
In presenting a particular set of facts about the genocide, the RPF is wiping away the specificity of individual acts of genocide, the death after death after death that are the aggregated whole. Such an approach ignores how ordinary Rwandans were enticed or coerced to participate. Each act of violence – a killing, a rape, a threat, a looting – is different and took place within a specific set of circumstances as individuals made their choice to kill, hide, resist, or stand by. This is not to downplay the magnitude of the genocide, but is to point out that in assigning collective responsibility to all Hutu, many of whom did not commit acts of genocide, the programme of national unity and reconciliation does more than simply misinterpret the nature of the genocide. It is likely to recreate, given Rwanda’s history of ethnic conflict, the same conditions of ethnic inequality and political repression that it claims to undo. The next section shows the shortcomings of considering the genocide as an isolated incident rather than as part of a broader continuum of violence that shapes individual lived experiences of fear and insecurity – experiences which in turn shape individual ability and willingness to forgive what happened to them and their loved ones in the name of national unity and reconciliation.

**A Continuum of Violence**

The 1994 genocide was not a spontaneous outburst of ethnic violence as the programme of national unity states; it was the product of pre-existing ethnic groupings, which a powerful and hardline élite strategically manipulated to hold on to state power. An intense civil war raged from October 1990, which was critical in legitimating and justifying violence that in turn created the context of fear and insecurity that led some individuals to kill family, friends and neighbours. The broader point is that the 1994
genocide was but one instance of violence, albeit an extreme one. In addition to the violence of the 1994 genocide, there were four primary periods in which state-led violence was particularly acute, and had varying impacts on the lives of ordinary Rwandans depending on their social location and their ethnic identity as determined by the state. This section analyses the dynamics of violence during the political transition and civil war (October 1990-April 1994), the immediate post-genocide “emergency” period (July 1994-1995), the mass return of Hutu refugees from neighbouring countries (1996-1997) and the rebel insurgency in the northwest (1997-2000).

Political Transition and Civil War (October 1990 - April 1994)

Before the then rebel RPF entered Rwanda from Uganda on 1 October 1990, the country was already in crisis and economic decline.\(^\text{13}\) International donors, including France, President Habyarimana’s biggest ally and supporter, began to pressure Rwanda to liberalise its political system to allow for multi-party politics (Reyntjens, 1994: 564).\(^\text{14}\) At the same time, the economy faltered as donors tied their funding to political liberalisation and the adoption of structural adjustment measures. Record low prices for Rwanda’s main sources of foreign income, coffee and tea, compounded an already dire socio-economic situation (Storey, 2001; Verwimp, 2003). Widespread unemployment and famine resulted; ordinary Rwandans began to express their discontent with the regime by refusing to pay MRND membership dues, to pay their taxes or even to show deference to local officials (Longman, 1995).

\(^{13}\) The RPF crossed into Rwanda from Katuna town (a border post due north of Byumba town) and made its operational base in the Virunga mountain range in northwestern Rwanda between Gisenyi and Ruhengeri towns (see Figure 2)

\(^{14}\) France linked its continued development aid to political reform while continuing to supply arms and military training to the FAR (Bertrand, 2000: 20). The US provided support to the RPF (Kinzer, 2008: 95).
Opposition politics soon dominated the political landscape as different segments of Rwandan society sought to organise political parties. In September 1990, Rwandan intellectuals joined forces to agitate for democratic change. In a public letter addressed to President Habyarimana, the group identified an urgent need for multiple political parties, arguing that the socio-economic situation in Rwanda was the result of the MRND’s “hoarding of power” (Bertrand, 2000: 55). In the face of mounting criticisms of his one-party regime, Habyarimana tried to steer the democratisation process from the outset. He created a *Commission Nationale de Synthèse* (CNS), charged with identifying what democracy meant to ordinary Rwandans, and with drafting a new constitution (Bertrand, 2000: 44). Habyarimana stacked the CNS with members and close allies of his MRND; and having revised the constitution to allow political parties to form, he promoted the creation of small parties that were essentially satellites to the ruling MRND (Bertrand, 2000: 43; Reyntjens, 1995: 266). In keeping with the times, the MRND added another ‘D’ to its name, becoming the *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement et la Démocratie* (MRND(D)) (Prunier, 1997: 126).

Despite Habyarimana’s efforts to control the democratisation process, a robust opposition quickly emerged. Several parties that had first been created at the time of independence (1959-1962) re-emerged, notably the *Mouvement Démocratique Rwandais*

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15 Ordinary Rwandans recalled the consultations, and remarked that local officials from the MRND “told us what democracy meant and then offered us kanyanga [alcohol] to support their vision at community festivals and meetings” (interview with Thomas, a 46-year-old umukene wifashije man, 2006). One woman said prosaically, “demokrasi (democracy) was and still is something that élites talk about; we just hope their politics don’t affect us too much” (interview with Aurelia, a 39-year-old umukene woman, 2006).

16 Pro-MRND parties were: 1) *Parti Démocratique* (PADE); 2) *Parti Progressiste de la Jeunesse Rwandaise* (PPJR); 3) *Rassemblement Travailliste pour la Démocratie* (RTD). Other parties “flirted” with the MRND, only to later align with one or more of the opposition parties: 1) *Parti Démocratique Islamique* (PDI); 2) *Parti Socialiste Rwandais* (PSR); 3) *Union Démocratique du Peuple Rwandais* (UDPR) (Burnet, 2005: 84).
The MDR was founded in March 1991 by disaffected Hutu élites from central Rwanda who seized the opportunity to re-enter politics following the coup of 1973 and Habyarimana’s subsequent ban on political activity (C. Newbury, 1992: 201). Unlike the original PARMEHUTU, which was a party for Hutu, the MDR sought to identify as “a party of the masses” (Bertrand: 2000: 94). The party saw itself as the main challenger to the one-party rule of the MRND that favoured Hutu from the north. Its goal was to move beyond the regional and ethnic politics of the MRND in order to bring the issues of all Rwandans to the table. According to one MDR founder, the main political problem was not the oppression of the Hutu by the Tutsi, but the oppression of the Rwandan people of all ethnicities by a group that had acceded to power by force and was determined to stay there (Eltringham, 2003a: 78-85).

In September 1991, the MDR condemned the civil war in swearing its unanimous support for the Habyarimana regime against the RPF. However, its communiqué rejected the framing of the conflict as an “ethnic war”, casting it instead as part of a broader set of political problems which the MRND needed to urgently resolve (Bertrand, 2000: 100). The MDR leadership saw the civil war as further evidence of the regime’s incompetence in dealing with Rwanda’s pressing socio-economic issues, not least of which was the return of refugees still living abroad. Other parties emerged in pursuit of a common goal – to overthrow the MRND. The other opposition parties, the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD), a left-of-centre party that drew its membership from the south, and the Parti Libéral (PL), a right-of-centre party that attracted urbanites, including prominent Tutsi businesspeople, joined forces to press the Habyarimana regime to find a way to end the
civil war and solve the economic crisis. In November 1991, the three parties signed a joint memorandum that highlighted the regime’s refusal to enact “real” democratic reforms (Prunier, 1997: 134). In response, the MRND swore in a new cabinet on 31 December 1991 and appointed one person from the “opposition”, a member of the pro-MRND Parti Chrétien démocrate (PCD) (Reyntjens, 1995: 109).

The formal opposition (that actually opposed the MRND) took to the streets; mass protests – a first in Rwanda – were held throughout the country (Bertrand, 2000: 141-142). In March 1992, the formal opposition forced Habyarimana to accept an agreement with the now united opposition parties to form a new government, with the prime minister’s office going to the MDR. The agreement also required Habyarimana to begin peace talks with the RPF (Prunier, 1997: 145-150). On the surface, the Habyarimana regime softened its control of the state. Behind the scene, members of the MRND’s inner circle – the akazu – broke away to form their own party called the Coalition pour la défense de la république (CDR). The CDR not only opposed peace talks with the RPF, but was overtly racist in favouring a Hutu-only Rwanda. Opposition appeals for the RPF and the MRND to fight their battles at the negotiating table fell on deaf ears when the RPF attacked FAR forces stationed near Byumba in February 1993, a blatant violation of a cease-fire agreement that had been negotiated at Arusha (Des Forges, 1999: 109). The attack also led the opposition coalition to question its support of the RPF, whose relentless aggression on the battlefield brought into question its willingness to negotiate in good faith. The perception among members of the opposition coalition was that the RPF wanted to seize power by any means necessary, not share it (Des Forges, 1999: 109-110; Kuperman, 2004, 61-63).
Civil War and the Invasion by the RPF

The RPF largely drew its membership from the exiled Tutsi refugee community in Uganda, most of whom had fled Rwanda between 1959 and 1962. Hutu and Twa, either as enemies of the Habyarimana regime, members of ethnically mixed families, or those who followed their Tutsi patrons were also exiled, and some joined the RPF movement (Mamdani, 2001: 159-160). Uganda was home to the majority of Rwandans who fled the political violence during the 1959-1963 independence period.17 Burundi, Tanzania and Zaïre also hosted numerous Rwandan refugees. Some individuals fled further afield within Africa while others went to Europe and North America (Van der Meeren, 1996: 252). Many Rwandans exiled during the 1959-1962 period maintained ties with one another through social and cultural associations (Prunier, 1997: 66). These ties proved critical in the financing of the RPF (Kinzer, 2008: 81-83).

The ways in which Rwandan exiles got caught up in national political struggles in Uganda shaped the RPF decision to invade Rwanda in 1990. Uganda’s president Milton Obote (1962-1971 and 1980-1985) identified Tutsi from Rwanda as a “public enemy against whom to unite his party” (Van der Meeren, 1996: 261). In December 1980, Obote branded Rwandan refugees living in Uganda as “alien foreigners” and forced them to live in guarded camps (Scherrer, 2002: 49). He later labelled Rwandan Tutsi as the “natural allies” of his political foe Yoweri Museveni, leader of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) (Mamdani, 2001: 168). This prompted “scores” of young Rwandans to join Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) to take up arms with the purpose of

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17 There is no agreement on how many refugees lived in Uganda. Van der Meeren (1996: 261) cites a figure of 200,000 Tutsi living in registered refugee settlements in Uganda while Prunier (1995: 62) estimates 600,000 Rwandan refugees by 1990.
overthrowing Obote (Scherrer: 2002: 50). The participation of Rwandan refugees, several of whom rose to prominence as respected officers in the NRA, would later prove problematic for Museveni once he became Uganda’s president in January 1986 (Mamdani, 2001: 174-176). The large number of Rwandans in senior positions within NRA ranks forced Museveni to respond to public perceptions that Rwandans were taking over Uganda’s political leadership. Museveni “released” from military service in late 1989 two high ranking Rwandan officers – Paul Kagame (deputy chief of military intelligence) and Fred Rwigema (deputy minister of defence) (Rake, 2001:185). These dismissals provided the impetus for the RPF to organise its invasion, particularly as the joint Rwanda-Uganda ministerial commission that was set up in 1989 to solve the Rwandan refugee crisis failed. President Habyarimana refused to accept the mass repatriation of Tutsi refugees from Uganda, allowing only for the return of refugees who would make no land claims on their return to Rwanda (Hintjens, 1999: 290). In early 1990, Kagame and Rwigema created the military wing of the RPF, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA); the NRA reported more than 3000 deserters to the RPA, but took no steps to bring them back to barracks (DANIDA, 1997: 69). President Museveni provided tacit support in allowing southern Uganda to be used as the RPF’s base of operation (Scherrer, 2002: 50). Rwandan exiles living in foreign capitals, notably in Washington and London, lobbied foreign governments to support the RPF’s struggle (Kinzer, 2008, 56).

The RPF attack on Rwanda from the Ugandan border town of Kagitumba on 1 October 1990 surprised Habyarimana’s FAR. The RPF walked to Gabiro town, 60 kilometres north of Kigali, without encountering much military resistance. Habyarimana

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18 Mamdani estimates that approximately a quarter of the NRA membership of 16,000 were Rwandan refugees (Mamdami, 2001: 170).
wasted little time in asking for assistance from France, Belgium and Zaïre, without which the RPF could have easily continued its advance to Kigali. In order to highlight the need for external assistance, Habyarimana ordered his FAR forces to stage a mock attack on Kigali on 4 October 1990 (Scherrer, 2002: 52). French and Belgian paratroopers arrived quickly to support the FAR and push the RPF back to Uganda. The RPF suffered heavy losses in the withdrawal, including the death of Fred Rwigema on the second day of fighting. Rather than pursue an absolute military victory now that the French were openly supporting the Habyarimana regime, the RPF leadership adopted guerrilla tactics against the cumbersome and undisciplined FAR and its allies (Jones, 1999: 57).19

Throughout the civil war, the RPF continued to occupy the northern part of Rwanda. In Kigali and elsewhere across the country, Tutsi civilians, perceived as natural allies and spies of the RPF “invaders”, were victims of arbitrary arrests, political assassinations and organised massacres (Vandeginste, 2003: 253). The civil war with the RPF provided the Habyarimana regime with the necessary pretext to pursue any and all measures needed to protect itself from an enemy that was both external (the RPF and the exiled refugees that supported them) and internal (all Tutsi and Hutu political opponents) (Burnet, 2005: 82). It also “contributed to the fragmentation of the political landscape and to the introduction of weapons and warriors difficult to control. And, it progressively generated a culture of violence in which political solutions became increasingly difficult” (Reyntjens, 1996: 246). It was in this climate that peace negotiations took place in Arusha, Tanzania.

19 Belgian paratroopers returned home by the end of October (Prunier, 1997: 93).
The Arusha Peace Negotiations

The Arusha peace negotiations began in June 1992. Just over a year later, on 4 August 1993, accords were signed between the ruling MRND, the RPF and the opposition coalition parties, the MDR, PSD and the PL.\(^{20}\) The agreement included protocols on uniting the FAR and RPF armies,\(^{21}\) repatriation of refugees, and the resettlement of displaced persons (Kroslak, 2008: 41-42). It included provisions for power sharing amongst its signatories, including the creation of a national unity and reconciliation commission and a national summit on Unity and Reconciliation.\(^{22}\) It also laid out a timetable for installing a broad-based transitional government, which was to be made up of representatives of all Rwanda’s political parties, save the CDR which the RPF argued was not a political party at all, but instead an extremist splinter group of the MRND (Jones, 1999: 70-71).\(^{23}\)

Any optimism that the signing of the Arusha Accords may have generated was short-lived. President Habyarimana resisted their implementation at every step and failed to implement agreed-upon action until international donors pressured him to do so (Uvin, 1998: 96). He followed a “two-track policy” of implementing the Accords on one hand while planning the genocide to eliminate the “Tutsi problem” on the other (C. Newbury, 1995: 13). The CDR and Hutu Power extremists within the MRND gained the

\(^{20}\) The Tanzanian government mediated the process, in conjunction with the Organisation of African Unity and the governments of France, Belgium and the United States.

\(^{21}\) The agreement called for a 60-40 split of FAR and RPF soldiers among the rank-and-file and a 50-50 split of FAR and RPF among commanding officers.

\(^{22}\) Articles 24 and 88 of the Arusha Peace Agreement on Power-Sharing.

\(^{23}\) Mediators encouraged the RPF to compromise and allow the CDR to join in the power-sharing agreement. The RPF held firm, rejecting the argument that bringing hardliners into government where they could be managed was preferable to leaving them out of the agreement where they could wreak havoc (Kuperman, 1996: 228).
upper hand in October 1993 when Tutsi army officers in Burundi assassinated that
country’s first democratically elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye. Hutu Power
extremists in Rwanda painted his assassination as “undeniable proof” that Tutsi anywhere
would do anything to regain power (Turner, 2005: 41).24 The opposition coalition
splintered into “extremist” and “moderates” factions. These two factions began to bicker
over the assignment of seats to government set out in the Arusha agreement, which
delayed the launch of the transitional government by several months (Jones, 1999: 59).
The RPF added insult to injury by issuing a bland statement of regret, while praising
Ndadaye’s assassination among the Rwandan refugees still living in Uganda (Prunier,
1995: 201-202). This tipped the balance of power towards Hutu Power extremists as
some moderates looked warily on a continued alliance with the RPF (Jones, 2001: 62;

In the wake of Ndadaye’s assassination, the first battalion of United Nations
peacekeepers arrived to monitor the implementation of the Arusha Accords.
Habyarimana continued to stall their implementation, notably through the continued use
of hate radio and organised violence.25 From the opening days of the civil war, the
Habyarimana regime understood the importance of using media to rally ordinary
Rwandans around the regime. In March 1992, Radio Rwanda was the first to directly
encourage the killing of Tutsi in Bugesera town, south of Kigali (Article 19, 1996).

24 “Hutu Power” refers to the coalition of Hutu extremists from within the MRND and CDR as well as
those members of the MDR who defected.
25 The most famous example of pre-genocide hate propaganda is the November 1992 speech of MRND
vice-president Léon Mugesera. He made the first call for violence against Tutsi in Gisenyi province. He
said, “the mistake we made in 1959…is that we [Hutu] let you [Tutsi] get out safe and sound…your
country is Ethiopia and soon, we will send you to your home, via Nyabarongo [river] on an express trip”
(Article 19, 1996: 38). The tone and content of Mugesera’s speech, which drew on the false image of Tutsi
as invaders from Ethiopia, were frequently repeated on state-run radio prior to and during the 1994
genocide.
Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) began its broadcasts just after the Accords were signed in July 1993. Extremist elements within the MRND and the CDR used the cover of multi-partyism to launch RTLM as a means to complement the message of state-run Radio Rwanda – that the way to eliminate the RPF “problem” was to exterminate all Tutsi (Des Forges, 1999: 96-105). Far from the somber and serious tones of Radio Rwanda, RTLM programming was informal and playful and was dedicated to voicing the views and opinions of ordinary Rwandans; “it still broadcast official voices often enough to continue to enjoy the authoritativeness of national radio, but to that it added the appeal of being the station to speak for the people” (Des Forges, 2007: 29).

RTLM reported Ndadaye’s murder “in a highly sensationalized way to underline supposed Tutsi brutality and heighten Hutu fears of Tutsi” (Des Forges, 2007: 31). RTLM became of the voice of Hutu Power and its extremist politics and anti-Tutsi vitriol was the order of the day. RTLM broadcasting also denounced Hutu who were willing to share political power with Tutsi. It used increasingly violent language, for example saying that Hutu militias would “rip into little pieces those Hutu who supported the RPF” (Article 19, 1996: 56). RTLM also made specific denunciations against prominent Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu, “as enemies of the nation who should be eliminated one way or another from the public scene” (Des Forges, 2007: 30). The RTLM broadcasts contributed to the creation of a climate of fear and insecurity among ordinary Rwandans, which in turn legitimised some ordinary people’s decisions to kill when pressured to do so by Hutu Power militias between April and July 1994.²⁶

²⁶ Straus (2007) shows that ordinary Rwandans exercised considerable agency in deciding whether/how to participate in the genocide or not. He concludes, “the evidence amounts to a persuasive refutation of the commonly held beliefs that radio had widespread, direct effects and that hate radio was the primary driver of the genocide and participation in it” (Straus, 2007: 630). “Radio emboldened hard-liners and reinforced
Hutu extremists within the MRND and the CDR fed the fear and insecurity of ordinary Rwandans by making violence a normal and routine part of everyday life for Hutu, Tutsi and Twa alike. After the RPF invaded in October 1990, the Habyarimana government adopted an increasingly explicit policy of encouraging and planning mass violence among civilians. Local authorities used false rumours and misinformation to promote ethnic hatred and incite the local residents to take part in attacks on Tutsi civilians, who were identified by Hutu Power extremists as either RPF infiltrators \textit{(abacengezi)} or accomplices \textit{(ibyitso)}. Local officials instigated violence through awareness-raising campaigns known as “sensitisation”, “to put local peasants ‘in the mood’, to drum into them that the people they were to kill are \textit{ibyitso} (accomplices), actual or potential collaborators of the RPF archenemy” (Prunier, 1995: 138). The government staged the first event of Hutu violence against Tutsi two weeks after the RPF invasion in Kibilira commune in Gisenyi province (Prunier, 1995: 109-110). Local officials falsely reported that Tutsi accomplices to the RPF killed Hutu in their community (Article 19, 1996: 14-15).\textsuperscript{27} In response, groups of civilians, under the control of Hutu militia leaders, roamed the hills looking for RPF accomplices to kill. Local and regional officials were aware of the violence, but chose not to end it until several days later, sending a clear message of tolerance, if not acceptance, of violence against (mainly Tutsi) civilians.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{27} Two corpses were paraded at the sensitisation meeting (Article 19, 1996: 14).

\textsuperscript{28} The RPF also showed little regard for civilian loss of life during its military campaigns in northern and central Rwanda between October 1990 and April 1994. It was a tactic of both the RPF leadership and the Habyarimana regime to attack civilians and then blame the deaths on the other side (Umutesi, 2004: 17-44).
As the civil war continued, the Habyarimana regime moved toward a more explicit policy of promoting ethnic violence among ordinary Rwandans. The regime blamed the Kibilira massacre on the RPF and its Tutsi accomplices, while international media reported it as an instance of “ethnic hatred” (Article 19, 1996: 15). Blaming the RPF for violence they had sponsored provided the Hutu Power extremists with the cover they needed to authorise their officials to commit human rights violations against ordinary Rwandans, including mass arrests and imprisonment, disappearances, extrajudicial executions and death. The civil war also provided the Habyarimana regime with the necessary pretext to train the Hutu Power militias – the interahamwe and impuzamugambi – that would later incite ordinary Hutu to kill Tutsi during the genocide. Members of both militias organised and implemented mass violence, targeting in particular Tutsi civilians and politically moderate Hutu as accomplices of the RPF. The strengthening of Hutu Power militias added to the normalisation of violence and made fear and insecurity a staple of everyday life in pre-genocide Rwanda. Throughout 1992 and 1993, Hutu Power extremists ordered political assassinations and large-scale massacres of Tutsi civilians in the central and northern regions of Rwanda. Murders, beatings, disappearances and imprisonment became a regular and accepted part of daily life (Umutesi, 2004: 31). One Hutu man who participated in my research summed up the climate well,

Oh yes, there was all sorts of violence. They divided us by identity card at the [sensitisation] meetings which we had to attend. They would send armed men into the hills to bring us to the meetings. Sometimes we would be sent to training sessions to learn how to kill our neighbours. They told us this was part of our work and not to forget that umuganda [collective work] was for the good of the nation. We were told that Tutsi wanted to kill us and to learn to defend ourselves for our own good. Sometimes they gave us food. We usually got [banana] beer.
I never thought about my Tutsi neighbours as evil but the RPF was in Rwanda and causing headaches for us [Hutu]. They [militia leaders] also told us that we would be rewarded for good behaviour when the war was over and peace was restored. They offered things like livestock and mabati [roof sheeting]. As things started to heat up [in the months leading up to the 1994 genocide] many of us killed neighbours. We saw how things were going around us. Tutsi were scared and so were Hutu. We were told that democracy was the problem, that the RPF wanted to take power from Hutu to impose themselves on us again (interview with Augustin, a 54-year-old umutindi released Hutu prisoner, 2006).²⁹

As violence became a normal and accepted part of the everyday realities of ordinary Rwandans, President Habyarimana continued to stall the implementation of the Arusha Accords. In early April 1994, President Mwinyi of Tanzania convinced Habyarimana to attend a summit in Dar es Salaam to discuss the regional implications of the crisis in Burundi. On 6 April 1994, Habyarimana returned from Tanzania by private aircraft. The passengers included some of the most powerful members of his government as well as the new Burundian president Cyprien Ntaryamira. On its landing approach, unknown assailants fired a missile from a nearby hill.³⁰ The plane crashed; all passengers on board were killed instantly. The crash set off violent responses from both Hutu Power militias and the RPF. Violence broke out immediately in the northern provinces of

²⁹ Augustin went on to say, “So yes, I killed thinking it would be the best thing for me and my family. I did not want to be labeled an accomplice of the RPF. I had a son with a bad illness and had to think about how to get enough money to take care of him.”

³⁰ The identity of the individuals who fired the missile remains a mystery. The balance of available evidence points to Paul Kagame as the individual who ordered the downing of the plane because of his own desire to expedite the RPF’s ascension to power (Ruzibiza, 2005). Ruzibiza has since recanted his version of events, saying that he was “crazy” when he wrote his book (Contact FM, 11 November 2008). Academics Claudine Vidal and André Guichaoua, who analysed and confirmed the veracity of Ruzibiza’s account are “astonished” at his retraction (Hirondelle News Agency, 21 November 2008). This is likely the result of RPF intimidation tactics as his retraction came immediately after the arrest of Rose Kabuye. She was arrested in Germany on 10 November 2008 and is one of a number of Kagame’s inner circle suspected by French judge Bruguière of involvement in the killing of former president Habyarimana (BBC, 10 November 2008). Ruzibiza is a key witness in Bruguière’s investigation. Cf. footnote 33 in the Chapter One.
Ruhengeri and Gisenyi. RPF troops stationed in Kigali took defensive positions around the city (Dallaire, 2004: 269). Within twenty-four hours there were no “moderates” left, leaving General Roméo Dallaire, as head of the ill-equipped United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) to negotiate with Hutu extremists to stop killing ethnic Tutsi. Dallaire understood that the violence in Rwanda was genocide: “In just a few hours the Presidential Guard had conducted an obviously well-organised and well-executed plan – by noon on April 7 the moderate political leadership of Rwanda was dead or in hiding” (Dallaire, 2004: 232).

The Post-genocide “Emergency” Period (July 1994 to 1995)

Across the country, the genocide ended as the RPF took territorial control. It controlled Kigali by 1 July 1994, and had total control of Rwanda by 18 July 1994 when it finally defeated the last remnants of the Hutu Power forces in Gisenyi. In the process of securing territory, the RPF did save Tutsi lives; however, its overarching military goal was to win the war and gain state power. In fact, the RPF “expected their [1990] invasion to trigger a violent backlash against Tutsi civilians in Rwanda” (Kuperman, 2004: 61). As the RPF advanced, tens of thousands of ordinary Rwandans of all ethnicities fled, many of them under duress from leaders of the Hutu Power militias. Others fled on the order of local government authorities, who spread rumours amongst the refugee population about RPF reprisals. Millions fled west into eastern Zaïre; hundreds of thousands remained in the Zone Turquoise (which covered Gikongoro,

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31 Kuperman’s research also shows that the RPF understood that its efforts to gain state power would provoke genocidal retaliation from Hutu extremists “but viewed this as an acceptable cost of achieving their goal of attaining power in Rwanda” (Kuperman, 2004: 63).
Kibuye and Cyangugu provinces, see figure 2 on page 49) under the protection of French troops who arrived in June 1994 (Kroslak, 2008: 54).32

A new government was sworn in on 19 July 1994 and faced “seemingly insurmountable” obstacles (UNDP Rwanda, 2004a: 6). Approximately 10 percent of the population was dead; another 30 percent fled into exile (Reyntjens, 2004a: 178). Many of those who remained inside Rwanda were internally displaced. During the genocide, Rwandans from all walks of life suffered whether they were targeted for killing or not. Everyone had been exposed to killing in some way or another. Psycho-social trauma was prevalent; some studies suggest as many as 95% of Rwandans witnessed or participated in “extreme acts of violence” (Ndayambajwe, 2001: 46). As the genocidal Hutu Power forces retreated into Zaïre, they looted or destroyed anything of value. Government offices, schools, hospitals and health clinics as well as businesses, including market stalls and kiosks, were razed. Retreating government leaders of the interim government ordered the looting of the central bank (Prunier, 1995: 113).33 In the hills, crops rotted as there was no one to harvest them. In towns, there was no running water, electricity or telephone service.

The new government reaffirmed its “commitment to the terms and spirit of the Arusha Accord” (Reyntjens, 2004a: 178). A key exception was that the RPF gave itself all of the posts held by the MRND and CDR. It also created the new position of Vice-

32 The French mission, known as Opération Turquoise, has been highly criticised for its failure to arrest genocidal leaders of the defeated government as they fled into Zaïre either through the Zone Turquoise or via the northern withdrawal route via Gisenyi into Goma (Des Forges, 1999: 682-684).

33 An interim government was created on 8 April 1994. Its leaders quickly left Kigali and were based in Gitarama (in central Rwanda, Prunier, 1997: 268). The interim leadership, basically powerless in the face of strong military leadership from Colonels Théoneste Bagosora and Augustin Bizimungu, fled again to Gisenyi in the north on 13 June 1994 (Prunier, 1997: 273). Bagosora was convicted of crimes of genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on 18 December 2008 (BBC, 18 December 2008).
President, which was filled by Paul Kagame (Prunier, 1997: 300). The cabinet consisted of a Hutu majority (16 of 22 posts), including the President (Pasteur Bizimungu, RPF) and the Prime Minister (Faustin Twagiramungu, MDR). It seemed as though the RPF would establish an inclusive government that was committed to national unity and reconciliation. Politicians, civil servants, judges and military who served under the previous regime stayed behind in Kigali and “indicated their willingness to co-operate with the RPF” (Reyntjens, 2004a: 180). The RPF also negotiated with the French military, who continued to occupy and control the Zone Turquoise, to honour its commitment to withdraw on 21 August 1994. By the time of the French withdrawal, an additional 500,000 Rwandans had left the Zone, crossing into Zaïre at Bukavu town into the southern Kivu region of Zaïre (Prunier, 1997: 305).

These political developments indicated to old-caseload refugees (known in Rwanda simply as “returnees”) that it was time to return home.34 Their unofficial return to Rwanda (i.e., individuals and families were not processed by UNHCR) caused some headaches for the RPF-led government (HRW, 2001a: 19-21). Many of the old caseload returnees had no family or social ties in Rwanda; as a result, they simply occupied homes abandoned during the genocide. As the owners of these homes returned to Rwanda following the genocide, they found their homes either destroyed or occupied by “anglophone returnees who would not give up their new homes” (fieldnotes, 2006). In some cases, attempts by genocide survivors to repossess their homes were “met with threats, accusations of being genocide perpetrators, imprisonment, and even assassination instigated by individuals who did not want to give up their property” (Burnet, 2005: 110).

34 Old-caseload refugees are individuals, mainly Tutsi, who fled Rwanda during successive waves of violence between 1959 and 1973 and their descendents.
Hutu who returned home faced the possibility of being denounced as genocide perpetrators by virtue of their ethnicity. In some instances, aggrieved genocide survivors took revenge on Hutu, occupying their homes, stealing their livestock and other property, and in some cases, killing them. Hutu property owners were particularly vulnerable as returnees denounced them as genocide perpetrators, resulting in their arrest and imprisonment.

Some Rwandans, particularly those living near the Zaïrian and Tanzanian borders, remained vulnerable to attacks from members of the Hutu Power forces, the ex-FAR and interahamwe, who were hiding in the refugee camps. In addition, leaders of the genocide who now occupied positions of authority in the camps threatened to kill anyone who tried to leave (Umutesi, 2004: 79). The RPF also committed mass violations of human rights against ordinary Rwandans, notably massacres which took place after the Hutu Power forces had fled. Civilians were massacred by RPF soldiers in eastern, southern and central Rwanda (Des Forges, 1999: 705). The RPF also arbitrarily executed individuals – survivors or returnees, Hutu or Tutsi – if they perceived them to be associated with the former genocidal government or hostile to the new government (Des Forges, 1999: 709). The new RPF-led government distanced itself from these killings by blaming them on undisciplined new RPF soldiers who killed in revenge (Des Forges, 1999: 714). In April 1995, the RPF killed 8,000 civilians, many of whom were perceived to be ethnic Hutu, at the Kibeho internally displaced persons camp in southwestern Rwanda. The RPF blamed the massacre on interahamwe militia members living in the camps. As the truth came to light from humanitarian aid workers and human rights activists, the government
eventually recanted, justifying the massacre by saying it attacked Kibeho to eliminate *interahamwe* living in the camp (Burnet, 2005: 175-204; Pottier, 2002: 76).

The human rights abuses perpetrated by the RPF led many Rwandans to question its commitment to a government of national unity and reconciliation. It became increasingly clear that Hutu members of the government had little, if any, decision-making power and that they could only hold public office as long as they did not challenge the RPF’s actions. In particular, prominent Hutu politicians and long-time allies of the RPF resigned in August 1995, among them Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga (RPF), Justice Minister Alphonse Nkubito (PSD) and Prime Minister Twagiramungu (MDR) (Reyntjens, 2004a: 180). More than 40 prominent figures – both Hutu and Tutsi – fled into exile between 1995 and 2003, while several others have been assassinated, imprisoned or disappeared (HRW, 2003a: 8–9; ICG, 2002: 28–9). The 1995 resignations meant that new members of cabinet had to be appointed. The RPF appointed new Hutu to cabinet posts while at the same time installing its loyalists as deputies within Hutu-led ministries. This gave the appearance of an ethnically balanced government when in fact the real power within ministries lay with the RPF-appointees (Reyntjens, 2004a: 187-190). Political power was concentrated in the hands of a small group of individuals closely associated with Vice-President Kagame, who claimed that ethnicity was a fictional hangover from Belgian colonial rule while boasting that Hutu are

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35 Sendashonga went into exile and was assassinated presumably by agents of the RPF, after several failed attempts, in Nairobi in 1998. Nkubito died of allegedly natural causes in 1997 following two failed assassination attempts. Twagiramungu went into exile, and attempted to return to run against Kagame’s RPF in the 2003 Presidential elections. He remains in exile. Twagiramungu’s replacement Pierre-Célestin Rwigema (MDR) quit his post and went into exile in 2000.
well represented in his government (Gourevitch, 1996: 164). From October to December 1995, the RPF continued its pattern of human rights abuses. Hutu were particularly subject to arbitrary arrest on suspicion of committing acts of genocide. Many remained jailed for years without formal charge. The RPF explained these arrests as “necessary”, given the continued incursions of interahamwe and other forces intent on destabilising Rwanda from the refugee camps in Zaïre (Vandeginste, 2003: 254).

Repatriation of Refugees (1996-1997)

By the end of 1996, UNCHR estimated that there were almost 1,200,000 refugees living in eastern Zaïre and another 600,000 in western Tanzania (UNCHR, 1997). The sheer number of refugees, along with the complexity of the situation, meant that humanitarian organisations opted immediately following the genocide to organise the camps based on the Rwandan geographic regions and administrative structures to distribute relief (Minear and Guillot, 1996: 99). This had the unintended effect of reinforcing the authority and power of political and military leaders from the Habyarimana regime who had fled into neighbouring countries, some of whom were guilty of acts of genocide. These leaders also used their positions of authority to spread misinformation about security and living conditions in Rwanda (Umutesi, 2004: 89-102). Many Rwandan refugees received death threats if they tried to return; leaders in the camps wanted to maintain high numbers of refugees to justify the continued food and medical relief provided by international organisations (Minear and Guillot, 1996: 107).

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36 Kagame boasts that his commitment to sharing power with Hutu politicians is “sincere” since he could have if he wanted to “taken over everything but the fact is that we did it differently” [in opting for a government based on power-sharing] (Gourevitch, 1996: 168-169).

37 270,000 Rwandans were registered as refugees in Burundi. UNHCR reported 90,000 Rwandan refugees under its care in Uganda (UNHCR, 1997).
The Rwandan authorities that controlled the refugee camps in Zaïre hoarded international relief assistance; ordinary Rwandan refugees received very little medical or food aid, existing on “a little oil, some sugar and biscuits” (interviews, 2006). The immediate post-genocide period (1994-1996), the RPF-led government in Kigali did not want these refugees to return home and made it difficult for them to do so. Their attitude had shifted by mid-1996 when the government began to forcibly return the Rwandan refugees living in camps along the border with Zaïre. The regime saw the refugee camps, particularly those in Zaïre, as sites where Hutu Power forces could regroup and rearm since these men were hiding among the general refugee population (UNHCR, 1997).

Just as domestic politics in Uganda forced the RPF decision to invade Rwanda in October 1990, domestic politics in the Kivu regions of western Zaïre facilitated the forcible repatriation of Rwandan refugees. The mass influx of refugees from Rwanda in late 1994 re-ignited tensions between the Banyamulenge and the Banyarwanda living in Congo. The Congolese Banyarwanda have lived in the Kivus for several hundred years. Hutu live mainly in northern Kivu while Tutsi live in the south. But the distinctions between them were regional, not ethnic. It was not until the 1990s, when political tensions again emerged in Rwanda that the identity of the Banyarwanda as Kinyarwanda speakers of a particular locale shifted to an ethnic one of being either Hutu or Tutsi. Just as domestic politics in Uganda forced the RPF decision to invade Rwanda in October 1990, domestic politics in the Kivu regions of western Zaïre facilitated the forcible repatriation of Rwandan refugees. The mass influx of refugees from Rwanda in late 1994 re-ignited tensions between the Banyamulenge and the Banyarwanda living in Congo. The Congolese Banyarwanda have lived in the Kivus for several hundred years. Hutu live mainly in northern Kivu while Tutsi live in the south. But the distinctions between them were regional, not ethnic. It was not until the 1990s, when political tensions again emerged in Rwanda that the identity of the Banyarwanda as Kinyarwanda speakers of a particular locale shifted to an ethnic one of being either Hutu or Tutsi. 38 When the RPF was organising to invade Rwanda in 1990, it reached out to Tutsi in the diaspora and connected with the Banyamulenge of southern Kivu, not the Banyarwanda

38 The Banyarwanda of Congo are comprised of three distinct groups: 1) Nationals who were resident in Congo before the Belgian colonisers arrived; 2) Migrants who crossed into Congo during the colonial era under compulsion or in search of a livelihood; 3) Refugees who arrived in the post-colonial periods as a result of political instability in their home countries (Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda). Before the arrival of mainly Hutu refugees in 1994, nationals and migrants outnumbered refugees.
community in Congo more generally (Vlassenroot, 2002: 502). When the Hutu power extremists arrived among the 1994 refugees, they militarised the camps and “made life hell for Tutsi in North and South Kivu” (Mamdani, 2001: 255). Soon, Banyamulenge became a generic term for all Kinyarwanda-speaking individuals living in Congo, whether they were Congolese Tutsi or Hutu refugees who arrived in 1994 (Willame, 1997: 78-83). This is in contrast to the original meaning of the term Banyamulenge which referred to the 50,000 or so inhabitants of the Mulenge plateau, south of Bukavu in eastern DRC who were considered to be “Tutsi.” During the war that began in 1996 the Banyamulenge expanded the meaning of the term to other Tutsi from other areas of eastern Congo, including north Kivu, increasing their number to about 400,000.

Hutu Power elements living in the refugee camps incited attacks on Tutsi living in the Kivus. Local and regional Zaïrian authorities did not intervene to stop these attacks; in fact they silently encouraged them in hopes that the Rwandan refugees would return home on their own (Makombo, 1998: 53). In September 1996, the deputy governor of South Kivu announced on local radio that if the Banyamulenge (now meaning all Rwandans in eastern Congo, not just those from South Kivu) did not leave Zaïre within a week they would be imprisoned in the camps and killed (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1996: 2).

Perhaps ironically, this announcement provided the necessary pretext for the RPF to

39 The term Banyamulenge (those who live in Mulenge) gained political meaning after Rwandan Tutsi arrived in 1959-1962 as a way to distinguish them from the newly arrived Banyarwanda (those from Rwanda). This had the effect of changing Banyamulenge identities from territorial and class-based ones to an ethnic one, as Tutsi from Rwanda and Burundi arrived following political upheaval at home.

40 In January 1972, Zaïrian President Mobutu signed a decree giving Zaïrean citizenship to all natives of Rwanda and Burundi (Banyarwanda) who had settled in Zaïre before 1950. Mobutu reversed this decision in 1981, meaning that only those Banyarwanda who had obtained legal naturalisation actually held Zaïrian citizenship (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1996: 2).

41 This mixing of the population masked the involvement of Rwandan troops in the military operations and massacres carried out by the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo/Zaïre (AFDL).
attack and dismantle the refugee camps. The RPF again asked the international community to disarm the Hutu Power forces and their Zaïrian counterparts. When the request went unheeded, the RPF and local Banyamulenge took matters into their own hands in attacking their attackers. Throughout August and September 1996, the Banyamulenge rebels attacked interahamwe and Zaïrian army forces stationed in the refugee camps.

By November 1996, the Banyamulenge rebellion had acquired a name, Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo/Zaïre (AFDL), and a leader, Laurent-Desiré Kabila, handpicked by the RPF to give a Zaïrian face to it all. Tens of thousands of refugees – ordinary Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi – were caught up in the mêlée; many lost their lives (Umutesi, 2004: 138-163). Orchestrated and assisted by the RPF regime in Kigali, the AFDL rebels quickly moved from south to north, gaining control of the 300 miles of Zaïre's eastern frontier in a series of attacks between October 1996 and May 1997 (HRW, 1997: 16). In February 1997, AFDL rebels and their allies attacked the makeshift camps of fleeing refugees at Tingi-Tingi and Amisi; tens of thousands of ordinary Rwandans and Congolese died (Umutesi, 2004: 164-194). Some 600,000 refugees began to make the dangerous and arduous trek back into Rwanda. The international community stood by and watched as RPF-aided ADFL rebels repatriated most of the refugees to Rwanda in 1997 (Chaulia, 2002). Approximately 400,000 refugees went in the opposite direction and fled into Zaïre. AFDL rebels massacred thousands of civilian rebels in the process; tens of thousands of deaths were caused by inhumane camp conditions through cholera, dysentery and malaria. The AFDL blocked international humanitarian assistance to the refugees (IRIN, 1 July 1998).
In an unfortunate turn of events, the Tanzanian government announced shortly after the forcible closures of the camps in Zaïre that all Rwandan refugees in Tanzania must leave by the end of December 1996 (Human Rights First, 2002; UNCHR, 1997). Tanzanian security forces began to forcibly remove refugees, ignoring their right to return to Rwanda voluntarily. Nearly 300,000 of the 500,000 Rwandans resident in Ngara camp fled Western Tanzania to avoid being sent home (USCRI, 2004). For many, the flight was in vain as Tanzanian forces intercepted them and channeled them towards the Rwandan border where UNCHR struggled to register and process them. Instead, these refugees walked back to their home communities “under the direction of Rwandan Patriotic Army soldiers”, many of them to find that their fields had been planted and their homes occupied or destroyed by genocide survivors or Tutsi returnees (Pottier, 1997: 405). Tanzanian soldiers arrested thousands of these refugees on suspicion of genocide. Genocide survivors and returnees often made false accusations of participation in genocide against Hutu who returned from Tanzania in order to prevent these new returnees from reclaiming their homes and other property (fieldnotes, 2006).

The Rebel Insurgency in the Northwest (1997-2000)

The flood of refugees returning from both Zaïre and Tanzania led to a dramatic decline in Rwanda’s internal security situation. By mid 1997, the UN and international NGOs stopped all of their activities in the northwest – emergency reconstruction projects and human rights monitoring alike. The internal political situation in Rwanda was simply too unstable for these organisations to safely and productively carry out their work. Most of the northwest region of the country, Kibuye, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi provinces, was off limits to foreigners due to the UN’s stringent security controls for internationals living in
Rwanda (fieldnotes, 2006). The RPF forbade internationals working in Rwanda from travelling to the northwest, citing the “obvious” security concerns associated with the unregistered return of Hutu refugees who “participated in the genocide. Why else would they flee then resist returning home?” (interview with senior RPF official, 2006). Giving credibility to such strong statements among international donors and aid workers alike was the fact that some ex-FAR, *interahamwe* militia and other Hutu Power elements did indeed use the cover of mass refugee flows to return to Rwanda to attack civilians in efforts to destabilise the RPF-led government.

The RPF identified the Hutu Power forces as *abacengezi* (infiltrators), just as the Habyarimana regime had done with the RPF incursions into the country in 1990-1994. Ordinary people were once again caught in the crossfire, in both Rwanda and in camps in neighbouring Zaïre as the RPF mounted a counter-insurgency to eliminate the Hutu Power insurgency that “threatened Rwanda’s present and future peace and security” (interview with senior RPF official, 2006). In suppressing this insurgency, RPF troops killed tens of thousands of unarmed civilians, a slaughter which the government justified by citing its need for security (HRW, 2001a: 2). Both sides adopted a “deliberate strategy of confusion so as to be able to blame attacks on each other” (AI, 25 September 1997). Ordinary Rwandans became targets of arbitrary violence by one side or the other. Ordinary Hutu and Tutsi perceived by the RPF as sympathetic to the *abacengezi*

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42 Reyntjens contextualises this astonishing quote in his analysis of Rwandan politics in 1997-1998: “Convinced of its “due right”, the regime implements its security policy in a unilateral, aggressive and arrogant manner: it presents itself as a victim of the genocide which the world would not or could not stop and thus has no obligations to the international community, which has no moral authority to teach lessons in the field of human rights or any other field” (Reyntjens, 1999b: 26).

43 Both sides also targeted international aid workers. Three Spanish doctors working for MSF died in January 1997 in Ruhengeri province while two UNHRFOR human rights monitors were killed in February 1997 in Cyangugu province.
were subject to arbitrary arrest, ill-treatment and prolonged detention in life-threatening conditions, as well as death. RPF tactics to control its population included routine searching of peasants’ homes to identify those that were hiding or feeding abacengezi infiltrators – the same tactics that FAR forces used to identify those that hid RPF rebels during the civil war of the early 1990s. Hutu Power insurgents targeted ordinary people, burning their houses, slaughtering their livestock and killing those who did not help them fight the RPF (AI, 25 September 1997). Fierce fighting raged between the two sides for much of 1997 and 1998. Crops went unplanted and famine affected hundreds of thousands of civilians in both eastern Zaïre and northern Rwanda (FAO, 1998).

In late 1998, the tide turned towards the RPF, which had invaded eastern Congo, ostensibly to oust Laurent Kabila following a souring of relations between the RPF and Kabila’s AFDL. The RPF’s presence in eastern Congo disrupted the ability of the Hutu Power infiltrators to organise and invade Rwanda while eliminating their supply routes. The RPF urged ordinary Rwandans to move from their homesteads into displacement camps to protect them from the insurgent raids. Individuals that the RPF suspected of aiding the Hutu infiltrators were imprisoned on suspicion of genocide, forcibly located to the displacement camps or killed by RPF soldiers. Many ordinary Rwandans felt that their greatest risk now was not from insurgents but from local authorities charged with protecting them (HRW, 2001b). The sole participant in my research who lived in the northwest during the insurgency highlights the extent of the insecurity among ordinary Rwandans:

Boys were particularly vulnerable since the RPF would round them up and make them soldiers. Girls got to stay with their families then the infiltrators would come, and violence [rape] that girl. Maybe they heard that the RPF visited that family. It was almost like both sides knew who
was supporting which side and how to violence them. Orphans had it the worst because they had no choice but to go to the [displacement] camps. Every boy orphan that I know, even single orphans, got recruited to the RPF once those camps opened. For the rest of us, we lost our crops and our homes and everything really. They called it the post-genocide period but really it felt like the genocide continued right up until the abacengezi got chased back. My young sister lives in [community] so I left as soon as I was able to live with her. I don’t go back up north because I am a Hutu; I might get accused of something just for visiting! (interview with Marie-Claire, a 36-year-old umutindi Hutu, 2006).

In the rest of the country, ordinary Rwandans lived in fear that the RPF’s rule was just the reverse image of Habyarimana’s oppressive and exclusionary dictatorship. Ordinary Hutu were particularly vulnerable as the RPF continued to target them, particularly adult Hutu men, for their presumed participation in the genocide under the newly passed Organic Law for punishing genocide and crimes against humanity. In October 1996, there were an estimated 90,000 detainees, incarcerated on suspicion of genocide, of which 2,000 were identified as Category 1 accused (LIPRODHOR, 2001). When the law was passed, human rights organisations noted a dramatic increase in

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44 Rwandans speak of “single orphan” and “double orphan”. Single orphan means that the individual has lost one parent. Double orphan means that both parents are dead. The importance of family ties is revealed in this phraseology as even adults of legal age that I spoke to thought of themselves as single or double orphans.

45 The Organic Law No. 08/96 of August 30,1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity committed since October 1, 1990 (hereafter the 1996 Genocide Law) provided the necessary legal framework for punishing acts of genocide and crimes against humanity. Rwanda was not a signatory to the Convention of the Prevention of Genocide in 1994. The Organic Law is limited to acts which occurred between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994. The law divides the accused into four categories. Category 1 is sub-divided into four groups comprising a) the planners, organisers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of genocide or a crime against humanity; b) people in positions of authority at national, prefectural, communal, sector or cellule level, or in a political party, the army, religious organisations or in a militia who perpetrated or fostered such crimes; c) notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they committed atrocities, distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or wherever they passed; d) persons who committed acts of sexual torture. Category 2 is made up of persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices of intentional homicide or serious assault against a person, causing death. Category 3 comprises people whose criminal acts or acts of criminal participation make them guilty of other serious assaults against the person. Category 4 comprises people who committed offences against property (MINIJUST, 1996).
arbitrary arrests (IRIN, 1997: 4). Those Hutu not under suspicion of participating in the genocide were sent to *ingando* (re-education camps) to “learn how to live as neighbours with Tutsi” (interview with senior RPF official, 2006). The RPF saw the mass corralling of Hutu as necessary to plant the seeds of reconciliation while providing a structured environment to disseminate its ideology through political indoctrination (Mgbako, 2005: 202).

The RPF continued its drift towards authoritarian rule, the concentration and abuse of power in the hands of RPF loyalists and continued human rights abuses (Reyntjens, 2004a; 2006). Throughout 1999 and into 2000, the RPF neutralised its political opposition, weakened the human rights community, silenced journalists, and marginalised the independent civil society that had emerged before the genocide. The RPF continued to engage in assassinations and arrests of political rivals. Simmering tensions between Tutsi returnees, notably those from Uganda, and Tutsi survivors emerged. Returnees are often suspicious of Tutsi and Hutu that grew up inside the country, assuming they must have collaborated with the killing squads to have survived the genocide (interviews, 2006. See also Burnet, 2009). Conflict among returnees is common, as differing experiences of exile shape their interactions. Returnees from Uganda, where the RPF was founded, see it as “their army” as many of them organised fundraisers to fund the rebel movement (fieldnotes, 2006). These returnees see themselves as having more of a right to return to Rwanda than others, particularly those who “decided” to flee to Burundi or Congo (interviews, 2006). Conflict along language lines is also common, with anglophones dominating public life to the exclusion of

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46 The most notable exile of the time is Joseph Sebarenzi of the Parti Libéral, Speaker of the National Assembly and genocide survivor who “suddenly resigned [in January 2000] under pressure from groups within the RPF” (Reyntjens, 2004a: 181).
Many returnees from Uganda feel that their experience of exile was “worse” than that of those who fled to other countries in the Great Lakes Region because of the hardships they experienced in exile in Uganda; they feel justified in enjoying the spoils of their loyalty to the RPF now that they have control of the government (fieldnotes, 2006).

Two events combine to mark the consolidation of RPF political and social power in post-genocide Rwanda. First, the RPF unilaterally extended the so-called “transitional period” from genocide to democratic rule by four years (to July 2003) and second, Paul Kagame ascended to the presidency in March 2000. Skeptics saw the extension of the transition period as a strategic move by the RPF to continue to consolidate its grip on state power in advance of Rwanda’s first post-genocide elections in March 2001. The government’s façade of inclusive governance continued to crack in light of its “Tutsization of urban Rwanda which is the sociological and economic foundation of the RPF” (Reyntjens, 2004a: 188). Reyntjens continues, “out of a total of 169 of the most important office-holders, 135 (or 80 percent) were RPF/RPA and 119 (or roughly 70 percent) were Tutsi. It is estimated [in mid-2000] that over 80 percent of mayors and university staff and students are Tutsi” (Reyntjens, 2004a: 188).

47 This concern was confirmed in March 2008 when the RPF announced that French would no longer be taught in schools after 2010. The switch appears to be part of a broader government strategy to join the English-speaking Commonwealth. Critics of the government, particularly the political opposition in the diaspora, see it as a way to ensure the continuing marginalisation of French-speaking Rwandans, namely Tutsi survivors. Either way, ordinary people who average only three years of formal schooling are further marginalised by the switch as the first three years of school are taught only in Kinyarwanda (McGreal, 18 October 2008).

48 Returnees from North America, Europe or South Africa “cannot be trusted” as they have “no need to return if they have good jobs abroad” (fieldnotes, 2006). This interpretation is not shared by the RPF leadership, which encourages economically successful Rwandans from abroad to invest in the country.
The Tutsisation of the Rwandan state was confirmed when Paul Kagame, then Vice President of the country, acceded to the Presidency when then RPF-loyalist (and ethnic Hutu) Pasteur Bizimungu resigned “for personal reasons” (Reyntjens, 2004a: 181). This is not to suggest that a Tutsi regime governed Rwanda by at the end of 2000. Rather, the RPF has sought to gain, and maintain, physical and psychological control of the political and social landscape in post-genocide Rwanda by populating the administrative machinery of government, and granting positions of power and prestige to its loyalists, who are in the main ethnic Tutsi. The RPF hardly speaks for all Tutsi, as evidenced in its continued marginalisation of genocide survivors, while favouring anglophone returnees. Genocide survivors have clashed with the RPF-led government on several issues, most notably the integration of suspected génocidaires into the government and military (Kinzer, 2008: 216-218). Tutsi survivor organisations were also outraged by the government’s policy of publicly displaying skulls, bones and mummified corpses at memorial sites across the country as it violated Rwandan cultural and religious codes (Burnet, 2005: 123-124). In addition, survivors’ organisations were openly opposed to the RPF’s strategy to commemorate and memorialise the genocide. The elimination of the insurgency in the northwest combined with the marginalisation of genocide survivors and other political opponents gave the RPF the political room it needed to declare national unity and reconciliation as “a policy objective” once it was in a position to control the process (Reyntjens and Vandeginste, 2005: 103).

Conclusions

Deconstructing the official version of the genocide and contrasting it with the broader social and political context in Rwanda before and after the genocide serves a dual
analytical role. First, it shows how the programme of national unity and reconciliation seeks to both simplify and shroud the individual acts that, in aggregate, make up the 1994 genocide in ways that allow the RPF to silence its opposition by painting a specific version of events around an event that defies easy description or definition. Second, it shows how the simplistic official version of the 1994 genocide is far removed from the multiplicity of individual experiences of violence that ordinary Rwandans lived through during genocide in particular and throughout the 1990s more generally. This is a critical aspect of the programme of national unity and reconciliation, as it approaches ethnic unity through the maximal prosecution of adult Hutu as the sole perpetrators of acts of genocide with the purpose of “eradicating the ideology of genocide living inside them” (interview with NURC official, 2006). Far from a criminal population, Hutu (and Tutsi and Twa) killed their family, friends and neighbours for a variety of reasons as the excerpts that opened this chapter illustrate. Many individuals took part in the genocide “because of direct state-backed pressure and because they were scared”, not necessarily because they held deep-rooted ethnic hatred, as the programme of national unity and reconciliation contends (Straus, 2006: 245).

The chapter also shows that the programme of national unity and reconciliation is silent on other forms of violence perpetrated against ordinary Rwandans of all ethnicities throughout the 1990s by competing parties seeking to seize or maintain state power. Ethnic identities structured which individuals were the targets of violence, how they were targeted, when, and by whom. Ethnic Tutsi were the targets of the Hutu Power forces during the 1994 genocide. Ordinary Rwandans of all ethnicities were caught in the crossfire between the then-rebel RPF and Habyarimana’s FAR during the civil war. The
RPF also killed ordinary Rwandans during and after the genocide. The RPF specifically targeted ordinary Hutu during the operation to eliminate the insurgency in the northwest. Everyday violence differed in intensity and scope throughout the 1990s; there is however one constant – ordinary people were caught up in the maelstrom on the basis of their ethnic identity as determined by the state or those seeking to gain state power. Indeed, a survey of the different forms of everyday violence carried out during the 1990s does more than simply bring to the fore the plight of ordinary people in times of conflict, as the targets of militias and armed forces over which they have no control. It also highlights the need for the post-genocide programme of national unity to take into account the everyday lived experiences of violence of ordinary Rwandans throughout the 1990s, not just during the 1994 genocide. Without any acknowledgement of how Rwandans from different backgrounds recall and make sense of the violence they experienced or witnessed, the RPF regime opts instead to take a top-down and centralised approach to national unity and reconciliation that seeks to control who can say what and when about their individual experiences of violence. The next chapter continues this analysis in identifying the mechanisms of national unity and reconciliation that the RPF regime employs to maintain control of the post-genocide socio-political landscape.

49 A related point that is outside the scope of this dissertation is that the Rwandan genocide cannot be understood in isolation, not even within Rwanda; it must be assessed in the historical, social and political context of the Great Lakes Region.
Chapter 5: Mechanisms of National Unity and Reconciliation

Our main priorities after the genocide were to restore peace and security. We successfully did that and now the focus is on long-term development and the continued promotion of national unity. Rwanda will become the economic hub of the region under our policies. As a nation we cannot afford to continue the violence that has shaped Rwandan history all these many years. Good governance and a capable state\(^1\) are necessary to shape a positive future for all Rwandans (interview with senior RPF official, 2006).

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For me, the state means those with power, and with power you protect your own people. None of my people have power. They are dead, or are in jail. If I thought these strategies of reconciliation were really designed to keep us together and living in peace, I would support it. But this government holds power through officials that don’t even speak Kinyarwanda! How are we to negotiate our daily needs with officials that are strangers to us? The state is just something that I try to avoid. (interview with Gaston, a 34-year-old umutindi released Hutu prisoner, 2006).

These two quotes reveal the gap between the élite version of post-genocide Rwanda and that of the many ordinary Rwandans who participated in my research on the role of the state in promoting national unity and reconciliation. For the government, a “capable state” will “shape a positive future for all Rwandans” and allow for the “continued promotion of national unity”, whereas Gaston feels the state is best avoided and is wary of its strategies of reconciliation. For the RPF-led government, “Rwanda is a nation rehabilitated, whose past is truly the past, whose present is peaceful and stable,

\(^1\) “Good governance and a capable state” is the first pillar of the RPFs’ economic development policy “Vision 20/20”. Neither of these concepts are defined in the policy document, which states “The country is committed to being a capable state, characterised by the rule of law that supports and protects all its citizens without discrimination” (MINECOFIN, 2000: 14).
and whose future beckons ever more brightly with each passing year” (ORTPN, 2004: 4).

Behind this idealised image of Rwanda as a nation rehabilitated are the daily realities of ordinary Rwandan men and women who lived through the 1994 genocide. Their daily struggles to re-establish livelihoods, re-constitute social and economic networks and reconcile with neighbours, friends, and in some cases, family are subject to the top-down and state-led mechanisms of national unity and reconciliation that are the subject matter of this chapter.

An analytical focus on the interaction of 37 ordinary Rwandans resident in the south with the constituent elements of the programme of national unity and reconciliation reveals a very different reality from the government’s idealised version of Rwanda as a “nation rehabilitated”. For those ordinary Rwandans that participated in my research, the future is hardly bright, as the past continues to shape their daily present. The programme of national unity and reconciliation has outlawed public discussion of, or even reference to, one’s ethnicity – speaking of being Tutsi, Hutu or Twa. Individuals can only speak of being “Rwandan” in state-sanctioned settings – for example, in ingando re-education camps, at gacaca justice trials, during genocide mourning week, and through their membership in civil society organisations. There has been no frank or open discussion of how ethnic categories shaped the violence of the genocide, nor has there been any official recognition of different lived experiences of the 1994 genocide beyond the fact that only Tutsi were victims of violence during the genocide and that only Hutu killed. The RPF also does not allow for public discussion of violence that individual Rwandans experienced before and after the genocide, particularly the violence they experienced at the hands of its soldiers. Instead, the post-genocide government uses the apparatus of
the state to ensure that ordinary Rwandans respect the rules of who can speak about their experiences of the genocide, and how, through its programme of national unity and reconciliation. As one umutindi Hutu woman said, “When the state organises reconciliation, I go because I have no choice” (interview with Olive, a 49-year-old umutindi Hutu woman, 2006).

The opening excerpts also allude to the vexed relationship between some ordinary Rwandans and the mechanisms formulated by the post-genocide state in the pursuit of national unity and reconciliation. From the perspective of the ordinary Rwandans that participated in my research, the programme of national unity and reconciliation represents an oppressive force in their daily lives: the post-genocide state “organises everything” and it “makes decisions” in the name of national unity and reconciliation that ordinary people are then left to interpret and implement according to the official narrative (interviews, 2006). The purpose of this chapter is to dissect the institutional techniques of the programme of national unity and reconciliation to show how the RPF and its agents use the apparatus of the state to enforce the programme. A deconstruction of the various mechanisms of the post-genocide state helps to illuminate the social and political differences that the programme masks while showing the extent to which it represents an oppressive form of social control in the everyday lives of ordinary Rwandans.

**Understanding the Power of the Post-Genocide State**

Before identifying the acts of resistance of some ordinary Rwandans to the requirements of the programme of national unity and reconciliation in the final two

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2 By “state”, I mean the common set of public institutions capable of distributing goods and services and controlling violence within a defined, internationally recognised territory.
chapters of the dissertation, it is first necessary to situate the mechanisms that the RPF and its agents use to ensure citizens follow the prescribed rituals of national unity and reconciliation. This allows us to subsequently understand the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans as purposeful reactions to the power of the post-genocide state.

The practical, everyday effects of power are determined by the relationship of domination and resistance between the powerful and the so-called “powerless”.\textsuperscript{3} From this perspective, the dominance of state power is not simply an attribute of the state but rather a product of the relations between the state’s ruling élites and all of its citizens, and the resultant distribution amongst them.\textsuperscript{4} This allows for an analysis that looks beyond who has power (i.e., state élites), to focus on what kind of power is being exercised and by whom (Foucault, 1977, 1980). The apparatus of the state influences the circulation of power insofar as it is influential in dictating the social and political distribution of knowledge, something which RPF élites do very well (Pottier, 2002: 151-178).

Analysing these relational aspects of power means that political and social change relies on more than the institutional practices of the ruling élite, but also on the nature of the social and political relations between individuals and the state – in this case between ordinary Rwandans and the RPF and its agents.

\textsuperscript{3} By “powerless” I mean individuals “over whom power is exercised without their exercising it; the powerless are situated so that they must take orders and rarely have a right to give them” (Young, 2004: 52).

\textsuperscript{4} Among social scientists, power is a highly contested concept; there is no agreed-upon definition. Some define power as the ability to get someone to do what you want them to do (power-over) while others define it more broadly as an ability or willingness to act (power-to). Much of the debate in political science has centred on the nature and scope of the debate of how power-over is operationalised. Dahl’s proposition that power-over is an “intuitive idea”, meaning “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” sparked much debate (Dahl 1957: 202-203; see also Bachrach & Baratz, 1962 and Lukes, 1974). Others define power as a capacity to do something (power-to), the classic example of which is Arendt’s definition of power as “the human ability not just to act but to act in concert” (Arendt, 1970: 44; see also Allen, 1999).
The analysis is also informed by the work of feminist theorists who are interested in understanding social relations of domination and subordination and thinking about how such relations can be transformed through collective resistance. It is inspired by the work of Iris Marion Young (1990, 1997, 2004), which holds that power is a relation, not a thing that can be distributed or redistributed. In turn, a focus on power relations allows for an analysis of the broader social, institutional and structural contexts that shape individual interactions with state power such as those of the 37 ordinary Rwandans from the south that participated in my research. Young, like Foucault, concludes that power exists only in action, and must therefore be analysed as something which is “widely dispersed and diffused” (Young, 1990: 89). Young’s critique points us to a specific understanding of the power relationship as one that is unjust and oppressive to those over whom power is exercised, which is conceptually understood as domination (Young, 1990, 2004).

In analysing state power from the perspective of those individuals subject to it, we learn the myriad ways in which the programme of national unity and reconciliation is an oppressive force in the lives of ordinary Rwandans at the lowest rungs of the social hierarchy. Foucault’s work brings to the fore the ways in which state institutions structure everyday life, including the variety of available “surveillance” techniques and the exercise of “strategies”, “technologies”, and “programmes” of power (Foucault, 1978, 1980; see Bayart, 1993 and Ferguson, 1994 for application of Foucault’s relational power approach to African cases). Programmes of power define the realm of social reality that is to be turned into an object of knowledge, intervened in and made functional. Technologies of power are techniques and practices for the disciplining, surveillance,
administration and shaping of individuals as subjects. Strategies of power are what agencies do in practice when exercising power. Strategies also include the acts of resistance that individuals employ when confronted with power (Foucault, 1977). A deconstruction of the various mechanisms of the programme of national unity and reconciliation – what Foucault would call its techniques and strategies – helps to illuminate the social and political differences it masks from a variety of subject positions.\(^5\)

**The Programme of National Unity and Reconciliation**

The programme of national unity and reconciliation is an ambitious social engineering project that the RPF believes will forge a unified Rwandan identity while fostering reconciliation between survivors of the genocide and its perpetrators. The official narrative of national unity and reconciliation argues that the combination of a docile and obedient population, a legacy of authoritarian government and colonial policies of ethnic divisionism, caused the 1994 genocide. The official narrative is that “Rwanda cannot recover from the effects of the genocide until national unity is restored” (interview with senior RPF official, 2006). Reconciliation will “definitely occur once we [Rwandans] are able to recover the national unity that existed before the white colonisers arrived” (interview with NURC official, 2006). Ethnic unity is a “traditional value which must be reasserted, reinforced and taught to all Rwandans” and is considered to be “the basis of future peace and security” (Office of the President, 1999a: 16). The programme of national unity and reconciliation posits that a democratic political culture and respect for the human rights of all Rwandans are also necessary as they provide the foundation

\(^5\) It also points to continuities in the function of state power in Rwanda, a detailed analysis of which is beyond the scope of this dissertation but certainly requires further analysis.
from which “those accused of genocide can take responsibility for their actions” and from which “those who survived can participate in judging them [during gacaca court proceedings]” (interview with MINIJUST official, 2006). The programme of national unity and reconciliation also encourages Rwandans to hold their local officials to account for decisions that are not in the best interests of the community and to resist reckless leaders who might manipulate them to behave “wickedly”6 (interviews, 2006; NURC, 2007b; Office of the President, 1999a: 63-64).

The RPF uses the apparatus of the state to try to ensure that survivors forgive and forget what happened to them during the genocide, and that perpetrators tell the truth about what they did. For Rwandans who try to step outside the prescribed roles of national unity and reconciliation, the reaction from the government and its agents is quick and relentless: imprisonment without charge, disappearance, intimidation, even death (Frontline, 2005; HRW, 2000, 2001a, 2003, 2008; IFHR, 14 April 2005; Kituo Cha Katiba, 2006; LGDL, 2004; MSF, 2006c; Reyntjens, 2004a, 2004b; RSF, 31 January 2006; UNDP, 2008; USIP, 2005). The cost at the community level is just as steep but is of a different scale: gossip, character assassination, denunciation, shunning, and outcasting serve to isolate, ostracise and demonise individuals on the basis of where they were during the genocide, and whether they experienced, witnessed, resisted, or acted the by stander to the violence.7 This means that survivors (read Tutsi) and génocidaires

6 “Wickedness” is a form of violence that the RPF has identified in the aftermath of the genocide. The RPF considers it to be the main psychological source of violence since the genocide. It is closely related to feelings of bitterness and revenge. All Rwandans need to recognise “that wickedness as well as the ethnic hatred [sic] have been accentuated by the practices of the political powers that ran the country since 1919 to 1994” (NURC, 2008: 113).

7 Denunciation is by far the most serious of these techniques as it usually results in a prison sentence at best or disappearance or death at worst.
(read Hutu) have been cast into essentialist categories of victim and killer, and are the main protagonists of national unity. For example, the policy of national unity officially substitutes génocidaire for “Hutu”, and is thus able to exclude from public life those Hutu who do not toe the line on the basis that they are all génocidaires. The programme of national unity and reconciliation appears to be inclusive and conciliatory when in fact Hutu can participate only as génocidaires. The official position is that reconciliation between these two groups is ongoing and successful; Rwanda is both peaceful and safe. Survivors can speak of their experiences in sanctioned settings, such as during mourning week or *gacaca* trials. Génocidaires can hang their head in shame and ask for forgiveness once they have told the truth about what they did.

For the ordinary Rwandans that participated in my research, the penalties of falling afoul of the accepted limits of the programme of national unity and reconciliation are too high to be openly risked. The most marginal seek to avoid contact with the government and its agents while the government works to make sure everyone participates according to the official narrative. For example, Judith was put in the *cachot* [detention] by the local government official in her community because she failed to attend *gacaca* in mid-May 2006. She says,

> He put me in prison because I disrespected the rule about attending *gacaca*. I already told my truth [last week] and it was rejected by the judges. They said in front of everyone that my evidence was no good; some laughed. Some [Tutsi] survivors have said I should be kicked out of [the women’s cooperative she belongs to] because I am not respecting the rules of reconciliation. What is the point of going if I am going to be ridiculed, to be told my truth is not good enough. They tell us to tell our truth they then say it’s no good; this is how this government operates. Of course I know I have to attend, but I have mouths to feed. I need to plant

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8 The policy also does this successfully in denying the presence of “Hutu moderates” in post-genocide Rwanda. The logic is that if the “moderates” are dead or have fled, then those Hutu that remain in country must by definition be “extremists”.
my fields. There is no one to help me with this; so I decided to miss *gacaca*.

I even left home very early in the morning thinking that they [the judges] would not miss my presence. When [the local official] noticed I wasn’t there, he sent a military to come and get me. Now I am more than humiliated, I now have problems with my neighbours and survivors. And my kids too. I had to leave them alone for five nights while I rotted in prison. No one fed me, or even my kids during those days... this is reconciliation? I am more fearful than ever since I spent those nights in *cachot*. What is next? I don’t know but I do know it is best to avoid contact with government officials who push me to reconcile in ways that I don’t understand (interview with Judith, a 45-year-old umutindi Hutu woman, 2006).

This excerpt also shows that ordinary Rwandans need to understand their role as determined by the programme of national unity and reconciliation so that individuals can offer the requisite performance in its name. In order to ensure that national unity and reconciliation is carried out as envisaged in accordance with the official narrative, the RPF has instituted a variety of mechanisms to ensure that Rwandans, élites and ordinary folk alike, reconcile according to script.

**Mechanisms of National Unity and Reconciliation**

I have already examined some of the RPF’s techniques of national unity and reconciliation in earlier chapters: (1) the exploitation of the perceived unity of pre-colonial Rwanda (Chapter Three); (2) government control of public information, including the RPF’s reinterpretation of its role in stopping the genocide as well as its misrepresentation of the levels of peace and reconciliation among ordinary Rwandans (Chapter Four); (3) the constitutional illegality of public references to ethnic divisionism or trivialising the genocide (Chapter Four); and (4) the maintenance of a climate of fear
and intimidation through the deployment of security personnel at all levels of the administrative structure (Chapter Four). Eleven additional mechanisms can be identified.

First, the repression of political dissent: The RPF does not tolerate any form of political dissent; instead, it works to maintain “total control over the political landscape” (Reyntjens, 2006: 1107). Functional opposition political parties exist as part of a RPF-led coalition that was formed in advance of Rwanda’s 2003 national elections.9 The RPF has carefully eliminated the possibility of an organised internal political opposition, including the dissolution of the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) based on allegations of ethnic divisionism (Rafti, 2004; Reyntjens, 2004a: 184-185).10 The RPF beats up or imprisons political moderates, élite Tutsi and Hutu alike, as well as prominent members of civil society who speak out against the post-genocide policies. Those who can flee into exile (Reyntjens, 2006). The RPF accuses élite Hutu critics of harbouring genocide ideology11 while élite Tutsi, including formerly prominent members of the RPF,
are accused of corruption.\textsuperscript{12} By the end of 2006, many ordinary Rwandans understood that accusing someone of corruption was a tactic of the government to eliminate its opponents: “the perception remains that many government officials have engaged in corruption but are protected as long as they remain in good stead with the akazu [President Kagame’s inner circle]” (Burnet, 2007: 22).\textsuperscript{13}

The RPF also maintains a tight rein on the media. The RPF accuses journalists who speak out against its policies of ethnic divisionism or of preaching genocide ideology under the 2001 “divisionism” law. Only those media outlets that express views that are in line with the government are able to speak out; as a result, many self-censor (Uvin, 2003: 1). Instances of “courageous journalism” have in turn been followed by “crackdowns on the media” (Burnet, 2007: 5). Media independence and freedom of expression have declined considerably since 2000. For example, the RPF accused the editor of Umuseso, said to be Rwanda’s “last remaining independent newspaper”, of

\textsuperscript{12} For example, the RPF accused prominent party members, among them former President Bizimungu and the former Minister of Justice Gerald Gahima, of corruption. The RPF imprisoned Bizimungu on charges of embezzling public funds and fomenting ethnic violence while Gahima fled to the United States. Urban Rwandans I spoke with felt that the RPF treated Bizimungu more harshly because he is a Hutu and he did not grow up with President Kagame in Uganda, while it allowed Gahima to leave because he is a Tutsi who has close personal ties “since childhood” with Kagame (fieldnotes, 2006).

\textsuperscript{13} The RPF has instituted significant reforms designed to reduce public-sector corruption, and Rwanda is widely considered the least corrupt country in Africa (Kinzer, 2008: 235-236). However, enforcement of anticorruption laws “tends to occur in cycles” (Burnet, 2007: 22). In 2004, several senior government officials, as well as more than 100 police officers and 47 district mayors resigned or were removed from office for being corrupt. None of these individuals faced charges in court. In late 2006 and early 2007, more officials, including senior RPF officials, were accused of corruption, but again no charges were laid.
ethnic divisionism in 2003 (Reyntjens, 2006: 1107). The RPF continues to harass and detain without charge journalists who criticise government policies. Several journalists have fled the country; others have been beaten up (RSF, 2002; RSF, 31 January 2006; fieldnotes, 2006).

Second, elimination of references to ethnicity from public discourse: The RPF justifies its intolerance of political dissent in the name of eliminating the ideology of genocide and ethnic divisionism which it claims drove all Hutu to kill all Tutsi. The central idea of the programme of national unity and reconciliation is the slogan of “one Rwanda for all Rwandans”. Since the RPF believes that ethnic disunity caused the genocide, then the creation of an inclusive Rwandan citizenship, of a monolithic identity, is the “obvious solution to overcome our legacy of ethnic hatred and violence. We are no longer Tutsi, Hutu or Twa – we are Rwandans!” (interview with NURC official, 2006).

The RPF invokes its vision of “Rwandan-ness”, i.e., the promise of a unified national identity, as a strategic tool to silence its critics and opponents with allegations of being “un-Rwandan”. Individuals, élite and ordinary folk alike, who question the role of the RPF in stopping the 1994 genocide, or who make public references to war crimes or other human rights abuses that it committed before, during or after the genocide are beaten up, imprisoned, disappear; some are killed in mysterious circumstances (fieldnotes, 2006; HRW, 2007). The RPF limits public speech to acceptable topics, namely the hero-status

14 Umuseso’s editors were targeted by the RPF throughout 2003. Its pro-opposition stance openly angered President Kagame. Several of its journalists have been imprisoned, one for more than a month in August 2003. Others have fled the country, fearing for their safety (AFROL, 16 November 2003). The editor, Charles Kabonero, was acquitted on charges of divisionism in November 2004 for a story he wrote about Rwanda’s Vice-President during the national election campaign in the summer of 2003. His arrest and subsequent legal troubles “sent a wave of fear through Umuseso staff and reminded all journalists not to publish criticism of the government” (interview with New Times journalist (who fled in 2008); see also AFROL, 23 November 2004). Umuseso closed its doors in October 2007, citing “financial difficulties” (New Times journalist email communication with the author, January 2008).
of the RPF for liberating Tutsi from “the noose of Hutu power” and the resilience and ability of Tutsi survivors to forgive “the wrong-doings of Hutu who killed” (interview with senior RPF official, 2006).

In official government discourse, the second component of the official narrative of “national unity and reconciliation” is broadly understood to mean that survivors (read Tutsi) forgive while perpetrators (read Hutu) tell the truth about what they did during the genocide. As one government official explained:

In Rwanda’s parlance reconciliation is short for national unity and national reconciliation. Rwandans are just simple peasant people and they need us to make decisions for them. We have given them peace but they don’t know what to do with it. Survivors are traumatised because of what happened to them. That is why we brought back gacaca and ingando camps. Hutu will tell the truth about what they did during the genocide and justice will come. They will get reconciled because that is how it used to be between Hutu and Tutsi. Once we teach them, they will learn… National unity and reconciliation is within reach (interview with senior RPF official, June 2006).

The RPF also prevents any public discussion outside the acceptable categories of Tutsi survivors and Hutu perpetrators as it seeks to control who can say what and when about their lived experiences of violence before, during and after the genocide. Other categories do not even feature in public discourse: Tutsi and Twa perpetrators, Hutu and Twa rescuers; Tutsi, Hutu and Twa resisters; Hutu and Twa survivors. The RPF does this to reinforce its official narrative of how the genocide happened, and its heroic role for stopping it in July 1994. The ordinary Rwandans who participated in my research are more than just skeptical about the government’s commitment to national unity and reconciliation; they also recognise it as a form of social control. The words of one Tutsi survivor are emblematic of the widely held perception that,
We [survivors] need to know the truth about what happened to our loved ones. We need to have the right to bury them where they belong [at home], not in public memorials. We need to know how they died and who killed them. They talk about national unity and reconciliation. But they don’t know what unity or reconciliation means. I know I am a Tutsi, how can I not? I ran and hid because of being a Tutsi. Now I have to forget that in the name of unity and reconciliation. Unity for whom? Reconciliation for whom? It is a political game that local officials take responsibility for. Reconciliation is not an administrative matter; it is an affair of the heart, of accepting the wrong and then forgiving the ones who harmed you (interview with Joseph M., a 45-year-old Tutsi umukene, 2006).

The words of this prisoner are representative of the sentiments of former Hutu:

We [prisoners] are in here for different reasons. I killed but some did not. They got caught up in politics when they came back [from Zaïre]. I confessed to get a reduced sentence. But they changed the rules and some who confessed got between 20 and 25 years at gacaca. They said I would get out after ten years if I confessed. Part of confessing was re-education. Re-education to learn how to live with my Tutsi neighbours. I didn’t actually know what that meant because I have always lived with Tutsi. The Tutsi I know are poor like my family and we struggled together sometimes. But the new government says that we must learn national unity and reconciliation. So I got re-educated in 1999. There I learned about national unity and reconciliation. But I told my truth. It was even acknowledged by the authorities because they reduced my sentence! But then at gacaca [in 2005] my truth was denounced as a lie and got another 25 years! National unity and reconciliation is just a way for this government to eliminate Hutu. It’s like the new authorities are trying to kill former Hutu through excessive punishment (interview with Jean Claude, a 39-year-old Hutu prisoner, 2006).

Third, the collectivisation of Hutu guilt for the 1994 genocide: In labeling all Hutu as perpetrators of the genocide, the RPF has effectively chosen a strategy of maximum prosecution. The RPF arrested anyone who took part in the genocide without regard to individual motivations for participating in the killing. Interahamwe militias and

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15 A confession and guilty plea procedure was introduced under the 1996 Organic Law on Genocide. A defendant would benefit from a reduced sentence if he described “in detail all the offences committed, the date, time and scene of each criminal act and the names of victims and witnesses if known. S/he must also furnish any further information which may aid the prosecution” (MINJUST, 1996: articles 4 to 13).
other state agents of the previous regime forced many ordinary Hutu men to participate. By 2000, the RPF had detained more than 100,000 individuals for acts of genocide (PRI, 2007: 12). In assigning collective guilt to the Hutu population, the programme of national unity and reconciliation makes no distinction among different types of participation in the 1994 genocide.\(^{16}\) The Ministry of Local Government estimates at least three million perpetrators (MINALOC, 2002). Academic research does not support the government’s practice of collective guilt, finding instead that between 175,000 and 200,000 individuals participated – hardly the numbers needed to justify the assignment of collective guilt to Hutu (Straus, 2004).\(^{17}\)

Collective guilt also limits individual participation of Hutu in community life. Opportunities for paid employment are scarce at best, and their difficulties in finding work are compounded by suspicion that “those who fled [into neighbouring countries] must be by definition guilty of genocide” (fieldnotes, 2006). Full participation in community life is also limited because the perception that all Hutu are guilty of genocide shapes individual opportunities to reintegrate into one’s hill. Many Hutu men told me that it is better not to participate in community life rather than be regarded with suspicion. For example,

> When we go to umuganda [community work] everyone knows which of us [Hutu] is a released prisoner. Tutsi neighbours tell the [local official] that they are too afraid to work next to us [Hutu], particularly when we work with pangas [machetes]. Then you see them later and they laugh because we had to do their umuganda labour. I was released for lack of

\(^{16}\) This was discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, pp. 118-120.

\(^{17}\) Others have estimated similar numbers of perpetrators. For example, Des Forges estimated that “hundreds of thousands” participated (1999: 2) while Jefremovas is more cautious in estimating that between 1-2% of the population, or between 75,000 and 150,000 individuals participated (Jefremovas, 1995: 28). Approximately 3% of the killers were women (Straus, 2006: 100).
evidence but that does not matter. I am Hutu so I must be guilty (interview with Thomas, a 44-year-old umukene bifashije Hutu man, 2006).

Fourth, politicisation of Tutsi victimhood: Under the programme of national unity and reconciliation, only Tutsi are able to call themselves “survivors”. This has the effect of negating the lived experiences of the genocide of Hutu and Twa men and women who also risked death in Rwanda in 1994. It also silences the experiences of individuals from ethnically mixed families who lost some family members but not others on the basis of ethnicity before, during and after the genocide. According to one RPF official, “Hutu cannot be survivors because they were not targeted for dying” (interview with Ministry of Culture official, 2006). While this interpretation accords with the legal definition of genocide, it is also an effective technique for silencing non-Tutsi about the violence they suffered before, during and after the genocide at the hands of the RPF. It also “maintains in practice the ethnic division which the RPF-led government denounces in theory” (Pottier, 2002: 126).

Fifth, politicisation of individual mourning: Individual mourning is politicised in that the government only officially recognises it during mourning week. Only official survivors are recognised, and the RPF only represents their trauma symbolically through the image of the lonely, wounded survivor as the personification of the genocide. The government invokes this image of the traumatised survivor to silence criticism, particularly from the international community (Thomson, 2007: 3). Especially powerful is the image of the wailing survivor, usually a woman, head in hands, and in a spasm of trauma that has come to reflect Rwanda’s mourning week, which is dedicated to

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18 The Tutsi genocide is officially memorialised for the month of April every year, with official events occurring from 1 to 7 April.
remembering and memorialising Tutsi lives lost. Lives lost – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa – in the violence before and after the genocide are not memorialised. Instead, the government uses the mourning period to assert its official version of what happened during the genocide. Survivors (presumed to be “Tutsi”) are clearly distinguished from the killers (presumed to be “Hutu”). As argued in the last chapter, the government promotes a neatly distilled version of what happened during the genocide that does not correspond to the lived experiences of most Rwandans who survived it. The genocide means more to ordinary Rwandans than just the idea that all Hutu killed all Tutsi; some Tutsi killed, some Hutu protected Tutsi; Twa also participated; just as some joined in, others stood by. This single version of events hardly captures the multiplicity of individual experiences.

Despite this, the government requires that Rwandans of all ethnicities attend mourning week events, notably the exhumation of mass graves and reburial of bodies, and listening to the speeches of government officials that remind the population of the need to “never again” allow genocide in Rwanda.

Many ordinary Rwandans that I spoke with in 2006, both in formal interviews and through participant observation, said that they felt the RPF was manipulating the way the genocide is remembered to maintain their positions of power and wealth rather than truly seeking to unify the country (fieldnotes, 2006).\(^\text{19}\) Others, particularly Tutsi survivors, acknowledged the reburials as “a little bit necessary for national healing” but would

\(^{19}\) For example, “We dig up bodies for reburial at the national ceremony but how do we know those remains are even Tutsi bodies? We [Hutu] died as well, but nothing is mentioned about how we suffered during the genocide. Not all of us killed you know. Instead we go because our new government says we must; we were told this very clearly at ingando” (interview with Gaston, a 34-year-old umutindi released Hutu prisoner, 2006).
prefer to do it in private, “away from the spotlight” (fieldnotes, 2006). In homogenising the diverse individual lived experiences of victims of the genocide – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa – as well as those of individuals who lived through the violence of the 1990-1994 civil war, and the emergency period after the genocide (1995-2000), the RPF is stage-managing and politicising individual mourning.

In May 2008, the RPF amended the 2003 constitution to legislate that the genocide be known officially as the “genocide committed on Tutsi” (AFROL, 17 July 2008). This move further excludes the possibility of non-Tutsi survivors while allowing the government to continue to reify its role in stopping the genocide, as the amendment makes a powerful distinction between those who are the perpetrators of the genocide (read Hutu), and those who stopped it (the RPF). It also eliminates the possibility that “Hutu men made fateful choices to participate in violence against their Tutsi neighbours because they were afraid and because they felt pressure from other Hutus to do so” (Straus, 2006: 231). Instead, the constitutional amendment is yet another tactic that the RPF-led government uses to affirm its contention that deep-rooted but latent ethnic enmity of all Hutu for all Tutsi is a root cause of the genocide.21

Sixth, new national symbols: In 2001, the RPF adopted a new flag, national anthem and national seal since “the old ones are stained with Tutsi blood. We need a fresh start with new symbols to represent Rwanda as it is: peaceful and prosperous”

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20 Rwandan culture frowns upon public displays of emotion, and most of the Tutsi survivors that I spoke with found mourning week “offensive”, “upsetting”, and “humiliating” (fieldnotes, 2006). This was particularly so for Tutsi widows who had lost their Hutu fathers, husbands, sons or brothers during the genocide as there is no official outlet for their grief.

21 Similarly, the government created the National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide in September 2007 in efforts to further legitimise its official version of history. Part of its mandate is to research the causes and consequences of the genocide, and “to elaborate and put in place strategies that are meant to fighting revisionism, negationism and trivialization” (MINJUST, 2007b: art. 1(7)).
The old flag was based on the Belgian flag and was made up of three vertical bands, one each of red, yellow and green with the letter “R” in the middle (see image below). The flag needed to be changed because of its “association with Hutu domination over Tutsi” (interview with Ministry of Culture official, 2006). The new post-genocide flag is made up of three horizontal stripes, green on the bottom, yellow in the middle and light blue on top with a beaming sun on the right side (see image below). The green represents “the promise of prosperity” through the “modern and rational use of the country’s resources”; the yellow band of the sun’s rays represents the hope of economic development and the “awakening” of the Rwandan people from “old tendencies of hatred”; blue represents “peace and stability for all” (interview with Ministry of Culture official, 2006).

**Figure 3: Old and new national flags**

![Old and New National Flags](http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Flag-of-Rwanda)

The RPF adopted a new national anthem on 25 October 2001 with the official justification that the old song encourages the Hutu to throw off the “chains of Tutsi oppression” and replaced them with new lyrics that “promote the idea of one Rwanda for
all Rwandans” (interview with Ministry of Culture official, 2006). Ordinary Rwandans who participated in my research, Tutsi and Hutu alike, were baffled by the introduction of new national symbols, noting that the new symbols “seemed to be designed for those who returned after the war” rather than “designed to facilitate peace and security” (interview with Emmanuel, a 27-year-old umukene Tutsi man, 2006). Another individual recognised that the new symbols were an effort to “remind those like me [released prisoner] that Rwanda no longer belongs to us [Hutu]” (interview with Tharcisse, a 39-year-old umutindi released Hutu prisoner, 2006).22

Seventh, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC): In 1999, the RPF created the NURC. The NURC is managed on a daily basis by the Executive Secretary who is responsible to its Deputy Chairperson. The Deputy in turn reports to the Chairperson of the NURC, who is accountable to Parliament for all its activities and publications (interview with NURC official, 2006; NURC, 2007a).23 There is also a Council of Commissioners which acts as an advisory body under the guidance of the Chairperson (NURC, n.d.). There are 12 Commissioners, all of whom “are directly appointed by President Kagame” (interview with NURC official, 2006). There are two substantive NURC programmes – Civic Education, and Conflict Management and Peace Building – both of which are staffed by young Anglophone returnees (NURC, 2007c, 2007d).24 All staff are based in Kigali, and travel to the “hills to check in on how unity

22 Burnet found similar sentiments among Rwandans she spoke with at the time the new flag and anthem were released: “The majority of Rwandans that I asked about the new flag and anthem smiled thinly (as if bearing something painful) or made a comment to the effect that the state does as the state sees fit and the citizens wait to see what will happen next” (Burnet, 2005: 228-229).

23 Law no. 03/1999 of 12 March 1999.

24 All staff of the NURC “must be members of the RPF” (interview with NURC official, 2006).
and reconciliation activities are faring once every month” since it is “a non-negotiable option for Rwandese” (interview with NURC official, 2006).

The NURC is tasked with “emphasising the unifying aspects of Rwandan history, such as our shared culture and language and de-emphasizing divisive ones like the legacy of colonial rule and divisive politics” in all activities in the public sphere, including government, the private sector, civil society and the media (interview with senior NURC official, 2006). Its primary task is to sensitise “Rwandans on the importance of national unity”, propose “measures that can eradicate divisions among Rwandans and … reinforce national unity and reconciliation” and denounce and fight “against acts, writings and utterances which are intended to promote any kind of discrimination or intolerance” (NURC, 2007b). It also holds regular consultative meetings, including an annual National Summit (NURC, 2007g) to ensure that all government agencies, political parties, local officials and Rwandans “from all walks of life respect and observe the policy of national unity and reconciliation” (NURC, 2000: 21). It organises the ingando re-education camps, holds community festivals to promote unity and reconciliation “among the grassroots” (NURC, 2007h), provides funds to students’ clubs (NURC, 2007i) and consults with other government bodies on key aspects of their mandate to ensure across-the-board compliance with the programme of national unity and reconciliation (NURC, 2007b). For example, in 2006 the NURC approved the secondary school curriculum produced by the Ministry of Education, following careful study for strict adherence to the “proper version of Rwandan history and our historical unity before the colonisers arrived” (interview with NURC official, 2006).
Eighth, the *Ingando* re-education camps: another mechanism of national unity and reconciliation is the “re-education” of certain segments of the population through *ingando* solidarity camps. The RPF encourages some – government ministers, church leaders, university lecturers – and requires others – ex-soldiers, ex-combatants\(^{25}\), released prisoners, *gacaca* judges, and incoming university students – to attend *ingando* for periods ranging from several days to several months to study government programmes, Rwandan history and to learn about how to unify and reconcile (NURC, 2006b; 2006c; 2006d). The format differs according to the profile of the participants. Those individuals required to attend *ingando* do so for an average of 12 weeks, and participants live together in close barrack-style quarters (fieldnotes, 2006). There is a significant military presence, with armed soldiers monitoring the activities of participants. The setting is formal and information is delivered lecture-style; there is little “downtime” as participants follow a structured programme of “re-education”, with a focus on their socio-economic reintegration into Rwandan society. *Ingandos* are held in all five provinces, although most individuals receive their re-education in a locale other than their home community (WB, 2002: 17). The version of history taught at the *ingando* camps is offensive to many ordinary Rwandans who have participated, notably Hutu who experienced the events of 1959–1962 (fieldnotes, 2006).

Ninth, mandatory participation at *gacaca* trials: The RPF created the *gacaca* courts in 2001 as a response to the backlog of over 100,000 genocide suspects and to establish a truthful record of what happened during the genocide as a means to promote

\(^{25}\) ‘Ex-solder’ means any member of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (the military branch of the current government) who demobilised after 1995 (World Bank, 2002: 5). ‘Ex-combatant’ means any ex-FAR soldier who remained in, or returned to, Rwanda after July 1994; or, any member of an armed group who is a Rwandan national and returned to Rwanda after May 2001 (World Bank, 2002: 5).
the unity and reconciliation of Rwandans. The government portrays the gacaca courts as a “traditional” community-based and participatory process that will “clear the backlog of cases” while “promoting national unity and reconciliation” (interview with MINIJUST official, 2006). The purpose is to bring local communities together to witness, identify, corroborate, and prosecute perpetrators. Perpetrators are to “tell their truth” while survivors are, once the truth has been established, to forgive. Participation in gacaca is mandatory, and individuals are sometimes fined and/or imprisoned for failure to participate (MINIJUST, 2004: 8). In practice, the gacaca courts have increased the number of accused because of new denunciations, which means that gacaca has increased the prison population, not reduced it as the government envisaged.

Tenth, social control: The RPF tries to control the flow of information, particularly any dissent from government policy through a highly devolved administrative structure. The lowest unit in the Rwandan administrative structure, according to the government, is the family, while the highest is the central government (NURC, 2002; 14; NURC, 2004a: 9). Most decisions are made at the lower levels of government, with committee structures (as well as abunzi dispute mediators and abakagurambaga peace volunteers) in place to oversee the individual and group activities of all Rwandans.

26 Analysts predicted that it would take more than 100 years for the national courts to try all genocide suspects (PRI, 2007: 12).
27 There are almost 10,000 gacaca jurisdictions, meaning one for each Cell and Sector.
28 Rwanda is governed by “two layers of government (central and local) and one of six administrative entities: the Province (Intara), the District (Akarere), the Sector (Umurenge), the Cell (Akagari) and the Village (Imidugudu) [sic]” (MINALOC, 2007: 8). The sixth, and lowest level of government which is left out of this list is the nyumbakumi (meaning responsible for 10 households). Since 2006, there are five provinces (North, South, East, West and Kigali), 30 districts, 418 sectors, and 9165 cells.
29 During my re-education interviews with senior government officials, I asked how many villages and nyumbakumi there were; no one was able to answer. A representative of MINALOC stated prosaically that
The programme of national unity and reconciliation provides incentives to local security personnel to remain vigilant against “criminal elements, those who hold genocidal ideologies, or anyone who fails to promote unity” in accordance with the dictates of the programme of national unity and reconciliation (fieldnotes, 2006). The government provides livestock (cattle, goats, sheep and rabbits) as well as radios and refrigerators to local security forces as incentives to control the population. Local political and military authorities who fail to control those within their jurisdiction are subject to a variety of sanctions, including dismissal, imprisonment, as well as naming and shaming for “poor work ethic”, “corruption”, “sexual immorality” or “having HIV/AIDS” (interviews, 2006).

Dense networks of spies are known to exist throughout Rwanda (and abroad) and are rumoured to be paid for valid information by the Department of Military Intelligence (fieldnotes, 2006). The low-level bureaucrats report the activities of individuals in their bailiwick to the immediate superior at the next level of government, who then decides if the information warrants transmission to the next level up, and so on. Ordinary Rwandans all knew of state surveillance; most shrugged their shoulders, acknowledging prosaically that “we are monitored to make sure we do what we are told; we did it before the genocide (under Habyarimana) in the name of national development and now we do it in the name of national unity and reconciliation” (interviews, 2006; see also Verwimp, 2003 on development ideology under the Habyarimana regime).

“there are as many as the population requires to meet the development needs of their locale” (fieldnotes, 2006). The cell, the smallest formal administrative unit, averages 830 people (Vandeginste, 2003: 252).
Eleventh, government control of associational life: The RPF maintains tight control of civil society organisations and other forms of associational life.\textsuperscript{30} Civil society does not represent an open space where individuals or groups can openly and publicly influence or challenge government policy. Representatives of those civil society organisations that are publicly vocal against government policy, as well as members of their families and social networks, are subject to harassment, intimidation, denunciation, disappearance and even death (AI, 2004).\textsuperscript{31} Between July 2004 and January 2005, several domestic human rights NGOs that openly criticised the RPF and documented human rights abuses by government authorities were closed (fieldnotes, 2006). As a result, many civil society organisations practice self-censorship (HRW, 2007). Most play an important role in filling the social void in the lives of many Rwandans in the aftermath of the genocide. In particular, women’s organisations work to meet the basic needs of their members while providing much-needed social support to individuals who lost their family and social support networks during the genocide (Newbury and Baldwin, 2001:

\begin{quote}
30 In 2001, the RPF passed the Law on Non-Profit Associations, which provided it with the power to control projects, budgets, and the hiring of new staff; it also required all organisations to obtain a renewable certificate of registration from MINALOC. The certificate is granted on the basis of the organisation’s mission statement and annual report and must be renewed bi-annually. The registration process allows government authorities to monitor the activities of civil society and control their publications.

31 In 2001, and again in 2004, LIPRODHOR, one of the few remaining local independent human rights organisations in Rwanda, was summoned by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission and MINALOC to respond to allegations that its representatives were acting against national unity and reconciliation (AI, 9 June 2004). Nine LIPRODHOR employees fled into exile and the organisation was shut down in December 2004 on unsubstantiated charges that the policies and practices of the organisation were “divisionist” and that its representatives were promoting “genocide ideology” among ordinary Rwandans (AI, 10 January 2005). The “new” LIPRODHOR is managed by individuals who are “closely connected with the authorities” and was reopened after an internal investigation to root out those individuals “having the genocide ideology” (FIDA, 2005).
\end{quote}
As a result of their social role, the RPF sees women’s organisations “as the real civil society” (interview with Ministry of Culture official, 2006).

In addition, the RPF advises civil society organisations on what development issues to work on, who is able to join and how the rules and conditions of participation are set (fieldnotes, 2006). The RPF closely surveils all civil society organisations. Most organisations, particularly those in Kigali, are dedicated to servicing so-called “survivor issues”, including psychosocial trauma counseling, HIV/AIDS support, and the provision of micro-credit. Membership in civil society organisations is officially open to both Tutsi and Hutu survivors. Many Hutu “survivors” do marginally benefit from their membership in organisations that support survivors, although specific privileges such as access to subsidised health care and the waiver of school fees for children is available only to Tutsi women in their recognised status as “real survivors” (fieldnotes, 2006).

Conclusions

This chapter has identified and analysed the mechanisms of the programme of national unity and reconciliation to illustrate the extent to which it is a source of oppression in the daily lives of many ordinary Rwandans resident in the south. Identification of the myriad mechanisms of power that the RPF uses to promote its programme of national unity and reconciliation demonstrates three things. First, it makes

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32 Women-focused organisations in civil society have been instrumental in creating legal mechanisms designed to protect Rwandan women, such as the inheritance law of 1998. For analysis of the collaboration established between women and civil society immediately following the genocide, see Burnet (2008: 375-378). Burnet also notes there are other “unifying issues” for government and women’s organisations to rally around, notably land tenure and land use since women “are most vulnerable to losing access to land”, but “women’s NGOs and MIGEPROF [the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development] have refused to define land as a women’s issue” given its political “volatility” (Burnet, 2008: 379-380).

33 Tutsi and Hutu women who remarry lose access to these privileges, not on the basis of their ethnicity but rather on the basis that they have been able to reconstitute their families (fieldnotes, 2006).
apparent the extent of RPF control of the political and social landscape through its programme of national unity and reconciliation. Second, it illustrates how relations of power in post-genocide Rwanda are multiple and have no single reference point or source within the programme of national unity and reconciliation; everyone, élite and ordinary folk alike, is subject to power, albeit in very different ways for different individuals who occupy different social locations. For example, Tutsi survivors have a different experience of state power than do Hutu survivors, but both are subject to its purposeful application in ways that shape individual actions and attitudes to the programme of national unity and reconciliation. We also see how the broad categories of “survivor” and “perpetrator” fail to do justice to the multiplicity of individual lived experiences of ordinary Rwandans before, during and after the genocide. Third, a focus on the mechanisms of national unity and reconciliation allows for analysis of the social and political differences that the programme of national unity and reconciliation masks.

In particular, the chapter illustrates the discursive and structural elements of the programme of national unity and reconciliation to show its myriad forms at all levels of society. It also analyses the techniques and strategies it employs to ensure broad-based compliance to its dictates, for élite and ordinary Rwandans alike. Such an approach is necessary to set the stage for the next two chapters in order to understand the everyday acts of resistance of some ordinary Rwandans to the dictates of the programme of national unity and reconciliation as purposeful responses. Understanding and explaining the implications of the various forms of resistance to the various techniques and strategies of the programme of national unity and reconciliation is the task of the next two chapters. Chapter Six examines the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans as they
subtly and strategically battle for socio-economic survival. Chapter Seven focuses on one particular strategy of national unity and reconciliation – the *gacaca* courts – from a variety of subject positions beyond the survivor/perpetrator dichotomy, as an example of the agency of ordinary Rwandans in negotiating the many new structural constraints in their lives since the 1994 genocide.
Chapter 6: Everyday Resistance to the Programme of National Unity and Reconciliation

Jolie and I used to meet almost every Tuesday afternoon. We would bump into one another at the kiosk near my residence. She sometimes stopped to buy cooking oil or matches there on her way home from the market. Sometimes I would walk home with her so we could spend some private time together, sharing stories about our children in particular and family lineages more broadly. She was fascinated that someone like me would choose to live in Rwanda, given its “problems” and my “freedom to live anywhere”. My explanations that I was in Rwanda as a long-term visitor because of my interest in reconciliation processes in the country were met with some confusion. Jolie was one of the few Rwandans I met who did not lose any immediate family members during the genocide, and she often shared stories with me about how her “good luck” translated into social shunning and economic hardship afterwards. Her Tutsi husband joined in the killing in May 1994 as a “way to stay alive. They thought he was one of them and so he survived. He killed at least three people but we never talk about it because we can’t.” She is unable to join any of the associations set up for “survivors” of the genocide since she does not “qualify as a Hutu woman. I mean they say ‘good luck’ but they just use that as an excuse to keep me out of their association”.

When I asked whom she meant when she spoke of “they”, she spoke with frustration in her voice,

“They” are Tutsi survivors. We [survivors] are many but only a few get benefits. It is hardest for me because some of them know that my husband killed to stay alive. They seemed to understand just after the genocide, but then the government brought gacaca and some of them participate fully. What if they speak against him and I have to raise these kids alone? People like me stay on the sidelines to avoid too much trouble. My
husband once wanted to admit to his crimes [to the authorities] but I begged him not to. I am a former Hutu married to a former Tutsi. Am I not a survivor? Did I live through the genocide? Did I lose relatives? Is my husband half crazed because of what he did? I survived the events and even I could say that my husband is lost to me now. He feels a lot of guilt and shame for his actions [during the genocide]. We have not discussed his actions during the genocide since a long time. It is not really possible now. There are too many people that could denounce him [to the authorities] and make our lives very hard.

It is much harder to live together with my husband and my neighbours since the genocide because of what happened. Everyone killing everyone and others stealing, some just hid. Many died, many killed, many lost their belongings. Just coping is what I think about most. Really. It is just getting to the next day. What those survivors who won’t let me join their group fail to understand is that I am suffering as well. Coping is a task; it takes a lot of my energy. My family has many needs. I have two other kids [orphans] that live with us now that need feeding. One has malaria and I have no money for his medicine. When I give to that kid, I take away from my own kids. My husband is only of little comfort. He hardly works at all. He has no ideas of his own since gacaca started. He works only to avoid contact with other people. He is isolating me as well. What else can I do but just keep going? My problems are many and the solutions are few. I could speak out like some of my foolish (abasazi) neighbours. Instead, I will continue to try to get support from the survivors association, even though they say I am not a survivor. What other solution is there? How can you seriously ask me who “they” are when you know full well the answer?

Jolie and I had spent enough time together over the past few months for me to know that what she had just told me was difficult for her to say; I apologised for my insensitivity. I knew quite well how hard her life was since the genocide. She had shared some of her “inner secrets” with me before, but always reminded me to say nothing to anyone, lest “it attract the attention of the authorities”. The need to avoid the attention of the authorities, particularly local government officials and members of the local security forces, is an everyday lament for many ordinary Rwandans. Ordinary Rwandans like Jolie live under close surveillance from the government (as well as each other); the threat of retaliation is constant and run the gamut of sanctions – from losing access to social
benefits, to social shunning and outcasting, to imprisonment and in extreme cases, disappearance and even death. Chapter Five showed the extent to which the programme of national unity and reconciliation is a source of oppression in the daily lives of many ordinary Rwandans. This chapter examines the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans to the programme of national unity and reconciliation, the precise forms of which depend on the unique combination of dangers and opportunities that exist in any given situation. By necessity, their everyday acts of resistance are tactical since government officials and other agents of the state suppress any perceived challenge to the requirements of the programme of national unity and reconciliation, sometimes with a ferocity that dramatically exceeds the original violation.\footnote{Codere shows historical examples of the power of Tutsi to exert their authority over Hutu in the twilight of colonial rule, often in violent ways (Codere, 1962: 53-62).}

About a week following Jolie’s outburst, we found each other at our regular meeting point, the kiosk; she greeted me warmly and said, “Did you tell anyone about what I told you last time? You know, about how I would continue to fight to get [membership to] the survivors’ organisation?” I reassured her that I had not uttered a word to anyone about our private conversations. She sparkled with delight as she pulled a government-issued health card out of her handkerchief, which she kept carefully folded and tucked underneath the head wrap she usually wore. “Do you see this? Do you know what this is?” I nodded yes. She continued,

You see what can be done with some persistence? I finally got the signature I needed from the FARG official and here is proof that I am now a full member.\footnote{The Fonds d’Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide (FARG) was established by the government in 1998 to provide social services to all victims of the genocide, not just Tutsi survivors. Each Sector has a FARG representative who is responsible for the management of the Fund in those communities. FARG focuses on social services, and its support packages provide school fees, health, housing as well as income-generation training for members. In theory, anyone who is a victim of the genocide and is in need of social support is...} Even my husband did not believe what I accomplished.
But I did. I really did it. I got some protection from this government for my children. She said ‘no’ many times before now, but finally, I am a member! This is my first step to getting more support and to getting it as a survivor. Maybe next they will accept me as one of them…!

Jolie’s experience exemplifies a number of qualities of everyday resistance, which are subtle, indirect and non-confrontational acts that those subject to power enact to show their anger, opposition or indignation to what they perceive as unfair or unjust actions against them. Many ordinary Rwandans understand that the mechanisms of the programme of national unity and reconciliation represent wrongs against them and are unable or unwilling to openly risk direct action to remedy their situation. In Jolie’s case, as a former Hutu, she is not officially recognised as a “survivor” of the 1994 genocide, which in turn shapes her interactions with local officials and other agents of the state. The FARG representative in her community had not provided the necessary signatures to allow Jolie to join the local chapter of her survivors’ organisation.

Jolie did not share with me the specifics of how she was finally able to get the necessary signature to get medical insurance but she told me she persisted, which is but one quality of everyday acts of resistance given the attendant risks of “pushing too hard even though [the right to benefits] is mine”. Given the extent to which Hutu peasant women have been marginalised in post-genocide Rwanda, I assume she also showed another quality of everyday resistance – prudence – in pursing the necessary signatures first from the local FARG representative then the responsible local officials at both the Cell and Sector levels who must also sign before the request is approved and the medical card issued. Her persistence and prudence in gaining medical coverage from FARG also eligible to join. In practice, membership is at the discretion of the local FARG representative as her signature is necessary to gain membership; this means that very few Hutu women in the communities where I conducted my research received FARG benefits. For an overview of the FARG and its mechanisms as well as its political uses, see Burnet (forthcoming 2009) and Rombouts (2006).
show that she did not have an expectation of immediate success, evidenced in her remark to me that “just coping is what I think about most”, which points to a third quality of everyday resistance – individual effort to accomplish the stated goal to benefit the resister, however bleak the prospects for success.

Jolie’s act of resistance is not one that is tied to the overthrow of the Rwandan state. Instead, it is a form of everyday resistance that is in effect an act of individual subversion that does more than make her life more sustainable. It also opens up the possibility of understanding and explaining the extent to which the programme of national unity and reconciliation operates as the dominant form of social control in the daily lives of some ordinary Rwandans. In this sense, the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans act as a diagnostic of state power as they indicate sites of struggle between individuals and the mechanisms of the programme of national unity and reconciliation. This means that acts of everyday resistance are more than signs of individual agency; they also allow for an analysis of the forms of power that ordinary Rwandans are caught up in and of the complex processes of the programme of national unity and reconciliation from their perspective, not that of government élites.

On the surface, Jolie’s success in securing benefits as a survivor of the 1994 genocide may not appear to be an act of resistance. On closer examination however, her experience reveals the multi-layered negotiations of power – directly with her husband and her local FARG representative; indirectly with other women survivors who could testify against her husband at gacaca – in which she is enmeshed. In securing membership to her local FARG chapter, Jolie gained more than the much-needed medical coverage that she and her family so desperately needed. She may have also regained her
dignity, which in turn buoys her spirit for the inevitable next struggle that she will encounter in her life as an umutindi peasant Hutu woman in post-genocide Rwanda. In strategically engaging with the authorities to get medical benefits, Jolie’s experience is instructive of the spirit and quality of many forms of everyday resistance as subtle, indirect and micro-level actions. Indeed, in highly politicised environments that are characterised by intense government surveillance and scrutiny of individual behaviour, the routine business of just living one’s life and the normal tools of everyday communication are important devices for the expression of resistance. Jolie’s experience illustrates that everyday acts of resistance are often subtle, sometimes imperceptible; they are non-confrontational yet determined actions, despite the associated risks.

In focusing on the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans to the multiple and intersecting structures of state power, the chapter illustrates the extent to which the programme of national unity and reconciliation represents an oppressive form of power in their everyday lives. Specifically, it argues that the programme of national unity and reconciliation cannot be understood in isolation from the interactions of ordinary Rwandans with its mechanisms; it is the dialectic between the individual and the programme that determines individual opportunities to exercise agency, in which negotiating, manoeuvring, and muddling through are all essential aspects of individual efforts to resist its demands.

The argument is developed in three sections. The first sets out the analytical framework employed to understand the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans. The second section situates the broader socio-economic climate in post-genocide Rwanda to illustrate the conditions in which they live their lives. In particular,
the section focuses on the strict socio-economic hierarchy that shapes their interactions with both local authorities and each other. These two sections combine to set the stage for the third section of this chapter, as well as for the next chapter of the dissertation which examines the everyday resistance of ordinary Rwandans to the *gacaca* trials. This final section examines a cross-section of such acts of resistance to select mechanisms of the programme of national unity and reconciliation, to illustrate the power relations that ordinary Rwandans at the lower rungs of the social hierarchy are caught up in since the 1994 genocide.

**Conceptualising Everyday Resistance**

If the outcome of the exercise of power is to serve the interests of the power-holders, then everyday resistance, when effectively executed, is intended to serve the interests of the powerless (Scott, 1985: 1-27). Resistance as an analytical concept acts “as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, to locate their position, find out their application and the methods used” (Foucault, 1982: 209). Traditionally, resistance is identified when four criteria are present: 1) The action is collective and organised; 2) the action is principled and selfless; 3) the action has revolutionary impact; and 4) the actions negate the bases of domination (Scott, 1985: 241-303). The early resistance literature and its critics fail to delineate in any fruitful way what is an everyday act of resistance, focusing instead on organised and group action. For instance,

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3 As a nation, Rwanda only has one historical case that fits these criteria, the Social Revolution of 1959, in which ethnic Hutu rebelled against the dominance of ethnic Tutsi in state institutions and positions of social privilege (C. Newbury, 1988).

4 The early resistance literature in Africa focuses largely on organised and national-level resistance to colonialism in the 1960s and 1970s. Africanist historians criticised this literature for its failure to recognise that organised and collective resistance, such as Rwanda’s Social Revolution, was more than just the resistance of African élites to colonial rule: it was also a reaction of dispossessed groups to the oppressive
Issacman and Issacman identified the withholding of labour for cotton production by Mozambican peasants as an act of resistance (Issacman and Issacman, 1977: 47). Others however interpret the same event as peasant inaction, stealth or mutedness in the face of power (Crummey, 1986; Scott, 1985, 1990). Vail and White broadened the concept even further to include “everything from footdragging and dissimulation to social banditry, arson, poaching, theft, avoidance of conscription, desertion, migration, and riot” (Vail and White, 1986: 195).5

As Jolie’s story illustrates, I conceptualise everyday resistance to include any subtle, indirect and non-confrontational act that makes daily life more sustainable in light of the strong and centralised power of the programme of national unity and reconciliation. Everyday acts of resistance include some combination of persistence, prudence, and individual effort to accomplish a specific goal. Two additional qualities can also be identified. The first is lack of awareness on the part of the target – the government official or other agent of the state. For example, the ordinary Rwandan who gets up early to avoid being available to participate at gacaca knows she is vulnerable and does not dare risk an open confrontation with her local government official.

Everyday resisters choose to counteract or frustrate the mechanisms of the programme of

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5 This is a different definition than that put forth by James Scott, the grandfather of the concept of everyday resistance, who argued that that peasant politics are basically concerned with “bread-and-butter issues” and can be fruitfully employed to understand and explain confrontational forms of class struggle, not state power (Scott, 1985: 296).
national unity and reconciliation; attempting to defeat or overthrow it is not their purpose. In getting up early to go to her field, the everyday resister makes it harder for the government official to exercise his authority because she is not home to receive the order to attend the gacaca trial. In other words, “everyday resistance emphasizes a constant strategic alertness on the part of those involved that places a lot of weight on agency and calculation” (Sivaramakrishnan, 2005: 350-351).

The second additional quality is benefit to the resister. On occasion, a long term benefit will be the result, as was the case with Jolie who received medical coverage for herself and her family. More common is short-term benefit. In my example of the woman who gets up early to tend her fields, she will only be successful in avoiding gacaca every so often as the local official will inevitably find ways to force her to participate at future sessions. For those gacaca sessions in which she successfully avoids forced participation, she has practiced everyday resistance. The local authorities might not even notice her absence, particularly if she is not expected to testify but merely to attend. If too many individuals practice everyday resistance in the same way, the local official will likely notice that many ordinary Rwandans are not participating as expected. Having raised the attention of the local official, the act is no longer one of everyday resistance but instead becomes one of confrontational resistance where individuals collude – knowingly or not – to avoid participation at gacaca. If too many people undertake acts that also allow them to avoid gacaca, then harm can befall the resister, thereby invalidating the strategy of everyday resistance.

The five qualities of everyday resistance operate on a continuum. Specific acts of everyday resistance include one or more of these qualities. There is no “pure” form of
everyday resistance; instead they are “largely implicit” (Comaroff, 1985: 261; see also Gledhill, 1994: 85, Lonsdale, 2000: 14-15). Given the forces arrayed against ordinary Rwandans in the promotion of national unity and reconciliation, simply holding the line is interpreted as an act of everyday resistance; if the individual does no more than maintain his or her resources – e.g., land holdings or access to school fees – in the face of attempts by local authorities to take them away for whatever reason, then the individual is also practicing everyday resistance. Where survival depends on acquiescence or quiescence, the individual may do just one or the other, or both, depending on the context and circumstances on that particular day, and contingent on their stated goal (Gaventa, 1980: 20-25). For example, everyday resistance can include ignoring the demands of a local government official in non-obvious ways, or refusing to be bullied by a member of the security forces. Acts of everyday resistance allow for examination of the actions of individual Rwandans that may appear innocuous or meaningless to show that their actions are strategic and purposeful rather than an indication of their presumed obedience to government directives or of their willingness to “forgive and forget” (survivors) or “tell their truth” (perpetrators) in the name of national unity and reconciliation.

An analytical focus on the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans runs the risk of exaggerating their ability to make choices and act upon them. It also runs the risk of over-emphasising individual ability to counter or mitigate socio-political structures of domination such as the programme of national unity and reconciliation. Within the anthropological literature, analysts tend to romanticise resistance “to read all forms of resistance as signs of ineffectiveness of systems of power and of the resilience and creativity of the human spirit” (Abu-Lughod, 1990: 42). Rather than romanticise
resistance, the emphasis is on individual agency to understand the power relations in which individuals are enmeshed, and the resultant social and political inequalities. Agency is not exclusively tied to one individual actor, but is instead bound up with the power hierarchies they produce (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). In delinking agency from structure we learn how individual actors are able to evaluate critically the conditions of their lives to illustrate how individuals are not only enmeshed in but also positioned differently in relation to the mechanisms of power. This chapter and the next one show how ordinary Rwandans practice everyday acts of resistance to minimise the effects of the programme of national unity and reconciliation in their daily lives. The emphasis is not on acts of everyday resistance per se, but rather what the chosen forms of resistance say about the programme of national unity and reconciliation as a form of state power.

**Daily Hardships: The Socio-Economic Context**

In order to situate the everyday acts of resistance of some ordinary Rwandans to the mechanisms of the programme of national unity and reconciliation, it is first necessary to situate the broader socio-economic context in which they live their lives. For foreign visitors who base their stay in Rwanda’s capital city, Kigali, and take day trips along the paved main roads to the national museum in the south, to see the mountain

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6 Emirbayer and Mische take practice theorists such as Bourdieu and Giddens to task for their failure to understand and analyse agency as an analytical concept that is distinct from structure. They write, “the result has been a flat and impoverished conception that, when it escapes the abstract voluntarism of rational choice theory, tends to remain so tightly bound to structure that one loses sight of the different ways in which agency actually shapes social action” (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 963). Karp (1986) provides an excellent review of the implications of Giddens’ work for anthropologists who “see agency as a central term in their conceptual equations” (Karp, 1986: 132).

gorillas in the north, visit Lake Kivu in the west and safari to Akagera National Park in the east, the deep poverty and daily hardships that confront ordinary Rwandans is difficult to imagine. Kigali boasts a modern airport, several international hotels, a modern ICT infrastructure, which includes numerous wireless hotspots, and countless new residential and commercial properties. Numerous cafés and nightclubs have opened, catering to Kigali’s growing middle class of bureaucrats and businesspeople, as well as expatriates. Kigali also has a “low crime rate, clean streets and civic order” that “outsiders appreciate” (Kinzer, 2008: 239).

Behind this pristine image is the daily reality of crushing poverty that shapes the everyday lives of most Rwandans. For example, the government decreed in July 2006 that only covered shoes must be worn in Kigali and other town centres like Butare, Gikongoro and Gitarama (the closest towns for my participants). Many ordinary Rwandans, most of whom wear rubber flip-flops because of their low cost, are now unable to enter town to sell their wares at market. The regulation is that covered footwear is necessary “for cleanliness as well as food safety” (interview with MINALOC official, 2006). A MINALOC official told me in September 2006 that Kigali “only had 12% of its citizens suffer urban poverty” and bragged “that is the lowest urban poverty rate in Africa!” When I suggested that the low rate of urban poverty was probably the result of the government razing their properties in the interests of “cleanliness” and

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8 ORPTN, Rwanda’s national tourist agency, encourages international visitors to “experience” Rwanda through day-tripping from Kigali (ORTPN, 2004: 5).

9 See Ingelaere (2007: 37) for a list of fines for peasants who disobey “measures aimed at improving general wellbeing”, including tending livestock on “public places”, refusing to use a “modern cooking stove”, not having “clean clothing and body hygiene” and refusing “to participate in nocturnal security patrols”. The RPF has introduced other regulations that are outside the cultural reference points of ordinary Rwandans, including guidelines against sharing drinks, and ensuring in the rare occasion when drinks are shared that everyone use their own drinking straw.
“forcing” people back into the countryside, the official agreed that was possible but urged me to think about how clean and safe Kigali is: “Without those poor running around threatening our resources, we can think of ways to develop Kigali even further!” (fieldnotes, 2006).¹⁰

An estimated 87% of Rwandans are subsistence farmers (National Institute of Statistics, 2006: 27). The official poverty line is a daily income per adult of 250 Rwandan francs (Frw.) (or CN$0.54) while the extreme poverty line is a daily income per adult of 175 Frw (or CN$0.38) is (MINICOFIN, 2001: 9). Among the ordinary Rwandans who participated in my research, the average income per household was 50 Frw (CN$0.11) per day or 20,000 Frw per year (CN$43).¹¹ Only three of my 37 participants said that they had ever seen paper money, even though the lowest available denomination is 100 Frw (CN$0.21). With rare exception, the ordinary Rwandans I met were thin, barefoot and dressed in ragged clothes, which in many cases is the extent of their full wardrobe. Few owned shoes, making trips to market an additional burden as they had to rely on family and neighbours to be able to afford a single pair of shoes.¹² Their hands and faces were weathered and gave the appearance of an older age than their biological years. People’s eyes were lackluster from continued hunger; some had orange

¹⁰ A review of the main poverty indices to cross-check the 12% urban poor figures show Rwanda’s urban poverty rate as “unavailable” (World Bank 2008a, 2008b; UNDP, 2008). The IMF reports an urban poverty rate of 20%. Southern province, where most of my participants live, has the highest rate of poverty in the country with 67% of the population living below the poverty line (IMF, 2008: 162).

¹¹ Justino and Verwimp (2008) find that households whose home was destroyed during the genocide, or who lost land after the genocide through squatting or forced migration into villages (imidugudu) live in poverty. Southern Rwanda, where most of the Rwandans who participated in my research live, remains among Rwanda’s poorest provinces, despite positive economic growth since the end of the genocide, because of the high levels of Tutsi loss of life during the genocide combined with low levels of resettlement of returnees in this region of the country (Justino and Verwimp, 2008: 15).

¹² Several women I knew shared a pair of covered shoes, carrying them in a bag just in case they were stopped by a police officer to show that they owned covered shoes (fieldnotes, 2006).
hair, a telltale sign of malnutrition. In 2003, the FAO estimated that the per capita consumption of calories in Rwanda was 2070 kcal, of which a mere 54 calories were protein (FAO, 2004: 2). I regularly saw evidence of starvation; several of my research participants as well as their children exhibited symptoms of kwashiorkor and marasmus (forms of malnutrition caused by lack of protein in the diet). Several of the women who participated in my research told me that they sometimes eat dirt or swallow pebbles to ward off hunger pangs; two women lost children to starvation. Men told me that they drank banana beer “to fill the void of days without food” (fieldnotes, 2006).

Women suffer the additional indignity of struggling with the men in their lives for resources and personal power at the household level. The legacy of the genocide means that more women head more than a third of Rwandan households, 56% of which are widows of the genocide (UNDP Rwanda, 2007: 33). Female-headed households have a “higher and deeper incidence of poverty” than other households (UNDP Rwanda, 2007:

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13 This average daily caloric intake may seem acceptable by North American standards, where the average daily caloric requirement for a sedentary or lightly active adult is between 1290 kcal per day (women) and 1975 kcal per day (men), of which at least 40% of daily nutritional needs are protein-based. For peasant Rwandans, who earn their livelihood through manual labor, both the basic caloric and protein intake are too low to sustain normal levels of activity as the quality of food is not sufficient to meet basic nutritional guidelines (FAO, 2001: 35-52).

14 Family members, particularly the wives of these men, scoffed at the idea that drinking beer is a suitable solution to dealing with chronic hunger. One woman told me, “when we have nothing I mix haricots [green beans] with dirt to make a mixture that would keep us until the next meal. If he [her husband] would stop drinking beer, we might have a little left over to buy some rice or bread” (interview with Olive, a 49-year-old umutindi Hutu woman, 2006).

15 More than one-third of Rwandan women reported having experienced spousal violence - physical, emotional or sexual (UNDP Rwanda, 2007: 33). None of the women who participated in my research mentioned spousal or domestic violence of any kind. I did not ask any questions related to sexual violence before, during or after the genocide.

16 There is no way to know if these figures include women other than Tutsi survivors of the genocide as the government of Rwanda does not allow statistical data to be disaggregated on the basis of ethnic identity. Presumably, the figure of 56% is comprised of Tutsi widows of the genocide as they are the only accepted category of “survivors”. Of the 16 women that participated in my research, all but two considered themselves widows of the genocide (even those that had remarried). One woman said, “Oh yes, I remarried for survival. I need a husband to help with everything, especially to help with the fields. I loved my real husband but this one? Really, it was a matter of survival” (interview with Marie Claire, a 36-year-old umutindi Hutu widow, 2006).
3). The average life expectancy for Rwandans is 45.2 years; half of the children born in Rwanda since the genocide will not live past their 40\textsuperscript{th} birthday (UNDP, 2008). For all of the 37 ordinary Rwandans who participated in my research, the lack of food, clean water as well as affordable and proximate health services was a constant lament. Most Rwandans also live with untreated post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).\textsuperscript{17} Many of the women who participated in my research had the additional burden of child-care, including the care of orphaned relatives whose parents died before, during or after the genocide.

The division of labour in rural areas runs rigidly along gender lines. Peasant women work from long before the sun rises until long after it has set every day of the year. In the home, they cook all meals, wash dishes, clean, do laundry, sew and mend clothing and ferry water. Most try to earn a productive income, which many do through petty trade of surplus produce which they grow themselves. Peasant men engage in animal husbandry and may also work in the fields although among the men who participated in my research, tending to crops (as well as children) is seen as a task for women.\textsuperscript{18} Men told me of the shame they felt of having to work in the fields alongside

\textsuperscript{17} Psychosocial trauma is prevalent; some studies suggest as many as 95\% of Rwandans witnessed or participated in “extreme acts of violence” (Ndayambajwe, 2001: 46). Three-quarters of my participants told me that they had symptoms akin to post-traumatic stress disorder. Only a third of these individuals were in treatment for their PTSD. Those who were not cited lack of counselors as a barrier to treatment; a bigger concern was their concern for privacy. One woman said it best, “Of course I have trauma. Why do you think I agreed to speak with you? I can talk to you and feel safe that my secrets will not be shared with other Rwandese. I don’t have this feeling with the counselors [who live] here [in her community]” (interview with Béatha, a 31-year-old umutindi Hutu widow, 2006).

\textsuperscript{18} In the communities where I interviewed ordinary Rwandans, I rarely saw men in the fields. When they did work the fields, it was before the full heat of the day. By 11:00 a.m. or so, men could be seen lounging in the tall grass or in the banana groves, chatting with other men while women, many of them with infants strapped to their backs, continued to tend their fields. One umukene man explained their absence: “We do the very heavy work. Like preparing the beds and preparing the irrigation. We also help if necessary with the planting and the harvesting. But tending to weeds? That is work for women” (interview with Ephrem, a 32-year-old umukene Hutu man, 2006).
their women relatives as well as of the additional burden of not having access to income-
generating work, like carpentry or driving a taxi-moto. Hutu men who have completed
their *ingando* re-education feel this most acutely as they expected to find gainful
employment following their return to their home community (fieldnotes, 2006).

Compounding the challenges faced by ordinary Rwandan men and women is the
perception on the part of government officials, at both the local level and in Kigali that
peasants are but a homogeneous mass to be governed. The words of one local official are
emblematic: ordinary Rwandans are “a mass of poor peasants that we are responsible to
re-educate and then govern. Tutsi are survivors and we urge them to forgive. Hutu are
suspects and we urge them to tell their truth” (interview with Ministry of Community
Development official, 2006). Within this “mass” of poor ordinary Rwandans are the
socio-economic categories and the inequalities they engender that in turn shape
individual life chances as well as opportunities for moving up or falling down the social
ladder. All of the ordinary Rwandans that participated in my research understand that
only élites can hold political power (i.e., it is both acknowledged and accepted that
politics is the domain of the élite, whether political, business or religious). Social
mobility, of moving up to the ranks of the powerful, or, as one of my research
participants put it, of “becoming an important person,” is rare, and is not something that
the ordinary Rwandans who participated in my research expect to happen. Instead, their
efforts are aimed at maintaining their socio-economic location.

This lack of opportunity for social mobility exists where hierarchy is the societal
standard, inequality is anticipated, less powerful people expect to be dependent on more
powerful people, centralisation of state institutions is popular and unquestioned,
subordinates envision being told what to do, and privileges and social status are expected for élite members of society (Archer, 2003: 136-137). In scarce resource environments like post-genocide Rwanda, where the social structure is firmly entrenched and where individual options and opportunities are structured by one’s location in the social hierarchy, it is important to understand where individuals are situated economically. This matters because one’s socio-economic class shapes one’s life chances as well as determines how and when other Rwandans, notably élites, will engage and interact with the vulnerable, poor and salaried poor individuals that participated in my research, as well as how they interact with others in their socio-economic class and each another. An appreciation of the socio-economic categories that stratify Rwandan society is also important because it shapes individuals’ options to practice everyday resistance. Knowing one’s place in the social strata ensures that the everyday resister is aware of the risks inherent in choosing which strategy of everyday resistance is most appropriate, and when to deploy it.

The boundaries of the six socio-economic categories that stratify Rwandan society are relatively fixed (MINECOFIN, 2001). There are differences between Rwandans who occupy the three lowest categories – the most vulnerable, the vulnerable, and the poor – which are muted by the fact that many of these peasants have little to no access to cash, leaving them most susceptible to climatic shock. Members of these socio-economic categories also have little formal education, which means individuals in higher social categories write them off as “needing us to decide what to do for them” since they have no “ideas of their own, and so can’t move up in life” (interview with MINALOC official, 2006). The lowest category are the abatindi nyakujya (the most vulnerable, umutindi
nyakujya, sing.), which is made up of individuals who have no social standing whatsoever. Most beg to survive; some resort to prostitution or theft, which in turn isolates them from other categories of peasants as these individuals are considered by many, including other most vulnerable individuals, as “without hope” (fieldnotes, 2006). They have “poor personal hygiene and live in garbage cans or in barns” which means “they cannot be taught so there is no use in trying” (interview with Ministry of Culture official, 2006). For ordinary Rwandans, reaching out to help a most vulnerable person often results in the scorn of other peasants, which “makes it hard to help them. Even when it is clear that they are suffering, few reach out to them because it can cause problems with family and friends who ask ‘why do you help that goat [lost soul]?” (interview with Espérance, a 37-year-old umukene Tutsi widow, 2006).

The individuals that participated in my research occupy the next three categories on the social ladder – abatindi (vulnerable), abakene (poor), and abakene wifashije (salaried poor). The second lowest category in the social strata are the abatindi (vulnerable; umutindi, sing.) who sometimes own land, but are unable to work it successfully, either through personal inability or because the field is fallow.19 They eat only when they are able to share in the harvest of others. They often have some form of makeshift shelter. Any economic gains that an umutindi peasant might make are through the forging of alliances with other vulnerable Rwandans, usually to buy a goat or a sheep or to share in each others’ harvest to ensure that all members of the family get enough to eat on a regular basis. One umutindi peasant told me, “we eat when we can and we share knowing it is good insurance if our own crops fail. Those we share with share with us

19 Of the 37 ordinary Rwandans from southwestern Rwanda that participated in my research, 17 individuals identified as abatindi (plural; umutindi, singular).
and we all eat a little instead of nothing” (interview with Joseph N., a 31-year-old umutindi Tutsi widower, 2006).

The next highest socio-economic category is the abakene (poor; umukene, sing.), all of whom hold land, which, however is rarely sufficiently productive. They own small livestock such as chickens, goats or sheep. As a group, abakene are most likely to be called upon by members of higher socio-economic classes to work their fields in exchange for cash. Some have excess harvest and take this to market to sell. Access to micro-credit is also a possibility but this is through alliances within their social network of relatives and friends, not through formal credit facilities. The abakene wifashije (the poor with means) is the last, and highest, category of the peasantry. These individuals have both a one-room house and some land. They often own more than one cow along with several goats, sheep and chickens. Some own motorcycles; most own bicycles. They rarely work for others as their production makes them self-sufficient. It “can be a great shame” if an umukene bifashije has to work for others as he can usually sell some livestock to weather climatic or economic downturns (interview with Didier, a 47-year-old umukene bifashije Tutsi man, 2006). If the individual is educated beyond the eighth grade, he has access to formal credit facilities and may even qualify for a credit card, although for many abakene wifashije cash flow is a concern. These families usually live off the means of production, which can include ownership of a kiosk shop. Abakene wifashije often act as appointed local officials within communities, even though they

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20 Of those who participated in the research, 12 individuals identified as abakene (plural; umukene, singular).

21 Of the 37 ordinary Rwandans I consulted, two individuals identified as abakene wifashije (plural; umukene wifashije, singular). The remaining six individuals are prisoners and did not declare a socio-economic position.
receive no salary for their work. Many are also elected gacaca judges. The prestige of being asked to serve can open up opportunities to become an umukungu (rich without money), the socio-economic category of many appointed local officials (fieldnotes, 2006). Abakungu have more than one plot of land, and often own several heads of cattle. They often have development-related jobs and gain a small salary as an appointed local official, or as a project officer or manager of a civil society organisation. Many have servants from among the poor and vulnerable categories.\footnote{These servants rarely receive a wage, working instead in exchange for room and board.} Abakungu are without money because there is little left over for productive means once school fees and health costs have been paid. They often have access to a vehicle and housing through employment.\footnote{The average yearly salary is 350,000Frw (CN$780).}

The highest socio-economic category is that of the abakire (the rich), which is the category of most urban élites. They have land, excess production, several heads of cattle and other livestock as well as paid employment, either as a civil servant or in private business. Ordinary Rwandans told me that abakire are easy to identify “because they are always dressed up, and they never walk anywhere” (fieldnotes, 2006). They own at least one car and always have servants to prepare their meals and keep their homes presentable for entertaining and other social festivities, notably weddings.

It is within this structured socio-economic hierarchy that ordinary Rwandans battle daily to ensure their own and their family’s survival; to do so they must continually protect themselves against the apparatus of the state, the RPF and its agents who vigorously promote the programme of national unity and reconciliation. A recurrent theme in my conversations with ordinary Rwandans was the omnipresence of local officials, notably those that “came after the genocide to find themselves in a position of
authority even though they have never even lived in the community before” (fieldnotes, 2006). Implementing the requirements of the programme of national unity and reconciliation is the top priority for appointed and elected local officials alike. The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) is responsible for providing training to local officials to ensure that their actions accord with national policy. This puts undue stress on the ordinary people as Executive Secretaries at both the cell and sector levels are personally accountable to President Kagame, not to the population.

For local officials who grew up abroad, and whose life experiences are shaped by conditions of exile rather than of having lived through violence before and during the 1994 genocide, responding to the needs of ordinary Rwandans at the lower rungs of the social hierarchy is a challenge. In addition to having a different cultural worldview, many returnees see ordinary Rwandans solely in terms of their ethnicity. For most ordinary Rwandans, economic survival is their main priority; ethnicity is only a minor

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24 Ideally, the research would analyse the relationship between ordinary Rwandans and local officials, and that between local officials and state élites in Kigali. Unfortunately, the analysis that follows focuses largely on the relationship between ordinary Rwandans and the mechanisms of national unity and reconciliation as implemented by the RPF and its agents, most notable of whom are local government officials. This is not deliberate; instead it is a result of the government of Rwanda stopping my research five months early. I focused in the early stages of my fieldwork on interviewing ordinary Rwandans and did not have the opportunity to speak to local officials as originally intended. Consequently, my analysis about their role in promoting the government’s vision of national unity and reconciliation is grounded in the experiences of ordinary Rwandans and participant observation rather than in extended interviews with local officials themselves.

25 At the lower levels of Rwanda’s administrative structure – the Sector and the Cell – there is a distinction between power and prestige of the appointed and salaried Executive Secretary and elected, non-salaried officials. The Executive Secretary is the most important person at the local level, and is usually an individual who comes from outside the sector (and in many cases, grew up outside Rwanda). Of the 46 elected and returnee local officials I met during my fieldwork, all but three were known members of the RPF. One said, “you must be a member of the RPF if you are to gain a good [government] position. I joined to provide for my family and have not regretted my decision” (fieldnotes, 2006).

26 It can also be taxing for local officials, many of whom are young and inexperienced managers who have little sense of how to best interpret their responsibilities to both the central authorities and the local population.
factor in everyday life and matters most when one encounters state power, most notably the mechanisms of the programme of national unity and reconciliation.\textsuperscript{27}

The 37 ordinary Rwandans who participated in my research occupy the lower levels of the social hierarchy and struggle with the provision of everyday basic needs for themselves and their families under the watchful eye of local officials who have little sense of how the violence of the genocide shapes their poverty.\textsuperscript{28} Of the 46 local officials I relied on to conduct my research in southwest Rwanda, 33 were anglophone returnees who held a salaried position at the sector level while another seven anglophone returnees held a salaried post at the cell level, meaning that only six officials (less than 10\%) were potentially resident in their bailiwick before the genocide. That so many of their local officials come from outside the community raises concerns among many ordinary Rwandans about their ability to understand and appreciate their everyday needs. Under Habyarimana, local officials were residents of the communities they served and maintained network ties and social alliances with the rural community of their childhood (de Lame, 2005: 62-63). Since 2000, local officials are appointed by President Kagame directly, and are contractually obligated to develop the area under their supervision in line with national policy objectives. These \textit{imihigo} (performance) contracts grant the salaried official with a great deal of autonomy and with considerable leeway to interpret national policies to achieve the development goals of their sector or cell.\textsuperscript{29} Ordinary Rwandans I

\textsuperscript{27} Other researchers have found the same. See de Lame (2005a: 61-65); Ingelaere (2007: 8-12).

\textsuperscript{28} For example, Tutsi survivors living in southern Rwanda told me that they were financially poorer since the genocide because they had lost so many of their family members, particularly children who could husband livestock or tend fields. Hutu men living in southwest Rwanda who fled to the refugee camps in Zaïre also report increased poverty, combined with loss of social status as probable \textit{génocidaires}, as their land holdings were reduced or eliminated on their return home.

\textsuperscript{29} Since November 2007, \textit{imihigo} contracts are signed between local officials and individual households. Household heads are to “make vows of the achievements they will have attained in a period of one year.
consulted spoke of the disdain that local officials had for them as well as of the
difficulties they have in trying to “modernise” in accordance with new measures of
“progress and development” introduced since 2000 (fieldnotes, 2006).

A good example of the drive to modernise without due regard to the needs of
ordinary Rwandans is the national land policy, which the RPF introduced in 2000.30 It
has increased the vulnerability of peasant families in seeking to “modernize agriculture”
and encourage the “rational use of land” (MINIRENA, 2004b: 9). Rwanda’s
mountainous terrain, combined with variations in soil quality, means that few ordinary
Rwandans have sufficient arable land to provide for the basic nutritional needs of their
families. Dispersed plots, often shared in alliances with other families, serve as a form of
insurance for peasant families to ensure that enough crops are harvested to provide
sufficient food for basic survival. The new land policy considers usage for basic survival
irrational and made it illegal for peasants to work together to tend their fields as local
growing and climatic conditions allow (Ansoms, 2008: 12; fieldnotes, 2006). The RPF
ordered local officials to appropriate irrationally used land and gave large plots to “senior
government and military officials and important businessmen” who now use the land for
commercial purposes (Burnet, 2007: 19). Displaced ordinary Rwandans experience the

30 There is a significant sub-literature on land policy as well as the National Habitat Policy of 1996, which
decreed that all Rwandans who have historically lived in scattered homesteads across the country (this is
why many ordinary Rwandans refer to their home as “hill” rather than to a specific community) must reside
instead in government-created villages (imidugudu; umudugudu, sing.). Both policies mark a drastic and
often negative change in the way of life for ordinary peasant Rwandans who rely on the land for their
livelihood. For an overview of the land policy and its impact on social life as well as national peace
processes, see, Burnet and RISD (2001); Gasasira (1995); Gasarasi and Musahara (2004); Musahara and
Huggins (2005); Pottier (2006); MINIRENA (2004); and Van Hoyweghen (1999). On the National Habitat
Policy, see, ACORD (1998); ADL (2000); Hilhorst and Van Leeuwen (2000); HRW (2001b); RISD
(1999).
double insult of not being compensated for their expropriated land, and not being hired to work for a daily wage for the new *abakire* (rich) landowners. Many complained that individuals were brought in from outside their communities to work the fields. One *umutindi* Hutu man said: “We don’t even benefit from their employment. How are we supposed to eat without land?” (interview with Joseph B., a 26-year old *umutindi* Hutu man, 2006). A *umukene* Tutsi man said, “the new landowners have brought their own people to work their land; they live here now and have changed everything. First they take our land, then they bring their own people to cultivate it? How can we eat? How can we exist? We cannot afford most things; it is very hard” (interview with Janvier, a 31-year-old *umukene* Tutsi man, 2006).

The efforts of many ordinary Rwandans to accommodate the additional burden in their already strained lives through post-genocide policies like the new land policy have resulted in subtle changes in the ways that they interact with their local officials, as agents of the state, in their everyday lives. Rwandan culture has strict codes about who can speak out against such injustices and when. Indeed, there is no strong historical record of individuals who speak out against the oppressive actions of others who are more socially or economically powerful than they. Individual facility in the arts of disguising and concealing one’s real feelings or opinions on a given matter is self-taught and culturally sanctioned; dissimulation and acquiescence are both common.31 This leads

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31 Proverbs govern the boundaries of acceptable speech. For example, “only the people of the same social rank can confide in one another” (*akali muu nda y’umututsi umuhutu ntakemenya*); “authority has the right to respect” (*utazi umwami amukeza alyamye*); “one must attempt nothing higher than his position allows” (*amagara make asenya ku rusika*); and, “one who doesn’t know how to obey does not put himself under someone else’s order” (*iyabye ingare ntiba inja*).
outsiders, as well as RPF élites, to conclude that ordinary Rwandans are obedient, and comply without any reflection to their demands.\textsuperscript{32}

Instead, ordinary Rwandans have a variety of everyday strategies of resistance available to them as they navigate the difficult terrain of daily survival in post-genocide Rwanda. Despite continuing hardships, they revealed strong wills, fierce pride and creativity in making their lives more sustainable. For example, among the 37 ordinary Rwandans I consulted, one \textit{umutindi} Twa woman refused to remove from her land the makeshift grave marker she had constructed to remember the friends and family lost during the genocide. A \textit{umukene} Hutu woman spoke out against the local representative of the Survivor’s Fund, recounting his mismanagement of funds intended for the poorest of the poor. A \textit{umutindi} Tutsi man challenged an armed member of the Local Defence Forces when he tried to take the family’s only goat back to barracks. The next section examines the strategies of everyday resistance which ordinary Rwandans subtly and tactically employ to voice dissatisfaction with the government and its programme of national unity and reconciliation.

\textbf{The Everyday Acts of Resistance of Ordinary Rwandans}

A focus on the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans resident in the south in their daily encounters with local government authorities and other state actors reveals more than their inventiveness, creativity and reflexivity. Such an approach allows for a fuller picture of the reach of state power, in the name of national unity and reconciliation, in their everyday lives. Specific modes of resistance are effective only in relation to particular forms of state power. It is these points of enforcement, where many

\textsuperscript{32} The tactical nature of the obedience of ordinary Rwandans is discussed in Chapter One, pp. 16-17.
ordinary Rwandans make a conscious decision to resist the various mechanisms of the programme of national unity and reconciliation that is the subject of this section of the chapter. This section is divided into three parts to illustrate the specific tactics that some ordinary Rwandans enact in their efforts to minimise the impact of the programme in their everyday lives, to show how they resist state-led unity and reconciliation initiatives.

Before examining three specific everyday actions of resistance to the programme of national unity and reconciliation, it is important to clarify that the analysis focuses on specific actions rather than on mental tactics, such as imaginary conversations with local officials or other Rwandans in which individuals express anger, rehearse devastating retorts, or deliver clever rebuttals.\(^{33}\) I observed a variety of mental tactics of everyday resistance on numerous occasions and learned that Rwandans have a tradition of speaking their truth to government officials or other agents of the state, a fact which directly challenges government notions that ordinary people “do what they are told” or “don’t know what to do until we tell them to do it” (interview with NURC official, 2006). The most frequent mental tactic that some ordinary Rwandans relied upon to limit their interactions with local officials and with each other is the practice of ceceka (lit., be quiet or shut up), meaning that many individuals remain silent in the presence of the local authorities (and sometimes each other). Some analysts have focused on how ordinary Hutu use ceceka to frustrate the functioning of the gacaca courts, where Hutu accused of

\[^{33}\text{While these acts of the imagination constitute everyday acts of resistance, their ability to provide insight into the different forms of power in which individuals are enmeshed in post-genocide Rwanda is limited. Indeed, mental tactics were common among the Rwandans that participated in my research, but I was not privy to the rich and minute details that, with my shortened period of fieldwork, would be required to analyse them in any meaningful way.}\]
acts of genocide are expected to tell their truth (Chakravarty, 2006b; Rettig, 2008). Instead, some Hutu choose not to testify against other Hutu, placing the evidentiary burden on Tutsi survivors, a theme which is examined further in Chapter Seven.

All of the ordinary Rwandans that participated in my research understood well the risks of speaking out against the mechanisms of the programme of national unity and reconciliation, which is what makes their everyday acts of resistance to its dictates even more revealing. First, given the inherent risks, ordinary Rwandans are more apt to engage in non-confrontational acts of everyday resistance, such as the appearance of complying with the demands of the programme of national unity and reconciliation, or more frequently, avoiding contact with local authorities and other agents of the state. Second, identifying forms of everyday resistance illustrates the limited range of options that ordinary Rwandans have at their disposal to subvert the requirements of the programme of national unity and reconciliation. Individual compliance in this instance hardly implies agreement with the dictates of the programme of national unity and reconciliation; nor is it an indication of individual obedience. Instead, the chosen forms of everyday resistance diagnose the power of social control embodied in the programme, and reveal the extent to which it represents an oppressive form of power in their daily lives. Indeed, the levels of social control inherent in the programme of national unity and reconciliation.

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34 Chakravarty identifies ceceka as name of an underground organisation of Hutu that is spreading the word not to testify at gacaca tribunals. There is no available information on its leadership or membership (Chakravarty, 2006b: 12).

35 Several Tutsi survivors told me that they found it particularly difficult to provide evidence to the gacaca courts because they were in hiding during the genocide and did not actually see anything. As one Tutsi survivor told me, “I heard a lot. The screams. There would be screaming and then some cheering and even some laughter. Eventually the screams would stop, but the laughing continued. I really only heard the genocide, I did not see anyone kill anyone. Even if I did, I wouldn’t dare tell the authorities. They would make me tell what I say. I struggle enough without adding the burden of testifying at gacaca …” (interview with Alice, a 29-year-old umukene Tutsi widow, 2006).
reconciliation mean that that the majority of those who participated in my research strategically chose not to speak out as they understood that it makes life more difficult.\[36\]

As we saw in the last chapter, the relationship between ordinary Rwandans at the lower rungs of the socio-economic hierarchy and the post-genocide state is a vexed one; the programme of national unity and reconciliation constitutes an oppressive form of social control for many ordinary Rwandans. To illustrate the extent to which the programme is an oppressive force in their daily lives, specifically to explain its restrictions and hardships, I have chosen three specific types of everyday resistance: 1) staying on the sidelines; 2) irreverent compliance; and 3) withdrawn muteness. I analyse these three actions among the bevy of tactics that ordinary Rwandans shared with me to show that different forms of everyday resistance can be situated on a continuum. At one end of the continuum is isolated action that does not change one’s lot in life but nonetheless evinces the simple, though crucial, awareness that one has been treated disrespectfully in the name of national unity and reconciliation. At the other end are reflexive acts of resistance through which individuals refuse, in creative and conscious ways, to submit to the demands of the programme of national unity and reconciliation. In thinking about the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans as existing in a

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\[36\] There are three categories of individual who are willing to speak out against government policy or openly defy the directives of government officials, two of which are relevant when thinking about the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans to the programme of national unity and reconciliation. The first are known among their peers as abasazi (plural, meaning foolish). They use their “madness” to give the impression that they were mentally unstable, to justify their willingness to say what others will not or cannot attempt because the penalties of falling afoul of the government directives is simply too much to bear (interviews, 2006). Second are the individuals known as ibyihebe (plural, meaning fearless). Most of the individuals that participated in my research understand the risks of sharing their experiences of life before, during and after the 1994 genocide, and no longer fear speaking out because of the hardships they endured. This applies mainly to Tutsi survivors of the genocide, many of whom consider themselves to be “walking dead”. The third category of individual who is able and willing to speak out are known as ibipinga (plural, meaning those with deep-rooted principles). It applies to journalists, human rights activists and other intellectuals who take the risk to speak out against the government because of their deep-rooted principles, knowing full well that the consequences can be grave.
continuum, we learn about more than the hardships that individuals experience in their daily lives since the genocide; we also see what their chosen forms of resistance say about the programme of national unity and reconciliation.

Staying on the Sidelines

The first form of everyday resistance involving individual efforts to avoid participating in the various mechanisms of the programme of national unity and reconciliation is the practice of “staying on the sidelines”, meaning that many Rwandans find ways to avoid having to participate fully through a variety of avoidance tactics. For example, many ordinary Rwandans – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa – told me that they try as much as possible to stay on the sidelines to avoid too much trouble with the local authorities. Prosper, an ethnic Twa, tries to stay on the sidelines as a “way to protect my soul. My [local official] doesn’t understand that my people [the Twa] died because of the events [of 1994] and that I have new problems that need solutions since they say peace and unity have been restored. It is better to avoid contact than to be forced to reject your ancestry” (interview with Prosper, a 56-year-old umutindi Twa man, 2006).\textsuperscript{37} Aurelia, an ethnic Hutu woman, told me that she actively tries to avoid her local official,

\textsuperscript{37} Ethnic Twa in pre- and post-genocide Rwanda endure worse socio-economic conditions than the national population (CAURWA, 2004). Since 2001, when the ethnic divisionism laws came into force, organisations working for Twa people have had to change their names as well as their substantive focus to comply with the new regulations. This puts organisations that work for the rights of Twa people in the difficult position of having to justify their work with a segment of the population that has not been adequately reached by the existing programmes and policies of the post-genocide government. It also makes it difficult for foreign donors to continue to sponsor programmes and activities that directly support Twa organisations, as their presence is against national unity and reconciliation. CAURWA (Communauté des Autochtones Rwandais) is the primary civil society organisation in Rwanda that represents Twa interests and its representatives have not escaped the harassment and intimidation tactics that the post-genocide government employs to control the social and political landscape. In 2005, the Ministry of Justice ordered CUARWA to change its name to COPORWA (Communauté des Potiers Rwandais), or risk closure on the charge of ethnic divisionism. COPORWA no longer represents Twa interests, but instead anyone who works as a potter, the majority of whom are ethnic Twa.
The best strategy is to avoid the authorities. When you see them, they make demands for reconciliation. [My official] knows that I lost all of my people [immediate family members] during the events. He knows I am weakened and therefore pushes me to tell my truth. But my people are dead. What is there to tell? Because I am a former Hutu all I can do is try to get recognition as a survivor of the genocide so I can get some [financial] support. Of course that is Tutsi business but still, it is a matter of survival. It is hard to ask for help when I prefer not to speak with my local official because I fear his demands (interview with Aurelia, a 39-year-old umutindi Hutu widow, 2006).

Vianney, an ethnic Tutsi man, also seeks to stay on the sidelines,

Because of the hardships, I lost my whole family. What is the point of forgiveness anyway? The Hutu who killed, they know who they are but are they able to tell their truth? No, and I understand why not. If they say anything, they go straight to prison. I understand their problems; I blame this government for its lack of fairness. If we could all just get along, I know we could find some way to co-exist. Reconciliation is never going to happen. At least not for me, I am alone because of genocide. It is better to remain distant than to get mixed up with the ideas and plans of this [post-genocide] government (interview with Vianney, a 25-year-old umukene Tutsi man, 2006).

Avoiding interaction with local officials is a constant preoccupation, and is a tactic that some ordinary Rwandans employ to avoid participation in the elements of the programme of national unity and reconciliation they deem as unfair or disrespectful of their lived experiences of violence before, during and after the 1994 genocide. Several women told me how they do laundry in creeks and rivulets side-by-side for extended periods, often very early in the morning, to avoid having to meet their local authorities, or even other women. Florence beamed with pride when she shared her everyday tactic of choice,

Getting up early is a very good defense. It only becomes a problem when too many of us decide to miss gacaca or to be absent when the ingando graduates come back to our hill.38 When that happens, I act like I have malaria or explain to the official that I have “women’s problems”. He

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38 Some communities have a “welcome home” ceremony for ingando graduates which is intended to re-introduce them to members of their community.
never asks; instead he runs the other way. Indeed, I am too old for those [women’s] problems but he leaves me alone every time!” (interview with Florence, a 46-year-old umutindi Hutu widow, 2006).

Ordinary men, particularly released prisoners, shared how they used the marketplace as a domain where they could whisper news of political developments. They shared information with each other of who had been arrested, denounced or put in prison since the last market day, of news of how gacaca trials were progressing in different communities, as well as news of how ingando graduates were coping with the return home following extended prison stays. Secretive ingenuity facilitates the flow of political information between ordinary Hutu men. Gaston explained it best,

We [Hutu] have few options. Going to the bars is no longer an option. We are viewed with suspicion; few of us do that anymore. If the authorities see a group of former Hutu at a bar, then we can all get interrogated. They think we are plotting genocide or something. Instead of facing charges of genocide ideology, we communicate when we go to market to sell. The authorities are right there, even the LDF soldiers, and sometimes military men come to shop. We pass information by scribbling on gourds [pale yellow squash]. When we pass vegetables, the officials think we are just sharing our produce. But with a pencil, we can share information so our brothers know what is happening and when. This helps us [Hutu] avoid contact with the authorities who need us to participate at gacaca because we know what each other is experiencing. It is also empowering because while they try to get our produce for as little money as possible, we are disrespecting them! (interview with Gaston, a 34-year-old umutindi released Hutu prisoner, 2006).

In addition to staying on the sidelines of the various practices of national unity and reconciliation for political reasons, most ordinary Rwandans struggle in their daily lives to assure their economic survival. It is the struggle to eat and to find ways to send their children to school that shapes their everyday acts of resistance and drives them to stay on the sidelines. Avoiding contact with local officials and other agents of the state is more than just a tactic of protecting themselves from the demands of the programme of
national unity and reconciliation. It is the daily struggle for economic survival that in
part shapes the politics of ordinary Rwandans. Indeed, the level of political acumen that
they exhibit when determining how and when to engage their local officials so that they
can appear to be “co-operative, interested in peace and reconciliation and ready to tell our
truth” belies élite perceptions that ordinary folk are, in the words of one NURC official,
“just mere peasants who need us to tell them what to do. Really, they are like infants.
We need to parent them so they know about peace and reconciliation” (fieldnotes, 2006).
Many ordinary Rwandans actually rely on the condescension of élites to manoeuvre, as
they understand that their efforts to survive are political:

Everything in the country is political. I am hungry. I have seen people die
during war and starve during so-called times of peace. If you can’t feed
your family, then your thoughts are about survival, not about much else.
of course we need peace. But peace as this government explains it is
actually a form of violence against us [survivors]. Avoiding local officials
who want us to reconcile is politics. There can be no peace in the heart if
there is no peace in the stomach (interview with Jeanne, a 47-year-old
umutindi Tutsi widow, 2006).

Economic survival is a necessity for many ordinary Rwandans, particularly those
at the bottom rungs of the socio-economic hierarchy. This is especially the case for
mandatory activities that ordinary Rwandans must attend in the name of national unity
and reconciliation (e.g., government speeches, umuganda community work days, gacaca
trials) instead of tending to their fields, as the post-genocide government does not provide
basic social services, despite almost a decade of economic growth. Any economic gains
in the country have accrued to élites in Kigali as the government seeks to streamline and
modernise the Rwandan economy. Several individuals shared with me the difficulties of
assuring basic needs for themselves and their families, as bridges and roads that linked
rural communities to the market centres have been washed away. Joseph M., an umutindi Hutu man told me,

There is the fact that this government does not provide the basic items needed for us to be successful. How can I earn to care for my kids if I cannot get to market? The bridge [to town] went out last year and there is no sign that they [the government] will repair it. What are we to do but do it ourselves? We are not going to ask [the local authorities] to help us with rebuilding it. It is best to keep distant. Instead of standing up to tell them we need a bridge, some of us work hard to repair it.

This is not an official means of reconciliation but I have worked side-by-side with men who also want to provide for their families. We understand that the bridge is important to us all and we try to work together. It is risky, particularly for men like me because when they see us working together, they think we are plotting genocide. Some might be doing that; I don’t know what is in the hearts of others. What I know is that this government won’t help us so we have to help ourselves. We don’t ask for permission, we just do it and hope that our efforts won’t be noticed until the work is done. Of course if there is any backlash, some or all of us go to cachot [detention]. If there is praise for our efforts from the central authorities, it is the local official who benefits… (interview with Joseph M., a 44-year-old umutindi released Hutu prisoner, 2006).

The everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans to “stay on the sidelines” are subtle, indirect and non-confrontational. Implicit acts of everyday resistance, like washing laundry or building a bridge, may appear on the surface to be survival strategies. What these everyday acts of resistance reveal is that some ordinary Rwandans not only understand that the programme of national unity and reconciliation is an oppressive form of power but also that it makes their daily struggle to provide for their basic needs more complicated. Rather than blindly or willingly accept state-led directives to reconcile with one another, ordinary Rwandans recognise that the programme is yet another form of social control that they strategically avoid so that they can get on with more pressing matters – the daily realities of economic survival.
Irreverent Compliance

A second form of everyday resistance that many ordinary Rwandans exhibited was the practice of irreverent compliance, meaning that they followed the rules and regulations of the programme of national unity and reconciliation in ways that respect their position of inferiority to the authority of local officials and other agents of the state. Irreverent compliance is a response of ordinary Rwandans to the various assaults on their dignity, notably the expectation that they will participate earnestly and readily in prescribed activities of national unity and reconciliation. Some ordinary Rwandans have devised a number of ways to subvert the expectations of some aspects of the programme of national unity and reconciliation, particularly around the return ceremonies for ingando graduates following their release from prison and the pressures of forced participation in national mourning activities every April. For instance, Tutsi survivors who are forced to attend the return ceremony of a Hutu individual who they believe should not have been released from prison will laugh outlandishly at the remarks of local authorities during their “welcome home” speeches. In this way, they practice irreverent compliance, as individuals attend the mandatory meetings but let the official know in subtle ways their contempt or disrespect. For example, Esther told me about how she is able to “disrespect the system” while avoiding punishment for expressing her discontent with government policy at the frequent speeches that local officials make on all aspects of the programme of national unity and reconciliation:

Oh yes, when [the local official] says [at a speech] that [the graduate] has been re-educated through ingando training, I laugh out loud, or if that is not possible, I glare at him, to let him know that I do not believe for even one minute that ingando is a good idea for peace and unity. Because we gather [in groups of 30 or more people] at the [local government] offices, it is hard for the official to know it is me who laughed. Sometimes, he
stops and stares into the crowd. In those moments, there is a risk that a neighbour will point me out as the one who disrespected the official. When he doesn’t, I sometimes move to the other side of the crowd so he can’t find and punish me (interview with Esther, a 40-year-old umukene Tutsi widow, 2006).

Esther’s act of irreverent compliance may appear to have accomplished very little, but on closer examination it is clear that her tactics exploit one of the most vexing insecurities faced by local government officials in post-genocide Rwanda. As individuals who exercise their authority through fear, local officials expect a certain measure of deference and compliance to their demands. Indeed, the power and authority of local officials is reinforced through a strong central government, which makes acts of vocal disrespect like Esther’s all the more revealing. It is precisely because compliance is expected, since any refusal to attend the ingando “welcome home” ceremony would constitute an affront, if not a challenge, to the authority of the local official. Esther’s action of laughing or glaring at an event she is forced to participate in provides the official with little more than evidence that someone in the crowd is expressing disrespect.

In giving the appearance of consent and approval by attending the ingando ceremony, Esther has found a way to express her contempt while at the same time maintaining her subordinate position.

Inconsequential acts such as laughing at the words of a local official during a perfunctory speech can provide a foundation for more effective action, as evidenced in the irreverent compliance of Tutsi survivors like Esther, as well as those individuals – Hutu and Twa – who are not officially recognised as survivors of the 1994 genocide. For these individuals, mourning week represents a sphere of defiance, where individuals seek
to protect their dignity, as well as that of their loved ones who lives were lost during the 1994 genocide, as well as during, before and after the violence.

Janvier, a Tutsi survivor, explained to me how he resists mourning week despite the mandatory requirement to attend and “show solidarity for Tutsi lives lost” (interview with NURC official, 2006):

Mourning week is a joke. How stupid does this government think we [Tutsi] survivors are? We [Tutsi] talk about the ways this government disrespects our lives. I mean, we were targeted because we were Tutsi now we have to forget about that in the name of national unity and reconciliation. Me, I cannot. Tutsi is what I am. So the officials make speeches and we have to mourn in “official” ways. This means nothing. Many of my people are really dead; many around me are alive but they act like they are dead. Seriously, this idea that I am survivor is too much to bear. This government says they saved us, and saved Rwanda. This is just not true. So when they [government officials] make speeches on radio, I just turn it off which can get me in trouble [with the authorities] if a neighbour who is an enemy passes by and learns that I am not listening. Of course, I am a former Tutsi so maybe that wouldn’t happen but anything is possible these days.

Local authorities make public speeches we must attend. Now, I have benefits as a [co-operative] member. There is no way I am going to risk losing those funds. I need them to live. So it was first in 1999, once I had some strength and could think about regaining some balance in my head. I made a big decision to reject my local official. We were standing in the crowd after the speech. A very disappointing speech which is what shaped my decision. So I was standing quite close to him [the speech maker] and I stuck my tongue out at him. He did not see me but other [Tutsi survivors] did. Some of them squirmed and others covered their mouths to stop their laughter. One woman, she gasped, which made the official look around to understand why our mood had changed. He saw me with a stone-face and did nothing. After that, some of us stand up to officials who force us to mourn our dead and our lives in ways that are offensive to us. One was caught mocking [the official] and she spent the night in cachot [detention]. She still mocks when she can, and so do I. If I can’t mourn in my own way, at least I can show disrespect in private ways that other survivors understand… (interview with Janvier, a 31-year-old umukene Tutsi man, 2006).
Several ordinary Rwandans defied the demands of having to officially mourn lost loved ones. In 2006, the government decreed that the remains of individuals who were buried in mass graves during the 1994 genocide would be moved to local authority offices where “official grave markers” would provide “the appropriate respect and officially honour to those who perished during the genocide” (interview with Ministry of Culture official, 2006). For survivors of all ethnicities, the official mass graves are an affront for two reasons. First, the graves are locked, and can only be opened with the written permission of the local authority, something which many ordinary Rwandans avoid given their preference to avoid contact with local officials. Secondly, mass graves do not respect the wishes of survivors and their families to have the remains of their lost relatives buried on their own land, so that they can care for the grave and honour their dead.  

This directive was considered offensive by many survivors – Tutsi, Hutu and Twa – as they wanted to bury the remains of their relatives on their own property, as is the custom in Rwanda. The directive is particularly offensive to Hutu and Twa survivors who participated in my research, as most of them lost family members and friends after the official end of the genocide in July 1994, either at Kibeho camp, the refugee camps in Zaïre, or through disease or starvation.

Séraphine, a Twa survivor of the political violence of 1959 and the 1994 genocide, defied the directive of mourning her lost relatives in sanctioned mass graves in,

Sneaking a bone. A big bone, like my husband had. The official looked away and I grabbed it and hid it my skirt. My friend helped me because we knew that I could go to prison, or worse for grabbing a bone. She distracted him and I grabbed it.

*One Tutsi survivor told me that that her local official offered to give her “some bones that might be those of your relatives” if she paid him 100,000Frw. (CN$221) (interview with Espérance, a 37-year-old Tutsi widow, 2006).*
The government rule is that you must mourn at public ceremonies. Mourning means being respectful to those who died. This means Tutsi. It also means showing upset and even weeping or sobbing.\(^{40}\) I want nothing to do with that as my people [other ethnic Twa] are not recognised there. And the national memorial centres like the one at Gikongoro, we have to pay a fee to enter. I have no money to eat. How can I possibly travel and then pay to enter. Of course, when you enter [the memorial], I am told you have to sign a book so then the government knows you have visited. No.\(^{41}\) I am unable to mourn in ways that are more than shameful of the way my people died. My husband died at Kibeho camp and the RPF did it. We all know that [not clear who “we” refers to]. To say that only Tutsi are the survivors of the genocide is just false. But I am an old woman so what can I really do? I just appear to be mourning for them.

So I go to the [mourning] events. I hang my head. I act ashamed of what we Rwandans did to Tutsi. Basically, I do everything this government says we have to do to respect the lives of Tutsi that fell during the genocide.\(^{42}\) But in my heart, I am remembering my people. After [the ceremony], I go home and sit under my banana tree and pour some sorghum beer on my husband’s grave so I can share with him like we used to.

Everyone knows that others died too. Maybe not because of genocide but because of other forms of violence. It was like that in 1959 and in 1994. Killing, killing, killing. It is everyone’s business, not just the business of Tutsi and Hutu like the government says now and like it did in 1959.

\(^{40}\) Other ordinary Rwandans told me the same thing. When I visited the Gikongoro memorial site in August 2006, I was escorted by two soldiers, both armed with AK-47s, to the foyer of the memorial centre to sign the guestbook. It was strongly recommended that I leave “a sum” of money. When I put out 500 Frw (CNS1.05), one of the soldiers asked me if I couldn’t spare just a little bit more. When I said no, he stepped in very close to my body and stared into my eyes, and said, “survivors are poor. You are not. It is best if you leave more than that [pointing to the bill on the table].” I gave another 1,000 Frw. (CNS2.10). The soldier scoffed but stepped back and allowed me to leave the foyer. I walked back to the main road as I’d given away all of the money I was carrying (fieldnotes, 2006).

\(^{41}\) Kinyarwanda has nuanced language for expressing opinions. The word for an emphatic “yes” is cyane; and for an emphatic “no” is askwi, which is the word that Séraphine used to express herself. The Kinyarwanda word for “yes” is yee while the word for “no” is oya.

\(^{42}\) Several ordinary Rwandans told me that the requirement to “appear to be very upset and in constant mourning” during mourning week activities was stressful for them (interview with Pacifique, a 14-year-old umutindi Tutsi girl, 2006). Rwandan cultural codes frown upon public displays of emotion of any kind. Excessive emotion is seen as a sign of either weakness or madness in adults; only children express uncontrolled emotion, and that is because “they still have to be taught how to behave” (fieldnotes, 2006). Many individuals told me that they felt anxious about appearing upset as they were concerned about what amount of emotion to show and how. Esther summed it up best, “Crying? Do we cry? Do we frown? It is unclear. Me personally, I am careful not to do too much or to do too little. I just follow the lead of our officials [from FARG] so we know what is expected” (interview with Esther, a 37-year-old umutindi Tutsi widow, 2006).
So I took a bone, knowing I could go to prison or worse. I don’t think he’ll [the local official] will ever find out because I am an old woman and old women don’t challenge our officials. But since the genocide, and the rules of this new government, I have to do something to find ways to live my life in peace (interview with Séraphine, a 96-year-old umutindi Twa widow, 2006).

Séraphine proudly pointed to where the femur was buried on her own property, where she had created a shrine to her friends and family lost during the genocide, a crime that most ordinary Rwandans believe is punishable by law.43 That the recovered bone is unlikely to be that of her husband does not matter; as Séraphine pointed out her makeshift grave to me, she said, “The government won’t let me heal in my own time, in my own way. So I had to do what was right for my heart. I need to see the tombstone even if the bone is not truly that of [my husband]. I want to care for it and honour his memory. I planted this banana tree so the official won’t know from his car that it is a tomb for a survivor like me [an ethnic Twa]’’.

The compliance of many ordinary Rwandans is an indicator of the systemic forms of structural violence that local officials subject ordinary Rwandans to in the name of national unity and reconciliation. Acts of irreverent compliance are indeed one of the more disguised forms of everyday resistance as they are the desperate acts of persons living in extreme poverty, emotional pain, continual fear and constant isolation. Laughing, glaring, and defying government orders on how to mourn the lives of loved ones show that some ordinary Rwandans continue to resist the demands of the programme of national unity and reconciliation prudently, creatively, and with determination, even in the presence of local officials, in ways that restore their dignity. Indeed, acts of irreverent compliance do little to mitigate the structural forms of violence

43 I found no evidence of this law on the books. That many ordinary Rwandans believe it to be a crime is nonetheless significant.
that ordinary Rwandans experience in their daily lives. However, in a context of social
control and oppression like post-genocide Rwanda, many ordinary Rwandans recognise
that the programme of national unity and reconciliation is a form of violence against
them; they also understand that even the smallest act can be met with brutal reprisals
from local officials and other agents of the state. Irreverent compliance as a form of
everyday resistance is a useful indicator of the extent to which ordinary Rwandans
consider the directives of the programme of national unity and reconciliation as a burden
in their daily efforts to rebuild their lives and livelihoods.

Withdrawn Muteness

A third form of everyday resistance that some ordinary Rwandans practiced as
they performed the requirements of the programme of national unity and reconciliation
were acts of withdrawn muteness. These acts are purposeful and strategic moments of
silence that ordinary Rwandans employ to defy the expectations of the programme in
ways that either protect their meagre resources or assure their dignity in their interactions
with local officials. Acts of withdrawn muteness are made through the ways in which the
body and face are held, and are a standard response of many ordinary Rwandans to local
authorities or other agents of the state. This leads élites to wrongly conclude that
ordinary Rwandans are not political beings, since they lack “the necessary education and
consciousness to understand politics. It is because they are not modern that we have to
educate them on becoming Rwandans” (interview with NURC official, 2006). Among
the ordinary Rwandans I met, far from any primary road, electric line or other modern
convenience, I encountered individuals who possessed levels of political awareness that
energisises and shapes everyday acts of resistance as subtle and indirect as withdrawn
muteness. Trésor described the purpose of withdrawn muteness as a tactic that sabotages
the efforts of local officials to promote reconciliation among ordinary Rwandans:

Remaining silent is very rewarding because it angers local officials. They
ask if we are stupid. They ask if we understand. They ask why we are so
difficult. That is the point. When he [the local official] gets mad, I smile
inside because I know he is frustrated and annoyed. The officials work to
make us get reconciled while people like me [orphans and other survivors]
just want to be left alone. I mean life is enough of a struggle without the
burden of reconciling with people who may or may not have killed. Being
silent is a good way to appreciate the difficulties of life since the genocide.
We have all been hurt in some way, but we recognise the pain and
continue on. Silence helps us do that in ways that make sense to us, not to
local officials (interview with Trésor, a 16-year-old umutindi Tutsi boy, 2006).

Withdrawn muteness is also the tactic of choice for the imprisoned Hutu who
have even fewer options to resist. Of the six individuals that I spoke with, three had
confessed to their crimes of acts of genocide while the remaining three swore their
innocence. Prisoners use withdrawn muteness as a way to avoid cooperating with prison
authorities, as well as with the soldiers assigned to guard them during the days on which
prisoners fulfill their travaux d’intérêt général (works in the general interest, TIG)
obligations. For example, Jean-Bosco shared that playing dumb is a useful tactic. He
says,

44 Tigistes (those who perform TIG) are prisoners who serve part of their sentence by carrying out works in
the general interest. This means they dig ditches, build roads, and terrace hillside plots of land to prevent
soil erosion and maximise crop yields. They also build homes for Tutsi survivors of the genocide
(interview with prison official, 2006). Officially, tigistes are allowed to return to their home communities,
and spend part of the day (7:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.) in service to TIG projects. The tigistes I interviewed
worked on TIG projects during the day but spent their evenings in the local prison. It is also designed to
promote reconciliation “because [Tutsi] survivors get used to seeing prisoners in their communities”
(interview with prison official, 2006). When asked why the prisoners I spoke to were not allowed back into
their communities as part of their TIG sentence, the official told me that this is because “[Tutsi] survivors
are not yet ready to welcome them back [to their communities]”. The words of one prisoner sum up the
perspective of confessed prisoners, “We have never been allowed back [home]. They say it is because
survivors don’t want us. That may be because some of us did terrible things but we have never been given
the chance to re-integrate. What is the point of ingando and TIG if we never get a chance to try to
reconcile? We are slaves to this government like our ancestors were slaves during colonial times…”
(interview with Félicien, a 33-year-old prisoner who confessed to acts of genocide, 2006).
When I was nominated for TIG, I jumped at the opportunity because I heard it was a way to get back home much sooner than rotting here in prison. So we go with soldiers, or *gendarmes* (policemen), to do work. Hard work, manual work. So the boys [soldiers] all know that I am a medical doctor so I act like I don’t know how to terrace, or dig. I have never done this work before, but it is not very hard. It is just degrading and not something that I will do without the ability to go home at night. Now of course they [prison officials] exaggerated about the right to live at home while performing TIG. I shouldn’t have been surprised as this government just wants to keep educated Hutu out of the public system. This is why I am in prison even though I am 100% innocent. I saved lives during the genocide, and even did not run afterwards. I stayed in Butare and worked at the hospital, patching up everyone – Tutsi or Hutu. Some died on my [operating] table. Others survived. I am guilty for the death of those that died. It is clear that locked up in prison is where this government wants educated Hutu like me. False allegations of committing genocide are just a form of genocide that this government practices against [educated] Hutu like me.

So with these young boys that are responsible for prisoners when we are out on TIG, I just play stupid. I look at my feet, I look at the sky. I stare at them as they speak to me about how to work the shovel. I act completely ignorant and say nothing. I did this every time for months and months. I think it was almost one year before the soldiers began to tell one another that I was useless and could not be counted on to do manual work. It is a risky strategy as I will never fulfill the TIG requirements of my sentence. But I also know from being outside in the community that someone like me will never get out of prison. There is no justice in this Rwanda since the genocide. So I do what I can to limit my responsibilities… (interview with Jean-Bosco, a 42-year-old imprisoned Hutu, 2006).

Jean-Bosco plays dumb and remains silent as a strategy to make his life in prison more bearable. He also says nothing and feigns ignorance to maintain his sense of self as someone who is above manual labour; his actions guarantee him (at least in his eyes) his dominant position as a medical doctor with the “young boys who are responsible for prisoners”. Indeed, Jean-Bosco understands that as an “educated Hutu” he is likely to spend the rest of his life in prison. This in turn shapes his decision to feign ignorance. His subtle and non-confrontational action of everyday resistance also reveals the forms of power in which Jean-Bosco is enmeshed. As a Hutu prisoner with few, if any options, to
face justice and return to his community, Jean-Bosco’s actions show the analytical usefulness of the concept of everyday resistance. While Jean-Bosco’s acts are limited, individual and border on resignation, they reveal a poignant and meaningful element of the concept of everyday resistance – awareness of the oppressive elements of TIG activities that are upheld by local officials and other agents of the state. Jean-Bosco recognises the structural violence that TIG represents in his daily life. He also believes that he will likely never get out of prison. Withdrawn muteness shows that he will not submit entirely to the discipline of the soldiers and other agents of the state charged with overseeing and controlling his participation in TIG projects. It also indicates the oppressive nature of state power that Jean-Bosco is up against, as a member of one of post-genocide Rwanda’s most marginal categories, and illustrates how individuals resist the demands of the programme of national unity and reconciliation in minute and non-obvious ways.

**Conclusions**

A focus on the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandan men and women allows for a fuller picture of what these resistance practices indicate about the forms of power they are up against. Indeed, a careful look at what may appear on the surface to be trivial acts – for example, remaining silent or mocking local officials – provides insight into the kinds of power relations ordinary Rwandans are caught up in. This chapter shows that power relations in post-genocide Rwanda take many forms, have many aspects and are interwoven. They are also contingent on the relationships between the ordinary individual, as persons subject to the power of the state, and the various mechanisms of national unity and reconciliation. More than simply restoring the agency
of ordinary Rwandans as political beings who possess intimate knowledge of the exercise
of power in post-genocide Rwanda, the various and multiple strands of social and
political power are made apparent as local officials work to promote the programme of
national unity and reconciliation.

This chapter also shows how subtle, indirect and non-confrontational acts of
everyday resistance reflect individual understanding of the operation and function of state
power in post-genocide Rwanda. Indeed, the strongest evidence for the existence of, and
importance of identifying and analysing acts of everyday resistance is its ability to
identify sites of opposition and struggle within the programme of national unity and
reconciliation. Speaking of everyday resistance does more than show the creativity,
ingenuity and resourcefulness of the many ordinary Rwandans who are subject to the
dictates of the programme of national unity and reconciliation; it also reveals the
marginal socio-political position of ordinary Rwandans in identifying the places of
resistance where the oppressive power of the state is enacted in their daily lives. A focus
on the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans also illustrates the overlapping
and intersecting forms of social control embodied in the programme of national unity and
reconciliation, while revealing the structural limitations it places on ordinary Rwandans
whose lived experiences of violence are outside the dictates of its many mechanisms.
Chapter 7: Everyday Resistance to the Gacaca Process

This chapter examines one specific mechanism of the programme of national unity and reconciliation, the gacaca (ga-cha-cha) courts. The courts are an open-air local-level retributive mechanism that the government instituted to prosecute individuals for crimes of genocide. The “modern” post-genocide version of gacaca is loosely based on a traditional dispute-resolution mechanism of the same name (Waldorf, 2006: 48-55). The post-genocide government prioritised legal proceedings as the primary means of national unity and reconciliation. It opted for a variety of judicial processes – the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the national courts, and the gacaca courts – to fight the culture of impunity and to foster respect for the rule of law (Inyumba, 2001; Office of the President, 1999a). The gacaca courts are a central part of the government’s national unity and reconciliation “toolkit” and emphasise legal retribution over social reconciliation (Zorbas, 2004: 29). For the government, gacaca is a “truth and reconciliation strategy” that will accomplish the following: 1) establish a truthful record of what really happened during the 1994 genocide; 2) accelerate the release of more than 120,000 individuals accused of acts of genocide so that they could return home and “help

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1 Gacaca means literally “lawn” or “small grass”, and refers to the spot where the dispute resolution took place. The traditional form of gacaca justice differs significantly from its post-genocide form as the process was not institutionalised nor was it mandatory for the entire community to attend as is currently the case. It also did not mediate on crimes of genocide or other acts of mass violence. Traditionally, gacaca adjudicated family disputes concerning the distribution of property, inheritance, marital relations and personal injury on an ad hoc basis, not scheduled weekly. Women were rarely permitted to speak. Retribution was assigned to families and clan lineages, not to individuals. The traditional purpose of gacaca was to restore social harmony and order, not to apply state law as the courts do since the genocide. Gacaca, in both its traditional pre-1994 form, and post-genocide form, is under the control of local officials. For further analysis of its traditional objectives see International Herald Tribune (1999); Reyntjens (1990); Reyntjens and Vandeginste (2005); Urusaro et al. (2004).

2 For an overview of the various legal processes, see Des Forges and Longman (2004).
re-build Rwanda rather than just sitting in jail\textsuperscript{3}; 3) eradicate the culture of impunity; and
4) promote national unity and reconciliation (interview, MINJUST official, 2006; Rusagara, 2005). For many ordinary Rwandans, the \textit{gacaca} courts represent a form of state control in their lives, whose demands they try to resist subtly and strategically.

This chapter focuses on the government’s efforts to promote to national unity and reconciliation through the \textit{gacaca} courts. It argues that the \textit{gacaca} courts are another mechanism of the post-genocide government that reinforces state power and promotes the image of Rwanda as a “nation rehabilitated” in the name of national unity and reconciliation and at the expense of individual well-being (ORTPN, 2004: 4). Specifically, the chapter focuses mainly on the everyday acts of resistance of Tutsi survivors, as key actors in the performance of \textit{gacaca}, to show first how the courts limit individual agency and second to demonstrate the subtle and creative ways survivors express their discontent towards government policy before the \textit{gacaca} courts.\textsuperscript{4} The argument is developed in three sections. The first section brings together the conceptual frameworks from Chapters Four and Five to illustrate the extent to which the \textit{gacaca} courts act as a mechanism of state power.\textsuperscript{5} This chapter takes the analysis further in examining the everyday acts of resistance of some ordinary Rwandans to the \textit{gacaca}

\textsuperscript{3} The figure of 120,000 detainees is from 1999. Since then, the prison population has dropped significantly as the government has periodically allowed for the provisional release of elderly and infirm detainees as well as those who were under 14 years of age in 1994 or without case files. By March 2006, an estimated 54,000 individuals were still being held in prison detention on charges of genocide (Waldorf, 2006: 43).

\textsuperscript{4} I observed 31 individual \textit{gacaca} trials between May and August 2006 in 12 Sectors across Southern Rwanda in the geographic triangle between Butare, Gitarama and Cyangugu. I also attended seven \textit{gacaca} sessions as a guest of the government during my re-education (September 2006), an experience which fleshes out my analysis as I observed \textit{gacaca} from the government observers bench (rather than that reserved for regular observers) in two locations just east of Kigali.

\textsuperscript{5} Chapter Four analysed the power of the Rwandan state to structure everyday life by examining the myriad mechanisms of national unity and reconciliation, while Chapter Five focused on select acts of everyday resistance that ordinary Rwandans practice to make their lives more sustainable in the face of a strong and centralised state power.
courts to show that instead of promoting national unity and reconciliation, the courts are a mechanism where individuals subtly express their discontent with the post-genocide policies of the RPF – the gacaca courts are a site of everyday resistance to the policies of the RPF-led government, not one of national unity and reconciliation.6

The second section illustrates the nature of state involvement in and control of the gacaca process. Specifically, this section examines the extent to which state agents seek to control the gacaca process to emphasise the many constraints that the programme of national unity and reconciliation imposes on individuals, and how this limits opportunity for action. It also demonstrates how the programme of national unity and reconciliation forces individuals to participate at gacaca in ways that promote a sense of fear and insecurity in the everyday lives of ordinary Rwandans. Section Two sets the stage for the final section of the chapter – the acts of everyday resistance of Tutsi survivors. The third section focuses on Tutsi survivors as key actors in the gacaca process because it is their ability and willingness to testify about who did what to whom, where and when that is, according to the government, critical to its efforts to promote national unity and reconciliation.

The Power of State and the Gacaca Process

Žižek (1996) suggests that it is not the civilised public appearance of the state apparatus but rather the underworld of written codes of conduct and ritual that is the actual life-world of citizens. Yet this underworld is able to operate only because the

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6 The gacaca courts are also a site where individuals express the discontent they have towards others. The analysis focuses exclusively on the relationship between the individual and the state rather than on relations between ordinary Rwandans as my shortened period of fieldwork did not allow for consideration of the relationships between individuals. Chakravarty (2006b) and Rettig (2008) provide compelling analysis on individual feelings of resentment towards gacaca and its impact on intra-personal relationships.
image of the civilised state and the obedient citizen creates the sense of conceptual
distance necessary for the regime to create an image of itself as one that at least tries to
treat its citizens fairly (Žižek, 1996: 101). The gacaca process represents such an
underworld, as the post-genocide government promotes its programme of national unity
and reconciliation as a project that will result in an ethnically unified “one Rwanda for all
Rwandans” (discussed in Chapter Three). The gacaca law requires ordinary Rwandans
to participate⁷, and individuals are cast into the following pre-scripted roles: 1) citizen
spectators;⁸ 2) judges; 3) witnesses; 4) prisoners who have confessed to acts of genocide;
5) prisoners who have not confessed to their crimes; or 6) survivors (NURC, 2003: 8).
Individuals who do not perform according to the assigned script fall afool of the post-
genocide state and its agents are subject to a variety of sanctions. For example, Tutsi
survivors can lose their membership in civil society organisations that provide free health
care or subsidised school fees. Prisoners who confessed in hopes of receiving a reduced
sentence can find themselves with sentences of life in prison. Community spectators and
witnesses can run into trouble with government officials if they speak out of turn or off

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⁷ Article 29 of Organic Law n.o. 16/2004 of June 19, 2004 establishing the organization, competence and functioning of the Gacaca Courts states that: “Every Rwandan citizen has the duty to participate in the gacaca courts’ activities. Any person who omits or refuses to testify on what he or she has seen or on what he or knows, as well as the one who makes a slanderous denunciation, shall be prosecuted by the Gacaca Court which makes the statement of it. He or she incurs a prison sentence from three (3) months to six (6) months. In case of repeat offence, the defendant may incur a prison sentence from six months (6) to one (1) year” (MINIJUST, 2004). These sanctions are invoked by representatives of the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (NSGJ) who are assigned by MINIJUST to observe gacaca trials in a given community, and are arbitrarily applied (fieldnotes, 2006).

⁸ All adults over the age of 18 must attend gacaca or risk sanction (2004 Gacaca Law, art 29). Local officials and other state agents employ coercive tactics to force popular compliance. This exposes gacaca’s unpopularity, which is in turn shaped by the desperate poverty of many of its participants. Sanctions include fines and imprisonment. Where attendance is consistently low, military agents both force people to attend and then prevent them from leaving until a quorum has been reached and the trial can begin (fieldnotes, 2006). Quorum is 100 adults (2004 Gacaca Law, arts. 18 and 33). Most of the gacaca trials I attended proceeded without quorum. See Waldorf (2006: 65, n. 65) on the difficulties encountered by local officials in “rounding up” enough peasants to meet quorum.
topic. Judges must oversee and implement the *gacaca* process in accordance with government standards; those who do not can be imprisoned and/or denounced, which often means a loss of social and economic status.

The constant threat of sanction means that some ordinary Rwandans are tactical when making their performance before the *gacaca* courts as local officials and other state agents actively work to suppress any challenge to the programme of national unity and reconciliation. In order to get an official rendering of justice via the *gacaca* courts, local officials constantly remind ordinary Rwandans to “watch themselves” (interview, RPF official, 2006). Self-sanctioning behaviour is the result of this surveillance, which in turn narrows the ability and willingness of survivors and perpetrators to reconcile outside the official mechanism of *gacaca* (discussed in Chapter Four). Following Žižek, the programme of national unity and reconciliation maintains the civilised appearance of peace and security in ways that do not match individual lived experiences of the genocide. Simply stated, national unity and reconciliation is a product of the post-genocide regime; it is not something that necessarily exists in people’s everyday lives.

That individuals are unable to explore the possibility of reconciliation outside the glare of state power requires an approach that takes into consideration three different dimensions of state power: the idea of the state, practices of the state and the culture of the state. The state-idea is “an ideological artefact attributing unity, morality and independence to the disunited, amoral and dependent workings of the practice of government” (Abrams, 1988: 81). This belief in the idea of the state “conceals the workings of relations of rule and forms of discipline in day to day life” (Alonso, 1994: 381). This has important implications for the *gacaca* process, which is overseen by a
number of powerbrokers, *viz.*, the local authorities and other state agents, as well as *gacaca* judges⁹ (*inyangamugayo*, lit. those who detest disgrace). In cases where individual compliance to the rituals of *gacaca* is low, plain-clothed security agents are assigned by the central government to monitor the process (fieldnotes, 2006).¹⁰ At the level of the ordinary individual, the state is therefore embodied by local officials who are able and willing to uphold the idea of the state and who, as we saw in Chapter Five, are chosen for their ability and willingness to effectively and efficiently promote national unity and reconciliation or risk sanction from their bosses in Kigali. If a local official is unable to force individuals resident in his bailiwick to perform the demands of the programme of national unity and reconciliation, the official is liable to be replaced with someone who is more able to do so. Actions such as replacing local officials are an indication of the extent to which the post-genocide government recognises that its programme of national unity and reconciliation relies on coercive actions; it is hardly something which most Rwandans deem as legitimate or just.

The practices of the Rwandan state in pursuit of national unity and reconciliation, such as the *gacaca* courts, take place in articulated “state spaces” (Scott, 1998: 186). In

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⁹ Though beyond the scope of this chapter, further analysis is necessary of the role of judges as individuals who must do the bidding of the state at the expense of their own well-being and place in the community. Particularly, judges who are Tutsi survivors often lose the bond that links them to other survivors, meaning they also risk losing much-needed emotional and financial support because they are *gacaca* judges (fieldnotes, 2006).

¹⁰ State agents in uniform are often armed with AK-47s or other instruments of force, including truncheons. Plain clothed agents of the state are omnipresent, but play no official role in *gacaca* proceedings. These individuals make no attempt to hide their presence and, in my experience, everyone in attendance knew well who the state agents were and why they were there. Alice said it well: “Of course we all see them. And we all know why they come. To get justice the way it is supposed to be done. They talk only to those [elected] officials, and they have covered shoes and sunglasses. It is very obvious they come from outside [our cell]. One who came to witness [gacaca] proceedings didn’t actually speak enough of our language [Kinyarwanda] to observe properly and had to get help from one of the *inyangamugayo* who he knows. We never saw him again. The [current] observer always sits there, away from the other observers” (interview with Alice, a 29-year-old *umukene* Tutsi widow, 2006).
the process of controlling the spaces where unity and reconciliation can officially occur, the Rwandan state has neutralised or eliminated non-state spaces, thereby rendering these spaces suspect, which in turn constrains the ability of many ordinary Rwandans to resist the programme of national unity and reconciliation. Acts of national unity and reconciliation that occur outside of the gaze of the state do not officially count, as there is no official present there to register and legitimate the encounter. Reconciliation must be legible to all; the gacaca courts re-iterate the power of the post-genocide state to produce the image of lasting peace. Projects such as the programme of national unity and reconciliation “reveal both the power and the limitations of the regime’s project by announcing the gap between enforcing participation and commanding belief” (Wedeen, 1999: 22).

The “culture of state” refers to the practices of representation and interpretation which characterise the relation between individuals and the state, and through which the idea of the state is maintained.¹¹ This moves the analysis beyond “the apparatus of government to show how the magic and power of the state are forms in everyday discursive practice” (Crais, 2002: 25). An important aspect of state power is the management and appropriation of the symbolic world (Wedeen, 1999: 30). The power of the unity-generating Rwandan state is its ability to force individuals to reconcile according to pre-defined roles and in the dissemination (largely through powerbrokers) of credible threats of punishment for non-compliance. Individuals behave as if they are being watched because they are – gacaca is a public and compulsory spectacle. Most ordinary Rwandans also understand that the appearance of compliance is an important

¹¹ Mitchell (1991) theorises this point to show how the boundary between state and society is better understood as the result of complex power relations that are the result of individual interaction with the apparatus of the state.
aspect of performing national unity and reconciliation. Thus, the state commands orchestrated displays of individual obedience to the programme of unity and reconciliation while also producing tactical compliance through the actual or anticipated use of punishment. Another important aspect of the culture of the state is the climate of fear it produces and the self-sanctioning behaviour that individuals adopt for fear of being punished for non-compliance.

In spite of this strong state presence and the ubiquity of local officials who work to ensure that as many individuals as possible participate to uphold the façade of national unity and reconciliation that the gacaca courts seeks to create, many ordinary Rwandans exercise their agency in strategic and creative ways to show their opposition or indignation to what they perceive as unjust actions against them or members of their family. As we saw in Chapter Six, the risks associated with direct action – losing access to social benefits, social outcasting, disappearance and, in extreme cases, death – can be severe. As a result, ordinary Rwandans practice everyday acts of resistance that are subtle, indirect, and non-confrontational. They include some combination of persistence, prudence and individual effort to accomplish a specific goal that benefits the individual resister against a local official or other state agent who is unaware that the individual is attempting to resist or subvert the demands of the programme of national unity and reconciliation. An analytical focus on the everyday acts of resistance to gacaca trials reveals the subtle, indirect and non-confrontational ways in which ordinary Rwandans do more than mitigate the demands of their mandatory participation. They also creatively and strategically express dissatisfaction with their inability to discuss RPF war crimes, land conflicts and their continued poverty in the presence of government officials during
gacaca. Before examining in further detail the specific everyday acts of resistance of Tutsi survivors, to illustrate the extent to which gacaca is a mechanism of state power, the next section demonstrates how individuals are expected to perform certain roles before the gacaca courts in accordance with the script of the programme of national unity and reconciliation.

The Gacaca Courts in the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation

The gacaca courts are at the heart of government efforts to achieve national unity and reconciliation since the 1994 genocide “ruptured the social fabric” (interview with NURC official, 2006; see also NSGJ, 2005b; Karasira, n.d.; Kerrigan, 2000; Rusagara, 2005). Little is known about the actual functioning of the gacaca courts in pursuit of the goal of promoting national unity and reconciliation despite a voluminous academic literature (e.g., Alvarez, 1999; Betts, 2005; Corey and Joireman, 2004; Daly, 2001/2002; Drumbl, 2000, 2002; Fierens, 2005; Kirby, 2006; Redmond, 2000; Sarkin, 2001; Schabas, 2005; Uvin and Mironko, 2003; Waldorf, 2006; see also Aghion, 2004; Chakravarty, 2006b; Gaparayi, 2001; HRW, 2008; Ingelaere, 2007 for the perceptions of ordinary Rwandans on gacaca processes). 12 This is largely because it has focused predominantly on the protection of human rights and the ability of gacaca courts to uphold international standards of criminal justice and legal accountability rather than on their outcomes at the level of the individual. Political psychologists and trauma specialists have focused on the healing potential of the courts and the importance of 12 The reports of international NGOs such as Amnesty International (2002b, 3 March 2004); African Rights (2003a); Avocats sans frontières (n.d.(a)); and Penal Reform International (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2007b) provide useful and important micro-level analysis of the functioning of the gacaca courts from the perspective of ordinary Rwandans.
justice as a pre-condition for reconciliation, but again are silent on how unity and reconciliation play out in the lives of ordinary Rwandans (Borland, 2003; Redekop, 2008; Pham et al., 2005; Staub et al, 2003; Staub, 2004; see also Brounéus (2008) on the difficulties of truth-telling from the perspective of Tutsi widows).13

A common thread in these analyses of the gacaca process is the assumption that ordinary Rwandans are willing participants. Schabas (2005: 897) claims without any reference to his methodology or sources that: “Rwandans have consistently rejected any compromise with full accountability, insisting upon criminal prosecution for all alleged perpetrators”. Pham et al. (2004: 603) provide more insight about their methods but do not state the specifics of their sample, or the circumstances in which their survey was completed: “More respondents supported the local judicial responses (90.8% supported gacaca trials and 67.8% the Rwanda national trials) than the ICTR (42.1% in support)” (see also Boisen, 1997; Gasibirege and Babagola, 2001: 11-16). Official government documents contend that “the autocratically divisive political structures that once denied minorities a political voice have been replaced, for instance with the implementation of democratic cellular councils that involve local communities in important decisions at grassroots level” (interview with NURC official, 2006). What these sources obscure is the extent to which gacaca represents yet another “state space” where individual Rwandans are observed and monitored for their compliance to the script of national unity and reconciliation.

13 International non-governmental organisations are also divided on the possibility that gacaca will deliver justice and reconciliation to Rwanda. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are critical of both the judicial and reconciliatory capacities of gacaca. Others, like Avocats sans frontières, Réseau de Citoyens (Citizens’ Network) and Penal Reform International, are relatively supportive and work with the Rwandan government to improve and refine the gacaca process. Penal Reform International has to share its reports with the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions before they are “allowed” to be published (fieldnotes, 2006).
Gacaca started as a pilot project in June 2002 and was later refined in 2004.\textsuperscript{14} The most notable refinement was the merging of categories 2 and 3 (intentional murder, attempted murder, manslaughter and assault cases) into a single category.\textsuperscript{15} Gacaca was launched nationwide in January 2005, with the government estimating that it would take ten years for the courts to complete the process.\textsuperscript{16} In 2006, the gacaca trials at the Sector and Cell levels were taking place throughout the communities where the ordinary Rwandans that participated in my research live. Trials in these communities had already passed the first stage of gacaca, the information-gathering stage,\textsuperscript{17} and the courts were involved in the second and final stage of judgment and sentencing.

The gacaca process is a top-down and highly centralised process that is overseen by the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (NSGJ), which is a chamber of the Supreme Court of Rwanda. Its primary task is to coordinate the transmission of prisoner dossiers between the Cell and Sector-level courts, and to connect these courts to the local offices of the NSGJ, which are housed in the capital of each province (NSGJ, 2005/06, 14).

\textsuperscript{14} The Gacaca Law was passed in 2001 and retained the main features of the 1996 Genocide Law (MINIJUST, 1996), meaning it kept the same four categories of genocide crimes and reduced sentences for confessions and guilty pleas (MINIJUST, 2001: arts. 51, 56, 68-71). See p. 151, n. 45 for full definitions of genocide crimes found in the 1996 Law.

\textsuperscript{15} The 2004 Gacaca Law collapsed categories 2 and 3 of the 1996 Genocide Law into one category, known as category 2. Category 3 crimes are now categorised as offences against property. The Sector-level gacaca courts try category 2 defendants while the Cell-level courts have jurisdiction to try category 3 (accused of offences against property) (MINIJUST, 2004: arts. 41-42, 51).

\textsuperscript{16} The government now expects gacaca trials to end in June 2009 (Hirondelle, 19 January 2009; Rwanda News Agency, 30 December 2008).

\textsuperscript{17} During the pretrial information-gathering phase, judges work with local government officials and government prosecutors to compile local histories of the genocide. Based on the available evidence, judges then categorise the accused, and the dossier is sent to the appropriate jurisdiction for trial. The national courts try category 1 cases. Initially, the national courts meted out the death penalty. The government revoked these provisions of its penal code in mid-2007 (Amnesty International, 2 August 2007). The maximum sentence for category 1 accused is now life in prison while the gacaca courts have a maximum sentence of 30 years. Sentences in both the national courts and the gacaca courts can be reduced if the accused confesses under the guilty plea and confession mechanism of the 1996 Organic Law on Genocide (MINIJUST, 1996 and 2004).
2006). Each district level office is linked with other government offices, including the Prosecutor’s office, the prison, the relevant line ministries and with the central coordinating office in Kigali (NSGJ/ASF, 2002: 3-5). The NSGJ also have the requisite legal authority to monitor and advise the gacaca courts, including oversight of the election process of judges, as well as the ability to intervene at the local level when judges “are not in control of the proceedings” (interview with local NSGJ official, 2006).18 NSGJ staff at the lower levels of the bureaucracy must remain abreast of activities at the level of the Cell and Sector and report these to authorities at the provincial and national level. They must also complete weekly and monthly reports for transmission to authorities at MINJUST (NSGJ, 2004: 7).19

Local NSGJ staff also work with senior government officials from the Ministry of Justice and NSGJ in Kigali to “sensitise the population” and to ensure that nyumbakumi (responsible for ten houses) – the lowest administrative official – assist gacaca judges to investigate the involvement, or not, of individuals in committing acts of genocide in 1994 (interview, local NSGJ official, 2006).20 Sensitisation campaigns target rural populations to encourage people to participate out of self-interest and in the interest of national unity and reconciliation. This quote from a local official reveals the extent to which the full participation of the population is also required: “As for you saying you will not forgive

18 A PRI reports questions the autonomy of the judges from government interference, noting that local officials at the Cell and Sector levels nominate judges for election, and that many of the judges already held positions within the local administration before their nomination (PRI, July-Dec 2001: 30-31).

19 This is the ideal. In practice, there are significant gaps in the reporting, with a variety of structural and logistical challenges keeping officers from their reporting duties. Rain is the most frequently cited cause of cancelled gacaca sessions as the tribunals are held in the open air. Fuel shortages for lack of budget and sheer distances between the courts in some areas also play a role (fieldnotes, 2006).

20 Waldorf notes that the participation of nyumbakumi in establishing lists of victims, property damage and suspects is not authorised by the gacaca law. He writes, “This practice made gacaca less participatory and more susceptible to corruption, while also reinforcing the power of state representatives at the expense of gacaca judges and local communities” (Waldorf, 2006: 51, n. 275).
him or that you will not do this or that, that is very bad. Whether you like it or not, that is the law” (quoted in PRI, Apr-June 2002: 23). Mass participation is crucial to the success of the Rwandan state in generating the image of national unity and reconciliation: Génocidaires must provide truthful information about what they and their accomplices did during the genocide or go to prison for a sentence of at least 15 years. Before any truth-telling takes place, a panel of nine judges (inyangamugayo) has already amassed a dossier of evidence against which the truth is adjudicated.21 Witnesses corroborate, revise or reject the evidence presented by the inyangamugayo or the testimony of survivors and/or génocidaires. Citizen spectators observe the proceedings and their en masse presence adds an air of credibility and legitimacy to the proceedings as it shows external observers (i.e., Westerners) that the government at least tries to treat its citizens fairly in the pursuit of justice for crimes committed during the genocide. The performance of survivors is critical to the spectacle, acting both as accusers and, once the truth has been established, as magnanimous individuals who are able to forgive. Tutsi survivors bear the brunt of the burden of providing the truthful record of how the genocide happened, and can be punished if they fail to “tell all of their truth” (interview with local NSGJ official, 2006).22

In practice, however, gacaca courts are a contested and conflicted state space and are characterised by discord and tension between the various actors. Citizen spectators

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21 Officials at the central prosecutor’s office at MINJUST collate and approve all dossiers before the judgement stage of gacaca begins.

22 Article 29 of 2004 Gacaca Law states that any person who omits or refuses to testify, “is considered as refusing to testify on what he or she has seen or known, any person who apparently knew something on a given matter denounced by others in his or her presence, without expressing his or her own opinion […]” And: “Is considered as a perjurer, anyone who gives a testimony ascertaining that he or she is telling only the truth and holds evidences for that, takes an oath and signs it; but later on it appears to be false and done on purpose. The perjury is prosecuted during the very hearing of the matter in which the prosecuted person has given the testimony, if it is discovered that the person did it or purpose.”
spoke of the ways in which local authorities, usually one or more of the nyumbakumi, the Cell or Sector coordinators demand individual attendance, with the threat of official sanction. Witness this from a Hutu woman with children:

He came [the Cell coordinator] and he asked me why I didn’t attend the gacaca. He came on a motorcycle so everyone [in the community] knew. I told him because my son is sick and I stayed home with him. He wrote something in his book and said, ‘Next time you have to come. I don’t care the reason’. So I got scared because my son wasn’t sick at all! It was that I had no money to spare for transport but I didn’t tell him because I know that is no excuse. The radio says we have a responsibility to participate. Last time we had a meeting [at the office of the Cell coordinator] the official said that there was no excuse for not participating….

But I didn’t see anything so what can I say? I heard people getting killed but I was in hiding. I mean, I hid when they [the killers] came. Who didn’t? We all hid in those days [during the genocide]. I don’t know who saw what but I say that I saw nothing. I heard the official tell someone whose name I know to kill but I didn’t see it. If he killed, I don’t know. So why go if I have nothing to say and if I have no money. How do I get money to go? I am not a survivor so am not a member of an association; money for school uniforms is now due. Now I have a big headache because he knows I did not go and gacaca is again next week. Next week! And now my neighbours know he [the Cell coordinator] has come so I have to go.

I also fear because if my neighbours find out that I said my son was sick they might use that information to denounce me [to the Cell coordinator]. What will I do then?” (interview with Béatha, a 31-year-old umutindi Hutu widow, 2006).

Béatha’s experience, as a Hutu woman, is emblematic of the stresses and strains that those who, in the eyes of the government, are peripheral to the success of gacaca as a tool to generate national unity and reconciliation. As a Hutu woman, her role in the

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23 Transport from some outlying communities to the Cell or Sector office costs as much as 400frw (CN$0.90) each way. As gacaca is a weekly event, that virtually wipes out the monthly household income for the participation of one individual. Most individuals wake well before dawn to allow sufficient time to walk to gacaca, only to lament having done so because the sessions almost always started late as proceedings could not begin until a quorum of judges and observers were present. In some communities where I observed gacaca, proceedings would begin as much as six hours later than the scheduled 9am start (fieldnotes, 2006).
gacaca is limited since she is not expected to testify (as a Tutsi survivor nor to tell her truth as a génocidaire); instead her role is to act as a citizen spectator, to give the appearance of popular support for the courts. Her words are also symbolic of self-monitoring behaviour that characterises post-genocide processes of justice and reconciliation. In addition to the strain of meeting the official requirements of gacaca, the participant refers to the knowledge that her neighbours may hold about her reason for not attending the gacaca session. Official state-based sanctions (fines, imprisonment) for non-participation matter, but so do the watchful eyes of friends, neighbours, and in some instances, family in assuring the full participation of the population at gacaca. There may indeed be other reasons why Béatha prefers not to attend the weekly gacaca session. She may want to avoid being falsely accused by neighbours, or she may know more than she is willing to share, and does not want to participate to avoid forced contact with her neighbours. The point is that the gacaca process represents for many ordinary Rwandans an oppressive form of state power that forces individuals to participate in ways that are not necessarily in line with their own lived realities.

Key actors in assuring the smooth operation of the gacaca courts are the judges, the inyangamugayo. Judges are officially “elected” by members of the communities they are to serve under local authorities. Judges are constantly balancing their privileged role as elected (although unpaid) officials with the requirements of living as a member of the community they are to serve. Judges have little autonomy when it comes to rendering judgment. Any confusion about the scope of the gacaca law or the relevant procedures is decided upon by a NSGJ official in Kigali. Judges are simply to conduct the gacaca trial

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24 Inyangamugayo are elected at the cell level with community members queuing up behind the individual judge. The public nature of the voting makes it critical for individuals to know and understand who the local authorities want to see elected. Elections are held in the compound of the local government building.
in a fair and impartial way. In theory, ‘fair and impartial’ means that in the course of assessing evidence, weighing individual testimony from survivors or génocidaires, and assuring the procedural integrity of the trial, judges can draw on their own personal experiences and insights for the gacaca process. In practice, it means that judges are under constant surveillance by both local government authorities, as well as by community members, both of whom can report any wrongdoing, real or perceived, to state authorities. The gacaca law itself is also a constraint as judges are duty-bound to respect its rules and regulations at all times, even though training and support in how to do so are minimal. Judges, because of the important role they play in facilitating the smooth operation of the gacaca courts, are expected to spur génocidaires to tell the truth, and also to ensure survivors are able to offer an act of forgiveness. Because of this power, judges are often reminded by the state of their duty to ensure the active participation of the population at gacaca.

Ensuring the active participation of the population is not without its attendant risks. The lament of one male judge is emblematic:

It is a most difficult thing to be a judge. And no one understands. There is no one I can share my difficulties with. I am not a survivor like the other survivors but even they look at me differently. I feel isolated since I became a judge. And because I have a family, I have responsibilities to them. My wife even asked how I could let my family starve when it was time to harvest. But I couldn’t do that work because it [being a judge] takes at least two days a week, sometimes more. […] If I don’t undertake my duties as a judge, I can get into serious problems with [he names the local government official that he reports to]. And I can also get into serious problems with other survivors.

Last year, we acquitted a Hutu who was accused. We didn’t have enough evidence or information to do anything but let him go. So we did. I truly before God I did not think he was guilty. And no one spoke up about his role. It didn’t sound like he did anything. And he was sorry. He fell on the ground [in front of his accuser] and said ‘I’m sorry, I’m sorry, I’m
The survivor accepted and we all felt happy about the power of *gacaca* at that moment. I was proud to be a judge; you know, really proud. Then, the day after, the IBUKA lady requested to see all of us judges. I was in my field trying to feed my family the few beans we had left. She said that the survivors around me [in his community] were so angry with us. Then she raged against me and I felt like I did the best I could in deciding how the accused was telling his truth. I said I was sorry but I don’t think it [the evidence against the accused] was enough. I fear now that I am going to be denounced because I was told [by the other judges] that she [the IBUKA representative] is very powerful with many connections in Kigali…. What if something happens to me? Who will take care of my family? (interview with Didier, a 47-year-old *umukene wifashije* Tutsi survivor and *gacaca* judge, 2006).

Didier’s narrative is reflective of the additional challenges that judges face in the performance of *gacaca*; judges must uphold its rituals while ensuring that their behaviour does not compromise the ability of others to participate. Indeed, the penalties of falling afoul of the post-genocide order of national unity and reconciliation are too high. The most marginal seek to avoid contact with local officials, and other Rwandans. Fear of being ‘denounced’ as well as the threat of being denounced is a common survival strategy under the programme of national unity and reconciliation. It requires both a sense of imagination to craft an appropriate story that the authorities will believe as well as a sense of showmanship to deliver the tale successfully. If poorly rendered, tales of denunciation can result in the shunning or outcasting of the teller by his/her community.

Women are more likely to denounce as the result of the poking and prodding of a male member of her family. For example, male relatives force many Tutsi survivor women to testify in ways that support interests outside that of delivering justice or promoting reconciliation. In one case, the local official, an individual who has business relations with the brother of a Tutsi survivor, instructed her on how to deliver her

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25 IBUKA (Kinyarwanda, to remember) is the umbrella organisation of survivor groups. Each sector has its own representative.
testimony. The accused was detained on allegations of genocide crimes “only” in 2001, which suggests that he was targeted for economic reasons other than his actual involvement in the genocide:

My brother was in business with [the local official]; they knew [the accused] had a house and a good job [as a translator for an international organisation]. [The official] told me to denounce [the accused during testimony]. [The official] said if I didn’t I would end up dead or in prison, even though [X] is my brother! I didn’t know what to do; he is my blood brother but he grew up outside. He wasn’t even here during the war! I denounced him [the accused]. He got life [in prison]. I never saw him before but I denounced him. I am an unmarried woman so I have to do what I am told. What would happen to my children? (interview with Esther, a 40-year-old umukene Tutsi widow, 2006).

Male survivors, as well as Hutu and Twa women, rarely practice denunciation as they are not subject to the same levels of surveillance as are Hutu men. Hutu men are subject to three main forms of surveillance by both officials and other Rwandans: 1) they have been tried and convicted of acts of genocide, either through the modern or gacaca courts and are imprisoned for 25 years to life, in which case, their economic and social networks, particularly those who visit them in prison, are surveilled; 2) they have never been imprisoned for committing acts of genocide but remain under surveillance for any evidence of harbouring genocidal ideologies or of making revisionist/negationist statements about the genocide; and 3) they have been imprisoned on charges of committing acts of genocide and have been released, either through acquittal (domestic courts) or released following judgement at gacaca with some individuals remaining subject to suspicion in their communities, particularly those who are seen “to have it too easy”. At the level of the ordinary rural and peasant Hutu, scenario three is most likely as the other two apply to urban, educated, and well-resourced individuals. For ordinary
Hutu men, the surveillance tends to be from friends and neighbours. Witness this statement:

I returned to [community] after gacaca and I confessed everything I did. I even told them about things some others did because I was told this would help me get home. […] When I got home, my wife and kids were living with a survivor! He wouldn’t let me talk to her but I was her husband! I didn’t know what to do because he was in my house. I had nowhere to go. So I stayed where my parents stayed. Then his relative denounced me! She said I didn’t tell my truth. But I did. I know I did. I did what I said. But I ended up back in prison for life… (interview with Félicien, a 33-year-old imprisoned Hutu man, 2006).

For génocidaires, the challenges and constraints of participating in gacaca are multiple. There are Tutsi women who have testified against their Hutu husbands. There are Hutu who admit to killing in a context of duress by the authorities of the previous regime. There are Hutu who claim innocence despite sometimes overwhelming evidence that they actively participated in the genocide. Hutu who voice concern about the impartiality and fairness of gacaca can be imprisoned for providing false testimony or for harbouring genocide ideology. Hutu who question why members of the RPF who killed civilians during and after the genocide are not being tried in the gacaca courts also run the risk of life in prison, or other fates including forced exile, disappearance or death. That Tutsi might be guilty of serious crimes against Hutu is publicly unimaginable and is something that is rarely discussed among Rwandans in private let alone in a public space like gacaca. Joseph U. looked at me wide-eyed when asked if asked him if he thought the RPF or any other Tutsi had committed any crimes in 1994. He hushed me and said, “Susan! I thought you understood this country. You better just stop talking with questions
like that…”

Many individuals invoked the historical oppression of Hutu by Tutsi and scoffed at the idea that there could be national unity and reconciliation delivered by such a skewed practice as gacaca. Another common theme in the narrative of Hutu adults, men and women, is the idea that gacaca was a pretext to persecute Hutu for the genocide of Tutsi. The remarks of one young man are emblematic:

You know, I don’t think there is an adult Hutu inside this country that doesn’t fear the gacaca. I don’t fear it because I was only four years old at the time of genocide, but my uncles fear it and so does my older brother. And I fear for them because if something happens to them, what will happen to me? I haven’t even finished school yet. How will I make my living? I wouldn’t be surprised if something happened to one of them though…. That is how things work around here. My people don’t know anyone important, so who will stand up for us if something goes wrong at gacaca?

One of my uncle’s friends was denounced [for acts of genocide] but he knows people in Kigali and his wife’s brother is important in our local church [a priest]. He knows people, you know. That and he is already important to the community because his brother [the priest] will protect him. Not because he is religious but because he also knows people. Right after our return [in 1996 in the mass repatriation of Hutu refugees from Zaire by the RPF], he denounced many of us [Hutu]. We don’t know anyone important. For me, gacaca is just a way for the government to put us Hutu in prison, and to make sure we don’t make more genocide for them. It [genocide] could happen because Hutu are no longer welcome here. My uncle says that he thinks even there could be a genocide but the RPF won’t allow it! (conversation with Anselme, the 16-year-old Hutu nephew of Augustin, an umutindi Hutu widower, 2006).

Several participants spoke at length about the onerous demands placed on Hutu for who stand accused before the gacaca courts. Chantal, a Hutu woman who was called to act as a witness but soon found herself in prison accused of acts of genocide, said,

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26 I saw Joseph again about three weeks later when I was walking home from the bank. We agreed to go for a walk in the hills, where he told me that he admired my “bravery” in trying to speak for Hutu and thanked me for asking the question about RPF/Tutsi culpability. He continued, “…be careful with this government; RPF spies are everywhere”.
…and then I got denounced. I mean I am telling the truth and I get denounced from someone in the audience. He said that all Hutu are killers and challenged my version [of events]. I was truly amazed. Really amazed you know. No one, not the judge, not the survivor, no one said anything. Someone said that Hutu are all in it together. I didn’t even know what that person meant when he said that. […] I am innocent but am in prison now. I have no way out… (interview with Chantal, an imprisoned Hutu woman, 2006).

Survivors are just as constrained, if not more so, in their action and speech as génocidaires. The role of survivors in the gacaca process is critical to the promotion of national unity and reconciliation. The deep well of hope and resilience that survivors, particularly female survivors, display on a daily basis is “an inspiration to all Rwandans and evidence that unity is within reach” (interview with NURC official, 2006). Despite an apparent ability to “forgive” spontaneously, a common thread in the narrative of survivors when speaking about gacaca was the constant sense of insecurity they felt. Feelings of insecurity were widespread, particularly with regard to the act of testifying against the accused at a gacaca session and in their daily lives as they came into contact with family, friends and neighbours of the accused. Witness this statement from a female survivor, who was required by the Cell coordinator to testify against the individual accused of killing her entire family,

I had a visit from [the nyumbakumi] who told me that [the accused] had made a statement that he killed my family. I was amazed. It was like God struck me down. How could this be? I was very nervous but also very excited. I wanted to know what happened to my family but not really. I mean I am alone now. I was raped and I know that I will not remarry. I am too old. And by this time even barren. Who would marry me?! So I know that I am alone and I try my best to stay silent so that I can live the rest of my days in peace. I just want peace. I am a member of [survivor’s organization] and they give me some small money and I still have my land. So I was as happy as I could be after genocide.

Then! Then! Then! I am told they found the man who did this to my people. I was horrified. Now I have to relive all of that bad memory. I
know how my people were killed. I was there! I was younger then and was able to run away you know. I just ran into the [banana] grove. Other women talk about how they made efforts to protect their children. Me? I just ran. I guess that means I didn’t love my children as much as those other women. I just didn’t want to confront the man. I really couldn’t remember what he did. I would like to have the remains of my people buried at home, but I would rather stay out of the way of gacaca if I could.

Of course, I could not say no because it is my duty to forgive. So he [the accused] stood up and I recognised him as the husband of my sister! It was not the man I thought it was at all. No! I just broke down then. I just stopped moving and I don’t think I have moved since. This is why I am not afraid to speak to you because my life is over. I don’t know why they call us ‘survivors’. How can I get peace like this? Really. I wish I never learned the “truth” as the gacaca says it is. I had some peace, as much peace as an old woman like me can have and now I am supposed to live with his news? I wish I never was told to go to gacaca that day. I hardly sleep or eat since…. Participating comes with nothing for nothing. Maybe I would accept more easily if I could get some kind of settlement27 (interview with Jeanne, a 47-year-old umutindi Tutsi widow, 2006).

Equally, non-Tutsi women thought of themselves as survivors but were unable to be recognized as such. For example, Hutu women bristle at the thought that they are not also considered survivors. To wit,

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27 Jeanne is referring to the absence of reparations from the government for Tutsi survivors of the genocide when she speaks of “some kind of settlement”. Most survivors are “desperately poor” and want reparations (Longman and Rutagengwa, 2004: 173; see also Aghion, 2004 and Rombouts, 2006). The government has yet to provide any meaningful form of reparation to survivors despite the creation of the Fonds d’Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide (FARG) in 1998. Both the 1996 Genocide Law and the 2004 Gacaca Law provide for a compensation fund. Both the national courts and the gacaca courts have awarded reparations to individual survivors, but these judgements have not been enforced “because the convicted genocidaires are indigent” (Waldorf, 2006: 57). The government legislated itself immunity, arguing that it meets its responsibilities to survivors through its 5% budgetary allocation to FARG, which is constitutionally mandated according to article 12(1) of Law n.o. 02/98 of 22/01/1998 establishing a National Assistance Fund for Needy Victims of the Genocide and Massacres Committed in Rwanda between 1 October, 1990 and December 31, 1994 (hereinafter FARG Law). FARG cannot be used to pay any awards ordered by the national or gacaca courts. The FARG law also requires that every Rwandan over the age of 18 must make a yearly contribution of 100 Frw. (CN$0.22), while corporate entities must make a monthly contribution of 10,000Frw. (CN$22) to the Fund. Companies have been reluctant to pay, alleging that the Fund is mismanaged. Human Rights Watch (2003b) confirms that while the FARG defines “survivor” broadly to include Hutu and Twa, in practice it provides financial support only to Tutsi, which may exacerbate the very ethnic divide that the programme of national unity and reconciliation seeks to undo (see also Rwanda News Agency, 8 January 2009).
I was married to a Tutsi man. He died trying to save me and the children. We all survived but one. I was targeted because my kids are Tutsi because their father is Tutsi. I mean how can I not be considered a ‘survivor’. The authorities say it is because I am a Hutu. But my people [male members of her family] are gone; who cares for me? And I have these kids to feed, to send to school” (interview with Aurelia, a 39-year-old umukene Hutu widow, 2006).

Adult male survivors felt unwilling to forgive in any sincere way as many reported feeling culturally bound to re-constitute their family life as husband and head-of-household as quickly as possible. Participation in gacaca had the possible effect of upending the relative stability and peace they had been able to re-capture in their private lives. Emmanuel’s words are representative,

“I remarried as soon as she [the new wife] said yes. She is also a [Tutsi] survivor but is deeply traumatised. She needs a lot of support. So I care for her and our home. We have no children because she is unable to carry any since she was damaged [by rape]. But I don’t care. Together, we are a family. I fear gacaca because what if someone says something to trigger her trauma? What if someone accuses me of being an accomplice? I am a man who survived the genocide. For some people, that means I am an accomplice of the génocidaires! If I was a ‘real’ Tutsi, I would be dead right now! The people who say that are Hutu but they are powerful. One of them even drives a taxi. How can I stand [and testify] before such people if they were to ask me to…?” (interview with Emmanuel, a 27-year-old umukene Tutsi survivor, 2006).

This brief survey of individual experiences with the gacaca process from a variety of subject positions reveals the climate of fear as well as the distrust of the government that the courts have created in the lives of many ordinary Rwandans. Individual action before the gacaca courts is a performance that does not constitute or even indicate the presence of actual unity and reconciliation in the daily lives of most people. Instead, individual performances of gacaca highlight the extent to which the programme of national unity and reconciliation creates an atmosphere of fear and distrust in relation to the RPF-led government. Instead of creating “one Rwanda for all Rwandans”, which is
the stated goal of the programme of national unity and reconciliation (discussed in Chapter Six), *gacaca* is a mechanism of state power that helps the government consolidate its hold over the country, albeit in a highly coercive and therefore unstable manner. In instrumentalising the *gacaca* courts and individual performances of *gacaca*, the government places the responsibility of appearing to embrace the demands of the programme of national unity and reconciliation squarely on the shoulders of ordinary Rwandans. The government has also carefully crafted a state space that makes individual non-compliance difficult. This does not mean that some ordinary Rwandans do not resort to creative and subtle forms of everyday resistance to make their lives more sustainable; instead, it means that they need to be strategic in enacting their resistance. This is something that Tutsi survivors do most often as key actors in the *gacaca* process, and their everyday acts of resistance express their dissatisfaction with the post-genocide policies of the RPF. It is to their everyday acts of resistance that we now turn.

**Everyday Acts of Resistance to Gacaca**

In carefully scripting individual performances before the *gacaca* courts, and in providing repressive sanctions for those who choose to transgress the boundaries of their scripted role, the government does more than affirm its authoritarian tendencies. It also highlights the extent to which individuals are “severely constrained in their ability to openly discuss the social and political situation in Rwanda” (Longman and Rutagengwa, 2004: 176). This last section draws on the acts of everyday resistance of Tutsi survivors to illustrate the subtle, tactical and non-confrontational ways in which some ordinary Rwandans are able to express their discontent with the post-genocide policies of the RPF. Specifically, the section examines the two common critiques that many ordinary
Rwandans make to show their opposition and express their indignation for the RPF-led government: 1) they strategically speak out against RPF excesses, and 2) they indirectly critique the government in voicing the hardships that compliance with new post-genocide policies have created in their everyday lives.

*Speaking Against RPF Excesses*

For many ordinary Rwandans, the *gacaca* courts represent an opportunity to subtly speak out against RPF excesses. Their goal is not to overthrow the *gacaca* court system or even actively subvert its demands; instead, their everyday acts of resistance are an attempt to live within their own truth – to have their lived experiences of violence during and after the genocide acknowledged and respected by local authorities, not crafted for them as they are by the programme of national unity and reconciliation and implemented by disrespectful local officials. As we saw in the last section, participants to the *gacaca* process are expected to act according to script in ways that accord with the idea, practices and culture of the post-genocide Rwandan state. The RPF presents the appearance of individual compliance to the *gacaca* process as reality, and by scripting the ways in which individuals must participate in *gacaca* as a key mechanism of the programme of national unity and reconciliation.

In practice, however, some ordinary Rwandans strategically critique the excesses of the RPF in ways that seek to restore their individual dignity. For example, a judge in one of the communities where I regularly observed *gacaca* would start proceedings with a brief comment. He sometimes criticised the continued disappearances of residents in his community. He would not look directly into the audience before him or at the observers who are always seated to the side of the judges’ bench; instead he would stand
up and look up towards the sky to lament the disappearances, implying that they were made by the government, but offering no firm statement of accusation. At another trial, a génocidaire stood before the judges’ bench, awaiting sentencing after proceedings had finished. He began to speak, to no one in particular, about the poor living conditions in prison and how the “new government” was “getting rid of all Hutu”. Some in the audience applauded. He was then sentenced to 30 years in prison. It was not clear if this was because of the available evidence (many accused at that particular session received the maximum sentence of 30 years) or because he had spoken out. The government observer then got up and reminded the audience of their duty to “honour the truth”. He continued, “If someone is sentenced, he is no longer part of society. He is not to be applauded” (fieldnotes, 2006).

Tutsi survivors, as individuals who regularly stand before the bench of judges, are best positioned to speak out about RPF excesses and do so in ways that are aimed at regaining personal dignity while offering a subtle critique of the excesses of local government officials.28 Vianney offered this insight:

I mean they [local officials] do what they do because they must react to what Kigali tells them to do, but they do it in ways that are offensive to us and how we [peasants] live our lives. We must be very smart about how we protest their treatment of us. All they care about is power and money. We [peasants] know that if you have power and money, you can do more, enjoy life more.

Of course, for our [local] officials, they do well anyway because very few of them experienced genocide. They can be very cold to our experiences of surviving the genocide, which makes gacaca more difficult to

28 Gacaca judges are required to hear all individuals who ask to speak before the courts. Tutsi survivors are the backbone of the gacaca process since its legitimacy is largely contingent on their ability and willingness to speak about what they saw during the 1994 genocide. Many Rwandans told me that they did not see much because they were hiding to save themselves. This may or may not be true, as the statement may be driven by a wish to avoid testifying.
experience because they have no feelings for our pain. Reconciliation means respecting officials, not making amends in your heart. At least I am not a former Hutu. I can act out and if they catch me, I will just say I am having trauma. I notice that when survivors bring up their trauma, the officials sometimes get very uncomfortable, which means it is probably a good way to avoid their punishments (interview with Vianney, a 25-year-old umukene Tutsi survivor, 2006).

Vianney’s narrative illustrates the extent to which he had thought through and considered carefully what acts of resistance he might possibly attempt, and how. As a Tutsi survivor, he testified several times at gacaca, and quickly realised that when he speaks “before the judges, everyone is listening to me. In those moments, I have some possibility to do something clever. I can plead trauma if they treat me too harshly”. So Vianney has considered how he would express his act of everyday resistance and assessed its risks. He believes if he gets caught, he will invoke his diagnosis as a survivor who is in government-sponsored treatment for trauma. Vianney has concluded that any “small protest” he makes before the gacaca courts must be carefully considered if it is to accomplish his goal of regaining his dignity and restoring his pride. Indeed, Vianney understands that before the gacaca courts, he had an opportunity to exploit his role as a traumatised survivor who testified before the bench of judges, and in front of members of his community. It is also clear that such an opportunity required subtle subterfuge. His everyday act of resistance was strategically directed at what he perceived to be the excesses of the RPF:

At the moment of testifying, I stand up and just begin to talk. Talking about how hard it is since the genocide. How I have no prospects for a wife. How I will never get someone to take care of me and that I will die lonely. How I have no land because that which belonged to my family was redistributed [under the 2000 land policy]. Am I not the head of a household? I am not the sole living person in my family? How can they take my land? True, I care for no orphans but still, am I not a real survivor?
When I see that the observers are not really paying attention or have decided they don’t care about me, and that the President [of the gacaca court] has decided to let me speak, I go on to say, I have these problems because of the way that government is now working. They say democracy means peace. But I have no peace, and I can’t live my life. If the judge looks at me in an unusual way, I stop. But if I feel like I can continue, I turn away [from the judges’ bench] and turn out to the audience to see how they are reacting. Some brave souls will applaud or give a laugh to show how they support me.

Up until now, the observers have yet to punish me, and the judge continues to allow me to speak like this. I am known around [his community] as someone who speaks his truth. It doesn’t change my life very much; I am still poor and alone. But it somehow makes this life more bearable. It is also that I feel more protected because I am voicing what others will not say. What I say at gacaca gives me a reputation as ibyihebe [fearless], and I feel respected by the elders [in his community]. They leave me alone, which is what I want because then I can go to gacaca, say a few words [against the local authorities and government observer], and make a small protest without getting in much trouble. My neighbours can see I know what I am doing because I’ve yet to go to cachot [detention], or even get a visit [from the local official].

Vianney’s seemingly open act of defiance of his scripted role as a survivor of the genocide who must tell his truth reveals more than just his disrespect for the demands of the programme of national unity and reconciliation and the local officials who implement it. His actions also point to the subtle and creative ways in which he tries to restore his self-respect and which assert his agency. Through repeated participation as well as careful analysis of the atmosphere and mood of different actors – judges, local officials, government observers, citizen spectators – to the gacaca process on any given day, Vianney’s everyday act of resistance demonstrates first his dissatisfaction with the process. His speaking out also wins him favour in his community as someone who is able and willing to speak out against government. What specific excesses he speaks against are contingent on the atmosphere at gacaca on the day in question. On different
occasions, Vianney and other Tutsi survivors like him speak against the luxuries their local officials enjoy: their ability to afford to go to the local bar most evenings, as well as their “fancy clothes and covered shoes”; their access to land and other perks of RPF membership, notably house servants and private vehicles which “we peasants will never have”; their ability to “move around and have the means to do what they want while we basically starve”.

Vianney’s act of everyday resistance also highlights the gap that local authorities and government observers are supposed to mitigate, between the appearance of broad-based and willing participation at gacaca and the actual ability of the government to promote an internalised and sincere belief in the ability of the gacaca courts to promote justice and reconciliation. The power of the state, through local officials who carry out its sanctions, seeks to eliminate individual attempts to subvert the demands of the programme of national unity and reconciliation. The programme, as shown in the last section, requires conformity and discipline – ordinary Rwandans must not step beyond their scripted role. Vianney’s carefully constructed statements of dissent illustrate more than the lack of legitimacy that the courts enjoy among ordinary Rwandans; they also highlight the yawning abyss between the aims of the programme of national unity and reconciliation and the aims of everyday life. Vianney and others like him who decide to speak out take great risks, albeit calculated ones, in efforts to make their lives more bearable. Everyday acts of resistance in front of the gacaca courts also demonstrate that some ordinary Rwandans, despite the demands and concomitant sanctions of the programme of national unity and reconciliation, strive to think independently and express their politics as part of their attempts to live within their truth.
Protesting Hardship

The *gacaca* courts are also a site for ordinary Rwandans to protest the economic strains of complying with the new post-genocide policies of the government. In addition to the difficulties of complying with the demands of participating in social and political life, the post-genocide government has instituted ambitious policies designed to re-engineer rural society, most notably land and agricultural policy. There is a sizeable disconnect between government policy and the lived realities of peasant Rwandans. Rwanda’s post-genocide leadership places the responsibility for one’s well being on citizens themselves in proclaiming that “good citizens work hard, and working hard means following government directives. Our job is to work with peasants to make sure they work to overcome their poverty” (interview with MINALOC official, 2006).

Poverty, according to the post-genocide government, is “partly due to the ‘wrong peasant mentality’” (Ansoms, 2009: 298).

Espérance, a 37-year-old *umukene* Tutsi survivor, sums up the impact of this “wrong mentality” on her daily life:

Being “good” and “productive” often means I go to sleep hungry. At least I am mostly alone. But for some [neighbours] it is too much to bear. They struggle even more than me, and I struggle a lot. At least I benefit from membership [in a local survivors’ group]. There I can join with others and we can strategise how to be “good”; for others [non-members], their chances are few. I tell you, if they gave food at *gacaca*, everyone would go!

Espérance’s narrative highlights the primary source of tension for many ordinary Rwandans – the need to participate fully at *gacaca* while fulfilling the demands of being a “good” and “productive” citizen without the resources to do so. The government has instituted significant changes to the peasant way of life through its drive to modernise
Rwanda’s agricultural sector, with a view to reducing the number of households that rely on subsistence farming for their livelihoods without offering another form of income and without consideration of the impact of new institutional arrangements on peasant farmers and other unskilled labourers (MINECOFIN, 2000: 17). With little opportunity to protest government actions to reduce the proportion of the population that relies on subsistence agriculture, ordinary Rwandans like Espérance use the gacaca courts to subtly and strategically show their disapproval of such policies:

I really can only speak about land policy when there are no military observers. They come with weapons and they are not afraid to use them. So if they are there, I say nothing. Land is very contentious because the government is trying to get us to modernise and to produce “strategically”. If only modernisation could benefit us [peasants]…. It does not, so speaking out needs to be done very carefully. Me, I am alone, and I am old, too old to remarry. So I speak out to get some some respect and if I am lucky, I will get some peace and quiet. I have thought about it and am prepared to suffer the consequences. I have nothing left to lose.

Espérance’s narrative illustrates more than the extent to which she has considered the room she has to manoeuvre when testifying before the gacaca courts, and how this room in turn shapes what she hopes her speaking out will accomplish; her ultimate goal is to gain “some peace and quiet”, by which she means being left alone to cultivate her land in her own way, not according to government dictates. It also illustrates the extent to which she has carefully considered how she can behave before the gacaca courts in ways that protest against the land and agricultural policies – this is her everyday act of resistance and it is grounded in both her political acumen and her recognition by the government as a Tutsi survivor. As a survivor, she is expected to testify before the

29 The impact of the drive to modernise on ordinary Rwandans was discussed at pp. 204-205. See also Ansoms, 2009, Burnet, 2007; and, Ingelaere, 2007b.
*gacaca* courts, and she does so regularly. She does not worry about getting caught because she is “alone and old, too old to remarry”. Espérance’s narrative illustrates that she seeks to limit the ways in which the rules and regulations of the post-genocide government enter her life, while attempting to make life more liveable in cautiously critiquing government efforts to modernise her life:

I only decide to speak out or not that [particular] day. I never make a clear statement that I disagree with [the policies of] this government. Sometimes I am too weak to go to *gacaca*; maybe I am sick. Other times, I am thinking in my head for days before about what I might say. Then I arrive [at *gacaca*] and I lose my strength to do it. Once militaries came up over the hill in a most unexpected way. We all froze. I testified that day, but what I said was mostly lies. I was too scared to tell the truth. Speaking lies is less risky than being truthful. The government likes to hear our lies because they think it’s our truth.

When I do speak out, it is important to speak in ways that are not obviously wrong. I would never say “this policy is useless”. That would get me in big trouble, probably in *cachot* [detention]. So, I plan how I will make my protest. If something feels wrong, I don’t react. For example, if the prisoner is the relative [of friend or member of the co-operative] I will speak but in ways that make him look innocent, if even it really looks like he is not.

So when I get the chance, I talk about how hard we [peasants] work to survive. I mean we are all survivors of the genocide. Even some former Hutu! I try to show how we are not lazy. I say, “I wake up early to harvest so we can come to *gacaca* on time”. I say, “I work hard to produce enough to share with others”. I once said “I can’t eat flowers so why would I tear out my banana trees”. That one got me in trouble when [the local official] came to tell me that if I don’t produce what is expected they will take my land and then I will have to work for someone whose land is working for the nation. So I

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30 Government directives require that peasants adopt monocropping, which rarely provides enough for families to meet their basic nutritional needs. The government, through local officials, requires that peasants plant cash crops like pineapples, coffee or flowers (fieldnotes, 2006).

31 When asked how she reacted to the visit of her local official, Espérance responded, “I got nervous. I stayed away from *gacaca* for two weeks. I knew I could do that successfully without raising the attention of the court. I started going again but did not speak out for a long while”. 

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learned that it is important not to say too much. I just want to say that forced cultivation is not going to work.32

Espérance’s narrative demonstrates the subtleties in her act of everyday resistance. Nowhere does she openly criticise government policy. She understands that the associated risks are too high. Instead, she prudently makes her criticism in ways that express her discontent over the new land and agriculture policy. She prudently waits for the appropriate time to voice her discontent. Espérance assesses both her mood and the general atmosphere before speaking, and she considers other actors who will participate or observe the gacaca proceedings. She is also careful to speak when military observers are not present, as she appreciates the added difficulty that their presence brings.

Espérance’s everyday act of resistance demonstrates the hardships that most ordinary Rwandans experience as a result of the new rules and regulations that have been imposed since the 1994 genocide. It also illustrates the ways in which some ordinary Rwandans seek to strategically confront the post-genocide government.

Ordinary Rwandans like Espérance understand that local officials perceive their overstepping their scripted role as an attack on the government. The programme itself, as a mechanism of state power, is structured in such a way that it leaves nothing to chance. The task of local officials is to ensure the integrity of the programme; ordinary Rwandans are expected to conform to its demands. Any action that ordinary Rwandans take to express their dissatisfaction with the policies of the post-genocide government could be perceived as an attack on the programme of national unity and reconciliation, which

32 She continued, “The right crops are the ones that provide enough, you know, sweet potatoes, groundnuts, bananas. Trying to grow the right crops means we are forced to grow on every possible piece of land. Even I grow beans in the small bit of dry land under my window. It is hard because the water supply is far. If the local official or one of his boys sees me carrying water, he can ask questions about why I need so much water. He can even fine me for using too much water...”
shapes individual options to resist. A focus on the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans also illustrates how the ordinary Rwandans that I consulted hardly believe in and support the policies of the government. Instead, they reveal both the power of the programme of national unity and reconciliation to shape how individuals are forced to participate in state spaces like the gacaca courts, as well as the limitations of the programme in actually commanding a meaningful belief in its ability to make the lives of ordinary Rwandans more bearable since the genocide.

**Conclusions**

This chapter focused on the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans to illustrate how the requirements of participating at gacaca represent a source of insecurity and fear in their everyday lives. It also showed that some individuals, particularly Tutsi survivors, are able to express their dissatisfaction with the post-genocide regime and its policies by examining their everyday acts of resistance before the gacaca courts. Specifically, the chapter demonstrated how the programme of national unity and reconciliation seeks to eliminate individual expressions of non-conformity to its demands. Instead of accepting wholesale the requirements of the programme, some ordinary Rwandans are creatively resisting its demands through subtle and thoughtful acts of everyday resistance. The evidence was largely drawn from the acts of resistance of Tutsi survivors as they are the individuals with the most latitude to speak out while providing evidence against génocidaires during the gacaca trials.

The chapter also illustrates the mixture of conformity and discipline that is needed to successfully render an act of everyday resistance. Both Vianney and Espérance understand the extent to which the gacaca courts represent a form of state control in their
everyday lives – they recognise the continuous threat of sanction and modify their behaviour accordingly. Their everyday acts of resistance are, as a matter of necessity, subtle and non-confrontational. The goal is not to overthrow the state or even to alter their participation at gacaca; instead, they seek to make their lives more sustainable in limiting their contact with local officials. The decision-making process about whether or not to speak out at gacaca is carefully strategised and cautiously crafted so as not to raise the suspicion of local government authorities and government observers to the gacaca process. Their everyday acts of resistance illustrate that the courts are also a site of national unity and reconciliation but rather are another mechanism of state power that helps the government maintain its grip on state power. A focus on the everyday acts of resistance of the 37 ordinary Rwandans that participated in my research also indicate the extent to which the demands of the programme conflict with the aims of their daily lives – to live peacefully away from the watchful eye of local officials who do the bidding of the state in the name of national unity and reconciliation.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

This dissertation is a political ethnography of state-society relations in post-genocide Rwanda. It challenges much of the conventional post-genocide literature, most of which focuses on the behaviour and practices of urban élites, provides a top-down perspective on the socio-political climate in contemporary Rwandan and treats the RPF regime as a unitary actor in its efforts to promote “one Rwanda for all Rwandans” in the name of national unity and reconciliation (Chapter One). It analysed the programme of national unity and reconciliation and examined in detail the disciplinary mechanisms deployed by the RPF to generate compliance with its demands while seeking to eliminate possible expressions of non-conformity among Rwandans, élites and ordinary folk alike (Chapters Three, Four and Five). It then analysed the everyday acts of resistance of 37 ordinary peasant people resident in southern Rwanda to demonstrate the extent to which state-led and top-down reconciliation processes of national unity and reconciliation are an oppressive form of state power in their everyday lives (Chapters Six and Seven).

Specifically, the dissertation employed the concept of everyday resistance to identify and analyse the power relations between ordinary people and the Rwandan state, to show how individuals are positioned in relation to state power, and how this positioning affects their life chances in the post-genocide order.

The methodology aims to portray the 37 ordinary Rwandans from southern Rwanda who participated in the research as “knowers” of their own life stories, rather than building on existing portrayals of peasant Rwandans as powerless and passive victims (Chapter Two). Life history interviews formed the backbone of the research material. I triangulated the evidence gathered through life history interviewing with the
data gained through semi-structured interviews with government élites, a detailed
deconstruction of the structural and discursive elements of the programme of national
unity and reconciliation along with careful analysis of its historical bases, and participant
observation. The methodology allowed for analysis of the post-genocide political order
from the perspective of ordinary Rwandans who occupy the lowest-rungs of the country’s
socio-economic hierarchy. The purpose was to privilege their locally situated knowledge
by employing methodological tools that uncover, rather than presuppose, individuals’
motivations and behaviours.

In focusing on the everyday interactions of ordinary peasant Rwandans with the
programme of national unity and reconciliation, six key findings emerge. First, the
programme constitutes a mechanism of state power that presents a self-serving version of
history and manipulates the language of ethnicity to justify and maintain policies of
exclusion in much the same way as previous regimes in Rwanda have done. According
to the official version of Rwandan history found in the programme of national unity and
reconciliation, ultimate blame for the 1994 genocide lies with Rwanda’s colonial powers,
who instituted divide-and-rule policies that made all Hutu hate all Tutsi. The programme
aims to undo the effects of colonial rule in creating “one Rwanda for all Rwandans”
(Office of the President, 1999a). The government exhorts Rwandans to no longer see
themselves as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, because ethnicity is a fiction that was created by
Rwanda’s colonisers. For peace and security to prevail, the programme asserts that an
imagined and romanticised ethnic unity that Rwanda enjoyed prior to the arrival of the
Europeans must be reasserted and taught to all Rwandans.
Careful analysis of the historical record finds that violence in Rwanda, whether that of the 1994 genocide, the 1959 social revolution, or during colonial times, is part of everyday life for many ordinary peasant Rwandans; however, it has not been driven by atavistic tensions between Hutu and Tutsi. Instead, history shows that the political élites have strategically manipulated ethnic identity to justify resorting to violence. Elites have consistently presented violence as the result of ethnic hatred, when in fact the motivations of its organisers and sponsors have invoked an alleged age-old ethnic animosity to seize, gain or consolidate power. For most ordinary Rwandans, ethnicity actually plays only a minor role in their daily lives; instead, their everyday realities are shaped by their socio-economic position. The tactics of ethnic control found in the programme of national unity and reconciliation differs from those of previous regimes in that they de-emphasise rather than emphasise individual ethnic identities to justify the programme’s policies of exclusion.

Second, the programme of national unity and reconciliation polices the boundaries of accepted public speech about the causes and consequences of the 1994 genocide in ways that reify and reinforce the hero status of the RPF in stopping it. Rwandans – élites and ordinary folk alike – can only speak of being “Rwandan” in state-sanctioned settings – for example, in ingando re-education camps, at gacaca justice trials and during genocide mourning week. And yet this reality is starkly contradicted by the fact that the roles played in state-sanctioned spaces and events are determined by ethnic status. There has been no official recognition of different lived experiences of the 1994 genocide beyond the fact that only Tutsi were victims of violence during the genocide and that only Hutu killed. The RPF also does not allow for public discussion of violence
that individual Rwandans experienced before and after the genocide, particularly the violence they experienced at the hands of RPF soldiers.

Instead, the post-genocide government uses the apparatus of the state to ensure that ordinary Rwandans respect the rules of who can speak about their experiences of the genocide, and how they do so, through its programme of national unity and reconciliation. From the perspective of many ordinary Rwandans, the official version of how the genocide happened found in the programme of national unity and reconciliation does not recognise the continuum of everyday violence that Rwandans of all ethnicities experienced, albeit to varying degrees of intensity, before, during and after the genocide.

The research finds that the programme of national unity and reconciliation is a mechanism of state power that reinforces the power of the RPF rather than alleviating the deep-rooted feelings of fear, anger and despair as they struggle to rebuild their lives and reconcile with friends, neighbours and in some cases, family.

Third, in the name of national unity and reconciliation, the RPF continues to tighten its control over the socio-political landscape. Since taking power after it effectively stopped the genocide in July 1994, the RPF has aggressively sought to consolidate it grip on state power. The RPF uses its version of how the genocide happened to exclude its political opponents, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa alike, from education, higher status jobs and positions of responsibility in the bureaucracy. All Rwandans, élites and ordinary folk alike, are careful about how and whether they speak about life since the genocide. For many ordinary Rwandans, the programme of national unity and reconciliation means a loss of security and an increased sense of fear as the programme tries to eliminate ethnic difference as the basis of present and future peace and security.
The RPF considers unscripted comments as suspect and interprets them as signs of disobedience. In this way, the power of the programme of national unity and reconciliation lies in its ability to orchestrate obedience, but also to shape discussion about everyday life before, during and after the genocide. For example, the programme of national unity and reconciliation has labelled adult male Hutu as génocidaires who are either guilty of acts of genocide, or who must be closely watched for evidence that they harbour genocidal ideologies. In identifying all adult male Hutu as potential génocidaires, the programme positions them as potential enemies of the state, which in turn leads to the dissemination of credible threats of punishment – such as loss of socio-economic status, harassment, imprisonment, disappearance or perhaps even death. In this way, all adult male Hutu become subjects of suspicion and second class-citizens as probable génocidaires.

Fourth, most ordinary Rwandans resident in the south recognise that the programme of national unity and reconciliation goes against their interests as peasants who occupy the lowest rungs of the socio-economic hierarchy. They therefore seek to resist, subtly and indirectly, its many demands. For many ordinary Rwandans, the programme represents a double bind in that they consider the various mechanisms of the programme itself unjust and illegitimate as its aims do not accord with the exigencies of everyday rural life. For example, local officials and other state agents force ordinary Rwandans to “perform” reconciliation in state-sponsored spaces, such as the gacaca courts or during national mourning week activities. Individuals who do not conform to the demands of the programme of national unity and reconciliation can be harassed.

1 Indeed, this finding likely applies to other actors in post-genocide Rwanda. Further research is needed on how the programme of national unity and reconciliation plays out in the lives of, for example, “rich” peasants and returnees, both anglophone and francophone.
intimidated, imprisoned, disappeared or even killed. Any action (or inaction) that leads
some ordinary Rwandans, notably those known as abasazi (fearless), to step outside their
scripted role is perceived as an attack on the programme of national unity and
reconciliation. Many ordinary Rwandans understand that the programme is designed to
give the appearance of peace and security in ways that reinforce the authority of local
officials; most of the 37 ordinary Rwandans I consulted consider the directives of the
programme to be a burden in their daily efforts to rebuild their lives and livelihoods.

Fifth, many ordinary Rwandans see the ways in which the local authorities
implement the programme as an affront to their everyday life since the genocide. This
marks a dramatic departure from the interactions of ordinary people with the local
officials that mediated their relations with the central government authorities before the
genocide. The Habyarimana regime (1973-1994) enjoyed considerable support among
ordinary peasant Rwandans – Hutu and Tutsi alike – who felt that its development
policies served their interests, which in turn gave the regime greater legitimacy at the
grassroots that the programme of national unity and reconciliation currently enjoys. The
implementation process of the various aspects of the programme of national unity and
reconciliation and the strategic ways in which ordinary Rwandans seek to resist its many
demands demonstrate more than its unpopularity among rural people. It also highlights
that many ordinary Rwandans resent the RPF regime’s lack of concern with protecting
rural livelihoods. Thus, for many ordinary Rwandans, the programme of national unity
and reconciliation is the product of an illegitimate regime, an opinion that contrasts

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2 This is not to suggest that there was no rural discontent under Habyarimana. It is only to highlight that
the programme of national unity and reconciliation is a different form of state power because of the role of
local officials in implementing its many demands.
considerably with élite claims of Rwanda as a “nation rehabilitated” and one that has “put the legacy of the genocide behind it” (ORTPN, 2004: 4).

Sixth, many ordinary Rwandans attribute the illegitimacy of the programme of national unity and reconciliation to the mediating role that local officials play in its implementation. Before the genocide, everyday interactions with local officials were not necessarily positive; in many ways the relationship between ordinary Rwandans at the lower levels of the socio-economic hierarchy and their local officials was as coercive as are peasant/state relations since the genocide. What differs is that the local officials’ unpopularity among ordinary Rwandans before the genocide was mitigated by the latter’s overall positive opinion of the Habyarimana regime and its development policies – the local level of the state was unpopular while the centre was generally quite popular, among Hutu and Tutsi alike. This may appear counter-intuitive, given the authoritarian tendencies of the regime and the eventual descent to genocide. Ironically, the Habyarimana regime’s popular legitimacy among the grassroots actually helped make the genocide possible. Ordinary Hutu killed their Tutsi friends, neighbours and family members because the order to kill came from local government officials whose authority was backed by the coercive power of the state that was rooted in Habyarimana’s credibility in the countryside.

Under the programme of national unity and reconciliation, local officials are the intermediaries responsible for implementing the policies of an unpopular central authority, the RPF. The ordinary Rwandans resident in southern Rwanda that I consulted do not view the RPF regime as a possible source of remedy for their grievances against the excesses of elected local officials and appointed technocrats, who in turn are
responsible to Kigali for effectively and efficiently implementing government policy. This finding also challenges the RPF’s assertions, seconded by casual foreign observers such as Kinzer (2008), that its post-genocide policies enjoy broad-based grassroots support. That the programme of national unity and reconciliation provides few benefits to most poor peasant Rwandans explains both the unpopularity of local officials and the illegitimacy of the programme of national unity and reconciliation among rural people. The superficial appearance of grassroots support also shapes the widely held perception among Western observers and Rwandan élites alike that ordinary peasant Rwandans believe in and therefore voluntarily comply with the demands of the programme. A focus on the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans challenges the idea they are obedient, and illustrates how they hardly believe in the dictates of the programme of national unity and reconciliation. Quite the opposite; their obedience is tactical. Where the programme forces ordinary Rwandans to live within its official truths, they confront it in ways that seek to restore their personal dignity while subtly attempting to live their own truth of what they experienced before, during and after the genocide.

Taken together, these findings illuminate the power relations that structure ordinary Rwandans’ everyday lives since the genocide. The analysis demonstrates how Rwanda’s rigid socio-political hierarchy limits individual opportunities to reconcile according to their position in the social structure, and how the programme of national unity further limits their ability and willingness to reconcile with neighbours and friends. Many ordinary Rwandans perceive the demands of the programme as detrimental to their interests, which shapes their decision to resist in an attempt to make their lives more sustainable and restore their sense of dignity. For the ordinary Rwandans I consulted, the
programme of national unity and reconciliation forms the panorama of their everyday life, meaning that it constantly and consistently reminds them what they must do. The ordinary Rwandans that participated in the research understand that their local authorities, most of whom have no sense of the impact of the legacy of the genocide on their everyday lives, do the bidding of the state in the name of national unity and reconciliation. Identifying the quotidianness or “everydayness” of resistance of the 37 ordinary peasant Rwandans that participated in the research illustrates how the programme of national unity and reconciliation constantly conditions their daily lives. Thus, the dissertation deconstructs the various subtle and creative ways in which ordinary Rwandans determine how and when “resisting reconciliation” constitutes a viable coping mechanism.

The remainder of this chapter first summarises what the everyday acts of resistance of ordinary Rwandans to the programme of national unity and reconciliation say about the nature of compliance in highly stratified societies. It then underlines the methodological importance of bringing in the individual lived experiences of ordinary peasant people. Lastly, it proposes a few areas of further research that are relevant for the study of politics in Rwanda and elsewhere in Africa.

**Compliance and Resistance in Highly Stratified Societies**

Questions about why and when individuals comply have been central to the study of politics since Max Weber first posed the question (Weber, 1946: 78). The answer is generally drawn from Weber’s ideal types of political authority (traditional, charismatic and legal-rational). People obey for one of three reasons: 1) because they believe in the values, norms and standards within which a particular regime operates; 2) because they
believe it is in their material interest to do so; or 3) because they fear the coercive threats and sanctions of non-compliance. Though these can be valid explanations of why individuals comply, they do not capture the complete picture. Such approaches to compliance rarely consider the ways that individuals subjected to dominant power resist its demands; and where they do so it is to understand and explain moments of significant upheaval like rebellions and revolutions, such as the 1994 genocide. However, moments of upheaval do not contrast as strongly with “normal” times as many social historians, sociologists, and political scientists have assumed. Explanations about when and why individuals comply during periods of so-called normalcy fail to provide adequate explanations for why individuals sometimes do not comply when the situation appears “normal”, as it currently does in Rwanda under the programme of national unity and reconciliation. In highly stratified societies, “normal” times can involve the intensification of older forms of oppression and the creation of new forms, which can in turn create the conditions for a return to political upheaval. It is therefore important that political scientists identify and consider the everyday practices of resistance of individuals subject to coercive forms of power, such as the mechanisms of direct and indirect control found in the programme of national unity and reconciliation.

Neither domination nor resistance is autonomous; the two are entangled so that it becomes difficult to analyse one without discussing the effects of the other (Foucault, 1982; Scott, 1985). An analysis of everyday periods of “normality” through an examination of the everyday acts of resistance of individuals subject to dominant forms of power identifies sites of struggle and other points of weakness in the power of the state by pointing to areas where the demands of the state system conflict with the aims of
everyday life. This is the primary contribution of the dissertation; it provides a bottom-up analysis of state power from the perspective of those subject to its demands. In this way, the research adds to the resistance literature in focusing on individual acts of everyday resistance as a means of understanding how the various mechanisms of the state are manifested in their everyday lives. This is important since the way in which politics affects and engages the real lives of people is almost completely absent in the academic literature, and when it does appear, it is represented through the eyes of local élites. Such an approach also illustrates the analytical utility of the concept of everyday resistance to understand the power relations in which individuals are enmeshed, and to explain the resultant social and political tensions and inequalities.

Ordinary Rwandans’ everyday acts of resistance to the coercive mechanisms of the programme of national unity signal more than their individual agency and the strategic nature of their compliance (the usual focus of anthropologists). Instead, the dissertation extends the concept of everyday resistance to point analysts toward the multiple and overlapping structures of power that ordinary people confront in their daily lives. Tracing the subtle and indirect resistance of ordinary Rwandans resident in the south from a variety of subject positions to the demands of the programme of national unity and reconciliation provides more than a bottom-up approach to disentangling the various forms of subjugation in post-genocide Rwanda. It also facilitates analysis of the ways particular forms of subjugation produce the appearance of individual compliance. A careful look at what may appear to be trivial matters – remaining silent, laughing at the wrong moment, or playing dumb – can provide important insights into the dynamics of power in contexts of coercive state authority.
A focus on the everyday acts of resistance of some ordinary Rwandans to the many mechanisms of the programme shows how the post-genocide state tries to depoliticise peasant people by orchestrating public performances, but most importantly closes off the possibility for individuals to join together to organise politically. Because ordinary Rwandans have no opportunity to express themselves politically in public, their performative practices in response to the demands of the programme of national unity and reconciliation show how they tactically conceal or reveal their political opinions. When they express no opinion, and therefore appear compliant, many casual observers conclude that ordinary people believe in and support the regime. Their everyday acts of resistance to the programme of national unity and reconciliation illustrate the opposite. Individuals simulate greater loyalty than they actually feel as a means of coping. A closer analysis of their performances of compliance shows that the proscriptions and limitations of everyday life may serve to intensify and enhance their ability and willingness to engage politically. Thus, even where compliance is coercive and the opportunities for dissent are minimal, individuals continue to express their politics through their acts of resistance. Identification of the individual acts of everyday resistance of the most marginal in a highly stratified society such as post-genocide Rwanda points analysts towards areas where political life can quickly descend from the appearance of compliance to open protest and perhaps onto revolution or even genocide.

Indeed, the power of any regime, including the RPF, is always partial. Studying post-genocide Rwanda from the perspective of those subject to its power reveals the paradoxical effects of the mechanisms of social control found in the programme of national unity and reconciliation as the dominant form of state power in post-genocide
Rwanda. On one hand, the programme invites the political engagement of Rwandans, élite and ordinary folk alike, that it seeks to control in forcing them to participate in state-sanctioned activities of national unity and reconciliation. On the other hand, the methods of resistance available to most ordinary Rwandans, especially if they are subtle and indirect, are by themselves incapable of significantly altering the post-genocide order. Nonetheless, these acts of resistance are important because they point to the hidden spheres of politics of individuals who have no opportunity to express themselves politically in public. Their practices of resistance are indicators of more than individual dissatisfaction with a particular regime; they also provide the foundation for creating alternative spaces for political actions and ideas. It is difficult to predict if and when these individual acts will cascade into a collective movement that may lead to peaceful contestation of power or culminate in riot or rebellion. But they clearly demonstrate the potential for such upheavals.

The everyday acts of resistance of ordinary people could be called pre-political, since they are not overtly directed at the state system. Still, these acts made in the face of a strong state power are more than elementary signs of individuals seeking to live their daily lives as best they can; they are indicators of emergent confrontation with the state system in which those who are most marginal in society express their dissatisfaction with the state and its agents.

This dissertation has focused on southern Rwanda, but the approach used here is also relevant for the study of politics in other regions of the country, as well as in Africa, and in other societies where domination is commonplace. The everyday acts of resistance show how individuals who are subject to oppressive forms of state power, even
the most marginal, work to resist the efforts of the state to make them comply with its demands. In this way, everyday acts of resistance act as indicators of discontent and enable analysts to recognise and examine the importance of pre-political actions as indicative of the locations where collective action for political change may emerge. For, as Norton (2004: 41) notes, because political change often comes from those who are most marginal and on the periphery of state power, it is important to “recognize the power of liminal, or marginal, groups.... Because they stand on the boundaries of identity they are often central to debates over those boundaries”.

**Researching Resistance**

From the outset, my research has sought to understand the individual experiences of a cross-section of ordinary Rwandans resident in the south before, during and after the genocide. Also shaping my analysis is my own direct experiences of the power of the state in stopping my research and placing me in a “re-education” camp. This first-hand experience of the tactics of the post-genocide state to induce compliance informs this research. Some readers may contend that I lack the critical distance necessary for the analysis of the complex interactions between some ordinary Rwandans and the demands of the programme of national unity and reconciliation and that my analysis is unduly biased against the current regime. In order to maintain the integrity of the research, I have combined the oral data gained through fieldwork and the insights of participation observation on the daily rhythms of life in post-genocide Rwanda with careful historical and empirical analysis to understand and explain the ways that ordinary Rwandans attempt to shape their lives since the genocide. Throughout the research process, my purpose in writing the dissertation remained to bring ordinary people into the frame of
analysis in order to provide a more nuanced view of contemporary Rwanda that moves academic and policy discussions beyond the congratulatory analyses of some observers about the hero-status of the RPF as the saviours and moral guardians of the “new” Rwanda (e.g., Gourevitch, 1998; Kinzer, 2008; Mamdani, 2001).

My findings challenge the commonly held beliefs, assertions and assumptions about rural life during and after the 1994 genocide and more specifically about ordinary people as supposedly powerless and passive – apolitical actors who willing obey the directives of their political leaders. Ethnographic vignettes and excerpts from the life history interviews that I conducted with 37 ordinary Rwandans resident in the south of the country, and occupying the lower rungs of the socio-economic hierarchy, provide much needed texture to our understanding of the programme of national unity and reconciliation from the ground up, rather than privileging a state-centred and top-down perspective. The lived experiences of some ordinary Rwandans before, during and after the genocide also provide important insights on why it is important to look beyond surface characterisations of “normalcy” that uphold and reinforce the power of political élites. This approach also disputes the rhetoric of the RPF leadership to show how they are using the apparatus of the state for their own benefit in the name of national unity and reconciliation.

More narrowly, my focus on the everyday acts of resistance of individuals contributes to a greater understanding of the power relations in which these ordinary Rwandans are enmeshed. This approach is useful to understand and explain the evolving relationship between state structures and socio-economic inequality that occur in myriad forms in systems where domination is pervasive. It is also an important approach in
terms of breaking down the crude analytical binary of élite and peasant to accentuate the
layering effects of one’s location in the social hierarchy, as well as one’s regional
location, to analyse the disciplinary power of the state from the perspective of those
subject to it. It also also an approach that could be fruitfully employed in other regions of
the Rwanda, notably the northwest of the country where the government has focused its
energies to re-educate Hutu accused of harbouring genocide ideology. My research in
southern Rwanda shows that many ordinary Hutu killed for reasons other than ethnic
hatred. Understanding individual motivations for ordinary Hutu to kill in different
regions of the country is invaluable to post-genocide processes of justice and
reconciliation as it would allow the government to punish individuals for crimes they
actually committed, rather that ones they are perceived to have carried out.

The everyday acts of resistance of some ordinary Rwandans to the programme of
national unity and reconciliation reveals more than the abyss between the aims of the
programme and those of daily life. It also provides for a bottom-up examination of the
mechanisms of power and control under which many ordinary Rwandans live their daily
lives to reveal how social structures are constituted through a variety of contradictory and
contested processes, rather than as a seamless, functional whole. Exposing and
explaining the politics of ordinary people through their acts of everyday resistance in the
face of a strong and centralised state power, such as Rwanda’s, illustrate that the
assumptions that academics, policy-makers and journalists often make about the politics
of ordinary people are ill-founded or simply incorrect. Ordinary people are political
beings with the capacity to act or not, to resist or not, based on their own sophisticated
understandings of the social and political context in which they find themselves.
Bringing ordinary people into the picture, as actors rather than as victims, is “the surest way to avoid the lethal stereotypes that hinder our understanding of complex situations and produce simplifications that contribute to more injustice” (de Lame, 2005b: 133).

**Areas of Future Research**

Through analysis of the everyday acts of resistance of a select group of ordinary Rwandans, we see that the direct and indirect instruments of control and manipulation of the programme of national unity and reconciliation are similar to those used by previous regimes. We also see how the RPF regime has orchestrated the appearance of popular legitimacy and broad-based support for its programme through these mechanisms of control. My research has focused on the everyday acts of resistance of individuals subject to state power to illustrate their usefulness for understanding state-society relations in Rwanda. The dissertation opens up avenues of future research both in Rwanda and other African societies, where layered domination is commonplace and legitimated through practices of coercive compliance. This approach can be applied, for example, in a variety of states across Africa where post-conflict reconciliation programmes have been instituted following violent conflict to understand and explain the extent to which such programmes represent an illegitimate and oppressive form of power in the lives of ordinary peasant people.

Fruitful avenues of future research include analysis of post-conflict peace and reconciliation policies of countries such as Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe where the repression of the political opposition has potentially masked deep-rooted resentments that could lead to renewed political violence. An analysis of reconciliation practices where peace is brokered through élite power-sharing pacts and reconciliation programmes are
implemented from the top-down can provide useful and important insights on the legitimacy of such policies from the perspective of the peasantry. Whether, and how, ordinary peasant people practice everyday acts of resistance to top-down processes of reconciliation can open up new ways of understanding how these policies play out in their everyday lives. It also facilitates the identification of the overlapping and intersecting forms of subjugation faced by individuals who are subject to the demands of post-conflict reconciliation policies, and what it could mean for the stability of state power in countries emerging from political conflict.

Another useful area of future study is to focus on the everyday politics of ordinary people, rural peasant and urban dweller alike. Analysis of the politics of ordinary people addresses an important gap in our understanding of state-society relations in Africa as most political science research tends to focus on large-scale structures, macro processes, epochal events, major policies and “important” people. Rather than take “the state” as a point of departure, a focus on the effects of state power on the everyday lives of rural people points to a recognition of multiple actors, multiple agencies, organisations, and levels that defy straightforward analysis. For example, research into the practices of local state officials is necessary, as it is with these individuals that the majority of rural poor come into contact with “the state” and where their images of the state are forged. More research is needed on the role of local officials in the promotion and enforcement of state policies, since they are the frontline intermediaries between ordinary folk and their central government bosses. Such research would challenge stereotypical portrayals by the western media and policy makers of African regimes as monolithic entities. It also buoys the work of Africanist scholars who have long recognised that the apparatus of the
state is far from monolithic. Portrayals of African states as monolithic hardly reflect the nuanced interrelationships individuals have with the state apparatus itself, within and across different spatial levels, or the dynamics governing such interactions. A focus on the politics of ordinary people can stretch beyond the boundaries of sub-Saharan Africa to allow for comparisons with countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia.

A final area of future research concerns the analysis of post-conflict reconciliation policies like Rwanda’s programme of national unity and reconciliation from the perspective of other sets of actors living in southern Rwanda as well as in other regions of the country whose lived experiences with state power are also missing from our analyses of the state. An analytical focus on how state power plays out in the lives of, for example, the middle class, youth or women can further disaggregate social science conceptualisations of the state in questioning the conditions under which it operates as a cohesive and unitary whole. Such an approach points to the importance of including in our analyses the multiple patterns, processes, hierarchies, and institutions of state power that shape the lives of individuals subject to its power. A bottom-up approach like the one I used in this study, combining theoretical inquiry with historical research and the local-level perspectives of 37 ordinary Rwandans at the lower rungs of the socio-economic hierarchy, allows for a look behind the rhetoric of élite claims of Rwanda as a “nation rehabilitated” to focus instead on how they use state power, to what ends, to whose benefit and with what effect for future peace and security.
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Appendices

Appendix I: Dramatis Personae

Abatindi

**Augustin** (b. 1952) is a Hutu widower who was released from prison after telling his truth about what he did during the 1994 genocide. “Oh yes”, he says, “I killed. I feared being killed [by other Hutu] so I killed. I did it after my [Tutsi] wife died so there would be someone to take care of our children”. He graduated from *ingando* re-education camp in late 2005. Augustin rents land from a Tutsi who returned to Rwanda in 1995. “It is not so bad in terms of production because I am alone now; there is no one left to care for or to take care of me”. He thinks the programme of national unity and reconciliation is a good idea if “it stops another event like the killing [of 1994]. At least there is some peace under this government”.

**Béatha** (b. 1975) is a Hutu widow with nine children to care for, two of her own and seven orphans. She lost her third child to disease in the refugee camps in Zaïre. “You cannot image how hard it is. I can’t mourn for my people and I can’t care for the ones I have. Since the government re-assigned land, it is very difficult to get enough to survive, let alone live”. She hopes that the programme of national unity and reconciliation will provide peace but wonders “is it really peace if I can’t take care of my kids?”

**Gaston** (b. 1972) is a released Hutu prisoner who has never been married, a source of shame for him. He graduated the *ingando* process in 2004 but feels he will “never be able to reconcile with his neighbours” because they do not accept him “as someone who is innocent”. He was imprisoned by the post-genocide government in 1998 upon his forced return from the refugee camps in Zaïre. He was released for lack of evidence in 2001.

**Jeanne** (b. 1959) is a Tutsi widow whose Hutu husband died in 1996 of disease in the refugee camps in Zaïre. She lives with three of her five children as her two oldest sons died in late 1994, after the genocide officially ended. She works part-time as a seamstress and is able to barter with friends and neighbours for food and shelter. “I am too old and too broken to work the fields but I have arrangements that seem to be working out well enough”. She does not think unity and reconciliation is possible among Rwandans who lived through the genocide: “we have seen too much to ever recover…”.

**Joseph B.** (b. 1980) is a 26-year-old Hutu man who says he did not kill during the genocide but that he did join “a squad” so the local official in his community would “think I was part of the plan”. “I was very young [14 years old] so I got food and water for the *interahamwe*. I went to prison for this.” He was released after *ingando* in 2002. He was able to find his five brothers and younger sister, all of whom survived the genocide after fleeing into the camps in Zaïre. His parents both died in “the events”. He would like to reconcile with his neighbours so Rwanda “doesn’t experience any more storms like the genocide”.

**Joseph N.** (b. 1975) is a Tutsi widower who is the only member of his immediate family to have survived the 1994 genocide. “When the killings started, my father told us it was a food riot so we didn’t hide because we had the possibility for a good harvest and
wanted to protect our stocks.” He has remarried since the genocide to another [Tutsi] survivor, and they had two children. Joseph has lost land since the genocide as the government “took away some” of his plot and “gave it to a Hutu in the name of national unity”. Providing enough for his family’s daily needs is his constant preoccupation. He lost one child to malaria and the other is weak with malnutrition.

**Joseph U. (b. 1962)** is a Hutu man who was found innocent at a *gacaca* session in April 2006. “Yes, I killed, but I told my truth and now I am free”. He graduated *ingando* and returned to his hill to find his wife had re-married. He has lost most of his land to his ex-wife’s new husband (“a former Tutsi!”) and fears there will be violence again in Rwanda. “You cannot promise to re-educate a man then leave him to rot. That is not peace. That is not reconciliation”.

**Judith** (b. 1961) is a Hutu widow. “My husband was a Tutsi and was among the first to die when the genocide started.” She has seven children, three of her own, and four whose parents were killed in 1995 at the Kibeho internally displaced persons camp in southwestern Rwanda. She thinks national unity and reconciliation is not possible because the “government forces it upon us through officials that didn’t even grow up in Rwanda. How do they know what is best? They don’t even know how to plant or grow [crops] but they tell us how to work our land…”.

**Marie Claire** (b. 1970) is a Hutu widow who considers herself a survivor “even though the new government has taken that away from me”. Her first husband, a Hutu, was killed in 1996 in the Kibeho camp “by soldiers”. She remarried a Tutsi man in 2003 and has been able to get some support as a survivor of the genocide since the marriage. She hopes the post-genocide government can promote national unity and reconciliation but is not sure that “they [the new local officials] understand what peasants like us need”.

**Martin** (b. 1959) is a Tutsi man who survived, with his immediate family, by hiding “deep in the forest”. His life has been “especially hard” since the genocide because neighbours and friends wonder what he must have done, or who he worked with, to have survived along with his entire family. He says, “I learned after the genocide that talking is no good if others are not able to listen”. For Martin, the programme of national unity and reconciliation is just a way for “the government to keep its power. Local officials tell us how to reconcile and we do it. What else can a [poor peasant] like me do? I agree but only because it is safer than disagreeing!”

**Olive** (b. 1957) is a Hutu woman who lost most of her immediate family during the genocide. “Only three of us survived; all the children starved to death or got diseases in the camps [in Zaïre]”. She lives with her husband although “he is traumatised and it is like having another child in the house”. She doubts reconciliation is possible because “so many RPF soldiers killed us [Hutu]. They say forgive and forget but really is that possible after so much has happened [in 1994] and things have not yet improved?”

**Pacifique** (b. 1992) is a Tusti girl who hid in a pit latrine for two months until the genocide ended. Both of her parents died during the genocide. She is responsible for nine other children under the age of 12, all of whom are orphans of the genocide. On the programme of national unity and reconciliation she says, “if I thought reconciliation was possible, I would work for it. But I can’t feed these kids…how can you reconcile if you are hungry day in and day out?”
Scholastique (b. 1952) is a Hutu woman who was released from prison in 2006 for lack of evidence. She lost her Hutu husband and children during the genocide and another three children in the Kibeho camp and “feels dead inside ever since”. She does not believe reconciliation is possible because “the soldiers of this new government killed but we are not allowed to talk about that”.

Séraphine (b. 1910, d. 2008) is the grandmother of Prosper (see below), another Twa participant. She has lost family members, friends and neighbours to ethnic violence since the Social Revolution in 1959. “I have seen a lot in my years, but nothing as dramatic as the [1994 genocide] where people went mad, killing everyone around them”. She has lived alone since 1989 when her third husband died of natural causes. On the programme of national unity and reconciliation she says, “of course I have heard of it. They [the government] promote it everywhere. Rwanda is a place with many old and unresolved issues; forcing Rwandans to reconcile is not going to work”. She died of natural causes in October 2008.

Tharcisse (b. 1967) is a Hutu man who was released from prison in 2003. He was not accused of acts of genocide in his home community until 2001 “by neighbours who said I killed. I didn’t. I fled like everyone else. It was soldiers who killed and we [Hutu] tried to avoid getting swept up by them!” He is a widower having lost his wife and three children during the flight into the camps in Zaïre. He has not seen his only child who survived the genocide since he was put in prison in 2001. He will never remarry because “the only way forward is to marry a Tutsi, and “not one of these survivors want me since I spent time in prison.” He does not believe that “national unity and reconciliation is designed for Hutu; it is now a Tutsi government so former Hutu like me must wait until my people have power again.”

Théogène (b. 1957) is a Twa man who saved “at least six Tutsi during the events [the 1994 genocide]”. He considers himself a “hero, but those Tutsi don’t even acknowledge me when I pass them in the street”. He thinks that the programme of national unity and reconciliation is a good idea but it “has to allow everyone to participate and benefit, not just [Tutsi] survivors”.

Trésor (b. 1990) is a Tutsi boy who was separated from his mother during the flight into the refugee camps in Tanzania. He lives with his aunt, the only remaining adult in his immediate family. He sold gum, matches, cigarettes and other sundry items to supplement his family’s income until the government mandated in 2006 that all businesses have to sell in state-sponsored markets. He is unsure about the utility of the programme of national unity and reconciliation “because no matter what, I will never see my mother again…”.

Abakene

Aimable (b. 1930) is a Tutsi man who survived the genocide by providing food and shelter to the leaders of the killing squads in his community. “I was so fearful and since I am an old man, they said they would spare [my life] if I helped them”. He is not convinced that the programme of national unity and reconciliation is going “to create peace and security like the new government says. We [peasants] were hungry before the
war and we are hungry now. What is changed is that we can no longer solve our problems in our own way. The government says reconcile and that is said to be enough to bring peace…”

**Aurelia (b. 1967)** is a Hutu widow who lost her entire family during the genocide. “Some tried to resist the call to kill but they just got killed. They are buried [at Gikongoro memorial] but I cannot go there to visit their remains because the [official] says I have to pay to visit [the memorial centre]!” She is skeptical about the prospects for lasting peace in Rwanda and says that the programme of national unity and reconciliation is “for Tutsi. They are the survivors and they get help from this new government. This is how politics works in Rwanda. Now that Tutsi are in power, they help Tutsi. Hutu like me have to wait until our people have power again”.

**Emmanuel (b. 1979)** is a Tutsi man who survived the genocide by hiding in the drop ceiling of the local government offices. He has little faith in the government’s programme of national unity, saying it is something for “élites while poor people starve”.

**Ephrem (b. 1974)** is a Hutu man who was released from prison in 2001 for lack of evidence. He did not participate in the *ingando* re-education camps, although he wanted to receive “the training so I would know how to participate in these activities for national unity and reconciliation”. He feels isolated in his community since he was released from prison. “My wife left me and married a Tutsi because she thought I would never get out of prison. That Tutsi took my wife and my land. What can I do now but keep quiet until the government changes back to a Hutu one?”

**Espérance (b. 1969)** is a Tutsi widow who survived by “running every time we heard the killers were coming”. She eventually ended up in Kibeho camp and witnessed the RPF attacks on civilians there. “Many died but the army of the other side [the Rwandan Patriotic Front] sent their men into the camps to tell us to keep quiet. I told them I was a Tutsi and they took me to a hospital just outside Butare. There I worked as a nurse’s assistant until 1998”. She is sole survivor in her immediate family and tries to avoid “getting forced to go to activities that the government says are for unity and reconciliation.” She says, “Reconciliation is for people who can afford to eat…”.

**Esther (b. 1966)** is a Tutsi widow who survived by “[sexually] servicing the killers”. As a result, she is “deeply traumatised” and has been outcast by her immediate family, who do not want the shame of having “a damaged woman in their midst. She hopes the message of national unity and reconciliation “takes root” in the hearts of Rwandans so that “storms like the genocide” never happen again.

**Florence (b. 1960)** is a Hutu widow who successfully hid Tutsi friends and neighbours during the genocide. “I fought them [the killing squads] and was able to save at least 10 people!” She was raped “many times” but “could not give up because I knew they would die if I told them where those [Tutsi] were hiding”. She does not believe that the programme of national unity and reconciliation is “doing anything good for Rwanda because some of us are not even considered human because of what happened during the events. If only we could get recognition [from the government] as victims of genocide, perhaps things would get better”.

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**Janvier** (b. 1975) is a Tutsi man who survived the genocide because he had a severe case of malaria when the killers came to his community. “I was slumped on the floor with high fever and fits so they left me as dead. I saw them kill the rest of my family; when I woke up, I found everyone cut up”. He works the fields of more prosperous landowners for his daily needs. He thinks it is only a matter of time before Rwandans “start again with the violence” since “it is just part of our culture”. He thinks the programme of national unity and reconciliation is a good idea, but that it “probably won’t work because who can trust anyone nowadays?”

**Joseph M.** (b. 1945) is a Tutsi man who survived the genocide by cheering on the killing and “appearing to support their cause. Because you can’t know who is Tutsi or Hutu without looking at their [identity] card, it was easy for me to join”. He doesn’t think the creation of a national identity of “being Rwandan” will end violence like the genocide. “Really, issues like national identity and reconciliation are for government officials to fight over, not us peasants who just want to eat every day and send our kids to school”.

**Prosper** (b. 1950) is a Twa widower and is the grandson of Séraphine (see above). He was born into a prominent Tutsi family, and his father was a Hill Chief under the Belgian administration. “When violence came in 1959, I was a young boy. My parents and everyone around me died. Maman took us [Prosper and his younger brother] as her own children; she raised us really. I became a Twa over time because she raised us that way. I look like a Tutsi but my heart is Twa”. He is skeptical about the prospects for national unity and reconciliation since the programme only “works for some of us. If you are Tutsi survivor, you can benefit. As a Twa, nothing has come out of it for me and my people. We are not even allowed to say we are “Twa”…!”

**Alice** (b. 1977) is a Tutsi widow who lost her husband and two of her five children during the genocide on the trek to Zaïre. “One kid died of malaria and the other was just too weak to keep walking. We left him behind to save ourselves. I don’t know what happened to him but we hoped that someone would save him. Three days later my husband was killed by the militias. I somehow escaped”. She hopes that the programme of national unity and reconciliation can “bring Rwandans together. It will be good to know peace. Of course there is a lot of opposition to some of these new ideas about unity but hopefully this government can help those Hutu see the light”.

**Vianney** (b. 1981) is a Tutsi man who hid in the marshes during the genocide. He has never married and has no kids. “Since the genocide, I am basically alone. My parents died and I don’t know where my brothers and sister are. I suppose they are dead; but they could be alive. No one has offered the truth about how they died”. On the programme of national unity and reconciliation, he says, “if only they [those accused of genocide] would tell their truth then we survivors could know peace and security. I won’t rest until the truth has been shared. I just hope this government can bring peace”.

**Abakene wifashije**

**Didier** (b. 1959) is a Tutsi man who survived the genocide by hiding in the chicken coop of a Hutu friend who also killed most of his family. He does not have any of his own land as the new government took over his family home “after the war”. Because he
works as a cook in a restaurant and earns 18,000Frw (CN$39) a month, he is not eligible for subsidies for school fees or medical care despite his volunteer position as a gacaca judge. On the programme of national unity and reconciliation, he says there are “too many problems in this country; they talk about unity and reconciliation but I don’t see it in the hills.”

Thomas (b. 1962) is a Hutu man. At the time of the genocide he was married to a Tutsi woman with four children. His wife and three of his children died. He remarried in 2005, again to a woman who identifies as a Tutsi. He did not flee into the refugee camps in Zaïre. Instead, he stayed behind in the Opération Turquoise zone, and later spent time in the Kibeho camps. He presently works as a taxi-moto driver, and has an average monthly income of 7,000Frw (CN$15). He thinks national unity and reconciliation is possible if “the government stops telling us to tell our truth. We [Hutu and Tutsi] need time to heal…”.

Prisoners

Cécile (b. 1961) is a Hutu woman who confessed to her crimes of genocide and was released under the 1996 confession and guilty plea procedure. She was re-accused of genocide in 2002 when the gacaca courts were in their evidence-gathering phase. She returned to prison in 2004. She says, “national unity and reconciliation is a joke. I told my truth only to have a [Tutsi] survivor say I didn’t tell my whole truth. I confessed to what I did but now I am in prison for another 27 years. And they say Hutu and Tutsi can live together again? Not if Hutu like me can go to prison for no good reason”.

Chantal (b. 1971) is a Hutu woman who went to prison in 2005 for crimes she says she did not commit. “I am here for 25 years. Who will raise my kids? My husband is also in prison. I don’t even know where those kids are or who they might be with. I am sad all the time. Reconciliation will never happen for me because I am an old woman and will die in this prison…”.

Félicien (b. 1973) is an imprisoned Hutu man. He confessed to his crimes in 1998 and received a 15-year sentence. “Yes, I killed. I killed because it was the law at the time. I lost most of my relatives, which means life is extra hard here [in prison] because I have no one to come bring me food or really tell me news about how things are under this new government”.

Jean Bosco (b. 1964) is a Hutu man who worked as a medical doctor before and after the genocide. “I took care of Tutsi and Hutu. It didn’t matter, we just worked on those that were injured and who could be saved. I was put in prison in 2005. But honestly, if I was guilty, wouldn’t I have run like everyone else? No. I chose to work in the Butare hospital to help save lives. Prosecuting Hutu for acts of genocide is a weapon of this government to keep itself in power”.

Jean Claude (b. 1967) is Hutu man who was released from prison in 2004 after serving ten years in prison for crimes of genocide. He returned to prison in 2005 when neighbours accused him of killing the family of a Tutsi neighbour before the gacaca courts. He is now in prison on a 30-year sentence and feels that the programme of national unity and reconciliation is “a form of genocide against Hutu”.
Valentina (b. 1954) is a Hutu woman who left Rwanda in May 1995 with her husband and their two young children after the RPA attacked civilians at the Kibeho camp. She was arrested in 1998 after she and her husband returned to Rwanda from the refugee camps in Zaïre. Upon their return to Rwanda, both were arrested on charges of genocide. “I do not know who is taking care of my children. I haven’t seen them or my husband [since our return]”. Her neighbours alleged at gacaca in 2006 that she killed 19 people which resulted in her imprisonment; she admits to killing six Tutsi and two Hutu. She is serving a 30-year-sentence and expects to “die here” even though she confessed to her crimes shortly after her arrest and expected to receive a reduced sentence.
Appendix II: Socio-Economic Hierarchy in Rwanda

Rwandan society is stratified across six socio-economic categories. From the bottom up they are:

- *umutindi nyakujya* *(abatindi nyakujya, pl.)* most vulnerable
- *umutindi* *(abatindi, pl.)* vulnerable
- *umukene* *(abakene, pl.)* poor
- *umukene wifashije* *(abakene wifashije, pl.)* poor with means or salaried poor
- *umukungu* *(abakungu, pl.)* rich without money
- *umukire* *(abakire, pl.)* rich
Appendix III: Administrative Units in Rwanda

Since 2001, Rwanda is made up of six administrative units, listed in the following hierarchy (from bottom to top).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nyumbakumi</th>
<th>Group of Ten Houses (normally corresponds to an average of 50 individuals)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Imidugudu (Umudugudu, pl.)</em></td>
<td>Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Akagari (Utugari, pl.)</em></td>
<td>Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Umurenge (Imirenge, pl.)</em></td>
<td>Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Akarere (Uturerere, pl.)</em></td>
<td>District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Intara (Intara, pl.)</em></td>
<td>Province</td>
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